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Abstract 
The creation of the National Assembly for Wales and the Scottish Parliament in 1999 
was accompanied with an aspiration that these new institutions would allow Scotland 
and Wales to develop their own policies, better suited to local needs than those 
designed in Westminster or Whitehall. This thesis explores policy-making in the first 
terms of the devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales, focusing on where the policies 
developed by these institutions diverged from those pursued at Westminster. Policy 
divergence is examined by studying the development of the financing long-term care 
for the elderly policies. The aim of this thesis is to identify why policy divergence 
occurred in the long-term care case, considering the impact of actors (or agents) and 
the institutional setting in which they operate, as suggested by Scharpf's model of 
actor-centred institutionalism. 
As actor-centred institutionalism suggested, both actors and institutions played a major 
role in shaping policy responses. In the Scottish case a range of actors cooperated and 
lobbied together for the introduction of free personal care, spurred on by the First 
Minister, who created an opportunity for those in favour of free personal care to 
pressurise his government to introduce the policy. In contrast, in Wales, actors were 
divided and never built up the same momentum to ensure the introduction of a more 
generous long-term care package. 
The institutional setting in which these actors operated was a major factor in shaping 
their policy preferences and the strategies they adopted to achieve them. This thesis 
considers the impact on policy-making of the devolved institution's electoral system, 
financial and legislative powers, design of the institutions, and the place of these 
institutions in a UK setting. The different institutional structures in Scotland and Wales 
provided different incentives and resources for actors, encouraged different styles of 
policy-making from Westminster and affected the way in which issues were framed. 
Examining the roles of actors and institutions in the formation of distinctive policies 
highlighted that in the real world these two elements are mutually dependent and 
cannot be separated. As a result it is impossible, and pointless, to determine whether 
actors or institutions were most influential on the development of distinctive policies. 
Instead this thesis explores how the difference between the configurations of actors 
and institutions in Scotland and Wales contributed to the creation of policies which 
were distinctive both from each other and the UK Government. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: Devolution and the new institutions 
In 1997 the Labour Government came to power with a commitment to 'meet the 
demand for decentralisation of power to Scotland and Wales, once established in 
referendums'. 1 The Government set out proposals for devolved assemblies in Scotland 
and Wales in the White papers, 'A Voice for Wales' and 'The Scottish Parliament'. On 
the basis of these white papers, referendums were held in Scotland and Wales in 
September 1997. The Scottish referendum consisted of two questions, the first of 
which asked whether there should be a Scottish Parliament and the other focused on 
whether the Parliament should have tax-raising powers. The Scottish referendum 
indicated clear support for the introduction of a Scottish Parliament with tax-raising 
powers. On a turnout of 62.9%, 74.3% of voters agreed that there should be a 
Scottish Parliament and 63.5% wanted the Parliament to have tax-raising powers.2 In 
contrast the Welsh referendum, held a week later than in Scotland, was more closely 
contested. In Wales there was no proposal to devolve tax-raising powers, and so the 
Welsh electorate were only asked if they agreed that there should be an Assembly. In 
Wales just over 50.1% of the population voted, 50.3% of voters supported the creation 
of the Assembly compared to 49.7% against.3 Therefore, the Welsh vote was won by 
1 Labour Party Manifesto (1997) New Labour because Britain deserves better 
2 Bogdanor, V. (1999) Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford University Press, Oxford), p.199 
3 Wyn Jones, R., Trystan, D. and Taylor, B. (2000) 'Voting Patters in the Referendum' in Jones, B. and 
Balsom, D. The Road to the National Assembly for Wales (University of Wales Press, Cardiff), p.162 
8 
only 6721 votes.4 Despite the narrow majority in favour of devolution in Wales, the 
referendum results in both Scotland and Wales led to the creation of the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. 
1. 1 Research questions and thesis structure 
This thesis explores policy-making in the first terms of the new devolved institutions in 
Scotland and Wales. Although policy is primarily made by executives, policies need to 
be formally sanctioned by the institution in which the executive operates. Therefore, 
this thesis refers to the policy of the Scottish Parliament or the National Assembly, even 
though in many cases the impact of the devolved institution was limited to simply 
sanctioning the policy of the executives. 
The focus of this thesis is on policies developed by the devolved institutions which 
diverged from those pursued at Westminster. Policy divergence is significant because 
'one of the main purposes of devolution was to allow Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland to get away from "one size fits all" policies imposed by Westminster and 
Whitehall, and to develop their own policies better suited to local needs'.s Hazell 
argued that if devolution did not lead to distinctive policies it will prove a serious 
disappointment to those who voted for it.6 Additionally, it would be difficult to justify 
devolution if the devolved institutions simply adopted the same policies as Westminster. 
Investigating cases of policy divergence also allows for an exploration of the particular 
4 IbId, p.161 
S Hazell, R. (2001) 'Conclusion: The State of the Nation after Two Years of Devolution' in Trench, A. (Ed.) 
State of the Nations 2001: The Second Year of Devolution in the Untted Kingdom (Imprint Academic, 
Exeter), p.255 
9 
features of policy-making in the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for 
Wales, whereas considering examples where uniform policies have been adopted 
throughout the UK would encourage an examination of UK-wide characteristics. 
This thesis examines policy divergence through the study of a case study, the financing 
of long-term care for the elderly. It considers why policy divergence occurred, focusing 
on two variables, actors and institutional setting. Actor-centred institutionalism, as 
developed by Scharpf, 7 is the theoretical framework adopted in the thesis, explored in 
chapter two. The basic premise of actor-centred institutionalism is that the 
perceptions, preferences and strategies of actors, the configuration of these actors, and 
the institutional setting in which they operate, shapes policy decisions. Therefore, this 
thesis closely examines the role of the actors and the institutional setting in the case of 
financing long-term care for the elderly. Chapter three compares the long-term care 
policies adopted in England, Scotland and Wales, because it is important to establish 
that policy divergence exists before considering why it exists. Chapter four charts the 
development of the long-term care policy in Scotland, and chapter five explores how 
the long-term care policy was made in Wales. Chapters six and seven examine the 
impact of a variety of actors in the development of the long-term care policies. Chapter 
eight explores the impact of the institutional setting on the long-term care policies. 
Finally, chapter nine concludes the thesis by considering the sustainability of policy 
divergence in the long-term. However, before we can assess policy-making in the 
devolved institutions it is necessary to have a basic overview of the powers and 
6 IbId 
7 Scharpf, F. W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research 
(Westview Press, Colorado) 
10 
structure of the legislatures, because it is within these structures that actors act. The 
reminder of this chapter explores the key features of the Scottish Parliament and the 
National Assembly for Wales; their legislative functions, financial powers, institutional 
design and development, electoral systems and the resulting coalition governments. 
However, before examining the new devolved institutions it is worth considering policy-
making before their creation, particularly the role of the Scottish and Welsh Offices. 
1.2 Policy-Making in the Scottish and Welsh Offices 
In order to understand the new devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales it is worth 
considering the institutions that were in place prior to their creation. This discussion is 
informed by historical institutionalism, which suggests that the history of a policy or an 
institution have a strong impact upon subsequent decisions and behaviour. For 
instance, Krasner argues that policies are path dependent, and once launched will 
continue along until some sufficiently strong political force deflects them from it.s 
Whilst poliCies can change it is suggested that this is only possible at certain key times, 
which Collier and Collier refer to as 'critical junctures,.9 The idea here is that once an 
institution starts to follow a particular path, the costs of reversal are high. Whilst there 
are points at which choices are made, institutional arrangements prevent an easy 
reversal of the initial response. Levi uses the metaphor of the tree, rather than the 
path, to explain this process, 
'From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller 
branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to 
8 Krasner S. (1984) 'Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics' in 
Comparative Politics (VoI.16, pp.223-46) 
9 Collier R., Collier D. (1991) Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and 
Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton University Press, Princeton) 
11 
the other-and essential if the chosen branch dies-the branch on which a 
climber begins is the one she tends to follow,lO 
Given the importance of history in the development of policies, it is likely that policy-
making in the Scottish and Welsh offices will continue to have a significant impact upon 
policy-making in the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales, and so 
will be a factor on whether the new devolved institutions diverge from or converge with 
policies pursued at Westminster. 
As Bulpitt notes, the maintenance of the United Kingdom has required territorial 
management by the centre. ll The establishment of the Scottish and Welsh Offices can 
be seen as part of this territorial management strategy, and the territorial offices and 
their respective powers were established and strengthened often on the basis of the 
strength of nationalist feeling, often inferred from support for the nationalist parties. 
The main sub-state institution in Scotland prior to devolution was the Scottish Office, 
which was established along with a Secretary for Scotland in 1885. The Secretary for 
Scotland was from 1892 a member of cabinet and in 1926 became a Secretary of State. 
In addition the Scottish Office gradually extended its responsibilities over time in a 
piecemeal manner, mirroring the expansion of the welfare state. 12 For instance, a 
Scottish Board of Agriculture was set up in 1912 and a Scottish Board of Health was 
10 Levi, M. (1997) 'A Model, A Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis' 
in Lichbach, M. and Zuckerman, A (Eds.) Comparative Politics: Rationali~ Culture/ and Structure 
(Cambridge University Press, New York), p.28 
11 Bulpitt. J. (1983) Territory and Power in the Untted Kingdom: An Interpretation (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester) 
12 Tomaney, J. (2000) 'End of the Empire State? New Labour and Devolution in the United Kingdom' in the 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (Vol. 24, No.3, pp.675-688), p.678 
12 
established after the First World War.13 As a result by the 1960s the Scottish Office 
included a range of competencies covering domestic life in Scotland, a range of powers 
which in England were the responsibility of nine or ten departments, including health, 
housing, education and industry.14 In contrast, the Welsh Office and a Secretary of 
State for Wales were not established until 1964. Initially the Welsh Office possessed 
limited powers, restricted to the control of housing, local government, roads and 
planning.1s In a similar vein to the Scottish Office, the powers of the Welsh Office also 
grew incrementally, and on an ad hoc basis. For instance, health was added to its 
functions in 1968 and primary and secondary education in 1970.16 The extension of the 
Welsh Office's powers has led some commentators to suggest that it eventually 
possessed almost the same level of responsibilities as the Scottish Office,17 though the 
Welsh Office never attained the breadth of powers held by the Scottish Office.18 In 
addition the Scottish and Welsh Offices possessed different histories and cultures. For 
instance, the Scottish Office was in place for a greater length of time than the Welsh 
Office, and Scotland was always able to maintain a separate legal and education 
system from England. As a result, despite the similarities of some of their powers the 
possession of different histories, cultures and policy development experience 
encouraged the Scottish and Welsh Offices to develop different characters, both from 
each other and from Whitehall. However, the extent to which both the Scottish and 
Welsh Offices were capable, and wiling, to pursue distinctive policies from Whitehall is 
an area of some dispute. 
13 Mitchell, J. (2006) 'Evolution and Devolution: Citizenship, Institutions, and Public Policy' in Pub/ius: The 
Journa/ofFedera/isni...VoI.36, No.1, pp.153-168), p.158 
14 Tomaney, J. op.cit, p.678 
15 Pilkington, C. (2003) Devo/ution in Britain Today(Manchester University Press, Manchester), p.58 
16 Ibid 
13 
During the 1980s and early 1990s some commentators claimed that the policies 
developed by the territorial ministries were less 'Thatcherite' than those pursed by their 
counterparts in England. 19 The offices were able to develop such policies it has been 
suggested for two key reasons. Firstly, the territorial ministries had institutional 
autonomy and control sufficient resources to pursue independent policies. Secondly, 
the political culture of their territories were considered to be more consensual or 
corporatist than that prevailing in England.20 
Kellas, in The Scottish Political System argued that the Scottish Office was able to 
develop considerable autonomy from Whitehall and that this had a significant impact 
upon the separate Scottish political system. 21 Kellas argues that during the Thatcher 
years the ability of the Scottish Office to defend Scottish interests was reduced, but he 
suggests that other elements of the quasi-autonomous Scottish political system still 
operated to frustrate Thatcherism and resist the imposition of alien policies.22 In addition 
Holliday suggests that where Scotland was able to resist Thatcherism this tended to be 
due to cultural and societal forces rather than as a result of activity by the formal 
political institutions, 
17 Bogdanor, V. (1999) Devolution in the Untted Kingdom (Oxford University Press, Oxford), p.160 
18 Mitchell, J. op.cit, p.159 
19 Griffith, D. (1999) 'The Welsh Office and Welsh Autonomy' in Public Administration (Vol.77, No.4, 
pp.793-807), p.794 
20 Loughlin, J. (1997) 'Wales in Europe: Regional Actors and European Integration' Paper in Planning 
Research No. 164 (Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Wales, Cardiff) 
21 Kellas, J. G (1989) The Scottish Political System (4th edition) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 
14 
'As regards extent, Scottish limits to Thatcherism were often substantial. As 
regards nature, the main limiting factor was cultural rather than institutional. 
In a period of radical political initiative, the formal institutions which 
structure the Scottish political domain played only a minor role in 
constraining Thatcherism. By contrast, informal features of the Scottish 
political order were often major limiting factors. Formal resistance was 
minimal. Informal resistance was maximal.,23 
It has traditionally been suggested that the territorial offices were able to act with 
different levels of autonomy in different policy areas. For instance, Brown et al. 
suggest that 'there has generally been more Scottish innovation in education, child law, 
housing and social work, than in training, industry and health,.24 This fits with Bulpitt's 
dual-polity model, which states that between around 1926 to 196, a dual polity 
operated in the UK with both the centre and periphery achieving a relative autonomy 
from one another,.25 During this period Bulpitt claims that the Centre concentrated on 
'High Politics', such as defence, foreign policy and macroeconomics, and sought to 
distance itself from 'Low Politics', including issues such as health and education. As a 
result it is not surprising that the Scottish and Welsh Offices were able to develop 
distinctive policies in the low politics arenas. However, Griffith found that in the 1980s 
Conservative ministers wanted to achieve their ideological goals of extending diversity 
and choice of provision, and restricting public provision even in relatively mundane 
areas of 'low politics,.26 As a result the suggestion was the dual polity model identified 
by Bulpitt was challenged, and the ability of the Scottish and Welsh Offices to develop 
22 Kellas, J. G. (1990) 'The Constitutional Options for Scotland' in Parliamentary Affairs (VoI.43, pp.426-
434) p. 429. 
23 Holliday (1992) 'Scottish Limits to Thatcherism' in The Political Quarterly (VoI.63, No.4, pp,448-459), 
p.459 
24 Brown, A., McCrone, D., Paterson, L. (1998) Politics and Society in Scotland (Second Edition) (Macmillan 
Press Ltd, Basingstoke), p.102 
25 Bulpitt, J. (1983) Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: An Interpretation (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester), p.3 
26 Griffith, D. (1999) 'The Welsh Office and Welsh Autonomy' in Public Administration (Vol. 77, No.4, 
pp.793-807) , p.804 
15 
distinctive policies reduced because the Centre was suddenly interested in their areas 
of responsibility, For instance, Holliday argues that education policy in Scotland during 
the 1980s indicates the desire of the centre to impose their wishes on a reluctant 
Scotland, 
'The 1987 appointment of Forsyth to the Scottish Office education team, and 
his elevation to Scottish Education Secretary in 1990, were clear attempts to 
impose Thatcherite radicalism on this leadership class',27 
However, Holliday suggests that no side was victorious in the development of education 
policy ,28 For instance, in contrast to their English counterparts, in Scotland the powers 
of school boards were substantially watered down through consultation.29 In addition no 
Technology Academy (the Scottish equivalent of English City Technology Colleges) was ever 
created, and the trust related to this initiative. Finally, there was a major boycott of testing 
in Scotland.3D On the other hand, however, Forsyth guaranteed that parental choice was 
now an accepted feature of the education system in Scotland and the creation of school 
boards increased the possibility of gradual adoption of local management in schools.31 As a 
result, overall Midwinter et al. state that Scotland was not exempt from the key 
elements of the Thatcherite strategy, 
'for the simple reason that the conventions of British government would not 
allow it. The British political programme was applied, with the Scottish Office 
refraining from independent policy initiatives, and concentrating on a 
conventional defence of Scottish interests within the framework of that 
programme,.32 
27 Holliday (1992) 'Scottish Limits to Thatcherism' in The Political Quarterly (VoI.63, NoA, ppA48-4S9), 
~AS4 
8 Ibid 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid p.4SS 
16 
In Wales the existence of a distinctive political system has been less evident than in 
Scotland. There was, for instance, no book written on the Welsh political system in the 
the style of Kellas's work. In fields such as social housing and education Wales closely 
mirrored developments in England, encouraging Griffith to argue that 'Institutional 
autonomy and administrative devolution did not bring different policies to Wales,.33 
Instead Griffith suggests that in Wales there was, 'with few Significant exceptions, 
uniformity with, and not divergence from, English practice,.34 In contrast, however, 
Gamble argues that having a cabinet minister heading the Welsh Office allowed for the 
development of coherent interventionist policies distinctive from those pursued at 
Whitehall, 
'The most striking example of such strategic thinking came paradoxically in 
the Thatcher years ... Under Walker and Hunt the Welsh Office has practiced 
not the disengagement favoured by Thatcherite ideology but an 
interventionist industrial policy,.35 
Yet, even those that point to the ability of the Welsh Office to develop distinctive Welsh 
policies on occasions generally accept that 'the Welsh Office was one of the smallest 
government departments. This meant that it lacked the resources and political clout to 
sustain its own policy agenda on the whole of its extensive functional remit.,36 In 
addition, in Wales, unlike in Scotland civic culture was much less well developed prior 
to devolution. In the days of the Welsh Office there was a lack of Welsh national 
bodies in most areas of public life, and where such bodies existed these were 
32 Midwinter, A. Keating, M. and Mitchell, J. (1991) Politics and Public Policy in Scotland (Macmillan, 
Basingstoke), p.208 
33 Griffith, D. (1999) 'The Welsh Office and Welsh Autonomy' in Public Administration (VoL77, No.4, 
r,p.793-807) , p.800 
4 Ibid., p.803 
35 Gamble, A. (1993) 'Territorial Politics' in Dunleavy, P. and Gamble, A, Holliday, I. and Peele, G. (eds.) 
Developments in British Politics (4th edition) (Macmillan, London), p. 83 
17 
regionalised and dominated by an exclusive policy elite. 37 As Osmond explains, before 
the creation of the National Assembly 'it could fairly be said that there was a civIl 
society in Wales rather than a Welsh civil SOCiety. dB 
As a result of the history of the Scottish and Welsh Offices it is possible to draw some 
conclusions about policy-making in the new devolved institutions. After all, as Mitchell 
notes, 'Devolution in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland did not so much create a 
new tier of government as add a democratic element to an eXisting tier'.39 To a certain 
extent, in both Scotland and Wales there was a limited experience of developing 
distinctive policies by the Scottish and Welsh Offices. Whilst the Scottish and Welsh 
Offices were occaSionally capable of developing distinctive poliCies in certain policy 
areas, more often than not their role was limited to implement poliCies decided 
elsewhere and introduce modest variations where they could to suit the needs and 
idiosyncrasies of the two countries.4o In addition, in both Scotland and Wales there 
was a lack of policy development capacity outside the Scottish and Welsh Offices. 
Whilst policy communities in Scotland were more established, primarily due to the 
existence of a range of national bodies, in Wales they were particularly weak, meaning 
that after devolution Wales 'lacked both the civil service capacity and the civil society 
36 Deacon, R. (2002) The Governance of Wales: The Welsh Office and the Policy Process 1964-99 (Welsh 
Academic Press, Cardiff), p.5 
37 Taylor, G. (2004) 'Policy Dynamics and Community Structures: Welsh Education Policy Under the 
National Assembly for Wales' presented at ECPR Workshop (Uppsala, April 2004), p.9 
38 Osmond, J. (2002) 'Introduction: Emergence of the Assembly Government' in Jones, B. and Osmond, J. 
(Eds.) Building a Civic Culture: Institutional Change, Policy Development and Political Dynamics in the 
National Assembly for Wales (Institute of Welsh Affairs and the Welsh Governance Centre, Cardiff), p. xxvii 
39 Mitchell, J. op.cit, p.165 
40 Kellas, J.G. and Madgwick, P.J (1982) 'Territorial ministries: the Scottish and Welsh Offices' in 
Madgwick, PJ and Rose, R. (eds.) The territorial dimension in United Kingdom polItics (Macmillan, 
London), p.29 
18 
infrastructure to take on the task of policy development on an all-Wales basis'.41 In 
addition the functions controlled by the territorial offices 'provided the logic of the 
public policy competences of the new devolved institutions set up by the New Labour 
government'.42 Therefore, as suggested by historical institutionalism, the history of 
policy-development in the Scottish and Welsh Offices continues to playa major role in 
shaping policy-making in the new devolved institutions; shaping their legislative 
functions, cultures, capacity and incentive structures. 
1.3 Legislative functions 
Following the devolution referendums the Scotland Act (1998) and the Government of 
Wales Act (1998), which set out the powers of the devolved institutions, were enacted. 
The Scottish Parliament was given the powers to introduce primary legislation and the 
National Assembly for Wales received the power to pass secondary legislation. The 
distinction between these two types of legislation is blurred, but basically primary 
legislation sets out the objectives of the law and secondary legislation works within this 
framework to introduce rules and regulations to ensure that these objectives are met.43 
For instance, the Activity Centres (Young Persons' Safety) Act 1995 is an example of 
primary legislation which makes provisions for the regulation and safety of adventure 
centres. 44 Secondary legislation then fills in the detail of the legislation, such as 
establishing who can hold a licence for an adventure centre and what requirements are 
41 Taylor, G. (2004) 'Policy Dynamics and Community Structures: Welsh Education Policy Under the 
National Assembly for Wales' presented at ECPR Workshop (Uppsala, April 2004),p.9 
42 Mitchell, J. (2006) 'Evolution and Devolution: Citizenship, Institutions, and Public Policy' in Pub/ius: The 
Journal of Federalis!7i...Vol.36, No.1, pp.153-168), p.158 
43 Zander, M. (1994) The Law-Making Process-Fourth Edition (Butterworths, London), p.92 
44 Silk, P. (1998) 'The Assembly as a Legislature' in Osmond, J. (Ed.) The National Assembly Agenda: A 
handbook for the first four years (The Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff), p.72 
19 
placed upon licence holders.45 In this case, although the primary legislation severely 
limited the secondary legislative options, the secondary legislation was crucial to the 
operation of the legislation. Whilst both types of legislation can allow policy 
divergence, the Scottish Parliament's ability to create both primary and secondary 
legislation gives it an advantage over the National Assembly for Wales when it comes to 
diverging from Westminster. 
The Scotland Act (1998) reserved certain issues to Westminster; including the 
constitution, foreign affairs, financial and economic matters, drugs, immigration, trade 
and industry, energy, road traffic and social security.46 The Scotland Act (1998) stated 
that the Scottish Parliament could legislate on any matter not specifically reserved for 
Westminster. In practice this meant that the key responsibilities of the Scottish 
Parliament included local government, home affairs, the legal system, housing, 
agriculture, health, social work and education.47 Dividing powers by reserving functions 
to Westminster strengthened the Scottish Parliament because any issue not mentioned 
in the Scotland Act is automatically controlled by the Scottish Parliament. However, the 
Scotland Act does not always clearly distinguish between reserved and devolved issues. 
For instance, whilst marine safety, navigation rights, the regulation of the British 
merchant fleet and all matters relating to the employment of seafarers are reserved 
matters, legislation relating to ports, harbours and piers is devolved.48 Devolving and 
retaining such similar powers means it can be difficult to determine where 
45 Ibid. 
46 Scot/and Act 1998, Chapter 46, Schedule 5 
47 Bogdanor, V., op.cit/ p.204 
48 McFadden,] and Lazarowicz, M. (1999) The Scottish Parliament-An Introduction (T& T Clark, Edinburgh), 
p.14 
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competencies lie. Therefore, a thorough analysis of the Scottish Parliament's powers 
needs to consider how its powers are used and interpreted in practice. 
The Immigration and Asylum Act (1999) is a good example of where there was 
confusion about the Scottish Parliament's legislative responsibility. The Scotland Act 
clearly reserves all immigration and asylum issues for Westminster.49 Therefore, the 
Scottish Executive's response to the UK Government's plans to introduce the 
Immigration and Asylum Act (1999) was that as a reserved matter it would not be 
considered in detail by the Scottish Parliament.so However, the Immigration and 
Asylum Act (1999) which emerged from Westminster amended five pieces of legislation 
in devolved areas; the Social work (Scotland) Act 1968, the National Health Service 
(Scotland) Act 1978, the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, the Housing (Scotland) Act 
1988 and the Children (Scotland) Act 1985).51 The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 
amended these pieces of legislation by excluding asylum seekers from some of the 
provisions guaranteed in these Acts. Consequently, whilst immigration and asylum is a 
reserved matter the Immigration and Asylum Act (1999) clearly impinged upon 
devolved matters. 
To add to the confusion the Immigration and Asylum Act appeared to contravene the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Shona Robison, a Scottish Nationalist Party 
(SNP) Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP), argued that as the Immigration and 
Asylum Act excluded certain groups from the entitlement to legal aid it contravened the 
49 Scotland Act, Op.Clt, Schedule 5 
so Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 9th June 1999 
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European Convention, which required that funded legal services were provided for 
people in detention.52 As the Scottish Parliament was responsible for 'observing and 
implementing international obligations, obligations under the Human Rights Convention 
and obligations under Community law',53 the Scottish Parliament could have been held 
responsible if the Immigration and Asylum Act was judged to have broken the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 54 
Due to concerns about the extent of the Scottish Parliament's powers the Scottish 
Executive agreed to review the Immigration and Asylum Act (1999) and arranged to 
'send representatives to Westminster about the dispersal policy, which is a reserved 
function, and about the voucher system which is also a reserved matter'.55 Therefore, 
despite the Scottish Executive's consistent argument that the Immigration and Asylum 
Act was entirely a reserved matter they sought to ensure that the UK Government were 
aware of the Parliament's concerns. 
The Immigration and Asylum Act case highlights the difficulties in clearly separating the 
Scottish Parliament's legislative functions from Westminster's, indicating that even in 
reserved areas poliCies may impinge on devolved matters. Therefore, there is a 
constant need for negotiation and dialogue between the levels of government in a 
devolved system. The immigration and asylum case also shows how the decision on 
S1 Daughlian, S. (Representative from the Scottish Refugee CounCil) giving evidence to the Scottish 
Parliament, Equal Opportunities Committee, 29th February 2000 
S2 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 9th February 2000 
53 Scot/and Act, op. cit/ Schedule 5 
54 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 9th February 2000 
55 Scottish Parliament, Plenary SeSSion, 5th September 2001 
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whether the Scottish Parliament can act is often as much a political decision as a legal 
one, 
Unlike in Scotland, the transfer of powers to the National Assembly for Wales was not 
achieved through one Act of Parliament. The Government of Wales Act enabled the 
transfer of powers 'of any function so far as exercisable by a Minister of the Crown in 
relation to Wales',56 As primary legislative functions cannot be enacted solely by a 
minister (except in the cases of Henry VIII clauses explored later in this chapter) the 
Assembly's functions were limited in the 1998 Government of Wales Act to those of 
secondary legislation,57 However, bearing this limitation in mind, the Government of 
Wales Act allowed for future transfers of secondary legislative functions in any area, 
The Government of Wales Act began the process of transferring powers to the National 
Assembly for Wales by allowing functions in eighteen areas to be transferred to the 
Assembly, including agriculture, culture, economic development, education and 
training, the environment, health, industry, local government, transport, water and 
flood defence and the Welsh language,58 Powers were transferred relating to individual 
Acts rather than specific policy areas, For example, the Assembly's functions include 
sections of the Asylum and Immigration Act (1996), the Local Government Act (1992) 
and the Forestry Act (1979),59 Further transfers have already occurred through primary 
legislation from Westminster, for example, the Local Government Act 2000 transferred 
56 Government of Wales Act 1998, Chapter 38, s.22(la) 
57 Foulkes, D (1999) 'Commentary on the Government of Wales Act 1998' in Cleveley et al. (Eds.) Current 
Law Statutes (Sweet and Maxwell and W.Green, London) p38:27 
58 Government of Wales Act 1998, op.cit., Schedule 2 
59 Statutory Instrument 1999 No. 672 (Transfer of Functions) Order 1999 
23 
new powers.60 Additionally, other powers have been transferred through statutory 
instruments since the initial transfer of functions. 61 
The method of transferring powers to the National Assembly, by devolving functions 
relating to individual Acts rather than entire policy areas, made confusion about the 
Assembly's powers more likely. This confusion is enhanced by the fact that the 
National Assembly's powers have sometimes altered when new legislation or new 
transfer function orders were passed at Westminster. Professor Keith Patchett 
explained to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution that a jigsaw 
puzzle analogy can help us to understand the differences between Scottish and Welsh 
devolution. For Scotland, Patchett argued that there was a picture of a policy area, 
such as education, where some jigsaw pieces are controlled by Westminster and the 
rest are controlled by the Scottish Parliament. However, for Wales, Patchett claimed 
that there was no picture; instead there was 'a jigsaw of constantly changing pieces, 
none of which has straight edges'.62 
The lack of primary legislation also made it more difficult for the National Assembly for 
Wales to act with autonomy from the UK Government in its first term. The Assembly's 
limited legislative powers put additional pressure on the Welsh Assembly Government 
to maintain a good relationship with the UK Government, as if it wished to secure 
primary legislation it would need to negotiate with the Secretary of State for Wales. 
However, as powers to the National Assembly were devolved in a piecemeal fashion, 
60 Local Government Act 2000, Chapter 22, S.106( 1) 
61 Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 253 (W.S) (Transfer of Functions) Order 2000 
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the lack of primary legislative powers would not always affect the National Assembly in 
the same way. 
The discretion offered by Westminster has been crucial to the operation of Welsh 
devolution because the UK Parliament can frame primary legislation to either limit or 
widen the scope of the National Assembly's options.63 For example, Westminster could 
introduce an Act with the objective of providing all school children with a piece of fruit 
every day, where the Assembly had secondary legislative functions to determine which 
fruit would be provided and they would have responsibility for arranging its 
distribution. Alternatively, Westminster could produce legislation requiring all school 
children to receive an apple every day, where the Assembly's ability to chose the type 
of fruit is removed and the Assembly's role is limited to arranging the allocation of 
apples. Therefore, it is difficult to reach any firm conclusions about the extent of the 
Assembly's legislative powers without examining each policy area in depth. However, 
there are suggestions that the Assembly's legislative functions may be more powerful 
than they first appear. 
At Westminster there is a growing concern that secondary legislation has become less 
about administrative detail and instead 'a means of achieving policy ends without the 
tedious business of requiring Parliamentary approval'.64 This concern tends to be 
expressed when statutory instruments can amend, or even repeal an Act of Parliament. 
62 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (December 2002) Devolution: Inter-Institutional 
Relations in the United Kingdom 
63 Morgan, K and Mungham, G. (2000) Redesigning Democracy: The Making of the Welsh Assembly 
(Seren, Bridgend), p.201 
64 Silk, P. (1998) op.cit./ p.73 
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For example, The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 gives the Lord Chancellor the 
power by order to make amendments or repeals in relevant enactments as appear to 
him to be necessary.65 Statutory instruments, like the powers discussed above, which 
allow primary legislation to be amended through the use of secondary legislation are 
called Henry VIII clauses. Henry VII clauses are significant because, by allowing 
primary legislation to be altered by secondary legislation, they give secondary 
legislation the same effect and importance as primary legislation.66 If such a function 
were devolved, therefore, the Assembly would possess significant powers over primary 
legislation.67 The initial Transfer of Functions (Order) 1999 did not devolve any Henry 
VIII clauses,68 however, in later transfers Henry VIII clauses were devolved. For 
instance, the Education Act 2002 included a Henry VIII clause which allowed the 
Assembly to alter national curriculum subjects through secondary legislation.69 This 
example highlights the wide variation in the Assembly's powers during its first term. 
The Assembly's role varied from filling in the details of primary legislation to making 
decisions on issues equivalent to primary legislative matters. 
So far this chapter has concentrated on what the National Assembly for Wales could do. 
However, the Assembly's ability to abstain from acting may also be a powerful trait. It 
has been suggested that the Assembly could decide not to introduce secondary 
legislation, so 'frustrating the intention of primary legislation'.70 This occasionally 
occurred before the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales. For instance, in 
65 Zander, M. op.cit./ p.92 
66 Allen, C.K (1964) Law in the Making (Oxford University Press, Oxford), p.S89 
67 Silk, P. op.cit./ p.73 
68 Statutory Instrument 1999 No. 672 (Transfer of Functions) Order 1999, S.2(e) 
69 Education Act 2002/ Chapter 32, 5.106-107 
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the late 1990s the Welsh Office decided not to introduce the necessary secondary 
legislation required for the publication of primary school league tables,71 The extent to 
which the National Assembly for Wales could decide not to enact secondary legislation 
is an area of some legal uncertainty; after all if primary legislation dictates that certain 
actions must be followed then it may be illegal to ignore this,72 Moreover, regardless of 
the legality of the situation, the Assembly must be careful when deciding not to 
introduce the necessary secondary legislation, as major conflict with the UK 
Government could arise if the Assembly frequently did not act in major policy areas,73 
Despite these problems, rather ironically, the Assembly may have achieved policy 
divergence through its inaction rather than its action, 
It is worth noting that the legislative functions of the Scottish Parliament and the 
National Assembly for Wales are not guaranteed, Unlike in a federal system, where 
legislative competencies are set out in a constitution, functions to the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales were transferred through an Act of the 
UK Parliament. Any Act of Parliament can be revoked as the powers of the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales were voluntarily transferred by 
Westminster, Consequently, as stated in the Scotland Act (1998), devolution 'does not 
affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland',74 
Therefore, although a politically controversial decision, Westminster could technically 
choose to ignore the wishes of the devolved institutions and legislate on any devolved 
70 Silk, P. op cit., p.7S 
71 Ibid 
72 Patchett, K. (2000) 'The New Welsh Constitution: The Government of Wales Act 1998' in Jones, B. and 
Balsam, D. (Eds.) The Road to the National Assembly for Wales (University of Wales Press, Cardiff), p.244 
73 Silk, P. op.cit./ p.7S 
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matter. However, as Bogdanor noted 'it is difficult to see how Westminster could 
continue to legislate for the domestic affairs of Scotland when it will no longer be 
debating them and no longer holding ministers to account for them'/5 
1.4 Financial Arrangements 
Bogdanor argued that 'finance is the spinal cord of devolution, for it is the financial 
arrangements which will largely determine the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the 
devolved administrations'.76 The Scottish and Welsh institutions were financed from 
block grants originating from Westminster, commonly referred to as the 'assigned 
budget'. The bulk of the budget was determined by the Treasury's Departmental 
Expenditure Limits CDELs) and changes in the Scottish and Welsh DELs were dependent 
on a calculation known as the Barnett formula, discussed later in this section. DELs are 
spending plans set for three years and in 2003-2004 it was estimated that the DELs 
accounted for 90% of the Scottish budget.77 Figure 1.1 shows the Scottish Parliament's 
and Welsh Assembly's DELs for each year of their first terms. However, the budgets of 
the devolved institutions also included Annually Managed Expenditure CAME), which is 
expenditure organised on a short-term basis and is not affected by the Barnett formula. 
AME includes various forms of funding which are passed directly to the devolved 
administrations, 'notably funding from the EU for agriculture under the Common 
Agriculture Policy'.78 
74 Scotland Act, op.cit/ S.28 (7) 
75 Bogdanor, V. (1999) 'Devolution: Decentralisation or Disintegration' in PolItical Quarterly (VoI.70, No.2, 
pp.185-194), p.186 
76 Bogdanor, V. (1999) Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford University Press, Oxford), p.235 
77 McVicar, M. and Wakefield, S (April 2003) Guide to the Scottish Budget- Subjed Profile (SPICe briefing) 
accessed at www.scottish.parliament. uklbusiness/research/briefi ngs-03/sb03-24. pdf on 12/11/04, p.4 
78 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, op.cit/ p.28 
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Figure 1.1 Departmental Expenditure Limits (£ millions!9 
1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 
( estimated) 
Scotland 14,147 15,143 16,944 18,041 19,972 
Wales 7,248 7,770 8,582 9,551 10,498 
The Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales were able to spend the 
majority of their budget as they wished. However, there were some legal restrictions 
on their allocation of funds, for instance, both the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales must ensure that they provide a school place for each child 
requiring it. 
The DELs represent the finances over which the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales have control and so do not include expenditure by UK departments. 
Therefore, welfare payments allocated to those living in Scotland and Wales are not 
included in the DELs. Expenditure on reserved matters in Scotland and Wales can be 
considerable. For instance, in 2000-01 it was estimated that total Scottish spending on 
both devolved and reserved matters was at £36.3 billion, of which only around £15.1 
billion was allocated for devolved functions through the Scottish DEL.80 
The Scottish and Welsh DELs alter each year depending on changes in spending by the 
UK Government. Changes in the Scottish and Welsh DELs are usually calculated by the 
application of the Barnett Formula. The Treasury states that any changes to the 
79 HM Treasury (April 2004) Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2004, p.9 
80 Scottish Executive (2003) Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland: 2000-2001 (Scottish 
Executive, Edinburgh) accessed at www.scotland.gov.ukllibraryS/government/gers03.pdf on 12/11/04 
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'budgetary provision of the devolved administrations funded by United Kingdom tax 
revenues (excluding the Scottish Variable Rate of Income Tax) or by borrowing will 
generally be linked to changes in planned spending on comparable public services by 
departments of United Kingdom Government. .. this linkage will generally be achieved 
by means of the population-based Barnett Formula. This largely removes the need to 
negotiate directly the allocation between Treasury Ministers, Secretaries of States and 
Ministers of the devolved administrations'.81 
The Barnett formula was devised in the late 1970s, due to the prospect of devolution, 
primarily to ensure that changes in spending throughout the UK could be calculated in 
a set manner, thus reducing the potential for conflict as different nations compete for 
finances. 82 The Treasury's guidance on funding the devolved institutions, quoted 
above, highlights that removing the need for negotiations on devolved financial 
allocations is still a major justification for using the Barnett formula. 
The Barnett formula takes account of three factors: 
1. the change in public expenditure in England 
2. the extent to which the relevant English departmental programme is comparable with the services 
carried out by the devolved administrations 
3. the population proportion 83 
The change in public expenditure in England forms the basis of any change in the 
Scottish and Welsh block grant. The Barnett formula applies to either rises or falls in 
English public expenditure, it does not apply to the entire block grant, the majority of 
which is set by spending during the previous year. Therefore, as Lord Callaghan noted 
during the second reading in the Lords of the Government of Wales Bill, the Barnett 
81 HM Treasury (July 2004) Funding the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern 
Ireland Assembly: A Statement of Funding Policy (Fourth edition) accessed at www.hm-
treasurv.gov.uk'/media/CB2/3C/Funding the Scottish Parliament National Assembly for Wales 
(296kb).pdf on 14/5/03 
82 Edmonds, T. (2001) The Barnett Formula: House of Commons Research Paper 01/108 (House of 
Commons) accessed at www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-108.pdf on 27/01/02, p.8 
83 Ibid., p.10 
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formula simply 'added something which was fairly rational onto something which was 
completely irrational'.84 
Whether a change in English spending affected the Scottish and Welsh block grants 
depended on the extent to which the relevant English departmental programme was 
considered to be comparable with the services carried out by the devolved 
administrations. The Treasury divided each devolved area into sub-programmes and 
set a comparability percentage for each component. Each sub-programme was either 
given a comparability rating of 1000/0 or 00/0; therefore, no sub-programme was 
partially funded by both the UK Government and the devolved administration. In 2004 
the UK Government's spending on a number of comparable sub-programmes increased, 
therefore, the Scottish and Welsh devolved administrations received a budget increase 
in 2004. The exact level of the increase was determined by the population figures for 
Scotland and Wales. 
The population ratio calculated the extent to which the Scottish and Welsh block rose 
or fell compared to England. In the first term of the devolved institutions the 
population estimates for Scotland were regularly updated and mid-year estimates were 
used to calculate the Scottish and Welsh block grants. Figure 1.2 below shows how the 
population proportion altered during the first term of devolution. 
84 House of Lords, Plenary Session, 21 st April 1998 
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Figure 1.2 Population Proportions used for Barnett Formula calculationSSS 
ONS mid-year population estimates (per cent) 1999 2001 2003 
Scotland's population as a proportion of the population of England: 10.34 10.23 10.20 
Scotland's population as a proportion of the population of England 
and Wales: 9.77 9.66 9.63 
Wales's population as a proportion of the population of England: 5.93 5.89 5.89 
In most cases the UK Government's spending on departmental programmes only 
funded England, so the Barnett formula considered Scotland's population as a 
proportion of England's population.86 However, on issues such as many Home Office 
and legal matters the UK Government financed spending in England and Wales, which 
meant that in the Barnett formula calculations the Scottish population as a proportion 
of the English and Welsh population was considered. 
Taking all three components together the Barnett formula, if health spending in 
England, which is 99.5% comparable for both Scotland and Wales, rose by £10 million 
the calculation would be: 
Change to the UK 
Government 
department's DEL 
X Comparability X Appropriate population 
proportion 
£10 million X 99.5% 
85 HM Treasury (July 2004), Op.Clt 
X 10.20% (Scotland) 
5.89% (Wales) 
= Increase in 
Funding 
= £1,014,900 
= £586,055 
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Therefore, if all other spending remained the same the increase in English health 
spending would increase the Scottish block by just over £1 million and the Welsh block 
by just over £500,000. 
The Barnett formula was initially devised to close the gap between spending 
throughout the UK, as it was thought that Scotland in particular benefited from higher 
public expenditure per head of the population. A strict application of the Barnett 
formula would have lead to slower public spending increases in Scotland and Wales 
because the Scottish and Welsh blocks would increase at a lower rate than English 
spending, known as the 'Barnett squeeze'.87 Historically the degree of convergence was 
limited for Scotland because the Scottish population declined rapidly but the population 
ratios used in the Barnett formula were not reviewed regularly. However, the 
Treasury's decision to review the population ratios more regularly since devolution 
makes public spending convergence throughout the UK more likely. 
The Barnett formula linked funding to the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales to spending in England. Therefore, as Hazell and Cornes argued, 
'problems will arise whenever English reforms are introduced with large expenditure 
numbers attached, because of their knock-on-effect5'.88 If England cut public 
expenditure in health, for example, and reallocated these funds to a retained matter, 
such as defence, and spending in other areas did not change, then the total Welsh and 
86 Ibid 
87 Edmonds, T., op.cit/ p.5 
88 Hazell, R. and Cornes, R (1999) 'Financing Devolution: The Centre Retains Control' in Hazell, R. (Ed.) 
Constitutional Futures: A History of the Next Ten Years (The Constitution Unit and Oxford University Press, 
Oxford), p.203 
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Scottish blocks would decrease. In the first terms of the devolved institutions English 
spending increased, therefore, the Barnett formula did not result in major conflict. 
However, even despite a budget decrease it was still difficult for the devolved 
institutions to set their own policy priorities autonomously. For example, in 2001 the 
Welsh Health Minister expressed her desire to dedicate a substantial portion of health 
spending to preventative health measures: 
'We therefore intend to intensify our investment in prevention through a 
strategy of life-long investment in health. The NHS will develop further into a 
health service and away from a primary focus on illness.189 
However, directing resources away from reducing hospital waiting times meant that 
Jane Hutt faced considerable political difficulty justifying why in 2003 '85% of patients 
in Wales were admitted for routine surgical treatment within a year of being placed on 
a waiting list, while 96% of patients in England were seen within the same period',90 
and eventually was replaced as Health Minister apparently due to her failure to cut 
waiting times. The political difficulties in justifying different spending could explain why 
when extra money was allocated to England for the NHS and education in the UK 
budget of 2000 the National Assembly mirrored exactly the way in which resources 
were allocated by Westminster.91 As a result, Kay suggested that it was difficult to see 
that the pattern of funding allocation was any different under devolution 'than it would 
89 The National Assembly for Wales (2001) Improving Health in Wales: A Plan for the NHS with Its 
Partners/ p.17 
90 BBe News (19 June 2003) 'Waiting Lists Longer in Wales' 
91 Blewit N. (2000) 'Finance' in Osmond, J. (Ed.) Devolution in Transition: Monitoring the National 
Assembly February to March 2000 (IWA) accessed at www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-
unit/leverh/wales/WAMAYOO.pdf on 15/11/01, p.21 
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have been under the Welsh Office in the sense of reflecting the central government's 
priorities'.92 
In the future, English spending may increase just enough to cover inflation. In such a 
case the Scottish and Welsh increase would be below inflation, and so the devolved 
institutions would be forced to make budget cuts.93 In such times the Scottish 
Parliament may seek to maintain levels of spending by employing its income tax 
varying power. The Scottish Parliament has the power to vary the standard rate of 
income tax up or down by up to three pence in the pound.94 Therefore, the Scottish 
Parliament has a mechanism for raising revenue independently of the UK Government's 
action, but the National Assembly for Wales lacks this power. In 1998 it was estimated 
that if the Scottish Parliament used the full extent of its powers, raising income tax by 
three pence, this would raise £450 million/5 and this estimate rose to £780 million in 
2004. 96 However, in comparison to the Scottish block grant, the tax varying power has 
the potential to raise relatively insignificant amounts, as in 1999 the Scottish DELs was 
£14 billion. 
Another method the devolved administrations can employ to generate income, is to cut 
local government expenditure. Both the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly 
92 Kay, A. (2001) 'Finance: The Future of the Barnett Formula' in Osmond, J. (Ed.) Farming Crisis 
Consolidates Assembly's Role: Monitoring the National Assembly for Wales March - May 2001 (rNA) 
accessed at www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/leverh/wales/wamayOO1.pdf on 20/12/01 
93 Taylor, B. (2002) Scotland's Parliament: Triumph and Disaster (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh), 
p.24S 
94 Scotland Act, op.cit/ S.73 (1) 
95 Mair, C. and McCloud, B. (1999) 'Financial Arrangements' in Hassan, G. (Ed.) A GUIde to the Scottish 
Parliament (The Stationary Office Limited, London), p.77 
96 Report of the Richard Commission (Spring 2004) Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements 
of the National Assembly for Wales (The Stationary Office), p.208 
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for Wales are responsible for funding local government. The devolved institutions 
could, therefore, cut the grants they provide to local government. The local authorities 
could then make up the difference in spending by increasing council tax. In this way 
'the devolved governments could levy taxes by proxy'.97 As Bogdanor notes, almost 
400/0 of Scotland's annual block is spent financing local authority expenditure so the 
power to withhold local government money can secure far more revenue for the 
devolved body than by raiSing income tax by 3p.98 However, if the devolved bodies 
withheld finance from local authorities 'the latter would of course need to raise the level 
of council tax very considerably to maintain services, given the high proportion of their 
income which derives from central grants'.99 Therefore, the finances of the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales remain heavily dependent on other 
levels of government and the relations between them, as the Objective One issue 
indicated in Wales. 
The European Union (EU) awards a variety of structural funds to poor areas of Europe, 
to provide support for projects that aid economic regeneration. West Wales and the 
Valleys region was awarded almost £1.2 billion of Objective One money for January 
2000-December 2006.100 However, a condition of Objective One funding is that any EU 
money allocated must be matched by non-European sources. As European funding was 
classified as public expenditure the Treasury rules suggested that that the National 
Assembly for Wales would be responsible for raising the match funding money 
97 Hazell, R. and Cornes, R., op. cit, p.209 
98 Bogdanor, V. (1999) Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford University Press, Oxford), p.239-240 
99 Ibid./ p.240 
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required. However, Objective One money was awarded after the Welsh block had been 
negotiated. Consequently, only around £40 million had been set as a baseline to cover 
European structural funds, based on expenditure in previous years, which was 
insufficient given the new Objective One allocation. 101 
The UK Treasury's lack of commitment to match funding raised 'serious concern that 
the Assembly will be committing to expenditure in 2000-2001 without knowing whether 
in fact it will be granted extra provision by the Treasury to cover the expenditure taking 
place at a later date'.102 The National Assembly's First Secretary at this time, Alun 
Michael, did not criticise the lack of commitment from the Treasury but described it as 
part of the public expenditure process; 'In theory you do not know that there is going 
to be money at all for the health service, education or the Welsh block after the current 
planning horizon'.103 
Alun Michael's position on the Objective One issue was a major catalyst for his downfall 
as First Secretary, in February 2000. Michael's replacement, Rhodri Morgan, was able 
to secure more money from the Treasury to provide a greater level of match funding by 
emphaSising the need to defuse the situation. In 2000 the Comprehensive Spending 
Review allocated an extra £421 million over and above what the strict application of the 
Barnett formula would have allocated, indicating that the Treasury eventually accepted 
100 Storer, A. (2001) 'Confrontation and Consensus: The Economic Development Committee' in Jones, B. J. 
and Osmond, J. (Eds.) Inclusive Government and Party Management: The National Assembly for Wales and 
the Work of its Committees (Institute of Welsh Affairs and the Welsh Governance Centre, Cardiff), p.79 
101 Bristow, G and Blewitt, N. (2000) 'The Comprehensive Spending Review' in Osmond, J. (Ed.) Devolution 
Looks Ahead: Monitoring the National Assembly for Wales May-August 2000 (IWA), p.7 
102 Osmond, J. (1999) Devolution: :4 Dynamic Settled Process?:' Monitoring the National Assembly July-
December 1999 (IWA) accessed at www.ucl.ac.uk!constitution-unit/leverh/wales/WA99DEC.pdf on 
15/11/01 
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some responsibility for providing match funding. l04 However, even after Rhodri Morgan 
had been able to secure greater funds, Plaid Cymru were not content with the situation. 
Plaid Cymru argued that in 2000 English spending increased by 80/0 and the Welsh 
block grant, excluding money earmarked for Objective One, only increased by 7.3%.105 
Therefore, suggesting that if the National Assembly for Wales wanted to maintain its 
spending with the levels set in England it would be impossible for Wales to meet its 
European funding commitments. Consequently Plaid Cymru suggested that to fully 
meet its match funding requirements the Assembly would be forced to spend £100 
million less each year on other programmes. lOG 
The Objective One case highlighted the reliance of the National Assembly for Wales on 
decisions taken at both the EU and UK levels. The Treasury only provided the National 
Assembly for Wales with additional money when Objective One became a major 
political issue. Therefore, as with the legislative powers of the devolved institutions, 
the finances available to the National Assembly for Wales and the Scottish Parliament 
are heavily dependent upon the interpretation and application of the Treasury's rules 
and conventions in practice. Funding the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales is, therefore, often the result of political decisions and negotiations 
between the different governments at each institution. In such a context, the UK 
Government retains considerable power because the Treasury controls economic 
matters and allocates the block grants. However, as the Objective One case illustrates, 
103 The National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 19th October 1999 
104 Kay, A. (2001) 'Finance: The Future of the Barnett Formula' in Osmond, J. (Ed.) Farming Crisis 
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where financial matters become a public concern and there is a risk of political damage, 
the UK Government may meet some of the devolved administrations' demands. 
1.5 Institutional design and development 
The Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales were designed to be 
different from Westminster. The Scottish Constitutional Convention aimed to create 'a 
way of politics that is radically different from the rituals of Westminster'.107 Additionally 
the Consultative Steering Group, which designed how the Scottish Parliament would 
operate, recommended a new form of politics based on four key principles; power 
sharing, accountability, access and participation, and equal opportunities.lOs The 
National Assembly for Wales was designed to encourage power sharing, as indicated by 
its body corporate status. 109 As a body corporate the legislative and executive functions 
of the National Assembly for Wales were legally combined rather than separated, as is 
usually the case in parliamentary institutionsYo This meant that there was a greater 
need for Assembly Members CAMs) outside the Welsh Assembly Government to possess 
a role in policy formation. 
This section briefly examines the institutional design of the Scottish Parliament and the 
National Assembly for Wales, focusing primarily on the committee systems as an 
106 Gwilym, E. and Williams, P (2000) 'Objective One Funding-to Come at the Expense of Education and 
Health' in Agenda- Winter 2000-2001 (IWA), p.14 
107 The Scottish Constitutional Convention (1995) Scot/and's Parliament. Scot/and's Right (The Scottish 
Constitutional Convention, Edinburgh), p.9 
lOS Consultative Steering Group (1999) Shaping Scot/and's Parliament (The Scottish Office) accessed at 
www.scotland.gov.uk/library/documents-w5/rcsg-04.htm on 10/11/01 
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example of how the institutions allocate power to different actors. Mezey argued that 
legislatures with strong policy-making powers have 'highly developed committee 
systems which enable them to divide the legislative labour in such a way that a degree 
of legislative expertise is generated in most policy areas',111 implying that strong 
committees are necessary if legislatures are to have a strong policy-making role. 
Therefore, by focusing on the committee system it should be possible to reach some 
understanding about the level of power sharing in place in the Scottish Parliament and 
the National Assembly for Wales. Additionally in the long-term care for elderly case 
study the committees played an influential role, as an arena in which actors expressed 
their views and as actors in their own right. 
In his study of Danish parliamentary committees, Damgaard argued that committees 
rarely behave as unitary actors, and instead should be understood as arenas for co-
operation and conflict among the political parties.112 Mattson reached similar 
conclusions when studying Swedish committees, concluding that in Sweden 
'committees constitute an arena for speCialised party representatives in which they 
pursue party politics and the arena is at times employed as a site for party 
negotiation'.1l3 However, Arter suggested that: 
110 Osmond, J. (2001) 'The Enigma of the Corporate Body: Relations Between the Committees and the 
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Westminster and Congress (Ohio State University Press, Columbus), p.278 
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'The structural properties and formal powers of the Scottish committees give 
them a greater capacity for autonomy - that is, unitary action and, by 
extension, an independent legislative impact - than most of their continental 
counterparts. f114 
The Scottish parliamentary committees were given a wide remit; they can scrutinise 
and amend legislative bills, examine statutory instruments, consider petitions, conduct 
inquiries and scrutinise the Scottish Executive.115 The committees of the Scottish 
Parliament combine the legislative and inquiry functions of Westminster's select and 
standing committees. The committees are involved in two stages of the deliberation of 
bills. At stage one they report on the general principles of the bill, comment on the 
consultation undertaken and assess where further evidence is required for detailed 
consideration of the bill. Then, following a debate in the plenary if the principles of the 
bills are accepted, the bill returns to committee for the second stage of deliberation, 
which involves detailed consideration of the bill. Such wide ranging powers were 
designed to counterbalance the lack of a second chamber in the Scottish Parliament. 
As Arter notes, the role of the Scottish committees is unusual, as 'in none of the Nordic 
parliaments are committees required to report on the general principles (objectives) of 
the bill'.116 The fact that bills in the Scottish Parliament go to committee before they 
are subject to a plenary debate suggests that the committees have an autonomous and 
more powerful role in policy-making. For instance, in parliaments in Western Europe 
Mattson and Str0m found that 'the role of committees increases if the major debate on 
114 Arter, D. (2002) 'Scandinavian-style Parliament with Scandinavian-style Politics? The Role of Committees 
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a bill has not taken place before it is referred to them'.117 
The powers of the committees were designed to redress the lack of a second chamber 
and allow them to counterbalance the Executive. However, there are limits to the 
strength of the committees. For instance, the Scottish parliamentary committees are 
given no formal or direct involvement in the preparation of Executive bills. As Arter 
notes, this is in sharp In contrast to Sweden, where parliamentarians and government 
conduct pre-legislative commissions of inquiry (utredningaf).118 Therefore, in Scotland 
power-sharing does not extend to the policy formation stage, when the Executive 
possess exclusive control, albeit with the requirement that Executive bills must 
complete a consultation process before being presented to the parliament. 
Additionally, in order to understand the impact of the committees on policy-making, 
there is a need to examine their operation in practice. 
In practice the success of the Scottish committee system has been mixed. Some 
committees have found that their agenda has been largely determined by the Scottish 
Executive. For instance, the first year of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee was 
dominated by consideration of legislative proposals, 'the committee launched a number 
of small inquiries but found its meetings dominated by its role as a revising chamber'.l19 
Committees have also struggled to develop a wealth of expertise, particularly as there 
was little continuity of membership. For instance, between 1999 and 2003, 25 
117 Mattson, 1. and Str0m, K. (1995) 'Parliamentary Committees' in Doering, H. (1995) (Ed.) Parliaments 
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Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) served on the 11 member Enterprise and 
Lifelong Learning Committee, and only 2 sat on the committee throughout the first 
term.120 
Committees have also faced problems combining their legislative and scrutiny functions. 
As Lynch notes, 'MSPs are responsible for considering legislation at all stages but are 
supposed to forget their party affiliations at the committee stage of the legislative 
process in order to suggest improvements to government proposals. 121 Lynch is cynical 
about the ability of MSPs to 'forget' their party affiliations and found that when voting 
occurred in committee in the Scottish Parliament's first term, MSPs generally voted 
along party Iines.122 His cynicism is supported by the anecdotal comments of 
parliamentarians. For instance, when David Gorrie, a Liberal Democrat backbencher 
(who had formerly been a member of the House of Commons), was interviewed by 
Arter, he commented that the Labour party's 'grip is much tighter in Holyrood than 
Westminster' as in Westminster Labour held a comfortable majority.123 However, 
different committees had different experiences; for instance, partisan voting appeared 
infrequent in the Health and Community Care Committee. The convenor of the Health 
and Community Care committee, Margaret Smith, told the procedures committee that 
there had only been two or three substantive party political divisions during the first 
119 Lynch, P. (2000) 'The Committee System of the Scottish Parliament' in Hassan, G and Warhurst, C. (Ed.) 
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term and that the committee does 'most of our work by consensus'.124 Interestingly, 
during the Scottish Parliament's first term, the Health and Community Care Committee 
was also one of the most well respected committees. 
In the first session there were occasions when the committees helped to shape 
legislation. For instance, the Equal Opportunity Committee opposed the Executive on 
the Census order and was prepared to force an amendment to the bill until the 
Executive relented and allowed a question on religion to be included in the census.125 
Additionally the committees have been able to apply pressure on the Executive to act 
on some issues. For instance, MSP Tommy Sheridan proposed an Abolition of 
Poindings and Warrant Sales Bill, which was discussed at three meetings of the Justice 
and Home Affairs Committee, two sessions of the Local Government Committee and 
three sessions of the Social Inclusion Committee. 126 All three of these committees were 
in favour of the bill, despite the Executive's oppOSition. When the bill finally reached 
the plenary stage the Executive's plans to introduce a wrecking amendment to the bill 
had to be withdrawn due to the considerable support for the proposed legislation which 
had galvanised as the bill progressed through the committees. 127 
In addition the Scottish committees are able to initiate bills. In the first session of the 
Scottish Parliament 61 public bills were passed (and 1 private bill); 3 were Committee 
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Bills, 8 were Member's Bills and 50 were Executive Bills.128 Therefore, in the 
Parliament's first session 82% of legislation originated from Executive Bills (not 
including private bills). In comparison, 87% of the legislation passed at the House of 
Commons between 1997 and 2001 originated from the UK Government.129 In both 
institutions the Executives clearly dominated the legislative process, but in the Scottish 
Parliament a higher percentage of non-Executive bills were passed, almost one-fifth of 
legislation in the Scottish Parliament originated from outside the Executive. However, 
despite some successes, Arter suggests that the Scottish Parliament should be seen, in 
Philip Norton's terms,130 as a policy influencing rather than a policy making 
assembly. 131 
The National Assembly for Wales, like the Scottish Parliament, has 'multi-functional 
committees'.m The National Assembly's committees have three main responsibilities; 
scrutinising the administration, policy development, consideration of subordinate 
legislation.133 In the National Assembly for Wales, backbenchers and ministers sat on 
the committees together, resulting in no clear distinction between the executive and 
the legislature. Partly as a result, the precise role of the committees in Wales was an 
area of controversy in the first term. Some AMs expected the committees to playa 
major role in policy-making whilst others argued that the Cabinet, later known as the 
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Welsh Assembly Government, should make policy and the committees should simply 
develop these proposals. The first Welsh First Minister, Alun Michael, argued that the 
committees were designed to be the 'Assembly's engine room',134 whose role should be 
to 'advise the Cabinet and the whole Assembly on the way they should progress on 
important issues'.135 Therefore, Alun Michael perceived the committees as advisers, 
with an indirect policy development role. The same opinion was less subtly expressed 
by Rosemary Butler, previously the Assembly Secretary for pre-16 education. During a 
debate on performance management of teachers Butler explained that she had 
considered the views of the Pre-16 Education Committee alongside those of other 
organisations outside the Assembly, suggesting that she viewed the Committee as one 
of many advisors.136 
When the Welsh Cabinet ignored the majority of the Pre-16 Education Committee's 
members who questioned performance-related pay, it provoked debate in the National 
Assembly about the structure of the institution. Mike German, the leader of the Welsh 
Liberal Democrats, argued that as the Welsh Assembly Government at this time was a 
minority administration 'the committees, when voting as a majority, represent the will 
of the Assembly's majority'.137 It was particularly important to establish the role of the 
committee in the National Assembly for Wales as the institution was created as a 
corporate body and so it was expected that executive and backbench members would 
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collaborate on policy development, debate and decision.138 The committees were 
designed to be a major channel for ensuring backbench input into policy decision. 
However, in the National Assembly's first term there was a re-examination of the 
separation of the executive and legislature, and an attempt to clarify precisely what 
backbench input into policy should involve; this was indicated by the Review of 
Procedures in 2001 and the Richard Commission, which reported in 2004.139 
In strictly legal terms at the end of the first term, in 2003, the National Assembly was a 
corporate body.140 As Rhodri Morgan acknowledged during the National Assembly's 
Review of Procedures, 'we could not create a Welsh Executive in the Scottish style 
unless the Government of Wales Act was substantially rewritten'.141 Within the 
limitations of the Government of Wales Act, however, the National Assembly had 
moved towards a more traditional governmental structure by the end of its first term. 
Symbolically the most significant change to the National Assembly's institutional 
arrangements occurred on 14th Feb 2002, when the Assembly unanimously accepted 
'the principle that there should be the clearest possible separation between the 
Government and the Assembly which is achievable under current legislation'.142 Here 
the Assembly accepted the creation of the Welsh Assembly Government as a separate 
138 Osmond, J. (2000) 'A Constitutional Convention by Other Means: The First Year of the National 
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entity from the National Assembly. Although in strictly legal terms the Government of 
Wales Act contains no reference to a separate Welsh Assembly Government, in practice 
the roles of executive and legislative have been separated. The legal status of the 
Assembly as a corporate body, combined with the reality of a formally recognised 
Welsh Assembly Government, creates a rather confused picture of policy-making 
responsibilities. The confused legal situation implies that to understand policy-making 
in the National Assembly for Wales it is worth examining the situation in practice, 
looking at how policies are made on a case by case basis. 
In addition to power-sharing between the Executive and the devolved institutions, 
indicated by the committee systems, the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly 
for Wales also sought to offer a strengthened voice to non-governmental actors. In 
Scotland non-governmental actors are provided with a formalised role in policy-making 
through the requirement for pre-legislative consultation. More informally non-
governmental actors are offered 'multiple-access points for discussing legislation with 
MSPs in committees and in plenary, and opportunities for further consultation with 
committees'.143 Additionally, the commitment of the devolved institutions to accessible, 
open and responsive government suggests that there would be greater participation 
with non-governmental actors than exists in Westminster. 144 During the first term in 
Scotland a range of civic organisations organised themselves through the Scottish civic 
forum which was attached to the Parliament and offered an institutionalised , 
mechanism for dialogue between pressure groups and the new devolved institutions.145 
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The civic forum discussed pre-legislative proposals and sought to negotiate a common 
position for discussion with the Scottish Parliament.146 In Wales, non-governmental 
actors, local government and business have a legal right to be consulted by the 
National Assembly, giving them a formal role in policy-making.147 In response to its 
legal commitment to consult in 2000 the Welsh Assembly Government established a 
Voluntary Sector Scheme. Whilst the Voluntary Sector Scheme is not legally binding it 
included a number of commitments, such as a requirement that each Assembly 
Secretary met 
'with representatives of the relevant networks of voluntary organisations covering 
their areas of responsibility at least twice in anyone calendar year. These meetings 
will review the operation of the Scheme and the level of consultation and discussion 
that has taken place between the network and the appropriate 
Secreta ry jCom mittee,148 
However, whilst the Voluntary Sector Scheme in Wales and the pre-legislative scrutiny 
arrangements in Scotland suggest that non-governmental actors have a role in policy-
making, whether their formal role translated into real policy-making influence is a 
different matter, which is considered throughout this thesis. 
1.6 Electoral system and coalition government 
The Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales are elected through a 
proportional representation model, an additional-member system. The decision to 
adopt a proportional representation system was a political one. In Scotland and Wales 
146 McTernan, L. (2000) 'Beyond the Blethering Classes: Consulting and Involving Wider Society' in Hassan, 
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the failure of the devolution referendums in 1979 encouraged co-operation between 
pro devolution parties. In Scotland, during meetings of the Constitutional Convention it 
became clear to Labour 'that proportional representation was the price which it had to 
pay for agreement with the Liberal Democrats'.149 Labour were also motivated by a fear 
that in a four party system the SNP could win a majority of seats with just 35% of the 
vote, and then use their electoral victory to claim a mandate for Scottish 
independence. 1so In Wales, the Labour party was more reluctant to accept proportional 
representation, and had less reason to do so because the Labour party was stronger in 
Wales and the nationalist threat less significant. In 1995 the Welsh Labour Conference 
voted to support the First Past the Post (FPTP) model for Assembly elections, but 
changed its position after negotiations with the Labour party leader, Tony Blair, and, 
the Shadow Secretary of State for Wales at the time, Ron Davies. 151 
The additional member system introduced in Scotland and Wales gives each elector two 
votes. The first vote is for a constituency member. The constituencies in the Scottish 
and Welsh elections mirror those for Westminster, except Orkney and Shetland are 
given a seat each in the Scottish Parliamentary election whereas they are combined for 
Westminster elections. The first votes are calculated as in the FPTP. In Scotland 73 of 
129 seats are calculated from the first vote and in Wales 40 of 60 are elected by the 
FPTP method. The second ballot then corrects the lack of proportionality in the first 
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vote. 152 For the second vote Scotland and Wales are divided into regions, there are 
eight regions in Scotland and five in Wales. When casting their second votes, electors 
vote for a party list in their region, rather than a particular candidate, and have no say 
over the order of the list. The members of the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales are then calculated using the d'Hondt method: 
1. The first vote (the constituency ballot) is counted using FPTP and winners declared (73 
in Scotland, 40 in Wales) 
2. The number of votes cast for each party in the second vote (the list ballot) are counted 
3. The second ballot total of votes for each party in a region are divided by the number of 
constituency members gained by that party in the constituency ballot in that region, 
plus one 
4. The party with the highest total after the above calculation has been done gains the first 
Additional member 
5. The next Additional Member, until all places have been filled, is allocated in the same 
way, but at each stage the Additional Members already elected for each party are added 
to the constituency members total used for the calculation at step 3. 153 
The electoral system adopted for the Scottish and Welsh elections makes it more 
difficult for political parties to secure a majority of the seats in the devolved institutions. 
For instance, in Scotland if the additional member system had been used for 
Westminster elections, then no party would have won an outright majority since 1974, 
and it is too difficult to predict the outcome of earlier elections if the electoral system 
had been changed, as the Liberal Democrats and the Nationalist parties did not put up 
Parliamentary candidates for all seats prior to this date. 154 Under a system whereby no 
party has a majority of the seats, and 'where parliament operates by majority decision 
rules, as is commonly the case, single parties cannot hope to monopolize political 
152 Myers, A. (1999) 'The New Electoral System' in Hassan (Ed.) A Guide to the Scottish Parliament (The 
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control'.lSS In such circumstances Muller and Str0m suggest that coalitions become a 
necessity, even if these coalitions are formed from day to day on an issue by issue 
basis. 
To date the Scottish Parliament has consistently been led by a coalition government 
between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, whilst in its first term the Welsh Assembly 
Government was a minority administration, a coalition government and a majority 
government (it is currently a minority administration again). 
Figure 1.3 shows the results of the first elections to the Scottish Parliament and 
National Assembly for Wales. The Labour party received the highest share of the vote 
in both Scotland and Wales, with 56 out of 129 seats in Scotland and 28 out of 60 seats 
in Wales. 
Figure 1.3 Results of the First Elections to the Devolved Institutions 156 
Party Constituency Regional Total 
Seats Seats Seats 
Scotland Labour 53 3 56 
SNP 7 28 35 
Conservative 0 18 18 
Liberal Democrats 12 5 17 
Others 1 2 3 
11291 
Wales Labour 27 1 28 
Plaid Cymru 9 8 17 
Conservative 1 8 9 
Liberal Democrats 3 3 6 
1601 
lSS Muller, w.e. and Str0m, K. (2000) 'Coalition Governance in Western Europe' in Muiler, w.e. and Stn~m, 
K. (Eds.) Coalition Governments in Western Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford), p.l 
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In Scotland, Labour quickly decided to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, who 
had won 17 seats, which gave the Scottish Executive a total of 73 out of 129 seats, and 
a clear majority. In Wales, Labour was closer to achieving a majority, so initially 
decided to govern as a minority administration. Therefore, the early days of the 
National Assembly were characterised by ad hoc deals on an issue by issue basis. 
Rhodri Morgan later explained that as a minority administration the Welsh Assembly 
Government 'struggled to provide the kind of stable and decisive forum in which 
policies vital to our nation's future can be debated and decided',157 and instead policy-
making consisted of striking 'a deal over every vote with Plaid Cymru, the Liberal 
Democrats, or occasionally with the Tories ... saying "You support this and we will 
support yoU"'.158 Therefore, in October 2000, after Rhodri Morgan had replaced Alun 
Michael as First Minister, a coalition government was formed in Wales between Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats, which gave the Welsh Assembly Government 34 out of 60 
seats. 
In Scotland and Wales the coalition governments each produced a partnership 
agreement which set out the aims of the coalition. In Scotland a key tenet of the 
partnership agreement was a commitment to review student tuition fees, which the 
Liberal Democrats argued was essential if they were to justify their position in 
156 BBe News- Vote 99 Election results accessed at 
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govern ment. 159 However, the partnership agreement contained little commitment to 
other Liberal Democrat causes, for instance on the proposal to introduce proportional 
representation for local government elections the Executive was only required to 'make 
progress',160 The Welsh coalition government also decided to focus on student finance 
and the Welsh partnership agreement, 'Putting Wales First', included a commitment to 
conduct 'an immediate independent investigation into the issue of student hardship and 
funding in Wales, dealing with those issues covered in the Scottish Cubie Report which 
fall within the Assembly's remit',161 
Tsebelis argued that, all other things being equal, 'the important variable for policy 
change is ... the number of parties and the ideological composition of the government',162 
Tsebelis developed the veto player's theory, which claimed that the number of 
individual and collective veto players whose agreement is necessary for a change to the 
status quo makes a crucial difference to policy outputs, The veto player's theory 
predicted that 'policy stability (defined as the impossibility of significant change to the 
status quo) will be the result of large coalition governments', particularly if the coalition 
government parties have significant ideological differences between them,163 Tsebelis 
also found that the more veto players involved in policy-making, the less the 
government was able to control the parliamentary agenda (though he did not seek to 
explain whether there was a causal relationship between these variables, and if so 
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which variable lead to the other).164 Tsebelis's work suggests that it is likely that the 
existence of coalition governments in Scotland and Wales would impact on the shape of 
the policies emanating from the devolved institutions, and could possibly be an 
explanatory factor for cases of policy divergence (where policies adopted in the 
devolved institutions differ from each other and those pursued by Westminster). 
MUlier and Str0m argued that coalitions can be understood as a game between political 
parties, and the actors within these parties. 165 In this way, therefore, coalitions 
structure the interaction of actors. Martin and Vanberg have claimed that to survive 
coalitions require parties with different preferences to bargain and compromise.166 If 
they are correct it seems plausible to suggest that if different parties and actors within 
these parties were involved in coalition government then different policy outputs could 
occur. For instance, if Labour had governed as a minority administration in Scotland, 
thus requiring the formation of day to day coalitions over different issues, it is likely 
that different policies would have emerged than those produced by a Labour and 
Liberal Democrat coalition government. In addition to shaping policy outputs Martin 
and Vanberg's analysis of coalition governments also hints that coalition governments 
encourage different policy-making processes to those of majority or minority 
governments. For instance, in comparison with majority administrations, coalition 
governments appear to require a greater level of negotiation, discussion and 
compromise because party whips tend to be less effective at persuading people from 
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other political parties to tow the Executive's line. Therefore, the electoral system in 
Scotland and Wales may affect the style of policy-making and the policy outputs 
emanating from the devolved legislatures. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This brief analysis of the new devolved institutions' legislative functions, financial 
arrangements, institutional design and electoral system highlights that the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales are unique institutions but their 
structure and culture is heavily dependent on the institutions that were in place prior to 
devolution. Actor-centred institutionalism, discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter, implies that these characteristics of the devolved institutions will shape policy-
making by shaping the perceptions, preferences and capabilities of individuals and 
groups of actors. Scharpf argued that institutions are the most important influences on 
actors.167 This chapter has focused on the devolved legislatures, as it is within this 
context that actors operate. The next chapter expands on the concept of actor-centred 
institutionalism, which is adopted as the theoretical framework throughout the thesis. 
Then the thesis investigates the impact of actors and institutions on the Scottish and 
Welsh long-term care for the elderly policies. 
166 Martin, L.W. and Vanberg, G. (2004) 'Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary 
Scrutiny' in American Journal of Political Science (Vol. 48, No.1, pp.13-27), p.1S 
167 t 39 Scharpf, F. W. Op.CI./ p. 
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Chapter Two 
Actor-Centred Institutionalism 
Chapter one described some of the key characteristics of the devolved institutions in 
Scotland and Wales. It was especially important to describe the features of the 
National Assembly and the Scottish Parliament because a central strand in this 
thesis is that institutions matter. This chapter begins by exploring in what way 
institutions matter, discussing the impact that institutional structures and habits can 
have on policy-making. Traditional, or old, institutionalism tended to focus on the 
formal structures of institutions; such as constitutions, legal systems and 
government structures. 1 However, new institutionalists adopt a wider definition of 
the institution, considering characteristics such as norms and conventions. There 
have been many attempts to integrate theories of the 'institution' (or structure) with 
the 'actor' (or agent). This chapter briefly examines the role of the actor in policy-
making, focusing on rational choice theories, before exploring how governance 
approaches can help to clarify which actors to study. Finally the chapter integrates 
these theories, adopting the framework of actor-centred institutionalism, developed 
by ScharpF 
1 Lowndes, V. (1996), 'Varieties of New Institutionalism: A Critical Appraisal' in Public Administration 
(Vol. 74, No.2, pp.181-97), p.181 
2 Scharpf, F. W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research 
(Westview Press, Colorado) 
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2.1 Institutions 
Institutionalism dominated political studies without serious challenge until around 
the 1950s; in a sense 'Institutionalism was political science'.3 Institutionalists at this 
time focused heavily on formal structures. As Rhodes explains the traditional 
institutionalist approach concentrated on 'the rules, procedures and formal 
organizations of government'.4 The traditional institutionalist approach has been 
likened to that of an intelligent observer, avoiding theoretical or methodological 
considerations, and describing what they saw.5 As a result, Lowndes claimed that 
old institutionalism took facts for granted and based its arguments on common 
sense assumptions.6 
Traditional institutionalism was challenged by the 'behavioural revolution' of the 
1950s and 1960s which focused on how key individuals behaved.7 Behaviourists 
examined what actors did and how their behaviour could be explained. For 
instance, behaviourists sought to explain voting behaviour, involvement in other 
forms of political participation (such as demonstrations and strikes), and the 
behaviour of leaders and decision makers.s Additionally, behaviourists explored 
group behaviour, such as that of political parties, interest groups and nation states. 
Goodin and Klingemann explain that the behaviourist revolution focused on 
'dismissing the formalisms of politics - institutions, organizational charts, 
3 Lowndes, V. (2002) 'Institutionalism' in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (Eds.) Theory and Methods in 
Political Science: Second Edition (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire), p.90 
4 Rhodes, R.A.W (1997) Understanding wvernance(Open University Press, Buckingham), p.68 
5 Peters, B.G (1999) Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism' 
(Pinter,London), p.2 
6 Lowndes, V. (1996), op.cit, p.181 
7 Ward, H. (2002) 'Rational Choice' in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (Eds.) Theory and Methods in Political 
Science: Second Edition (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire), p.6S 
S Sanders, D. 'Behaviourism' in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (Eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science: 
Second Edition (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire), p,4S 
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constitutional myths and legal fictions'.9 The behaviouralist revolution, therefore, 
posed a direct threat to institutionalism. Traditional institutionalism was criticised 
for simplifying the political world, assuming that by understanding political 
structures it was possible to understand behaviour.lD Peters suggested that such an 
approach left 'little or no room for the impact of individuals, excluding perhaps 
those exceptional individuals such as the 'Great Men' of history, to influence the 
course of events within government'Y As a result of the challenge posed by 
behaviourists in the 1980s institutionalism was relegated to the fringes of political 
study, especially in the United StatesY 
In response to the challenge to traditional institutionalism, Rhodes suggested that 
critics had misrepresented it, and in fact institutionalism was more sophisticated 
than they implied. For instance, Rhodes argued that many institutionalists did 
consider the impact of informal influences, such as procedural norms.13 Rhodes also 
argued that traditional institutionalism offered genuine insights into political 
systems, and described the approach as 'part of the toolkit of every political 
scientist'.14 However, Rhodes accepted that 'implicit assumptions must give way to 
an explicit theory within which to locate the study of institutions',15 In the 1980s the 
term 'new institutionalism' was coined, representing an attempt to develop a deeper 
9 Goodin, R. and Klingemann, H. (Eds.) (1996) A New Handbook of Political Science (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford), p.11 
10 Peters, B.G, op.cit, p.7 
11 Ibid. 
12 Lowndes, V. (2002) op.cit., p.94 
13 Rhodes, R. (1995) 'The Institutional Approach' in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (Eds.) Theory and 
Methods in Political Science (Macmillan, London), p.49 
14 Rhodes, R. (1997) op.cit., p.64 
15 Rhodes, R. (1995) op.cit., p.50 
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theoretical underpinning to the study of institutions that came to terms with the 
behaviourist challenge. 16 
Within the category of new institutionalism, a range of different approaches have 
since emerged. Peters, for instance, identified seven new forms of institutionalism: 
1. Normative institutionalism: Examines how the norms and values of institutions shape 
the behaviour of individuals; 
2. Rational Choice institutionalism: Perceives political institutions as systems of rules 
and inducements, within which individuals seek to maximise their position; 
3. Historical institutionalism: Explores how the design of government systems in the 
past influences decision-making today by individuals; 
4. Empirical institutionalism: Classifies different institutional types and analyses their 
impact upon government performance; 
5. International institutionalism: Examines how the behaviour of states is steered by 
the formal and informal structural constraints within the international political 
system; 
6. Sociological institutionalism: Studies how institutions create meaning for individuals; 
7. Network institutionalism: Suggests that regular, but often informal, interaction 
between individuals or groups, who share particular values or objectives shapes 
political behaviour.17 
New institutionalism, then, is a broad church within which both rational choice 
theorists and old institutionalists can be found. As a result Gamble claimed that 
new institutionalism is best understood as an 'organising perspective'.18 New 
16 March, J. and Olsen, J. (1984) 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life' in 
American Science Review (Vol. 78, No.3, pp.734-749) 
17 Peters, B.G op.Cit., pp.19-20 
18 Gamble, A. (1990) 'Theories of British Politics' in PolItical Studies (Vol. 38, No.3, pp.404-420), p.40S 
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institutionalism is not so much a theory about causality as a framework which raises 
questions and provides insights. New institutionalists claim that employing only 
theoretical approaches to policy research tends not to be productive because the 
range of actors involved in pOlicy-making are too variable and research interests too 
specific.19 Scharpf suggested that empirical data, which must be collected for each 
case, should form the basis of research on the interactions of policy actors. Such 
empirical data can then be organised and examined through an organising 
framework which draws from a range of theoretical approaches. The aim of new 
institutionalism, therefore, is to reach a deeper understanding, rather than to 
establish a new theory which claims to hold all the answers. Indeed Rhodes 
claimed that the multi-theory character of new institutionalism was one of its 
greatest strengths, 
'No theory is ever true, it is only more or less instructive. You can learn 
from the critical assessment of one theory; you can learn much more 
from a comparative critical assessment of several theories brought to 
bear on a single topic. The study of political institutions will benefit 
greatly from such multi-theoretic research. 120 
Despite the variety of frameworks within the new institutionalism approach there 
are a number of common themes and ideas. Lowndes suggests that it is not helpful 
to draw a sharp distinction between old and new institutionalism, as new 
institutionalism has built 'upon the insights of the best of the traditional 
institutionalists, within the context of more explicit and sophisticated frameworks'.21 
Lowndes identifies six ways in which new institutionalism has developed the study 
of institutions from old institutionalism: 
1) from a focus on organisations to a focus on rules 
2) from a formal to an informal conception of institutions 
19 Scharpf, F. W. (1997) op.cit., p.37 
20 Rhodes, R. (1995) op.cit., p.56 
21 Lowndes, V. (2002) op.cit., p.97 
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3) from a static to a dynamic conception of institutions 
4) from submerged values to a value-critical stance 
5) from a holistic to a disaggregated conception of institutions, and 
6) from independence to embeddedness22 
New institutionalism explores the sets of rules associated with an organisation 
rather than focusing on the organisation itself. Fox and Miller, for instance, define 
institutions as the rules which exist, between, under, over and around 
organisationsY New institutionalism suggests that these rules can be informal and 
formal. New institutionalists also suggest that these rules can be flexible because 
institutions are dynamic structures. As a result they perceive institutions as 
processes rather than permanent structures.24 Old institutionalism had an implicit 
commitment to particular values and models of government, whilst new 
institutionalism adopts a more critical stance, considering the range of ways that 
institutions can embody and shape societal values.25 New institutionalism is also 
less holistic, focusing on the constituent parts rather than entire political systems. 
New institutionalists also place the institutions in their wider context, highlighting 
how they are 'embedded' in a wider world. 26 
The new institutionalists focus on informal and dynamic structures, however, has 
made it more difficult to define what an institution actually is. Peters argued that an 
institution must be 'a structured feature of the society and/or polity', that it needs to 
have some stability over time, and that it must affect individual behaviour. Finally 
'there should be some sense of shared values and meaning among the members of 
22 Ibid. 
23 Fox, C. and Miller, H. (1995) Postmodern Public Administration (Sage, California), p.92 
24 Lowndes, V. (2002) op.cit., p.99 
25 Ibid. 
26 Granovetter, M. (1985) 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The problem of Embeddedness' in 
American Journal of Sociology (Vol. 91, No.3, pp.481-510) 
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the institution?7 The basic understanding of an institution offered by Peters is 
widely accepted by new institutionalists, but disagreement emerges when it comes 
to defining institutions in greater depth. 
The definitions of institutions in new institutionalism fall broadly into two categories. 
Firstly, there is a 'thin' conception of institutions where institutions are perceived as 
'analytically distinct from other factors that shape behaviour, such as interests, 
preferences and information',28 The thin understanding of institutions tends to be 
associated with rational-choice theories, as in such theories actors are seen to make 
deliberate decisions shaped by the rules of the system in which they operate. In 
contrast the 'thick' conception of institutions defines institutions as more than a set 
of rules or norms, Here institutions are considered to also include behaviour 
patterns, interests and belief systems,29 March and Olsen promote a thick 
conception of institutions, arguing that institutions comprise of, 'routines, 
procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, technologies, 
beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowiedge',3D Lane and Ersson explain that 
the different conceptions of institutions can be likened to seeing the game of chess 
either as 'a game governed by institutions in the form of rules', as in the 'thin' 
notion, or as an 'institution in itself', whereby the strategies and interests of the 
players form part of the institution, as in the 'thick' conception.31 
27 Peters, B.G op.cit., pp.18-19 
28 Lane, J. and Ersson, S. (2000) The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes 
(Routledge, London), p.4 
29 Ibid. 
30 March, J. and Olsen, J. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: the Organizational Basis of Politics (Free 
Press, New York), p.22 
31 Lane, J. and Ersson, S. op.cit, p.6 
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Despite the range of institutionalist models, there is common agreement amongst 
institutionalists, old and new, that institutions shape policy outcomes, that 
institutions matter, even if they are not agreed on what constitutes an institution. 
Steinmo and Tolbert have claimed that, 'it has become nearly passe to argue that 
institutions matter. Virtually all political scientists readily agree to this rather 
innocuous statement'.32 By saying that institutions matter, the argument is that a 
distinction can be drawn between policies that an actor might choose as a member 
of a system's institutions, and 'the policies they might select, in equilibrium, in the 
absence of that particular system's institutions'.33 To reach a deeper understanding 
of institutions, therefore, it is worth considering how and under what conditions 
they shape behaviour. In order to attempt this, we shall briefly examines two 
institutional designs that nearly all new institutionalists would agree can affect 
political outcomes; federalism versus unitarism, and their usual concomitant, 
presidential or parliamentary executives. 
Comparing federalist and unitary states has encouraged some commentators to 
suggest that one model is superior to the other. A key claim made of federal 
systems is that it can limit the despotic possibilities of democracy.34 Congleton 
argued that federalism can diminish some of the undesirable affects associated with 
ethnic nationalism because in a federal system it is more difficult for one group to 
use governmental powers to design and implement policies without the support of 
other groups. As a result Congleton argued that federalism makes it harder 
32 Steinmo S. and Tolbert C. (1998) 'Do Institutions Really Matter? Taxation in Industrialised 
Democracies'in Comparative Political Studies (VoI.31, No.2, pp.165-87), p.183 
33 Hammond, T.H and Butler, C.K (2003) 'Some Complex Answers To The Simple Question 'Do 
Institutions Matter?' in Journal of Theoretical PolitIcs (VoI.15,No.2,pp. 145-200), p.147 
34 Madison, J., Hamilton, A, and Jay, J. (1987) The Federalist Papers Kramnick, I. (ed.) (Penguin, 
Hammondsworth) 
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implement discriminatory policies?5 Watts agrees, suggesting that federal 
arrangements can protect the human rights of minorities because in such systems 
state sovereignty is constrained and the central tier have the authority to intervene 
where rights are threatened, obviously here the assumption is that the central tier 
would be less likely to abuse these rights. 36 
In addition several commentators suggest that federalism can reduce tensions over 
territory. Elazar, for instance, proposes that some form of federal solution is the 
only way for the to share land between the Jewish and Palestinian communities in 
the middle east. 37 According to Elazar, federalism can help to resolve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict because it offers a solution which is a combination of self-rule 
and shared rule. Thus, it allows the different communities a degree of autonomy 
and yet ensures they make jOint decisions when required, based on mutual consent 
amongst equals, rather than force or conquest.38 Here federalism offers a solution, 
by encouraging two divided communities to share power. In addition, federalism 
can offer a solution for a unified community which wishes to divide power between 
sub-national groups (such as ethnic, religiOUS, linguistic and cultural groups).39 
35 Congleton, R. (2000) 'A Political Efficiency Case for Federalism in Multinational States: Controlling 
Ethnic Rent-Seeking' in Galeotti, G. Siamon, P. and Wintrobe, R. (Eds.) Competition and Structure: The 
Political Economy of Collective Decisions: Essays in Honor of Albert Breton (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge) 
36 Watts, R.L. (1998) 'Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations' in Annual Review of 
Political Science (Vo!.1, pp.117-37) 
37 Elazar, D.J (1991) Two Peoples. .. One Land: Federal Solutions for Israel, the Palestinian~ and Jordan 
(University Press of America, Jerusalem) 
38 Ibid. 
39 Weinstock, D. (2001) 'Towards a Normative Theory of Federalism' in International Social Science 
Journal(VoI.S3, No.167, pp.9-12), p.7S 
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The suggestion is that federalism can offer a way to peacefully reconcile the needs 
for unity and diversity within a political system,40 establishing 'larger political units 
capable of fostering economic development and improved security, and smaller 
political units more sensitive to their electorates,.41 Watts suggests this need for 
both larger and smaller political units is the consequence of an increasingly global 
economy, which has weakened the traditional nation-state and strengthened both 
international and local pressures. Consequently, Watts argues that 'national 
governments are faced increasingly with the desires of their populaces to be both 
global consumers and local self-governing citizens at the same time. Thus, the 
nation state is at the same time proving both too small and too large to serve the 
desires of its citizens,.42 
In Britain, Burgess suggests that, the most significant pressures on the nation state 
have arisen from 'recent changes in the structure of the British economy, the 
governmental hegemony of the British Conservative party, the intensification of 
widespread political discontent in Scotland and increasing economic and political 
integration in Europe,.43 Burgess suggests that each of these issues has important 
constitutional implications, and whilst in the past the British constitutional system 
has been able to disguise constitutional questions as mere political questions, 
defusing such issues to be rendered relatively harmless,44 he suggests that 'this 
40 Watts, R. (2002) 'The Relevance Today of the Federal Idea' paper given at the International 
Conference on Federalism 2002 (St Gallen, Switzerland) 
41 Watts, R. (2001) 'Introduction: Federalism in an era of globalisation' in International Social Science 
Journal (Vol. 53, No.167, pp.9-12), p.9 
42 Watts, R. (2002) op.cit 
43 Burgess, M. (1995) The British Tradition of Federalism (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 
Madison, NJ.), p.3 
44 Ibid. 
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proven formula for political stability has now outlived its usefulness,.4s As a result 
he implies that constitutional change in Britain is almost inevitable because 'Existing 
constitutional assumptions and the structures and practices which reflect them are 
no longer able to contain the new forces which have emerged in the 1880s and 
1990s to challenge what seems like a complacent inertia. Their capacity successfully 
to canalise, contain and ultimately defuse serious threats to the Union has been 
severely attenuated'.46 However, Elazar identifies that the threat to the British 
nation state is part of a wider phenomenon, and he suggests that we have are in 
the midst of a paradigm shift which is taking us from a world of sovereign nation 
states to a world of diminished state sovereignty and increased interstate linkages 
of a constitutionally federal character.47 Elazar sees the move towards a more 
federal model as a positive phenomenon because he suggests that federalism 
encourages good outcomes.48 However, other commentators take a different view. 
Bagehot argued that federalism produced inferior results to unitarism because it 
was inflexible.49 Writing about the American system Bagehot suggested, 
'You have got a Congress elected for one fixed period, going out perhaps 
by fixed installments, which cannot be accelerated or retarded - you 
have a President chosen for a fixed period, and immovable during that 
period: all the arrangements are for stated times. There is no elastic 
element, every thing is rigid, specified, dated. Come what may, you can 
quicken nothing and retard nothing.'so 
The implication is that because federal systems require written constitutions they 
are more likely to be inflexible than unitary states which do not. Additionally it has 
45 Ibid./ p.4 
46 Ibid. 
47 Elazar, DJ (1996) 'From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift' in International PolItical Science 
Rew"ew(VoI.17, No.4, pp.417-429) 
48 Elazar, D. J. (1995) 'Federalism' in Upset, S. M (Ed.) The Encyclopaedia of 
democracy(Vol. II, pp. 474-82) (Routledge, London), p.475 
49 Bagehot, W. (1873) The English Constitution- Second Edition (Fontana, London) 
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been suggested that the proliferation of levels of government in a federal system is 
a source of inefficiencies and can impede measures which would contribute to the 
common goOd.51 For instance, due to the particular requirements for cooperation in 
a federal system, and the number of actors involved in policy-making, Scharpf 
suggested that a joint-decision 'trap' is likely in federal systems, as the inability to 
reach consensus can lead to no policy change at all, or sub-optimal policies.52 
Banting argued that this causes particular problems for welfare policy, 
'A large number of studies have concluded that federalism and 
decentralization create several types of barriers that constrain an 
expansive and redistributive welfare state by increasing the number of 
sites of political representation, federalism multiplies the number of veto 
points at which action can be delayed, diluted or defeated,S3 
Thus, implying that compared to unitary models federal systems can be inflexible 
and inefficient. 
A further criticism regularly levelled against federal systems, particularly the 
American model, is that they encourage destructive competition between the states. 
Some commentators suggest that such competition can lead to a 'race to the 
bottom',54 where 'each state tries to underbid the others by lowering its taxes, 
spending, regulation, etc., in a quest to make itself appear attractive to outside 
financial interests or unattractive to low-income families'.55 An alternative view of 
federalism is suggested by the 'laboratories of democracy' metaphor, which argues 
50 Ibid., p.59 
51 Weinstock, D. op.cit/ p.78 
52 Scharpf, F. (1988) 'The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European 
Integration' in Public Administration (Vol. 99, No.3, pp.239-278) 
53 Banting, K.G. and Corbett, S. (2002) 'Health Policy and Federalism: An Introduction' in Banting, K.G. 
and Corbett, S (ed.) Health Policy and Federalism: A Comparative Perspective on Multj-Level 
Governance (McGill-Queens University Press, London), p.5 
54 The phrase originated from a comment by Associate Justice Louis Brandis, 'The race was one not of 
diligence but of laxity', in a 1933 court case, Uggett. Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,558-29 
55 Schram, S.F (1999) 'Introduction: Welfare Reform: A Race to the Bottom?' in Schram, S.F and Beer, 
S. (Eds.) Welfare Reform: A Race to the Bottom (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C), p.1 
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that federalism allows states to develop innovative and creative solutions to 
problems, which do not risk the whole country,56 and then successful policies can be 
adopted by other states. 57 These concepts of 'race to the bottom' and 'laboratories 
of democracy' are not mutually exclusive, as states could find innovative ways of 
cutting expenditure. This argument that the institutional structure could impact 
upon policy outputs either by encouraging a 'race to the bottom' or by providing 
'laboratories of democracy' has particular relevance for our discussion of devolved 
policy-making, as it could be that devolution could also impact upon policy 
outcomes in either, or both, of these ways. Charles Jeffery, for instance, suggests 
that 'devolution might be expected to provide testing grounds for innovative policies 
better matched than policy designed in London to local needs, circumstances and 
preferences'. 58 As Keating suggests, where one government diverges by developing 
a popular or successful initiative it is possible that there will be a 'reconvergence 
around the new practice' by the different governments throughout the UK.59 
Despite these debates about the benefits and disadvantages of federal systems, 
Lane and Ersson argue that there is no evidence to suggest that federal or unitary 
states perform better than each other.60 Lane and Ersson compared levels of fiscal 
decentralisation, affluence and economic growth, social equality, democracy and 
56 This phrase also originated from a comment by Associate Justice Louis Brandis. In 1932 he claimed, 
'It is one of the happy accidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country', New State Ice Company v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
57 Donahue, J.D. (1997) Disunited States: Whats at stake as Washington Fades and the States Take 
the Lead (Basic Books, New York), p.13 
58 Jeffery, C. (June 2002) Fiscal and Economic Decentralisation: Towards an Agenda for Policy Learning 
Between Britain and Germany (Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society), p.13 
accessed at www.agf.org.uklpubs/pdfs/1366Fiscalweb.pdf 
59 Keating, M. (2001) 'Devolution and Public Policy in the United Kingdom: Divergence or 
Convergence?' Seminar on Devolution in Practice (Institute of Public Policy Research, October 2001), 
p.3 
60 Lane, J. and Ersson, S. op.cit, p.100 
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political stability in federal and unitary states. They found that that federalism has 
only one institutional effect, fiscal decentralisation; meaning that in federal systems 
the lower levels of government contribute more to public sector spending than in 
unitary states.61 
Another feature regularly examined by institutionalists is the impact of presidential 
versus parliamentary executives. Linz argued that presidential systems have two 
key features, dual-democratic legitimacy and rigidity.52 According to Linz 
presidential systems possess dual-democratic legitimacy because people directly 
elect both the president and the legislature, and the system is rigid because the 
legislature cannot remove the president, unless s/he has acted illegally. 
Additionally Weaver and Rockman pOinted out that as an executive's tenure is not 
dependent on strong party support in presidential systems; control mechanisms in 
political parties are not as strong in presidential systems.53 
As a result of these features of presidential systems Linz argued there is a strong 
possibility of deadlock in the system, 'Since both (the president and the legislature) 
derive their power from the vote of the people in a free competition among well-
defined alternatives, a conflict is always latent and ... there is no democratic principle 
to resolve it'.54 In addition, due to the legitimacy of executive and legislative actors, 
Str0m suggested that in presidential systems there is usually a greater number of 
61 Ibid., p.101 
62 Linz, J. (1994) 'Presidential or parliamentary democracy: does it make a difference' in Linz, J. and 
Valenzuela, A. (Eds.) The FaHure of Presidential Democracy (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore), 
p.6 
63 Weaver, R. and Rockman, B. (1993) 'Assessing the Effects of Institutions' in Weaver, R. and 
Rockman, B (Eds.) Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad 
(The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C), p.10 
64 Linz, J. op.cit./ p.? 
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influential actors involved in policy-making, compared to parliamentary systems.65 
Tsebelis suggested that the number of institutional veto-players, those whose 
agreement is required to introduce policy change, is crucial to the outputs of a 
system.66 According to Tsebelis the larger the number of veto players in a system 
the harder it is to change the status quo, and conversely, the smaller the number of 
veto players the easier it is to change itY As a result Tsebelis suggested that 'the 
logic of decision making in presidential systems is quite similar to the logic of 
decision making in multi party systems'.68 Here Tsebelis suggests that whether a 
system is parliamentary or presidential is unimportant, as it is the number of veto-
players that is Significant, all other things being equal. On the other hand Tsebelis 
suggests that the shape of legislatures and the electoral system can have significant 
impacts on policy outcomes. For instance, Tsebelis and Money argue that bicameral 
systems tend to preserve the status quo, compared to legislatures with only one 
chamber.69 
The range of institutional features which can impact upon outcomes led Weaver and 
Rockman to conclude that, 'institutional effects on government capabilities are not 
uniform, direct, or unidirectional; neither are they nonexistent. Institutional effects 
are real and Significant, but often indirect and contingent'.70 As a result whilst 
65 Str0m, K. (2000) 'Delegation and Accountability in parliamentary democracies' in European Journal 
of Political Research (Vol. 37, No.3, pp.261-289), p.281 
66 Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work(Princeton University Press, 
Princeton), p.19 
67 Ibid. 
68 Tsebelis, G. (1995) 'Decisionmaking in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, 
parliamentarism, multicameralism, and multipartyism' in British Journal of Political Science (Vol. 25, 
No.2, pp.289-32s), p.292 
69 Tsebelis, G. and Money, J. (1997) Bicameralism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 
70 Weaver, R. and Rockman, B. op.cit., p.39 
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Weaver and Rockman argue that institutions matter they suggest the impact of 
institutions varies and can be difficult to gauge. 
2.2 Actors 
In contrast to institutionalists who perceive the institution as the most important 
determinant for policy outcomes, methodological individualists see individual actors 
as the most important units of analysis/1 and so suggest that by studying the 
intentions and behaviour of actors we can explain political outcomes. Rational 
choice theory is one of the most well-established of these theories. 
The essence of rational choice theory is that 'when faced with several courses of 
action, people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best overall 
outcome,.72 Although there is fact no single rational choice theory, there are a 
number of assumptions which are generally shared by rational choice theorists: 
utility maximisation, the structure of preferences, decision-making under conditions 
of uncertainty and the centrality of individuals in the explanation of collective 
outcomes. 73 
Utility maximisation theories suggest that when a person is confronted with a range 
of alternatives they choose one which they expect will best serve their objectives. 
Downs applied this approach to electoral behaviour, suggesting that people vote for 
71 Weber, M. ([1922] 1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology (University of 
California Press, Berkeley) 
72 Elster, (1989) Nuts and Bolts for the Social xief7Ces(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), p.22 
73 Green, D. and Shapiro,!. (1994) Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (Yale University Press, New 
Haven), p.13 
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the party they expect to serve their interests best,74 According to Olson people act 
rationally when their objectives are pursued by means that are, as far as they are 
aware, 'efficient and effective for achieving these objectives',75 Olson also argued 
that even if a group possessed a shared objective, if there were costs to the 
individual of pursuing this objective, and if they believed their actions would have 
little impact anyway, then individuals would be unlikely to join in a collective 
action ,76 For example, even if people share a desire to reduce pollution, the costs 
associated with changing behaviour, combined with the small impact an individual 
can have, could result in the failure of a number of individuals to engage in 
collective action, 
Whilst rational choice theorists agree that some level of utility maximisation is 
involved in rational behaviour, they disagree about the level of utility maximisation 
involved, For instance, Simon argued that people do not seek out the best 
alternative, but instead look for an alternative which is 'good enough',77 Simon 
argued that people possess limited analytical capacity and they search 
'very selectively through large realms of possibilities in order to discover 
what alternatives of action are available, and what the consequences of 
each of these alternatives are, The search is incomplete, often 
inadequate, based on uncertain information and partial ignorance, and 
usually terminated with the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal courses 
of action',78 
Ferejohn differentiates between 'thin' rational and 'thick' rational approaches, 
suggesting that in thin rational accounts actors are rational as long as they 
74 Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of DemoClacy(Harper and Row, New York) 
75 Olson, M. (1965) The LogicofCo//ectiveAction (Harvard University Press, Cambridge), p.65 
76 Ibid. 
77 Simon, H.A (1957) Models of Man: Social and Rational (John Wiley, London), p.xxv 
78 Simon, H.A (1985) 'Human nature in politics: the dialogue of psychology with political science' in 
American Political Science Review (VoI.79, pp.293-304), p.295 
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'efficiently employ the means available to pursue their ends', whilst in thick rational 
accounts 'the analyst posits not only rationality but some additional description of 
agent preference and belief'.79 An example of a thick rational approach is the form 
of Utilitarianism proposed by Jeremy Bentham, which assumed that individuals seek 
to maximise pleasure.so In contrast Riker promoted thin rationality, arguing that as 
long as a decision meets consistency requirements then any choice can be 
interpreted as rational. 81 
There is general agreement amongst rational choice theorists that to be rational an 
actor's available choices should be able to be rank-ordered. This means that an 
actor should 'regard any two available outcomes as either unequal (that is, she 
prefers one to the other) or equal (she is indifferent),.82 In addition, rational choice 
theorists argue that if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C then A should be 
preferred to C. For instance, when voting in the referendum for a Scottish 
Parliament, if someone preferred not to have a Scottish Parliament (A) to a Scottish 
Parliament with tax raising powers (8), and preferred a Scottish Parliament with tax 
raiSing powers (8) to a Scottish Parliament without tax raising powers (C), they 
should also prefer no Scottish Parliament (A) to a Scottish Parliament without tax 
raising powers (C). Riker argued that it is this structuring of preferences, rather 
than their content, which make choices rational.83 
79 Ferejohn, (1991) 'Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England' in 
Renwick, K. (Ed.) The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational 
Action (Harper Collins, New York), p.282 
80 Bentham, J. (1996) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Burns, J. H. and Hart, 
H.L.A. (Eds.) (Claredon Press, Oxford) (first published 1789) 
81 Riker, W. (1990) 'Political Science and Rational Choice' in Alt, J. and Shepsle, K. (Eds.) Perspectives 
on Positive Political Economy (Cam bridge University Press, Cambridge), p.173 
82 Green, D. and Shapiro, I. op.cit., p.14 
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As decision-making usually involves uncertainty, rational choice theorists focus on 
the expected, rather than the actual, utility. Often a decision will involve an 
element of risk. For instance, a politician may desire to be leader of their party but 
be uncertain of the outcome if they stand as a candidate. Rational choice theorists 
assume such an individual will weigh the value of becoming leader against the 
probability of achieving this aim, perhaps deciding instead it would be in their best 
interest to support their opponent and strengthen their position in the party. 
A final area of general agreement amongst rational choice theorists is that the 
relevant unit of study should be the individual. Riker and Ordeshook, for instance, 
declared that 'society, not being human, cannot have preferences in any proper 
sense of the word "have", nor indeed can it order the preferences that it does not 
have'.84 Even where rational choice theorists have studied larger units, such as 
political parties, they have tended to treat these entities as individuals with unitary 
preferences and strategies. When it comes to policy-making, however, it is rarely 
the case that an individual makes policy alone. As a result, when studying 
institutions, rational choice theorists still focus on utility-maximising individuals, but 
explore how these individuals interact and how the institution shapes their 
perceptions of the options available to them. Unfortunately, whilst rational choice 
theories highlight that an examination of individual actors is necessary for an 
understanding of policy-making it does not always clarify which actors to examine. 
83 Riker, W., op.cit, p.173 
84 Riker, W. and Ordeshock, P. (1973) Introduction to Positive Political 777eory(Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs), p.78-79 
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2.3 Governance 
In order to understand the interaction between actors in policy-making and which 
actors to examine when studying policy-making it is worth considering governance 
approaches. Traditionally the tem 'governance' meant 'the ways and means in 
which the divergent preferences of citizens are translated into effective policy 
choices, about how the plurality of societal interests are transformed into unitary 
action and the compliance of social actors is achieved'.85 Therefore, governance 
involved transforming a plurality of societal interests into unitary action with the 
compliance of social actors. In the past it was assumed that state officials or 
governments held exclusive authority over the governance of citizens within its 
borders and so the terms government and governance have been used 
interchangeably. However, the term 'governance' is also used to imply a new way 
of governing, where governments no longer dominate. 
A number of theorists identify that political systems are gradually less and less 
characterised by a hierarchical, unitary system of government, governing through 
law, rule and order. Instead they speak of a more horizontally organised and 
fragmented system of governance where relationships are non-hierarchical and 
mutually dependent. 86 Rhodes identifies six key pressures which have encouraged 
this move away from government to a new mode of governance: 
85 Kohler-Koch, B. (1999) 'The Evolution and Transformation of European Governance' in Kohler-Koch, 
B. and Eising, R. (Ed.) The Transformaiton of Governance in the European Union (Routledge, London), 
p.14 
86 Rhodes, RAW. (1997) Understanding Governance. Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and 
Accountability (Open University Press, Buckingham); Pierre,J. (2000) Debating Governance: AuthOrity, 
Steering and Democracy (Oxford University Press, Oxford); Hix, S. (1998) ,The Study of the European 
Union II: The "New Governance" agenda and its Rival' in Journal of European Public Policy (Vol.S, 
No.1, pp.38-6S); Kooiman, J. (Ed.) (1993) Modern Governance: New Government- Society 
Interactions (Sage, London) 
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1) Economic depression and fiscal pressures leading to budget deficits 
2) The New Right's ideological distrust of big government 
3) Europeanization, which increased regulation and introduced new administrative 
pressures, such as regionalization 
4) Public disenchantment with government performance 
5) International management fashions, in particular the new public management (NPM) 
6) Information Technology, which made it easier to introduce NPM87 
Many commentators refer to this new mode of governance as 'network governance' 
because policy-making involves complex interactions and exchanges between a 
network of actors.88 In such a system an increasing number of actors, and types of 
actors, are involved in policy-making and so services, such as care in the community 
'are delivered by a network of organizations including the central department, local 
authorities, health authorities, agencies, private businesses and voluntary groupS,.89 
In addition, multi-level governance (MLG) theorists also point to the dispersal of 
power between different levels of governance. MLG theorists point to the processes 
of European integration, which has relocated functions above the state level, and 
regionalisation where powers have been transferred to the sub-state level. As 
Keating explains, 'Europe is increasingly regionalized, regions are europeanized, and 
the state is both regionalized and europeanized'.90 MLG theorists suggest that 
together these processes have reduced the control of the state level and led to a 
division of policy-making authority between actors at the suprastate, state and sub-
state levels. 
87 Rhodes, R.A.W, op.cit, p.88 
88 Eising, R. and Kohler-Koch, B. (1999) 'Introduction: Network Governance in the European Union' in 
Kohler-Koch, B. and Eising, R. (Ed.) The Transformaiton of Governance in the European Union 
(Routledge, London), p.S 
89 Rhodes, R.A.W Op.Clt., p.9 
90 Keating, M. (1998) The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Temtorial Restructuring and Political 
Change (Edward Edgar, Cheltenham), p.183 
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It is argued that the range of actors involved in network governance are 
interdependent, as to achieve their goals actors need to interact to exchange 
resources and negotiate shared powers. Rhodes argues that the interaction 
between members of the network are game-like, as participants in the network 
manoeuvre for advantage, deploying the resources they control to maximise their 
influence on outcomes and trying to avoid becoming dependent on the other 
'players".91 The key resources central to bargaining involving public sector 
organisations are authority, money, political legitimacy, information and 
organisational resources.92 However, whilst the possession of resources by an actor 
offers the potential for the exercise of power, 'Whether that potential is realized 
depends upon the effective deployment of resources: on the rules and the choice of 
strategies,.93 An actor or organisation has a range of strategies to choose from, for 
instance bargaining, incorporation, confrontation, persuasion and the use of 
incentives. However, the strategy that an actor adopts will depend upon the rules 
of the game, acceptable behaviour formed by the cultural and political framework, 
such as 'the need for trust and secrecy in negotiations, the 'government's right to 
govern' and territorially or non-intervention in other people's policy area'.94 This 
notion of power-dependence is important because it helps to explain why different 
actors interact and how power is distributed and redistributed within networks. 
91 Rhodes, R.A.W (1988) Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments if Britain 
(Routledge, London), p.42 
92 Rhodes, R.A.W (1985) 'Intergovernmental Relations in the UK' in Meny, Y. and Wright, V. Centre-
Periphery Relations in Western Europe: The New Local Government Series No.25 (George Allen and 
Unwin, London) p42 
93 Rhodes, R.A.W (1988) op.cit, pp.42-43 
94 Ibidp.43 
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As a result of networks dominating policy-making 'the boundaries between public, 
private and voluntary sectors are shifting and opaque,.95 As S0rensen notes the 
fragmentation of the political system into different layers and self-governing units 
raises questions about political representation, encouraging a 'battle between 
elected or otherwise appointed political elites about the right to represent 'a 
people".96 Whilst state level actors are involved in this process within these 
networks Eising and Kohler-Koch note that there is 'no sovereign actor able to steer 
or regulate,.97 Governance theorists tend not to question that state executives or 
the state arena remain the most important loci of power, but claim that actors from 
the state level are unable to exercise complete control over the policy-making 
process due to a dispersal of power to the other levels. As a result the role of 
government becomes less about command and increaSingly one of 'coordination 
and steering,.98 Here the state's role shifts away from being the main provider of 
policy and is instead based upon facilitating interaction among various interests.99 
However, the state still controls significant power, for instance, Rhodes 
acknowledges that the centre controls greater resources than other actors, 
therefore, there is an asymmetric interdependence of actors within networks. For 
instance, Rhodes argues that so far the British government has compensated for its 
loss of hands-on controls by reinforcing its control over resources,.100 In addition 
95 Ibid. 
96 S0rensen, E. (2002) 'Democratic Theory and Network Governance' paper presented at workshop 
no.12 'Demokrati og administrativ reform i norden' at the NOPsA- conference 2002 in A1borg accessed 
at www.socsci.auc.dkjinstitut2jnopsajarbejdsgruppe12jeva.pdf, p.7 
97 Rhodes, R.A.W (1997) op.cit, p.57 
98 Bache, 1. (2003) 'Governing through Governance: Education Policy Control under New Labour' in 
Politicalstudies(Vol.51, No.2 pp300-314), p.301 
99 Sloat, A (2001) 'MLG: An Actor-Centred Approach' at Multi Level Governance Conference (June 
2001, University of Sheffield) accessed at www.shef.ac.uk/rvperc/mlgc/papers/sloat.pdf. p.12 
100 Rhodes, R.A.W (1997) op.cit., p.54 
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Scharpf notes that networks operate 'in the shadow of the state. lOl As a result 
Scharpf claims that 'the state is able to influence the drift of negotiated settlements 
by shifting the balance of bargaining power from one side to the other through 
relatively minor changes in the institutional setting,.l02 As a result of the 
government's ability to sanction membership of networks and maintain a number of 
mechanisms for reasserting control Marsh et al. claims that the network governance 
literature often fails to take the role of governments and departments seriously 
enough. l03 Yet as Bache notes 'The circumstances under which the centre can and 
cannot steer networks in the context of asymmetric interdependence remains an 
important empirical question, with the answer likely to vary across issues and 
sectors and, indeed, over time'.104 If the governance approach is correct, therefore, 
we should find that a range of governmental and non-governmental actors from 
different levels of government influence policy-making at the sub-state level, and 
that no one actor, or type of actor, is able to always control the policy-making 
process. 
Governance approaches help to clarify which actors should be examined and can 
help us to understand how and why actors interact. The approach suggests that 
policy-outcomes are the consequence of both institutional characteristics (the 
resources and the rules of the game) and actor characteristics (actors' preferences 
and strategies). However, governance approaches can be descriptive rather than 
explanatory in nature, and as a result 'Governance studies at the national level have 
101 Scharpf, F. W. (1997) op.cit., p.204 
102 Ibid .. p.20 1 
103 Marsh, D., Richards, D and Smith, M. (2003) 'Unequal Plurality: Towards an Asymmetric Power 
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typically used an approach that has come to be called actor-centred 
institutionalism'. lOS This thesis will also adopt actor-centred institutionalism as its 
main theoretical framework because the approach is particularly useful at explaining 
how actors interact within institutional frameworks and a key aim of this thesis is to 
explore the role of the devolved institutions in shaping actor behaviour and policy 
outcomes. 
2.4 Actor-Centred Institutionalism 
As Peters notes, 'even the harshest critic must admit that the blending of rational 
choice perspectives and a general institutional outlook on political life can supply a 
number of important insights into politics'.106 Rational choice institutionalism 
combines rational choice and institutionalist approaches, to suggest that whilst 
actors are key to political outcomes, their action is shaped within institutions. 
There is a range of approaches which can be classified as rational choice 
institutionalism; fortunately there are many characteristics which are common to 
them all. This section outlines some of the key features of rational choice 
institutionalism, focusing primarily on the model of actor-centred institutionalism, 
developed by Scharpf. 107 
Rational Choice institutionalists argue that actors have a set of preferences which 
they purposefully seek to achieve. lOB According to Scharpf, 'Policy, by definition, is 
105 Mayntz, R. (1998) 'New Challenges to Governance Theory' Jean Monnet Chair Paper, RSC No. 98/50 
accessed at www.uned.es/113016/docencia/spd%20-%20doctorado%202001-
02IIntroducci%F3n/Mayntz%20governance%20EUI%20 1998. htm, p.7 
106 Peters, B.G op.cit., p.61 
107 Scharpf, F. W. (1997) op.cit. 
lOB Hall, P. and Taylor, R. (1996) 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms' paper 
presented at the MPIFG Scientific AdviSOry Board Meeting 9/5/1996 accessed at www.mpi-fg-
koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg dp/dp96-6.pdf, p.12 
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intentional action by actors who are interested in achieving specific outcomes'.109 In 
rational choice institutionalism the actor is expected to consider a range of 
strategies to achieve their goals. These strategies and preferences may be shaped 
by the institution in which they are a member,l1O however, the actor is capable of 
choosing to adopt a strategy which may conflict with cultural or institutional rules. 1l1 
As a result, for rational choice institutionalists, institutions are an intervening 
variable, influencing the actors' choice of strategy by constraining behaviour and 
providing incentives and resources. Here rational choice institutionalists conceive 
institutions as 'a structure that actors run into, go "ouch", and then recalculate how, 
in the presence of the structure, to achieve their interests'.112 Hall and Taylor 
suggested that one of the greatest contributions of rational choice institutionalism is 
this emphasis on the role of 'strategic interaction in the determination of political 
outcomes'. 113 
In addition to preferences, rational choice institutionalists also take into 
consideration that the behaviour of actors is likely to be shaped by their 
expectations of how others will act and the resources available to them. Scharpf 
claimed that one reason why the courses of action pursued by different actors vary 
is because their capabilities, intrinsic perceptions and preferences differ. 114 By 
capabilities, Scharpf refers to factors such as personal properties (for instance, 
physical strength, intelligence, human and social capital) and physical resources 
109 Scharpf, F. W. op.cit., p.36 
110 Peters, B.G. op.cit, p.44 
111 Scharpf, F. W. (1997) op.cit., p.36 
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(money, land, military power, access to information).1l5 Perceptions are also 
important to Scharpf because he argued that, 
'People act not on the basis of objective reality but on the basis of 
perceived reality and of assumed cause-and-effect relationships 
operating in the world they perceive ... [additionally] people act not only 
on the basis of objective needs but also on the basis of preferences 
reflecting their subjectively defined interests and valuations and their 
normative convictions of how it is right or good or appropriate to act 
under the circumstances'116 
Here rational choice institutionalists appear to accept the notion of bounded 
rationality, discussed in the previous section, rather than supporting a stricter 
conception of rationality. 
In order to understand the preferences of actors, Scharpf divides the concept into 
four components: interests, norms, identities and interaction orientations. ll7 
Scharpf identifies a basic self interest, similar to the notion found in classical 
economics of the rational-actor approach. Basic interest refers to 'the basic 
preference of actors for self-preservation, autonomy and growth' and can be applied 
to the individual or corporate actors. ll8 For the individual, Scharpf sees basic self-
interest as the desire to secure physical well-being and social recognition within 
social institutions which can ensure this self-interest is realised. In a similar vein, 
organisational self-interest is conceived as the preference for organisational 
preservation, autonomy and growth. The second component, normative role 
orientations, relates to the normative expectations of the occupants of certain 
positions, which can involve legal rules or less concrete issues such as social 
115 Ibid 
116 Ibid, p.19 
117 Ibid, p.63 
118 Ibid, p.64 
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disapproval.1l9 Identity refers to a method actors can adopt to organise their 
preferences and communicate these preferences to others, so an identity 'will 
simplify their own choices and ... when communicated and believed, reduces 
uncertainty for other actors'. 120 Whilst these first three categories refer to the 
preferences of the individual, interaction orientations consider the relational 
dimension of actor preferences. 
A key concern of rational choice institutionalism is that individuals acting rationally 
may collectively act irrationally. For instance, an actor may be able to secure a 
higher level of utility by 'free-riding' but the collective is better off if everyone 
cooperates. 121 Rational choice institutionalists often suggest that institutions can be 
designed with utility maximisation in mind, so that more socially desirable outcomes 
can be produced. 122 For instance, in Ostrom's work on common-pool resources her 
key concern was, 'how a group of principals who are in an interdependent situation 
can organize and govern themselves to obtain continuing joint benefits when all 
face temptations to free-ride, shirk or otherwise act opportunistically'.123 Here, 
unlike many other institutionalist models, rational choice institutionalism has a clear 
understanding of the actor. Rational choice institutionalists also often explore the 
interaction of such actors. For example, Scharpf argued that there is a relational 
aspect to preferences, as in policy-making 'envy may play a role, friends may 
cherish each other's gains, and enemies may gloat over each other's losses'. 124 
119 Ibid 
120 Ibid 
121 Olsen, M. op.cit/ p.6S 
122 Peters, B.G. op.cit/ pAS 
123 Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), p.29 
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As a result of the relational aspect of political behaviour, several rational choice 
institutionalists have characterised policy-making as a game, or sets of games 
played between a range of actors. In these games actors choose from a range of 
strategies, which are governed by factors such as their preferences, interests and 
expectations of the behaviour of others. The most famous of these games is the 
prisoner's dilemma, where two players can decide to either cooperate or defect. 
Here each player gains if both cooperate, but if only one player cooperates, the 
other one will gain more. If both defect both lose, but the extent of this loss is not 
as great as for the player who cooperated when the other player defected. 
However, actors who interact regularly are likely to develop expectations of the 
strategies other players will choose, and thus, they change their strategy as a 
result. For example, Axelrod found that when the prisoner's dilemma game is played 
a number of times players are most successful if they adopt the 'tit-for tat' strategy, 
rewarding their opponent for cooperation and punishing them for defecting.125 
Scharpf also points out that the interaction of actors can be shaped by subjective 
elements, which he believe helps to explain why, 
'the peace process in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, or Northern 
Ireland remain so difficult long after it have become clear that all sides 
can only lose from the continuation of conflict1l26 
Here Scharpf suggests that a relationship between actors may develop a character 
which affects the value placed on the 'real' gains or losses that distinguishes the 
125 Axelrod,R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New York) 
126 Scharpf, F. W. (1997) op.cit., pp.84-S 
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relationship from objectively similar relations with other parties, or the same party 
at another time. 127 
Rational choice institutionalism differs from other forms of institutionalism because 
it incorporates a model of actor behaviour. It combines its view of the actor, and 
the interactions of actors, with a focus on the institutional setting in which actors 
operate. As a result there is a need to clearly define the actor and the institution, 
and be able to separate these concepts. 
As Scharpf points out, 'in the final analysis only individuals can act'. 128 The 
implication, therefore, is that studying actors should only involve examining 
individuals. However, it is often the case the individuals act as part of a larger 
group or organisation. For instance, MSPs act as part of a committee or a political 
party. Scharpf argues that it can be helpful at times to define such groups of 
individual actors as collective actors. By identifying a collective actor the suggestion 
is that a capacity for intentional action exists above the individual level.129 The key 
factor in the identification of a collective actor is therefore, that there is a joint 
effect of coordinated action, the individuals involved intend to achieve a common 
purpose. In this thesis, therefore, both individuals and collective actors are studied 
and understood as actors. Whilst at times, collective actors will behave as a unit 
capable of joint intentional action, at others such units will separate into intentional 
individuals with separate preferences. 
127 Ibid, p.85 
128 Ibid p.52 
129 IbId 
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As with other new institutionalist models, defining the institution is a major concern 
of rational choice institutionalism. In Scharpf's model of actor-centred 
institutionalism, institutions are defined as 'systems of rules that structure the 
courses of action that a set of actors may choose'.13o Such a definition includes 
formal rules, such as the legal system, and also social norms, which if violated can 
result in loss of reputation, social disapproval and withdrawal of co-operation or 
rewards. l3l This differs from Ostrom et al. who saw institutions as sanctioned rules 
which change the costs and benefits for particular actions,132 and March and Olsen 
who argued that institutions can be social entities capable of purposive action.133 
Scharpf rejects both approaches arguing that Ostrom et al. are too narrow in their 
approach because social norms need to be incorporated into a definition of the 
institution and that March and Olsen are too broad because institutions are not 
capable of purposeful action. To Scharpf, social entities which are capable of 
purposeful action should be seen as organisations or corporate actors, and in 
contrast institutions simply structure the courses of actions actors may choose. 134 
Here Scharpf's definition has similarities to North's conception of institutions as 
'humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction',135 and it has similarities 
with other new institutionalist models which broadly argue that 'individuals will 
make conscious choices, but those choices will remain within the parameters 
established by the dominant institutional values'.136 Whilst rational choice theorists 
tend to ignore the possibility that institutions can shape the preferences and values 
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of actors, some rational-choice institutionalists take a wider view of institutions. 
Scharpf argued that institutions: 
'define not only the membership of composite actors and the material 
and legal action resources they can draw upon, and thus the scope of 
their legitimate activities and the powers of the individuals who act for 
them, but also the purposes that they are to serve or the values that 
they are to consider in arriving at their choicest137 
According to Scharpf institutions define how outcomes will be evaluated by the 
actors involved, and so influence what an actor considers as a feasible option.138 
For instance, part of the criteria for successful policy-making set by an institution 
may include undergoing a certain level of consultation during the policy-making 
process. Therefore, if a policy was successfully implemented but had not 
undergone the set consultation procedures, it could be evaluated as a failure. In 
this way the institution helps to shape the feasible options available to the actor, in 
this case perhaps encouraging them to consult on their policy proposals. 
Scharpf also claims that the institutionalised responsibilities of an actor influence 
their perceptions. For instance, membership of a particular department can 
influence preferences, 'not only by focusing attention on different phenomena but 
by influencing views of the relative causal effectiveness of phenomena that are 
jointly perceived'. 139 For example, in Allison's study of the Cuban missile crisis, 
different participants, depending on which department they were in, had different 
interpretations of what was happening and of what was in the best interests of the 
United States. 140 Here Allison's study implies that institutions shape the perceptions 
136 Peters, B.G. op.cit, p.29 
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of actors. Scharpf's model adopts a similar view of institutions, claiming that 
'institutions not only constrain feasible strategies, but they also constitute the 
important players of the game and shape their perceptions and valuations of 
outcomes in the payoff matrix. In short, the games that are in fact being played in 
policy processes are to a large extent defined by institutions'.141 
The definitions of actors and institutions outlined here mean at times an entity can 
be both an actor and an institution. To Scharpf, social entities which are capable of 
purposeful action should be seen as organisations or corporate actors, and in 
contrast institutions simply structure the courses of actions actors may choose. 142 
However, it is possible to have an entity which is both capable of purposeful action 
and structures courses of action. For instance, the Health and Community Care 
Committee in Scotland was an actor, in the sense that it possessed shared interests 
and a common purpose. However, the Committee was also an institution, 
structuring the interactions of actors by providing norms and rules for behaviour. 
Here it appears that at times an entity cannot be clearly defined as either an actor 
or an institution. As a result it could be argued that whilst separating the concepts 
of actors and institutions can be methodologically useful, there is no ontological 
distinction between institutions and behaviour.143 Yet, an entity's role as an actor 
can be separated from its role as an institution, and each component can be 
examined separately. For instance, the Health and Community Care Committee's 
role as a purposeful actor can be separated from its role as an institution, 
structuring the behaviour of actors. 
141 Scharpf, F. W. (1997) op.cit, p.4D 
142 Ibid., p.38 
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This thesis uses Scharpf's model of actor-centred institutionalism as a framework for 
understanding devolved policy-making, exploring policy-making through an 
examination of actor preferences, expectations and strategies, and the institutional 
context in which these actors operate. Actor-centred institutionalism offers a good 
starting point for exploring policy-making and providing possible explanations for 
why certain policies were adopted. However, this is not to suggest that actor-
centred institutionalism has all the answers. 
A major problem with rational choice institutionalism is its adoption of a thin notion 
of rationality; as long as preferences are ordered, fairly consistent and directed at a 
particular goal, they are thought to be rational. As a result the concept lose,s 
analytical value. After all, as Peters notes, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where 
actors 'could be said not to be acting rationally in the context of some possible set 
of incentives or another'.144 Bevir and Rhodes agree with Peters, arguing that the 
thin conception of rationality which focuses on logical consistency is problematic 
because 'it is either false or valid but of limited value. If we use an expanded notion 
of preference merely as a cloak under which to smuggle back in a na'lve view of self 
interest, it is false. But if we extend our concept of a preference to cover any motive 
for any action, we leave the concept pretty much devoid of all content'. 145 As a 
result of such criticism most rational choice institutionalists seek to 'fill out' the 
notion of preferences, appealing to the 'natural', 'obvious' or 'presumed' preferences 
143 Diermeier, D. and Krehbiel, K. (2003) 'Institutionalism as a Methodology' in Journal of Theoretical 
Politics(VoI.1S, No.2,pp123-144), p.126 
144 Peters, B.G. op.cit, p.61 
145 Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (2001) 'A Decentered Theory of Governance: Rational Choice, 
Institutionalism, and Interpretation' Working Paper 2001-10 accessed at 
www.igs.berkeley.edu!publications!workingpapers/WP2001-10.pdf, p.14 
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of people in certain positions.146 For instance, we may presume that politicians seek 
to maximize their support at the next election. 
Despite the obvious problems with adopting a rational choice institutionalists 
approach, rational choice institutionalism highlights 'key aspects of politics that are 
often underappreciated by other perspectives'147 and provides tools for analyzing 
them. Its focus on the strategic interaction between actors in shaping political 
outcomes is a key addition to institutionalists approaches, and as Hall and Taylor 
suggest, this a major advance on traditional institutionalists approaches despite the 
drawback that 'this advance comes at the cost of conceptualizing intentionality in 
terms of a relatively thin theory of human rationality'.148 
The multi-level governance approach is an example of an actor-centred 
institutionalist approach as it focuses on the actor's role in policy-making but also 
recognises the importance of institutions, as a set of formal and informal rules 
which can constrain political actors.149 Marks justified his actor-centred approach by 
maintaining that 'institutions do not think'.150 Therefore, an actor's membership of 'a 
particular institution does not allow one to infer that the individual wishes to defend 
that institution's autonomy'.151 
146 Ibid, p.14-1S 
147 Hall, P. and Taylor, R. op.cit, p.18 
148 Ibid 
For example, although MPs are located in 
149 Sloat, A. (2001) 'Multi-Level Governance: An Actor-Centered Approach' Paper given at the Multi-
Level Governance Conference of July 2001 at University of Sheffiekt accessed at 
www.shef.ac.uk/lVperc/mlgc/papers/sloat.pdf on 29/3/02, p.3 
150 Marks, G. (1997) 'An Actor-Centred Approach to Multi-Level Governance' in Jeffery, C. (Ed.) The 
Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe? (Frank Cass, London), 
p.22 
151 Ibid, p.34 
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Westminster, their criticism of the institution can vary and their primary loyalty may 
lie with their party or constituents rather than the institution itself. 
MLG theory tends to focus on policy-making at one level, the European level, and 
assesses the impact of a range of actors from different levels on the European 
Union's policies. The main example cited by MLG theorists is the case of EU 
structural funds. Structural funds, such as Objective One described in section 1.4, 
are awarded to regions rather than states and are allocated according to the 
partnership principle. The partnership principle is basically meant to ensure that 
there is close consultation and co-operation between the EU Commission, national 
governments and regional authorities when determining how the funds should be 
spent.152 Through their analysis of this case Marks et al. identify a 'system of multi-
level government involving competition and interdependence among the 
Commission, Council and European Parliament'.153 However, if MLG signifies a 
broader phenomenon of shared policy-making control it should also be possible to 
apply the theory to the state or sub-state level. 
Whilst the EU level is not considered here, it may be helpful to draw on the MLG 
approach throughout the thesis to explore the impact of governmental actors at 
both the state and devolved tiers, including members of government, backbenchers 
and opposition party members, and the role of civil society actors operating at the 
devolved tier will be investigated. Civil society is defined by the London School of 
Economics as, 
152 Dinan, D. (1994) Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community (Macmillan Press 
Limited, London), p.4D? 
153 Marks, G. Hooghe, L. and Blank, K. op.cit, p.361 
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'the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, 
purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from 
those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries 
between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, 
blurred and negotiated,.154 
As a result pressure groups and policy experts operating at the devolved levels, as 
examples of civil society actors, will be explored. This thesis shall draw on the MLG 
approach to explore how policy-making control is divided between this range of 
actors and how the institutional setting shapes the interaction of these actors. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In the UK's devolved institutions both new configurations of actors and new 
institutions have been introduced to the policy-making system. It is likely that both 
these factors have influenced the policy-making emanating from the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. For instance, Keating identifies 
the expansion of ministers, specialist advisors, innovative groupings of functions and 
the structure of the Scottish Parliament as potential forces for distinctive policy-
making in Scotland.1ss 
In this study the theory of actor-centred institutionalism will be used as a 
framework for understanding how the decisions affecting financing of long-term 
care for the elderly in Scotland and Wales were made. We will explore the role of 
both the individual actor and the institutional setting in shaping the long-term care 
policies, and will use Scharpf's work on preferences and actor interactions to inform 
1S4 London School of Economics- Centre for Civil Society What is Civil Society? accessed at 
www.lse.ac.uk on 8/9/05 
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this exploration. Moreover, we shall make use of the definitions of actors and 
institutions discussed in Scharpf's theoretical framework. As a result, the actor 
(individual, collective or corporate) is seen as purposeful and their behaviour as 
intentional, whilst the institutional setting should be understood as 'systems of rules 
that structure the courses of action that a set of actors may choose'.156 Such a 
definition of institutions includes formal rules, such as the legal system, and also 
social norms, which if violated can result in loss of reputation, social disapproval and 
withdrawal of co-operation or rewards. 1S7 
The justification for applying actor-centred institutionalism is that it offers a starting 
point from which to explore policy-making. Actor-centred institutionalism should be 
understood as a framework rather than a theory, meaning it should provide a guide 
for understanding policy-making. As Scharpf himself explains, employing theoretical 
approaches to policy research tends not to be helpful because 'constellations are too 
variable and research interests too specific,.158 It is not my intention to test actor-
centred institutionalism in depth, but simply to borrow from the theory in order to 
better understand devolved policy-making. Actor-centred institutionalism is useful 
because it suggests clear reasons why different policies are adopted, due to the 
different configuration of actors and the different institutions. However, other 
approaches discussed in this chapter can offer further insights into devolved policy-
making, and this study will draw on these where they are useful; particularly the 
155 Keating, M. (2001) 'Devolution and Public Policy in the United Kingdom: Divergence or 
Convergence?' Seminar on Devolution in Pracace (Institute of Public Policy Research, October 2001), 
p.3 
156 Scharpf, F. W. (1997) op.cit., p.38 
157 Ibid. 
158 Scharpf, F. W. (1997) op.cit., p.37 
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MLG theory and the concepts of 'race to the bottom' and 'laboratories of 
democracy'. 
The institutional settings explored in this thesis are the Scottish Parliament and the 
National Assembly for Wales. Often as shorthand throughout this study it will be 
suggested that 'the Scottish Parliament' or 'the National Assembly for Wales' took a 
certain decision or agreed a certain policy. By this I mean that a decision or policy 
was sanctioned by the actors within these institutions; Scharpf is or course, correct 
to note that institutions cannot themselves make decisions. The actors explored in 
the study are those from the devolved governments and opposition parties, UK 
governmental actors, pressure groups and policy experts who were involved in 
shaping the long-term care of the elderly policies at the devolved levels. 
In this study the concepts of institutions and actors are separated in order to 
distinguish between the factors which influenced how policies were made, allowing 
for easier analysis. When discussing the actor, the focus is on the actor's 
preferences and perceptions even though the institutional setting plays a role in 
shaping these orientations and the discussion of the institutional setting focuses 
more on the formal and informal rules which structure actor interactions and 
allocate capabilities to actors. However, in reality the actor and the institution are 
not so clearly separated. As Diermeier notes, separating these concepts is a useful 
methodological distinction which 'becomes troubling only if one insists on an 
ontological distinction between institutions and behaviour' .159 
159 Dierrneier, D. and Krehbiel, K. (2003) 'Institutionalism as a Methodology' in Journal of Theoretical 
Politics (Vo1.15, No.2, pp.123-144), p.126 
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Chapter Three 
Policy Divergence and Long-Term Care 
The aim of this thesis is to explore why the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales pursued distinctive policies from the UK Government. In order 
to examine the reasons for distinctive policy-making this thesis focuses on one case 
study, the financial arrangements for long-term care for the elderly. The adoption 
of free personal care was one of the earliest and clearest cases of policy divergence 
in Scotland.1 Whilst in Wales, the Welsh Assembly Government framed the entire 
long-term care debate differently from Scotland and England, perhaps indicating a 
higher level of policy divergence. Therefore, there are three distinct long-term care 
policies in operation in Scotland, Wales and England. Rather than intending to 
compare the successes or failures of these policies, this chapter simply seeks to 
demonstrate that policy divergence exists, so that subsequent chapters can explore 
why it exists. However, before examining the three long-term care policies adopted 
in England, Scotland and Wales there is a need to clarify the term policy divergence. 
3.1 Policy divergence 
In order to explore policy divergence we must first explain what we mean when we 
speak of public policy. Hogwood and Gunn identified ten different ways of defining 
the term 'policy', 
1 The term 'free personal care' was used in Scotland to signify a long-term care for the elderly policy 
which included a capped level of funds for personal care. Therefore, whilst those with low personal 
care costs might have received personal care completely free of charge, those with high personal care 
costs were expected to pay for some of their personal care costs. Therefore, the 'free personal care' 
policy did not mean that universally all personal care would be provided for free. 
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1) A label for a field of activity 
2) An expression of general purpose or desired state of affairs 
3) Specific proposals 
4) Decisions of government 
5) Formal authorization 
6) A programme 
7) An output 
8) An outcome 
9) A theory or model 
10) A process2 
As a result, Hogwood and Gunn suggest that 'Policy' can be used to refer to the 
intentions of the policy-maker, actions or decisions, effects or the process of making 
policy itself. Throughout the thesis policy is understood 'as the stated aims of 
policy-makers and the legislative and administrative measures taken to realise 
them'.3 Therefore, the thesis considers both policy decisions announced by policy-
makers and the initiatives designed to implement these decisions. As Keating 
explained, such an approach may encourage a skewed picture of devolved policy-
making. For instance, policy-makers may state policy aims to mask a hidden 
agenda.4 Additionally, focusing on policy as action ignores the importance of 
inaction. As Hogwood and Gunn pOinted out, if, for instance, government chooses 
not to change the laws on abortion then their inaction gives tacit consent for the 
current policy.s In additional Wildavsky suggested that defining policy only as a 
final product was problematic, as 'policy is a process as well as a product. 6 
However, despite the weaknesses of focusing on the decisions and actions of policy-
makers, such an approach allows us to clearly identify policy, to trace why these 
2 Hogwood, B. and Gunn, L. (1984) Policy Analysis for the Real World(Oxford University Press, 
Oxford), pp.13-18 . 
3 Keating, M. (2003) Policy Convergence and Divergence in Scotland under Devolution (Regional 
Studies Association Annual Conference) accessed at www.devolution.ac.uklKeatinq rsa 03.pdf on 
9/9/04, p.95 
4 Ibid. 
S Hogwood, B. and Gunn, L (1984), op.cit., p.21 
6 Wildavsky, A. (1979) Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis (Boston: Little 
Brown), p.387 
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policies have emerged, and therefore, offers a good starting point from which to 
understand distinctive policy-making by the UK's devolved institutions. 
The use of the term 'policy divergence' in this thesis primarily refers to the 
differences between policies made in Scotland and Wales from those in England, 
called vertical divergence. This study will also comment on horizontal divergence, 
which is when policies in the devolved administrations differ from each other. 
Policies can diverge in a number of different ways, some of which are more 
significant than others. Keating argued that the most radical form of divergence 
would entail the identification of different issues, leading to the production of a 
distinct policy agenda in the devolved institutions.7 In the first terms of the 
devolved institutions their agendas tended to mirror Westminster's, the major 
exceptions to this were in non-comparable areas where the same needs did not 
occur in Scotland, Wales and England. For example, the National Assembly's 
agenda deviated from Westminster when it considered Welsh language policies, 
which were not necessary for England. The second most radical form of 
divergence occurs if the same issues are identified but defined and framed 
differently.s For instance, the governments in Scotland, England and Wales may 
agree that drug addiction is a problem, but one government may define the 
problem as one of criminality, and so focus on the punishment of addicts, whilst the 
others may see addiction as a health issue and work towards providing care and 
assistance to addicts. A third and even less radical form of divergence occurs when 
issues are defined in the same way by each government but different policies are 
adopted, and the least radical form of divergence is when the same policies are 
7 Keating, M. op.cit, p.l 
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adopted but delivered differently.9 Figure 3.1 illustrates that these different types of 
divergence can be categorised on a scale from a high to a low level of policy 
divergence. At times simply identifying the type of divergence occurring can assist 
our understanding of the importance of the policy divergence, so these categories 
can aid our discussion of the long-term care policies in the UK. 
Figure 3.1: Types of Policy Divergence 
High level of divergence Low level of divergence 
I I I I 
Distinct policy Issues defined Different policies Policies 
agenda and framed adopted delivered 
differently differently 
3.2 The UK Policy 
It is worth noting that funding care for the elderly is an issue for many other 
countries. In their analysis of OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries, Banting and Corbett note that in relation to health policy 
'common goals, common pressures and common constraints have generated a 
shared agenda' and the funding of long-term care for the elderly is one of the issues 
they identify on the agendas of all the OECD countries.lO In the UK the Royal 
Commission for Long-Term Care, chaired by Stewart Sutherland, was established in 
1997 by the newly elected Labour Government to examine 'options for a sustainable 
system of funding of long-term care for older people'.l1 The Royal Commission 
reported in March 1999, recommending that long-term care provision should be 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Banting, K.G. and Corbett, S. (2002) 'Health Policy and Federalism: An Introduction' in Banting, K.G. 
and Corbett,S (Eds.) Health Policy and Federalism: A Comparative Perspective on Multi-Level 
Governance (McGill-Queens University Press, London), pp.3-4 
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divided into living, housing and personal care, and that different payment systems 
should apply to these different categories of care. The Commission's key 
recommendation was that all those assessed as needing personal and nursing care 
should have the costs of their care met by the taxpayer, regardless of their assets. 
The Royal Commission defined personal care as all direct care related to: 
• personal toilet (washing, bathing, skin care, personal presentation, dressing and 
undressing and skin care); 
• eating and drinking (as opposed to obtaining and preparing food and drink); 
• managing urinary and bowel functions (including maintaining continence and 
managing incontinence); 
• managing problems associated with immobility; 
• management of prescribed treatment (e.g. administration and monitoring 
medication), 
• behaviour management and ensuring personal safety (for example, for those with 
cognitive impairment - minimising stress and risk)Y 
In contrast, the Commission suggested that people should be responsible for paying 
their living and housing costs, if they have the means to do SO.13 The Royal 
Commission also explored alternative methods of assisting the costs of long-term 
care, in case their key recommendation was rejected. These included 
recommendations to at least exempt nursing care from means testing and to 
disregard the value of a person's house when calculating how much they should 
contribute to their care costs for three months when they first enter long-term 
care. 14 The Commission's findings were weakened by the fact that two 
commissioners, David Lipsey and Joel Joffe disagreed with the free personal care 
recommendation. Instead Lipsey and Joffe issued a note of dissent which argued 
11 Royal Commission on Long-term care (1999) With Respect to Old Age (The Stationary Office, 
London), Terms of Reference 
12 Ibid., Chapter 6 
13 Ibid., Executive Summary 
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that the proposal for free personal care was counterproductive as it would harm the 
long-term care of elderly people 'by diverting resources from the care they need'.1s 
The Royal Commission's recommendations about long-term care for the elderly can 
be seen, in Kingdon's terms, as ideas floating around in a 'policy primeval SOUp'.16 
Kingdon suggested that a variety of policy proposals float about in such a soup, 
surviving for serious consideration only if they meet criteria such as technical 
feasibility, consistency with dominant values and the current national mood, and 
possession of political supportY The long-term care policies adopted in England, 
Scotland and Wales, and most of the policy options explored in each nation, were 
largely based on the work of the Royal Commission. The consideration of funding 
long-term care for the elderly was also shaped by wider debates about welfare in 
the UK. The Labour party in particular was divided about welfare provision, with 
major disagreement about whether to focus on means-testing and targeting 
benefits or universal provision. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats appeared 
relatively united about the long-term care issue, with many Liberal Democrats 
championing the notion of universal provision. Therefore, whilst the Royal 
Commission set out the detailed proposals on long-term care funding which were 
considered throughout the UK, the wider terms of the debate were set by internal 
and external party disputes. 
Figure 3.2 below compares the different long-term care policies in the UK, before 
this chapter explores the English, Scottish and Welsh policies in more detail. 
14 Ibid./ 5.6.7 
15 Ibid./ Note of Dissent 
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Figure 3.2 Comparison of long-term care policies throughout the UK 
En~land Wales Scotland 
Personal Opposed free personal care due In favour of free personal care Introduced free 
care to cost in principle, but only if funded personal care 
by UK Government 
6 weeks free home care on 6 weeks free home care on 
discharge from hospital discharge from hospital 
Attendance Allowance Attendance Allowance Flat-rate 
higher rate- £58.80 per wk higher rate- £58.80 per wk payment 
lower rate- £39.35 per wk lower rate- £39.35 per wk £145 per wk 
(includes the M 
entitlement) 
Nursing Banded model Flat-rate model Flat-rate model 
Care 
Initial rate £25, £70, £110 per wk £100 per wk £65 per wk 
2004 rate £40, £77.50, £125 per wk £105 per wk £65 per wk 
Capital 
Limits 
2001 Lower- £11,500 Lower- £11,500 Lower- £11,500 
Upper- £18,500 Upper- £18,500 Upper- £18,500 
2004 
Lower- £12,500 Lower- £13,500 Lower- £11,750 
Upper- £20,000 Upper- £20,000 Upper- £19,000 
Personal 
Expenses 
Allowance 
2001 £16.05 £16.05 £16.05 
2004 £18.10 £18.40 £18.10 
Someone living in a residential home requiring a medium level of nursing care and 
personal care with assets of £100,000 in 2004 would receive £136 per week in 
England (Attendance allowance: £58.80, Nursing care: £77.50), £163.80 in Wales 
(Attendance allowance: £58.80, Nursing care: £105) and £210 in Scotland (Personal 
care: £145, Nursing care: £65). Those in care will not always be better off in 
Scotland than elsewhere. For instance, if a person with assets of £12,000 lives in a 
residential home in England and requires care they will not have to contribute 
16 Kingdon, J. W (1984) Agenda~ Alternatives and Public Policies (Scott, Foresman and Company, 
London), p.21 
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anything to their care costs. However, the same resident in Scotland would have to 
contribute a small amount to their care. The complexities of the system means the 
amount someone receives to pay for their care costs will vary dramatically 
depending on their individual circumstances. 
3.3 The English Policy 
3.3.1 Free Personal Care 
On 2ih July 2000, as part of the debate on the NHS plan, Tony Blair announced his 
belief that it would be better to spend £900 million on intermediate care rather than 
making all personal care free. 18 The Government consistently justified their decision 
not to introduce free personal care on the basis that 'the Government, does not 
believe that making personal care universally free would be the best use of the 
resources needed to make older people's services better and more responsive'.19 
Ideologically, therefore, the UK Government were not opposed to the prinCiple of 
free personal care, they just agreed with Lipsey and Joffe's argument that the 
resources needed to fund free personal care would be better spent elsewhere. 
However, the UK Government remained committed to giving some assistance to 
those in receipt of personal care through their Attendance Allowance payments. 
Attendance Allowance, which later became important to the development of the 
Scottish long-term care policy, was defined by the Department for Work and 
Pensions CDWP) as, 
17 Ibid. 
18 House of Commons, Hansard, 27th July 2000 
19 Department of Health (July 2000) The NHS plan: The Government's response to the Royal 
Commission on Long-term care accessed at www.dh.gov.ukJassetRootJ04LOSL21L54L040S2154.Ddf on 
3/12/03, p.S 
103 
'a benefit which is paid to people over 65 years of age who need help 
with personal care or who need supervision to avoid substantial danger 
to themselves or others. The entitlement is based on how much help is 
needed with bodily functions and/or supervision, and the benefit is 
intended to help meet the extra costs of people with severe disability'.20 
The payment varies depending on individual circumstances, but is roughly £58.80 
per week at the higher rate and £39.35 at the lower rateY 
The UK Government's decision not to introduce free personal care was a 
disappointment to many service providers, specialists and pressure groups with 
experience and knowledge of providing care for older people. However, the UK 
Government did accept many of the Royal Commission's other recommendations, 
which were widely welcomed, several of which are discussed below. 
3.3.2 Nursing Care 
During the debate on the NHS plan, Tony Blair announced that 'From October 2001, 
subject to parliamentary approval, nursing care in nursing homes will be treated as 
nursing care elsewhere in the NHS - free at the point of use'.22 However, it is worth 
noting that unlike other forms of care in the NHS, the policy of free nursing care did 
not actually mean that nursing care in nursing homes would be available entirely for 
free. As figure 3.2 illustrated, in 2004 the English policy of 'free nursing care' 
provided up to £125 per week for nursing care, therefore, if a person's nursing care 
cost more than this amount they would be required to contribute to their care. 
20 Department for Work and Pensions Disability Living Allowance OvervIew accessed at 
www.dwp.gov.uklmedicalldla.pdf on 18/11/03 
21 Department for Work and Pensions (2004) Attendance Allowance 
www.dwp.gov.uk/lifeevent/benefits/attendance allowance.asp#caniget 
22 House of Commons, Hansard, 27 th July 2000 
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The introduction of free nursing care required primary legislation, and the Health 
and Social Care Act (2001) allowed for its implementation. The Health and Social 
Care Act (2001) defined nursing care as, 
'any services provided by a registered nurse and involving-
a) the provision of care, or 
b) the planning, supervision or delegation of the provision of care, 
other than any services which, having regard to their nature and the 
circumstances in which they are provided, do not need to be provided by 
a registered nurse'.23 
The UK Government's free nursing care policy was introduced on 1st October 2001. 
Payments for nursing care were arranged using a tiered system, where nursing 
needs were assessed and the patient awarded £35, £70 or £110 per week 
depending on their nursing needs.24 The UK Government also committed to 
reviewing these payments, and increased them in April 2003 when they rose to £40, 
£75 or £12025 , and again in April 2004 when the lowest band stayed at £40 but the 
other tiers increased to £77.50 and £125. 26 
3.3.3 Capital limits 
Prior to the Royal Commission personal and nursing care were already provided for 
free for many of those in long-term care. Capital limits set the amount of money a 
person was allowed to possess (which included the value of their house) before 
they were required to contribute to their care costs. Those who owned less than 
the lower capital limit received all their care free whilst those with assets above the 
upper capital limit had to pay all of their care costs, with a tariff rate applied to 
23 Health and Social Care Act(2001) ch.1S (5.49 (2)) 
24 Department of Health (1 October 2001) Press Release: Free nursing care for all introduced from 
today accessed at www.dh.gov.uk on 14/8/04 
25 Health Newswire Professional (27 December 2002)More money for free nursing care 
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those falling between these categories. In the UK Government's reforms to long-
term care in 2001, they altered the capital limits. In 2001 the lower limit was raised 
from £10,000 to £11,500, and the upper limit from £16,000 to £18,500. 27 As with 
the nursing care bands, capital limits were also kept under review and were raised 
in April 2002 to £11,750 and £19,00028, in April 2003 to £12,000 and £19,500 and in 
April 2004 to £12,500 and £20,000.29 For capital of between the upper and lower 
limits, a tariff rate of £1 a week was charged for each complete £250, or part of 
£250 held, over the lower limit.30 The tariff rate meant, for example, in June 2001 a 
care resident with £12,630 capital would have the first £11,500 of their capital 
disregarded, and for the £1,130 remainding is charged for each £250, or part of 
£250 left, meaning they pay £5 per week towards their care. In addition care 
residents are required to contribute any weekly income to their care home fees, 
minus a set amount for personal allowances, regardless of whether they possess 
savings or not. In 2001 the amount allowed for personal allowances was £16.05 a 
week, this was increased in 2002 to £16.80, to £17.50 in April 2003 and to £18.10 
in April 2004.31 
26 Department of Health (2004) NHS funded nursing care: overview and information for the public 
accessed at www.dh.gov.uk on 18/8/04 
27 Department of Health (1 October 2001),op.cit 
28 Department of Health (March 2002) Local Authority Orcular LAC (2000) 11 
29 Wright, M. (13 March 2004) 'Inquiry into care homes side-steps the big issue' in The Daily 
Telegraph, p.ll 
30 Department of Health (5 January 2001) Press Release: Thousands to benefit from changes to 
residential care assessment accessed at www.dh.gov.uk on 18/8/04 
31 Department of Health (2004) 'Proposed Changes to Residential Care Charges' accessed at 
www.dh.gov.uk on 9/8/04; Department of Health (March 2002) op.cit.; Department of Health (2001) 
Local Authority Orcular LAC (2001)10; Department of Health (2003) Local Authority Orcular LAC 
(2003)8 
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3.3.4 Three Month House Disregard and Deferred Payment Scheme 
The UK Government also accepted in full the Royal Commission's recommendation 
that the value of the home should be disregarded for up to three months after 
admission to care in a residential setting, meaning that when calculating the amount 
someone should contribute to their care costs the person's home is not included in 
the calculation for the first three months of admission into care.32 Disregarding the 
value of the house for up to three months from the means test was introduced in 
England from April 2001.33 The three months disregard was taken to alleviate 
pressure on those entering care, to give them space to decide about the care they 
required. Disregarding the value of their house would allow a resident to move 
back home if their health improved, as their home would still be there. After the 
twelve week period the deferred payment scheme allows residents the option of not 
selling their home to pay for their care. 34 
The deferred payment scheme means that local councils will pay for the cost of 
residential care, on the understanding that they will get this money back when the 
resident dies and the house is sold.35 Local authorities simply lend money to care 
residents, which is secured against the value of the property. The deferred 
payment model was introduced in England on the 1st October 2001. Although prior 
to this date councils did have powers to place 'legal charges on homes and to 
recoup their costs at a later stage once the house is sold', in their response to the 
Royal Commission, the UK Government dedicated a ring-fenced grant to councils to 
32 Department of Health (July 2000) op.cit, p.8 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p.13 
35 Ibid. 
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pay for greater use of these powers.36 The UK Government justified the 
introduction of these measures as a means to 'ease the pressure on people to sell 
their own homes against their wishes and [to]. .. lessen the burden of care costs'. 37 
3.4 The Scottish Policy 
The key difference between the English and Scottish long-term care policies was on 
the issue of free personal care. However, there were also clear differences on some 
of the related long-term care policies too. 
3.4.1 Free Personal Care 
The Scottish Government decided to introduce free personal care from the 1st July 
2002.The definition for personal care adopted by the Scottish Executive was similar 
to the definition proposed by the Royal Commission (see section 3.2), and included; 
36 Ibid. 
'Personal Hygiene: Bathing, showering, hair washing, shaving, oral 
hygiene, nail care 
Continence Management: Toileting, catheter/stoma care, skin care, 
incontinence laundry, bed changing 
Food and Diet: Assistance with eating and assistance with special diets. 
Assistance to manage different types of meal services. Assistance with 
preparation of food. 
Problems of immobility: Dealing with the consequences of not being 
able to move 
Counselling and support: Behaviour management, psychological 
support, reminding devices and safety devices 
Simple treatments: Assistance with medication (including eye drops), 
application of creams and lotions, simple dressings, oxygen therapy 
Personal Assistance: Assistance with dreSSing, surgical appliances, 
prostheses, mechanical and manual aids. Assistance to get up and to go 
to bed. Transfers including use of a hoist'.38 
37 Ibid., p.11 
38 Care Development Group (14 September 2001) Fair Care for Older People accessed at 
www.scotland.gov.ukllibrary3/healthlcdgr-00.asp, Chapter 4 
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As already has been noted, the term free personal care does not mean that all 
personal care was provided for free, but that the Scottish Executive would 
contribute a set amount towards personal care costs. Personal care was 
distinguished from nursing care and hotel costs. 
The Scottish Executive decided that those assessed as requiring free personal care 
would receive a flat-rate payment of £90 a week. 39 In addition to the £90 paid by 
the Scottish Government, it was assumed that those in nursing or residential care 
would still be eligible for the UK Government's attendance allowance, then a 
maximum £55 per week (see section 3.3.1). Therefore, the full free personal care 
entitlement would be £145 per week. 40 In the end the Department of Work and 
Pensions (DWP) refused to continue to pay Attendance Allowance, and the Scottish 
Executive decided to contribute the full amount of £145 per week themselves. 
Initially the Scottish Government aimed to introduce free personal care on 1st April 
2002, but due to implementation problems free personal care was introduced in 
Scotland three months later, on 1st July. To implement free personal care and 
nursing care in Scotland primary legislation was required, and these measures were 
included in the Community Care and Health Act (Scotland) (2002). 
3.4.2 Free Nursing Care 
Free nursing care was also introduced in Scotland on 1st July 2002. Unlike the 
English banded model for free nursing care payments, in Scotland a flat-rate 
39 Scottish Parliament/ Plenary Session/26th September 2001 
40 Ibid. 
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payment of £65 was introduced, which was paid directly to care homes.41 Those 
requiring nursing care in Scotland automatically received £65 and those requiring 
nursing and personal care in Scotland were provided with £210 a week towards 
their care costs. In contrast to the English model, in Scotland there have been no 
increases to the amount paid for free nursing care; it is still set at £65 a week. 
3.4.3 Capital limits 
In April 2001 the Scottish Government matched England, raising capital limits for 
care from £10,000 to £11,500 and from £16,000 to £18,500.42 However, whilst 
English capital limits were raised in 2002 and 2003, in Scotland capital limits 
remained at the levels set in 2001 until April 2004 when Scottish capital limits were 
raised to £11,750 and £19,000,43 which is slightly lower than the English limits of 
£12,500 and £20,000.44 In Scotland the personal expenses allowance rose at the 
same rate as England, at £16.05 a week in 2001, £16.80 in 2002, £17.50 in 2003 
and £18.10 in 2004.45 
3.4.4 Three Month House Disregard and Deferred Payment Scheme 
As in England the Scottish Executive also introduced the 12 weeks property 
disregard, introduced on 9th April 2001. The 12 weeks property disregard only 
41 Ibid 
42 Scottish Statutory Instrument (2001) No. 105 The National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) 
Amendment (No.2) (Scotland) Regulations 2001 
43 Scottish Executive Health Department (1 March 2004) Orcular No.CCD3/2004: Uprating of 
residential care charging rules/ National Assistance (Sums for Personal Requirements) (Scotland) 
Regulations 2004/ National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) Amendment (Scotland) Regulations 
2004 
44 Wright, M., op.cit., p.ll 
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required secondary legislation. In contrast the deferred payment scheme required 
primary legislation, and The Community Care and Health Act (2002) allowed for the 
introduction of the deferred payment scheme. The scheme was introduced on 1st 
July 2002, the same day as free personal and nursing care, but nine months after 
the policy was introduced in England. The aim of the policy was the same as in 
England, to allow residents the option of deferring payment of their contribution to 
care home fees to avoid selling their homes.46 The Scottish Executive provided local 
authorities with additional money, £3.5 million for 2002/3 and a further £3.5 million 
for 2003/4 to enable them to make the additional deferred payments. 47 
3.5 The Welsh Policy 
3.5.1 Free Personal Care 
To have introduced free personal care in Wales the Welsh Assembly Government 
would have needed to request primary legislation to be passed at Westminster. The 
Welsh Assembly Government did not make such a request. However, all Assembly 
Members unanimously supported the principle of free personal care, and voted to 
'challenge the UK Government to fund and implement free personal care in the 
context of UK taxation, benefits and inheritance policy as the Royal Commission had 
intended'.48 Therefore, whilst Assembly members were not willing to pursue free 
personal care on a Wales only basis, they did believe that the UK Government 
45 Scottish Statutory Instrument (2001), op.cit.,; Scottish Executive (3 April 2002) Charging for 
residential accommodation guide; National Assistance (Sums for Personal Requirements) (Scotland) 
Regulations 2002; Scottish Statutory Instrument (2003) No. 86 The National Assistance (Sums for 
Personal Requirements) (Scotland) Regulations 2003; Scottish Executive Health Department op.cit. 
46 Scottish Executive (21 June 2002) Community Care Circular ceo 7/2002 - Deferred Payment of Care 
Home Fees accessed at www.show.scot.nhs.uklsehd/publications/CCD2002 07.pdf on 23/8/04 
47 Ibid. 
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should introduce and fund free personal care for England and Wales. The National 
Assembly for Wales, and the UK Government, also introduced six weeks of free 
personal care at home following hospital discharge. The intention of this policy was 
to allow older people without medical needs to leave hospital, thus freeing up 
hospital beds. 
3.5.2 Free Nursing Care 
Free nursing care in Wales was introduced for those who paid for their own care in 
December 2001, meaning that no individual who paid for nursing care from their 
own resources paid for their care from this date, and in April 2003 the policy was 
implemented in full (meaning that for residents of care homes funded by local 
authorities, local authorities stopped paying the NHS for their nursing care).49 The 
introduction of free nursing care in Wales came just two months after free nursing 
care was introduced in England. The Welsh Assembly Government decided not to 
introduce a banding system similar to the English model. Instead they opted for a 
flat-rate payment, as adopted by Scotland. The National Assembly for Wales 
decided to make payments of £100 a week for all those in need of nursing care, £35 
more that the Scottish Parliament's nursing payment.50 In England those with 
nursing needs received £35, £70 or £110 per week. 51 Therefore, most people 
requiring nursing care in Wales would receive a greater level of support than their 
counterparts in England. As in England, the Welsh Assembly Government has also 
increased the nursing payment since its introduction. However, the payment has 
48 National Assembly for Wales (May 2002) Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older People in Wales: 
When I'm 64 ... and more/ p.53 
49 Welsh Assembly Government (5 November 2001) Press Release: Jane Hutt announces Free Nursing 
Care for all Nursing Homes residents accessed at www.wales.gov.uk on 25/8/04 
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only been increased once, in April 2004 to £10552, compared to 2004 rates of £40, 
£77.50 and £125 in England.53 
3.S.3 Capital limits 
In Wales, initially capital limits were set at the same rate as in England, at £11,500 
and £18,500 in 200P4, rising to £11,750 and £19,000 in 2002.55 However, in 2003 
the Welsh capital limits rose to £12,250 and £20,00056, which were slightly greater 
than the English limits of £12,000 and £19,500. In the Assembly's second term, in 
2004, the difference between the Welsh and English capital limits increased further 
with the Welsh levels set at £13,500 and £20,500,57 compared to English limits of 
£12,500 and £20,000.58 In a similar vein the amounts allowed for personal 
allowances in Wales also began at the same rate as England, in 2001 personal 
allowances in England, Scotland and Wales were set at £16.0559 and all rose in 2002 
to £16.80.60 In 2003 whilst the Scottish and English amounts for personal 
allowances rose to £17.50 in Wales the amounts for personal allowances were set 
slightly higher, at £17.80.61 The difference between the personal allowances 
50 IbId 
51 Department of Health (1 October 2001), op.cit. 
52 Welsh Assembly Government (4 March 2004) Decision Report: NHS Funded Care- Review of Current 
Weekly Rate accessed at www.information.wales.gov.uk on 25/8/04 
53 Department of Health (2004) NHS funded nursing care, op.cit. 
54 Welsh Statutory Instrument (2001) No. 1409 (W. 95) The National Assistance (Assessment of 
Resources) (Amendment No.2) (Wales) Regulations 2001 
55 Welsh Statutory Instrument (2002) No. 814 (W.94) The National Assistance (Assessment of 
Resources) (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2002 
56 Welsh Statutory Instrument (2003) No. 897 (W.117) The National Assistance (Assessment of 
Resources) (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2003 
57 Welsh Statutory Instrument (2004) No. 1023 (W.120) The National Assistance (Assessment of 
Resources) (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2004 
58 Wright, M., op.cit., p.ll 
59 Welsh Statutory Instrument (2001), op.cit 
60 IbId 
61 Welsh Statutory Instrument (2003), op.cit, 
113 
remained the same in 2004, with the English and Scottish levels rising to £18.1062, 
and the Welsh amount rising to £18.40. 63 
3.5.4 Three Month House Disregard and Deferred Payment Scheme 
In Wales the twelve week property disregard was introduced in April 2001, the 
same time as in England and Scotland.64 However, the deferred payment scheme 
was not introduced in Wales until April 2003, which was much later than its 
introduction in England in October 2001. Therefore, although the policy did not 
diverge from the English model, the timing did. 
3.5.5 An Older Person's Strategy 
At first glance the details of the Welsh Assembly Government's long-term care policy 
does not appear highly distinctive from that of England. However, whilst the detail 
of the Welsh proposals on funding personal and nursing care are similar to those 
found in England their broader approach to the care of older people represents a 
significant divergence from both Scotland and England. Unlike the UK and Scottish 
governments, the Welsh Assembly Government designed a strategy for older people 
in Wales focusing on improving the quality of older people's lives in Wales.65 The 
report took a broad, holistic look at older people, particularly aiming to 'promote 
62 Department of Health (2004) 'Proposed Changes to Residential Care Charges' Op.Clt .. ; Department of 
Health (March 2002) Local Authority Circular LAC (2002)11; Department of Health (2001) Local 
Authority Circular LAC (2001)10; Department of Health (2003) Local Authority Circular LAC (2003) 8 
63 Welsh Statutory Instrument 2004 No. 1024 (W.121) The National Assistance (Sums for Personal 
Requirements) (Wales) 
64 The National Assembly for Wales (January 2002) Implementing Changes to Residential Care 
Charging Rules in Wales: A Consultation Paperaccessed at 
www.wales.gov.ukLsubisocialoolicyLcontentLconsultationsLdeferredDayments-e.doc on 25/8/04 
65 Welsh Assembly Government (January 2003) The Strategy for Older People in Wales 
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and improve the health and well being of older people'.66 In relation to long-term 
care, rather than focusing on the provision of care services in a residential setting, 
the Welsh Assembly Government attempted to prevent people entering into long-
term care, by promoting healthy living and providing greater support for older 
people in their own homes. The Scottish and English governments adopted similar 
measures to each other in an attempt to encourage older people to remain in their 
own homes, for instance they introduced rapid response teams to deal with housing 
repairs for older people. However, the Welsh Assembly Government focused more 
heavily on the promotion of healthy lifestyles for older people and sought to adopt a 
joined-up approach to their health needs, considering the impact of factors such as 
housing, transport, social inclusion and education.67 
The Welsh strategy for older people, therefore, illustrates their commitment to New 
Public Health, a model of health care which represents 'a wider understanding of 
health that fundamentally is about attacking root causes of ill health in great social 
problems such as unemployment, environmental, ill-health, and lifestyle problems 
through collaboration between agendas'.68 Greer argued that 'Wales is in many 
ways one of the only places in the Western World to take the global agenda of new 
public health and primary care dominance seriously'.69 By taking a broader 
approach to the health of older people and focusing on preventing the need for 
long-term care, rather than focusing on providing universal free care, the Welsh 
Assembly Government appeared to frame the entire long-term care debate 
66 Ibid., p.2l 
67 Ibid., p.33 
68 Greer, S. (2002) 'When Does Devolution Cause Divergence?: Health agendas and policy debates 
before and after devolution' Paper presented at the 2002 PSA Conference (University of Aberdeen, 
April Sth_ih), p.18 
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differently from England and Scotland, which is the second highest form of 
divergence identified in figure 3.1. Sullivan suggests that the distinctive focus of 
health care in Wales means that despite possessing the weakest constitutional 
settlement 'indications are that policy differences are greatest in Wales'.70 This 
finding supports our actor-centred institutionalism framework, suggesting that the 
design of the devolved institutions cannot entirely explain policy divergence, 
possibly indicating a need to consider the different constellations of actors operating 
in the institutions. 
3.6: Conclusion: The Extent of Policy Divergence 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter there are different types of policy 
divergence, ranging from the most radical option of developing distinctive policy 
agendas to the least radically of adopting the same policies but delivering them 
differently.71 In relation to free personal care all three nations follow the same 
agenda, set by the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care. The Scottish Executive 
focused on the same long-term care issues as in England but adopted a different 
policy. By developing different payment models for nursing care, arranging a flat-
rate scheme rather than a tiered model, the Scottish and Welsh institutions diverged 
from Westminster by adopting the same policy but administering it differently. As 
this study purposely chose to consider the development of the same type of policy, 
long-term care for the elderly, it is not possible to identify the most radical type of 
policy divergence in this case study, which would 'entail the identification of 
69 Greer, S. (2003) 'Policy Divergence Will it Change Something in Greenock?' in The State of the 
Nations 2003: The Third Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom (Imprint Academic, Exeter), p.212 
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different issues, leading to the production of a distinct policy agenda in the devolved 
institutions'.n However, the Welsh Assembly's approach to long-term care and 
health issues for older people appears to be an example of the second most radical 
form of policy divergence. The Assembly identified the same issues for 
consideration as England and Scotland but framed this long-term care issue 
differently, by concentrating on attacking the root causes of ill health and 
preventing older people from requiring long-term care. In England and Scotland a 
number of measures were adopted to tackle the root causes of ill health for older 
people. For instance, the UK Government's National Service Framework sets out 
programmes to promote health and active Iifestyles.73 However, such measures 
tended to be adopted on an ad hoc basis, and the majority of measures in the 
National Service Framework, for instance, were focused on the NHS providing 
support for healthy and active lifestyles. In contrast, the National Assembly took 
the public health agenda more seriously, developing a holistic Strategy for Older 
People. The difference in approaches can be seen through attitudes towards the 
health service. In the case of the National Assembly for Wales, as Greer notes, 
'rather than seeking to use a health service to promote health, it sets health 
outcomes and views the health services as a tool that will help achieve them (along 
with local government, education, transport, and other services)'.74 
This chapter has established that the long-term care policies adopted in Scotland 
and Wales diverge from England and each other. The rest of the thesis seeks to 
70 Sullivan, M. (2002) 'Health policy: differentiation and devolution' in Adams, J. and Robinson, P. 
(Eds.) Devolution in practice: Public policy differences within the UK (Institute for Public Policy 
Research, London), p.65 
71 Keating, M. (2003) op.cit, p.1 
12 IbId, p.1 
73 Department of Health (March 2001) National Service Framework for Older People 
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establish why the devolved institutions decided to pursue different policies from the 
UK Government, focusing on the impact of actors and institutional setting, as 
suggested by actor-centred institutionalism. 
74 Greer, S. (2002) op.cit., p.21 
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Chapter Four 
Making the Scottish Long-Term Care Policy 
Hazell argued that devolution will primarily be judged on the ability of the new 
administrations to create distinctive policies from Westminster, when different needs 
or desires exist,! As described in the previous chapter, the adoption of free 
personal care in Scotland was a clear example of the Scottish Parliament pursuing a 
distinctive policy from Westminster. This chapter describes how the Scottish 
Parliament developed its free personal care policy, charting events chronologically. 
These events are depicted in a timeline at the end of the chapter. The chapter 
provides a detailed account of how the free personal care policy developed in 
Scotland, and subsequent chapters will explore why the policy developed in this 
way. This, and subsequent chapters, draw on information from interviews with over 
40 policy actors in Scotland and Wales. A description of the methodological 
approach and a list of all interviewees can be found in the appendix to this study.2 
4.1 Responding to the Royal Commission 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care 
formed the basis of the English, Scottish and Welsh long-term care policies. The 
Commission reported in March 1999, as the political parties in Scotland were 
gearing up for the first elections to the Scottish Parliament. In April 1999 the 
1 Hazell, R. (2001) 'Conclusion: The State of the Nation after Two Years of Devolution' in Trench, A. 
(Ed.) State of the Nations 2001: The Second Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom (Imprint 
Academic, Exeter), p.255 
2 When citing from interviews, the name and position held by interviewees during the period studied 
here are stated, unless interviewees have asked to remain anonymous. 
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parties launched their manifestos for the Scottish election. The Scottish Liberal 
Democrat manifesto included a commitment to 'Promote an early dialogue with all 
interested parties throughout the UK to establish a common way forward in 
achieving the recommendations contained in the Royal Commission on Long Term 
Care',3 Note that the Scottish Liberal Democrats did not commit to implementing 
free personal care on a Scottish only basis; instead they implied that the issue 
should be resolved by the UK Government. In contrast the Labour party's manifesto 
offered no commitments on long-term care, and only noted that 'one of the early 
challenges for the Scottish Parliament will be to respond to the Royal Commission 
on Long-term care and its recommendations on personal care'.4 
The Scottish Parliamentary election on the 6th May 1999 gave no overall majority for 
any political party. The Labour party emerged as the biggest party, with 56 out of a 
total of 129 seats, 9 seats short of the 65 required to take overall control.s 
However, to govern it was clear that Labour needed to compromise with other 
political parties and so Labour entered into coalition negotiations with the Liberal 
Democrats. The coalition negotiations included a discussion of free personal care, 
but it was not adopted in the final partnership agreement. 6 All interviewees agreed 
that long-term care for the elderly was not discussed in any depth. Additionally, 
newspaper coverage of the coalition negotiations failed to mention long-term care 
and the final partnership agreement lacked any commitment on free personal care 
3 Scottish Liberal Democrats(1999) Scottish Parliamentary Manifesto 1999: Raising the Standard 
accessed at www.scotlibdems.org.ukLmanifestos/se1999/#3 on 3/12/03 
4 Scottish New Labour (1999) Building Scotland's Future 
S sse News- Vote 99 Election results accessed at 
www.news.bbc.co.uklhi/english/static/vote 99/during/index.stm on 4/12/03 
6 Interview with Nora Radcliffe (Liberal Democrat MSP) (December 2003) 
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or long-term care provision in generaL7 Instead the main focus of the partnership 
agreement, and media coverage of the agreement, was on student finance. Free 
personal care at this time was low on the Scottish political agenda, but this changed 
when the UK Government finally announced its formal response to the Royal 
Commission on Long-Term Care. 
On 27th July 2000, as part of the debate on the NHS plan, Tony Blair announced 
that nursing care in nursing homes would be provided free at the point of use. 
Additionally Blair announced his government's decision not to introduce free 
personal care. The UK Government's decision to reject free personal care ruled out 
the possibility of providing free personal care on a UK wide basis. Whilst pressure 
groups and politicians in favour of free personal care tended to favour a UK wide 
solution, once this option was closed pressure grew for the Scottish Parliament to 
act. 
The day after the UK government revealed its position on long-term care, on 28th 
July 2000, the leader of the Conservatives in the Scottish Parliament, David 
McLetchie, lodged a motion calling 'upon the Scottish Executive to implement in full 
the recommendation of the Royal Commission that personal care, as defined by the 
Commission, should be available after assessment, according to need and paid for 
from general taxation'.8 Additionally, pressure groups in Scotland began to focus 
more specifically on the Scottish Executive. For example, Help the Aged Scotland 
directly asked the Scottish Executive 'to grasp the nettle and offer a better deal on 
7 Labour and Liberal Democrats(May 1999) A Partnership for Scot/and: A Programme for Government 
accessed at www.scotlibdems.org.uk/docs/coaltion.htm#4 on 4/12/03 
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care'.9 Therefore, the rejection of free personal care by the UK Government 
immediately resulted in demands from opposition parties and pressure groups for 
the Scottish Parliament to 'go further' and act distinctively from Westminster. 
The Conservatives in particular continued to pursue free personal care within the 
Scottish Parliament. On the 26th September 2000 MSP Mary Scanlon lodged a 
motion which stated, 
'That the Parliament calls upon the Scottish Executive to implement the 
key recommendations of the report With Respect to Old Age: Long-term 
care - Rights and Responsibilities of the Royal Commission chaired by Sir 
Stewart Sutherland, including the funding of personal care on the basis 
of assessed need in order to alleviate the problems facing those who 
require long term care'.lD 
The Executive responded by proposing an amendment which was weaker than 
Scanlon's motion, simply stating that the Scottish Executive should 'continue, over 
time, to work towards fulfilling the Royal Commission's objectives of fairness and 
equity in the care of the elderly'.l1 Newspaper reports suggested that the 
Executive's amendment was the consequence of much negotiation between the two 
coalition partners, with 'considerable activity behind the scenes yesterday [27 
September 2000] as Labour business managers negotiated with their Liberal 
Democrat counterparts to try to agree an amendment which would bring the 16 
8 McLetchie, D. (lodged on 28 July 2000) 'SlM-1114: Long-Term Care' in Business Bulletin 122/2000: 
Section F Motions and Amendments accessed at 
www.scottish.parliament.uk/SlJagenda and decisions/bb-00/bb-08-04f.htm on 5/12/03 
9 Duncan, R. (28 July 2000) 'Executive challenged over care of elderly; Health Minister urged to come 
up with a Scottish solution to the long term needs of old people' in The Heral4 p.l 
1D Scanlon, M (lodged 26 September 2000) 'SlM-1215 Long Term Care' Business Bulletin 145/2000: 
Section F Motions and Amendments accessed at 
www.scottish.parliament.uk/SlJagenda and decisions/bb-00/bb-09-27f.htm on 5/12/03 
11 Gray, I (lodged 27 September 2000) 'SlM-1215.1 Long Term Care' Business Bulletin 145/2000: 
Section F Motions and Amendments accessed at 
www.scottish.parliament.uk/SlIagenda and decisions/bb-00/bb-09-27f.htm on 5/12/03 
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Liberals on board',12 Whilst there remained some speculation that a number of 
Liberal Democrats would vote against the Executive, most were persuaded to back 
the Executive's amendment. Two Liberal Democrat MSPs decided not to support 
the Executive amendment: Margaret Smith (the convenor of the Health and 
Community Care Committee) voted against the Executive and instead supported the 
Conservative's motion, and Mike Rumbles abstained from both votesY 
On 5th October 2000 the Scottish Executive formally responded to the Royal 
Commission on Long-Term Care and set out its plans for the care of older people,14 
The Executive accepted many of the Royal Commission's recommendations, 
including the major recommendation to provide free nursing care in nursing 
homes,ls The Executive also agreed to 'implement the Royal Commission's 
recommendation that for the first three months following admission to residential 
care, the value of a person's home will be disregarded from the means test',16 
Despite this, the Health Minister, Susan Deacon, decided not to introduce free 
personal care, The Executive explained that it did not 'believe that making all 
personal care free would be the best use of resources, benefiting mainly 7200 
people',l? Ideologically the Executive expressed sympathies with the 'principle of 
equity which underpins the Commission's recommendation on personal care',18 
However, in a similar vein to the UK Government, the Scottish Executive based their 
opposition to free personal care on the costs of the policy, arguing that 'to make 
12 McCann, A, and Horsburgh, F, (28 September 2000) 'Revolt on care for elderly set to fizzle out; 
Amendment wins over most Liberal Democrat MSPs on Sutherland report issue' in The Herald, p.6 
13 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 28th September 2000 
14 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 5th October 2000 
1S Scottish Executive (October 2000) Response to the Royal Commission on Long-term care accessed 
at www.scotland.gov.ukllibrary3/health/ltcare.pdf on 22/10/03, p.9 
16 Ibid, p.5 
17 Ibid, p.9 
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this change, at this time, when so many wider needs exist for tens of thousands of 
older people, would not be right. 19 However, on the 11th October 2000 the First 
Minister, Donald Dewar died, promoting an unexpected leadership contest within 
the Scottish Labour party and a re-examination of the Executive's long-term care 
policy. 
4.2 New First Minister, New Policy 
Following Dewar's death the Labour party was under pressure to quickly elect a 
leader, particularly as the Scotland Act stated that a First Minister needed to be 
elected within 28 days.20 Therefore, the Labour Party decided to hold an election 
for an interim leader amongst a mini-electoral college, consisting of Labour's MSPs 
and the Scottish Party's executive members. The victor would then face the full 
electoral college at a later debate. The vote took place on the 21st October 2000, 
and as widely predicted the only contenders were Jack McConnell and Henry 
McLeish. The election occurred only three days after Dewar's funeral, leaving little 
time for campaigning and so the policy positions of both candidates were unclear. 
In the end McLeish was victorious, though with a much smaller majority than 
predicted, and he went on to face the full electoral college on the 9th December 
2000 and win 99.2% of the voteY 
Immediately after the leadership election McLeish began a policy review, with 
speculation that 'there could be a change of heart' on the refusal to implement the 
18 Ibid., p.S 
19 Ibid. 
20 Scotland Act (1998) S46 
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full recommendations of the Sutherland report.22 Apparently McLeish used his first 
cabinet meeting as first minister to call for his ministers to ditch unpopular policies, 
underlining his desire for a 'change of emphasis and direction'.23 Hardie reported 
that ministers were given 'until 10 November to look at their departments and 
assess the relevance of policies'.24 Much of the speculation surrounding the policy 
review focused upon free personal care, with newspaper reports claiming that 
McLeish was 'expected to reconsider implementation of the Sutherland Royal 
Commission on care of the elderly.'25 
During McLeish's first performance at First Minister's question time, the SNP 
spokesperson on health, Nicola Sturgeon, asked whether the Scottish Executive had 
changed its position on the Sutherland report.26 McLeish hinted at the possibility of 
a policy change, stating that his health minister, 'Susan Deacon will be reviewing 
that policy. We will have a further look at that and we will take it from there'.27 The 
perception was that the First Minister was moving towards free personal care and 
the coalition government was 'expected to announce a U-turn by the end of the 
month on its controversial refusal to give free care to old folk'.28 The review of long-
term care policy, therefore, put Deacon in the awkward position of reviewing her 
own response to the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care, which had only been 
announced during the previous month. 
21 Birrell, S. (2002) '28 days to select your leader: leadership selection in the Scottish Labour Party' 
conference paper delivered to the Political Studies Association Conference, 5th-7th April 2002, 
University of Aberdeen accessed at www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2002/birrell.pdf. p.12 
22 Swanson, I. (30 October 2000) 'Sacked Minister hits out at 'Farmers Gag" in Edinburgh Evening 
New~ p.2 
23 Hardie, A. (1 November 2000) 'Tough McLeish orders review of every policy' in The Scotsman, p.8 
24 Ibid. 
25 Allardyce, J. and Macleod, M. (29 October 2000) 'McLeish will ditch Dewar's Failed Legacy' Scot/and 
on Sunday, p.1 
26 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 2nd November 2000 
27 Ibid. 
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During November 2000 Henry McLeish continually expressed his desire to review 
the free personal care policy. However, McLeish went further than expressing his 
commitment to a policy review in an interview on Newsnight Scotland. During the 
interview McLeish clearly stated that he 'would like to implement the Sutherland 
Report in full, funding personal care for the elderly in long-stay homes'.29 The 
Newsnight interview, therefore, put McLeish's desire to move towards free personal 
care clearly on the record for the first time. 
By the end of November pressure from both supporters and opponents of free 
personal care had intensified. Actors from the UK Government became more vocal, 
for instance, officials were reportedly 'urging against change and Gordon Brown ... 
[was] warning against making "rash promises'''.30 The Scottish Executive also faced 
countervailing pressure from those within the Scottish Parliament. For instance, in 
November 2000 the Health and Community Care Committee completed its inquiry 
into the delivery of community care, recommending that, 
'there should be no charge for services assessed as being required to 
meet the personal care needs of an individual. It therefore recommends 
to the Executive that free personal care should be provided on the basis 
of assessed need r31 
The cross-party committee had taken ten months to conduct its inquiry, taken 
evidence from a range of organisations and experts involved in community care and 
28 Edinburgh Evening News (4 November 2000) '~AP Care U-turn Expected', p.2 
29 BBC News Scotland (14 November 2000) 'Scorn over Quango Crackdown' accessed at 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hilscotland/1D222S2.stm on 19/11/03 
30 The Scotsman (November 20 2000) 'McLeish faces more pressure over care cash', p.2 
31 Health and Community Care Committee (2000) jf? Report 2000: Inquiry into the Delivery of 
Community Care in Scotland accessed at www.scotttish.pariiament.uk on 18/11/03, 5.43 
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had reached a unanimous decision.32 As a result the committee's report was well 
respected and contributed to the growing pressure for free personal care. 
4.3 Backtracking 
In January 2001 newspaper reports suggested that McLeish had watered down his 
commitment to free personal care, apparently due to fears about the unpredictable 
costs of the proposals and pressure from ministers in London.33 There was 
speculation that in place of free personal care the Scottish Executive would 
introduce an 'alternative care scheme which will be means-tested', thus limiting 
personal care to fewer, poorer pensioners.34 During First Minister's Question time 
on 18th January 2001 McLeish assured the SNP leader, John Swinney, that he would 
not backtrack from his commitment to older people, commenting that he wanted 'to 
see personal care as part of long-term care to be the subject of a review'.35 
However, here McLeish defined his commitment to a policy review rather than to 
free personal care, a lesser commitment than he gave during the Newsnight 
interview. Whether McLeish weakened his commitment to free personal care is 
debatable, but the press speculation surrounding McLeish's position indicates that a 
number of actors were engaged in briefing the press. According to several 
interviewees closely involved in the free personal care debate, journalists regularly 
receiving briefings from cabinet members, particularly from Henry McLeish and the 
Health Minister Susan Deacon who sought to pressurise each other towards a 
32 Scottish Parliament Health and Community Care Committee (28 November 2000) Press Release: 
Health Committee Publishes Inquiry Report on Community Care accessed at 
www.scotttish.pariiament.uk on 26/11/03 
33 Nelson, F. (19 January 2001) 'McLeish 'to ditch' elderly care plan' in The Times 
34 Ibid. 
35 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 18th January 2001 
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particular course of action.36 However, McLeish's unpopularity as First Minister 
amongst his Labour cabinet colleagues meant McLeish was not in a strong enough 
position simply to sack his Health Minister and force the adoption of his preferred 
policy position. 
On 24th January 2001 Susan Deacon formally responded to the Health and 
Community Care Committee's inquiry into the delivery of community care and 
announced the results of her policy review on long-term care. The Health Minister 
announced a range of long-term care services and benefits which she argued would 
'extend the provision of free care to a wider range of people and will remove the 
inequities between different conditions and different care settings'.37 Additionally 
the Executive announced the establishment of the Care Development Group, which 
would consider the provision of long-term care services.38 However, the proposals 
fell short of a commitment to implement free personal care across the board. 
Deacon faced strong criticism from the opposition parties for her failure to commit 
to free personal care. SNP MSP Nicola Sturgeon explained that her criticism of 
Deacon was so strong because the First Minister had in several interviews implied 
that 'the Government would implement Sutherland in full ... [but] Today we are 
being told that that is not what he said after all'.39 In addition the Executive faced 
hostility from Liberal Democrat and Labour backbenchers. As Keith Raffan, then the 
Liberal Democrats Health spokesperson, pOinted out, the opposition to Deacon's 
36 Interviews with Henry McLeish (First Minister), Peter MacMahon (Press Secretary to McLeish) and 
John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (December 2003 and 
January 2004) 
37 Scottish Executive (January 2001) Response by the Scottish Executive to the Health and Community 
Care Committees Inquiry into the Delivery of Community Care in Scotland accessed at 
www.scotland.gov.ukJlibrary3/social/idccr.pdfon5/1/04.pA 
38 Ibld/ p.5 
39 Scottish Parliament/ Plenary Session/24th January 2001 
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statement meant that the 'majority in this Parliament is for free personal care for all 
older people'.40 
4.4 The Parliament takes control 
Following the Health Minister's statement there was considerable anger against the 
Executive's position on free personal care. To express the dissatisfaction of Liberal 
Democrats backbenchers, Keith Raffan proposed a motion which called for a 
commitment to free personal care along with a definite timetable for 
implementation.41 His motion received the support of ten other Liberal Democrat 
MSPs, which if combined with the votes of the SNP, Conservatives, Scottish Socialist 
Party (SSP), Green and Independent MSPs would have guaranteed a majority in 
favour of free personal care.42 However, as coalition partners they would have 
required their Labour colleagues support to propose motions, so instead the SNP 
adopted their motion and placed it for debate for the next day. The SNP's motion 
stated; 
'That the Parliament, while welcoming the further package of proposals 
to improve care for the elderly announced by the Minister for Health and 
Community Care on 24 January 2001, notes that it is the policy of the 
Liberal Democrats, SNP, Conservatives and others to introduce free 
personal care for the elderly as proposed in the Sutherland Commission 
Report and calls upon the Scottish Executive to make a similar clear, firm 
and unequivocal commitment together with a definite timetable for its 
implementation'43 
From the evening of 24th January until the vote on the SNP's motion on 25th January 
discussions took place within the cabinet, within each party, and between the 
40 Ibid 
41 Scottish Parliament Business Bulletin 15/2001 (25 January 2001) 'Section F- Motions and 
Amendments' accessed at www.scottish.parliament.uk on 6/1/04 
42 Margaret Smith, Mr Mike Rumbles, George Lyon, lain Smith, Mr Jamie Stone, Nora Radcliffe, Robert 
Brown, Ian Jenkins, Euan Robson, Donald Gorrie 
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Liberal Democrats and the SNP, who discussed how they could ensure a majority in 
favour of free personal care.44 No definite decisions were made, and the Liberal 
Democrats walked out of cabinet negotiations late on 24th January claiming that no 
further discussion was possible. However, the following day cabinet discussions 
began again with 'frantic to-ing and fro-ing between the First Minister's office and 
the Deputy First Minister's at the parliament headquarters on George IV Bridge'.45 
The debate on free personal care on the morning of 25th January indicated the 
strength of feeling amongst Liberal Democrat backbenchers, with all five Liberal 
Democrats who spoke during the debate defending free personal care. At 
lunchtime on 25th January the Liberal Democrats group met to discuss the possibility 
of supporting a compromise amendment by the Executive. The Liberal Democrats 
believed that the wording drafted by the Executive was not clear enough, and the 
backbenchers decided that they would only accept an unambiguous commitment to 
free personal care. Additionally the Liberal Democrat backbenchers expressed 
concern about when the Executive would announce their compromise position. 
Raffan claimed that Labour had initially wanted to make a statement after the 
vote. 46 At the Liberal Democrat's emergency lunchtime meeting the backbenchers 
argued that they could not vote with the Executive before such a statement was 
made. 47 Therefore, following the lunchtime meeting, the two Liberal Democrat 
Ministers, Jim Wallace and Ross Finnie, entered further discussions with their Labour 
43 Scottish Parliament Business Bulletin 15/2001, op.cit. 
44 Interview with Shona Robison (SNP MSP) (December 2003) 
45 MacMahon, P. (26 January 2002) 'How McLeish made up his policies on the hoof' in The Scotsman 
accessed at www.news.scotsman.comitopics.cfm?tid=190&id=95992002 on 15/11/03 
46 Interview with Keith Raffan (Liberal Democrat MSP) (February 2004) 
47 Ibid. 
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cabinet colleagues, explaining that they could not fight off dissent in their group and 
they could no longer constrain their group on free personal care.48 
The exact wording of the statement was controversial and 'A form of words was 
drafted, re-drafted and re-re-drafted'.49 At one point Jackie Baillie, the Social Justice 
minister, was chosen by Labour Ministers to convince Wallace to support a form of 
words 'which was equivocal to say the least'5O, but it became clear that the Liberal 
Democrats would not support an amendment which lacked real movement. At the 
same time the UK Government was becoming anxious, 'Alasdair McGowan, the 
No.10 special adviser with responsibility for Scotland, was on the phone constantly 
to McLeish's private secretary Jonathan Pryce demanding to know what was 
happening'.51 However, as the vote approached and the Cabinet's attempts to dilute 
the motion were met with a resounding no by the Liberal Democrat backbenchers 
they became convinced that they had no choice other than to offer a clear 
commitment to free personal care. Apparently, at 4pm Jim Wallace went to see 
Raffan, as health spokesperson, to discuss the free personal care issue and at this 
time, only one hour before the vote, Wallace had still not seen the wording of the 
emergency statement, arguing that the Liberal Democrats would have to trust 
Labour.52 
In an unprecedented move, Tom McCabe made the emergency statement just after 
Spm, prior to the vote on the SNP's free personal care motion. Tom McCabe was 
forced to make the statement as Deacon, the Health Minister, had refused. The 
48 MacMahon, P. op.Cit 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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statement assured 'the Parliament that the Executive will bring forward, as soon as 
practicable after consideration of the development group's report in August 2001, 
proposals for the implementation of free personal care for a 11'.53 Making the 
announcement prior to the vote led to confusion over whether MSPs were voting on 
motions already laid or the Executive's statement. It also led to anger on the 
opposition benches who felt that the Parliament had been excluded from a deal 
done in private, motivated by political factors rather than effective policy-making. 
As SNP's Nicola Sturgeon put it; 
'The Government is driven less by care for the elderly and more by 
consideration of its own political survival .. , it is nothing short of tragic 
that the Government has had to be dragged kicking and screaming to 
give justice for Scotland's elderly people154 
The emergency statement meant that the Liberal Democrats could vote with the 
Executive with the confidence that the Executive would implement free personal 
care, therefore, the amended motion received the support of all the Labour and 
Liberal Democrat MSPs (except Keith Raffan), with the Conservatives abstaining and 
the SNP voting against. The final motion stated that, 
51 Ibid. 
'the Parliament recognises that there are benefits in providing free 
personal care for the elderly; welcomes as a major step in this direction 
the further package of proposals announced by the Executive on 24 
January 2001 which set out a process that will lead to a substantial 
extension of free personal care; notes that there are significant issues of 
cost and practicality in moving further and calls upon the Executive to 
broaden the terms of reference of the Development Group to require it 
to consider the practicalities, costs and implications of providing free 
personal care for all and to report by August 2001 with proposals that 
will inform the Executive's expenditure decisions for 2002-03 and 
beyond, ISS 
52 Interview with Keith Raffan (Liberal Democrat MSP) (February 2004) 
53 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 25th January 2001 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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However, the significant developments included in the Executive's emergency 
statement had not been subjected to a vote and the important debates and 
decisions had taken place outside the Parliament behind closed doors. 
4.5 Questioning the commitment 
After the vote on free personal care there was speculation about exactly what the 
Executive had agreed to. The Scottish Conservative leader, David McLetchie, 
highlighted that the emergency statement did not include a definite timetable for 
the implementation of free personal care and suggested that the Liberal Democrats 
had been bought off cheaply.56 However, whilst some were concerned that the 
Executive may backtrack on its commitment to free personal care, others sought to 
exploit the confused situation to encourage the Executive to retreat. Immediately 
after the debate MacMahon explained that the special adviser to No.10, Alasdair 
McGowan, contacted him again demanding that he issue a statement clarifying 
McCabe's statement, saying "You have to say it's not free personal care".57 In 
general the media and the opposition parties were of the opinion that the Executive 
would backtrack from its commitment to free personal care. John Swinney, then 
the SNP leader, predicted that 'Labour will draw up proposals, certainly. But it could 
make them too expensive, unworkable - you name it, they'll find a way out of it'.58 
In addition Keith Raffan tendered his resignation as Liberal Democrat health 
spokesman because he claimed he doubted the Executive's commitment, 'There are 
no deadlines in this deal, I could not vote for it so I have to tender my 
56 Ibid. 
57 MacMahon, P. op.cit. 
58 Nelson, F. (26 January 2001) 'McLeish care deal stifles Liberal Democrat revolt' in The Times, p.13 
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resignation'.59 On the other hand, groups representing older people put a more 
positive slant on the Executive's statement. Liz Duncan, spokeswoman for Help the 
Aged in Scotland, was quoted as saying 'finally the consensus in Scotland has been 
shown to hold sway. It raises standards clearly and irrefutably and the rest of the 
UK should endeavour to follow suit'.60 Linda Dunion, spokeswoman for Age Concern 
Scotland explained that the lack of deadlines was an indication that free personal 
care 'was a complex issue',61 rather than an indication of the Executive's lack of 
commitment. However, the positive public response by pressure groups lobbying 
for elderly peopleons should not necessarily be seen as evidence of their genuine 
belief that the Executive would introduce free personal care. For instance, Alison 
Petch argued that by publicly defining the Executive's statement as a firm 
commitment such pressure groups helped to ensure that the Executive could not 
backtrack from it.62 
4.6 Designing the Free Personal Care Policy 
On 29th January 2001 McLeish held a news conference in Glasgow which was 
meant to be an opportunity for him to launch the Executive's revised programme for 
government. However, free personal care remained a major issue of concern and 
the press wanted clarification on the Executive's position. McLeish argued that, 
59 Ibid. 
'There will be no backsliding. Those who have this view are simply 
wrong ... The commitment is there for all to see. We are embarking on a 
process which will have as its destination the implementation of free 
personal care for all. I cannot be more explicit'.63 
60 Hardie, A. and Scott, D. (26 January 2001) 'Care U-turn Saves Face for McLeish' in The Scotsman 
p.1 
61 Ibid 
62 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
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On the same day a ministerial working group on best value and budget review, 
chaired by Angus Mackay, met to re-examine the budget and determine how free 
personal care could be afforded, indicating that the commitment to free personal 
care was made before the details of the policy had been worked OUt. 64 In addition 
to this new group, throughout 2001 the Care Development Group, established by 
Susan Deacon in January, before the commitment to free personal care had been 
made, also met to consider long-term care, including proposals for free personal 
care. 65 
On 28th June 2001 Mackay announced the conclusions of his budget review. He 
explained that free personal care could mainly be funded through a budget 
increase. Mackay argued that out of the £286 million increase which the Scottish 
Executive had directed to health, between £100 and £200 million was to fund the 
various recommendations of the care development group in its work on 
implementing free personal care for older people.66 Mackay also announced budget 
increases in education, implying that the money to fund free personal care had not 
come at the expense of education policies. Whilst the costs of free personal could 
partially be met through the '£200 million extra cash allocated to Scotland in 
Chancellor Gordon Brown's budget' in March 2000,67 there was also speculation that 
funds would have to be transferred from other areas. It was reported that the 
Scottish Executive had to move an additional £289 million, of their £20 billion 
63 Scott, D. (30 January 2001) 'I Stake My Career on Free Care' in The Scotsman p.1 
64 Ritchie, M. (31st January 2001) 'Ministers plan spending review to finance £110m cost of elderly care' 
in The Heralrt p6 
65 Care Development Group (14 September 2001) Fair Care for Older People accessed at 
www.scotland.gov.uk/library3/health/cdgr-00.asp 
66Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 29th June 2001 
67 Swanson, I. (28 June 2001) 'Scots Budget Cash Boost for Health Care' in Edinburgh Evening News, 
p.2 
135 
budget, from other services,68 A large portion of the money allocated to fund free 
personal care from within the Scottish Executive's budget appeared to come from 
the social justice department, with sizeable chunks also taken from enterprise, 
transport and rural development.69 Ex-Health and Education Minister, Sam 
Galbraith, suggested that money was transferred from cancer services; 'free 
personal care for the elderly is an unaffordable right-wing policy which has been 
achieved only by raiding £80m a year from cancer treatment budgets',70 However, 
due to changes in the way cancer services are financed, it is difficult to establish 
whether Galbraith's interpretation is accurate, 
Interestingly Mackay's statement on funding free personal care was announced 
before the Care Development Group had established the cost of free personal care, 
As David Davidson, the Conservative finance spokesperson says, by setting aside 
money for free personal care for the elderly Mr Mackay 'has placed the care 
development group in a tight financial straitjacket',71 
On ih September 2001 the Care Development Group published their report 'Fair 
Care for Older People', The Care Development Group argued that by introducing 
free personal care the Scottish Executive would save the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) money, The DWP pays a benefit called Attendance Allowance to 
assist the costs of free personal care, The DWP's rules state that Attendance 
Allowance will be withdrawn 'if any individual receives any other form of assistance 
from the public purse for personal care, However, this rule only applies to care 
68 Ibid. 
69 Nelson, F. (29 June 2001) 'A lesson in how to conjure up £489 million' in The Times 
70 Gordon, T. (9 February 2004) 'Galbraith: free care for elderly should end' in The Heralct p.l 
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homes'.72 A strict interpretation of the DWP's rules, therefore, suggested that the 
Scottish Executive's policy of free personal care would mean that those receiving 
personal care in long-term care homes would no longer receive Attendance 
Allowance. The Care Development Group estimated that the free personal care 
policy of the Scottish Executive, would therefore save the UK Government around 
£20 million a year.73 As a result the Care Development Group argued that this 
money should be transferred to the Scottish Parliament, 
'We think it would be odd and contrary to equity if entitlement to 
Attendance Allowance for those in care homes stopped because of a 
policy of free personal care in Scotland. That would mean that DWP was 
not paying Attendance Allowance to anyone in a care home in Scotland, 
while paying it to many people in care homes elsewhere in the United 
Kingdom, including those in receipt of free nursing care after April 
20021'74 
However, the DWP had a different attitude, and claimed 'that social security is a 
reserved issue and hence there is no obligation for DWP to modify its rules to 
accommodate Scottish Executive policy'.75 Therefore, as McLeish explained, 
'discussions were brief'.76 McLeish explained that when he discussed the issue with 
the Work and Pensions Secretary, Alistair Darling, his demands were 'met with an 
absolute firm refusal' and Darling expressed his concerns that the introduction of 
free personal care in Scotland would put pressure on the UK Government to follow 
suit. 77 
71 Scott, D. (29 June 2001) 'Services Face Axe to Fund £200M Free Care Package' in The Scotsman, 
p.1 
72 Bell, D. (November 2001) 'Finance' in Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devo/ution- Quarterly 
Monitoring Report Scotland (The Constitution Unit) accessed at www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-
un it/mon rep/scotland/scotnovO 1. pdf on 18/11/03, p.49 
73 Scott, K. (8 September 2001) 'Scotland seeks help to fund elderly care' in The Guardian, p.9 
74 Care Development Group, op.cit 
75 Bell, D. op.cit., p.49 
76 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
77 McLeish, H. (2004) Scotland Rrst (Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh), p.142 and Interview with 
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The estimates on the costs of free personal care provided by the Care Development 
Group were based on the assumption that Attendance Allowance would continue to 
be paid to those in care homes in Scotland. Consequently, the refusal of the UK 
Government to transfer the Attendance Allowance costs meant the Executive's bill 
for free personal care increased by roughly a further £20 million. Despite the 
concerns over the cost of free personal care, on 5th September free personal care 
was included in the Scottish Government's legislative programme and McLeish 
announced that the policy would be implemented by April 2002.78 
Deacon accepted the Care Development Group's recommendations in full on 26th 
September 2001.79 The Care Development Group recommended a flat-rate payment 
for free personal care, 'payment will then be made at a rate which reflects their 
level of assessed need for personal care up to a maximum of £90 per week and at a 
flat rate of £65 per week for nursing care'.80 The Care Development Group also 
offered a definition of personal care and recommended that an implementation 
group should be established. By agreeing to these recommendations Deacon 
underlined that the Executive would meet its commitment to free personal care, 
arguing that 'whatever the outcome of those discussions (with the DWP), the 
provision of free personal care for Scotland's older people is a pledge that will be 
fulfilled'.81 
78 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 5th September 2001 
79 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 26th September 2001 
80 care Development Group, op.cit. 
81 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 26th September 2001 
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4.7 Implementing Free Personal Care 
The proposals for free personal care were included in the Community Care and 
Health (Scotland) Bill, introduced in Parliament on 24th September 2001. 
Unexpectedly, as plans for free personal care began to be considered by the 
Scottish Parliament, McLeish's position as First Minister was under threat. 
Seemingly minor allegations over constituency office expenses caused a political 
farce and ultimately McLeish's resignation as First Minister on 8th November 2001, 
barely a year after taking office. Jack McConnell, who was the only contender for 
the Scottish Labour Party Leader, officially became First Minister on 22nd November 
2001. The change of First Minister led some commentators to question whether the 
commitment to free personal care would be delivered after all, 'health reforms could 
include revisiting the thorny issue of free personal care for the elderly. Insiders 
worried about the massive costs of helping around 7,000 pensioners, suggested the 
policy might be "tweaked"'.82 The new Finance minister, Andy Kerr, reported grave 
concerns about the underestimated costs of free personal care and there was talk of 
the new First Minister re-examining the policy.83 However, the principles of the 
Community Care and Health Bill were passed unanimously,84 and at this stage it was 
probably too late politically to reverse the free personal commitment even if the will 
had been there to do so. 
In January 2002 the implementation steering group, established on the 
recommendation of the Care Development Group, informed the Executive of 
82 Allardyce, J. and Macleod, M (18 November 2001) 'The Traditionalist in a Moderniser's Clothing' in 
Scot/and on Sunday, p.13 
83 Farquharson K. (2 December 2001) 'McConnell may have to backtrack on free care for elderly' in The 
Sunday Times 
84 Scottish Parliament/ Plenary Session, 28th November 2001 
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difficulties in implementing the free personal care policy. The Executive accepted 
the implementation steering group's recommendation to push the implementation of 
free personal care back by three months 'to allow local authorities and other 
providers to ensure that the right assessment and delivery mechanisms are in place 
to meet the anticipated need'.8s There were concerns by opposition MSPS and 
pressure groups that the delayed implementation of free personal care was a last 
ditch attempt by the Executive to escape their free personal care commitment. 
However, the Health and Community Care Act, which received Royal Assent on 12th 
March 2002, ensured that nursing and personal care would be provided free of 
charge to the user.86 As a result the Community Care and Health Act enabled the 
implementation of free personal care, which was introduced in Scotland from 1st 
July 2002. 
There were some concerns expressed by local authorities about the implementation 
of free personal care. For example, in November 2002 the Highland Council 
considered restricting those eligible for free personal care due to a shortfall in 
funding.87 According to the Highland Council the '£4.1 million it was allocated to 
implement free personal care is £300,000 less than it needs'.88 Consequently, it 
planned to introduce a prioritised waiting list to target the most needy, set an upper 
limit on the level of subsidy people could claim and also raised the possibility of 
means testing.89 In the end the Council did not ration free personal care and 'the 
8S Scottish Executive (15 January 2002) Press Release: Free Personal Care Timetable Extended 
accessed at www.scotland.gov.ukJpages/news/2002/01/SE5162.aspx on 8/1/04 
86 Community care and Health (Scotland) Act 2002 accessed at www.scotland-
leg islation. hmso. gov. u klleg islation/scotland/acts2002/20005--b. htm# 1 
87 Ross, J. (13 November 2002) 'Council Runs Short of Funds For Elderly' in The Scotsman, p.9 
88 Ibid 
89 Ibid 
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money was found from somewhere'.90 Despite these initial concerns, by the end of 
the first term implementation horror stories had failed to materialise and though no 
studies were done in the Parliament's first term on the implementation of free 
personal care, most believed that it had been implemented relatively successfully.91 
For instance, in December 2002 Help the Aged director, Liz Dunion explained that 
'given the magnitude of the undertaking and the fact that the policy has only been 
in place for five months, it can best be described as a 
qualified success'.92 
4.8 Conclusion 
The development of the free personal policy in Scotland was, as McLeish put it, 'not 
a textbook example of government at work'.93 Instead a public commitment was 
made to free personal care by Henry McLeish, before a policy had been formulated 
or costed. McLeish's public support for free personal care spurred on supporters of 
the policy and raised the significance of the debate. Prior to McLeish's tenure as 
First Minister, whilst actors from civil society made demands for free personal care, 
there was general satisfaction with the Executive's response to the Royal 
Commission. Once the Executive committed to free personal care a policy needed 
to be devised. The finance minister, Angus Mackay, worked out how much free 
personal care would cost and explained from where the resources would derive, and 
then the Care Development Group worked through the details of the policy. One 
90 Farquharson, K. (17 November 2002) 'The Care Takes' in The Sunday Times, p.18 
91 Interviews with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy), Alison 
Petch (Member of the Care Development Group), Liz Dunion (Policy Director for Help the Aged 
Scotland) and Jess Barrow (Director of Communications for Age Concern Scotland) (January-March 
2004) 
92 Dunion, L. (5 December 2002) 'Letters' in Community Care 
93 McLeish, H. (2004) Op.Clt, p.141 
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civil servant explained that after the commitment to free personal care had been 
made, 'we needed to buy time to think the policy through (because) we had 
committed to free personal care without working out the financial arrangements and 
technical details such as the definition of personal care'.94 In many senses the 
policy process was chaotic, with the civil servant who would later implement the 
policy finding out McLeish's desire to introduce free personal care after reading a 
newspaper article and then questioning McLeish on the matter.95 Another 
interesting feature of the development of the free personal care policy was that the 
crucial discussions and deals on free personal care were conducted in private by 
Labour and Liberal Democrats actors, perhaps an inevitable consequence of 
coalition government. However, whilst the key negotiations occurred within the 
cabinet, the Parliament and civil society played a major role in pushing the 
Executive to act. 
94 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
95 Ibid. 
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Figure 4. 1: Timeline of events 
December 1997 
March 1999 
May 1999 
13 May 1999 
27 July 2000 
28 July 2000 
26 September 2000 
28 September 2000 
5 October 2000 
11 October 2000 
26 October 2000 
28 November 2000 
24 January 2001 
25 January 2001 
29 January 2001 
28 June 2001 
5 September 2001 
7 September 2001 
26 September 2001 
24 September 2001 
8 November 2001 
22 November 2001 
27 November 2001 
28 November 2001 
January 2002 
6 February 2002 
12 March 2002 
1 July 2002 
November 2002 
March 2003 
Royal Commission on long-term care established 
Royal Commission submitted its final report 'With Respect to Old 
Age: Long Term Care - Rights and Responsibilities' 
First elections to the Scottish Parliament and coalition negotiations 
Partnership agreement between Labour and Liberal Democrats 
signed 
UK government formally responded to the Royal Commission 
Conservative leader, David McLetchie, lodges a motion calling for 
the Scottish Executive to implement free personal care 
Conservatives propose a motion calling for free personal care 
Debate on long-term care in the Scottish Parliament. Liberal 
Democrats revolt fails to materialise 
Scottish Executive formally responds to the Royal Commission 
Death of First Minister, Donald Dewar 
McLeish elected as First Minister and launches a policy review 
Health and Community Care Committee publishes Community Care 
report 
Susan Deacon announces the result of the policy review, announces 
her decision not to introduce free personal care and establishes the 
Care Development Group 
Debate on free personal care which results in emergency statement 
to save the Executive from defeat in the Chamber 
A Ministerial working group is established to find resources for free 
personal care 
Mackay announces how the free personal care policy will be funded 
Scottish Government's legislative programme includes free personal 
care 
Care Development Group reports, assuming that Attendance 
Allowance savings by the UK Government will be passed on to the 
Scottish Parliament 
Susan Deacon accepts the Care Development Group's 
recommendations in full 
Community Care and Health (Scotland) Bill introduced to Parliament 
McLeish resigns 
Health and Community Care Committee reports on stage one of the 
Community Care and Health (Scotland) Bill 
Jack McConnell is sworn into office as First Minister 
Community Care and Health (Scotland) Bill debated in plenary-
stage one 
Implementation steering group on free personal care recommended 
an extension to the implementation of free personal care 
Community Care and Health (Scotland) Bill passed in plenary 
unanimously 
Community Care and Health (Scotland) Act receives Royal Assent 
Free personal care implemented across Scotland 
Teething problems by local authorities revealed 
Scottish Parliament is dissolved 
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Chapter Five 
Making the Welsh Long-term care Policy 
In Wales the long-term care issue was only seriously discussed after Scotland had 
decided to introduce free personal care. Supporters of free personal care in Wales 
appeared to use the Scottish decision to introduce free personal care to pressurise 
the Welsh Assembly Government to act. However, the Assembly's lack of primary 
legislative powers provided an excuse for them not to introduce free personal care. 
As a result the ability of actors to pressurise the Welsh Assembly Government to act 
was considerably less than in Scotland. In Wales the window of opportunity was 
always shut with the argument that free personal care was the UK Government's 
responsibility. As a result the development of the Welsh long-term care policy 
involved interesting negotiations between the Welsh Assembly Government and the 
UK Government. 
In a similar vein to the previous chapter, this chapter describes how the National 
Assembly for Wales developed its long-term care for the elderly policies 
chronologically, and again these events are illustrated in a timeline at the end of the 
chapter. After establishing how the National Assembly for Wales made its long-term 
care policies the thesis considers the impact of actors and institutions on the 
development of the policies in Scotland and Wales. 
5.1 Response to the Royal Commission 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Royal Commission on Long-term care 
reported its findings in March 1999, as the political parties in Scotland and Wales 
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were preparing for the first elections to the devolved institutions. As in Scotland, 
the issue of free personal care was barely mentioned in the campaign for the first 
Welsh Assembly elections. The care of the elderly was briefly discussed for 
instance, the Welsh Labour and Conservative parties both offered commitments on 
bed-blocking, but both parties failed to discuss the related issue of long-term care 
or its funding. 1 The Welsh Liberal Democrats devoted a section of their manifesto to 
'older people's lives' but long-term care was not discussed specifically.2 Plaid Cymru 
was the only Welsh political party to discuss long-term care and the issue was 
mentioned to highlight wider political points, 
'At the time of writing, the UK government has refused to commit itself 
to free provision of residential care for the elderly. We see an important 
opportunity for the National Assembly to challenge the right-wing views 
that currently dominate London politics'.3 
The lack of long-term care discussion in the 1999 Assembly election campaign is 
unsurprising. As this was the first Welsh Assembly election the manifestos of the 
main political parties were generally weak and offered few policy commitments. 
With the exception of Plaid Cymru, the main political parties were simply not used 
to designing a policy programme specifically for Wales. Additionally, as in Scotland, 
the election was held before the UK Government had responded to the Royal 
Commission, so the issue of long-term care was not considered as a specifically 
Welsh issue requiring consideration by the Welsh political parties. 
The consideration of long-term care issues in the National Assembly began in the 
Health and Social Services Committee. In January 2000 the UK Government had 
not yet formally responded to the Royal Commission on Long-term Care. Therefore, 
1 Labour Party Manifesto (1999) Working Hard for Wales, Welsh Conservative Party Manifesto (1999) 
Fair Play to All: Your VOIce in the Assembly 
2 Liberal Democrats Manifesto (1999) Guarantee Delivery 
3 Plaid Cymru Manifesto (1999) Working for the New WaleS', 5.2.4 
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the Welsh Assembly's Health and Social Services Committee on 19th January 2000 
examined long-term care on the understanding that this was primarily a UK issue. 
For instance, the Welsh Health Minister, Jane Hutt, argued that, 
'The main financial implications of the Royal Commission's 
recommendations are associated with the funding of personal care from 
general taxation and, as indicated earlier, are to be considered at the UK 
level in the Comprehensive Spending Review'.4 
The discussion of long-term care in the committee focused on producing definitions 
of nursing and personal care. The minister stated that she would take account of 
the Committee's concerns 'about the need to break down barriers between nursing 
and personal care, in her efforts to influence the drafting of the White paper [on the 
future of long term care]'.s Related to the discussion on the definitions between 
nursing and personal care, the Committee sought legal advice 'on whether the 
National Assembly had devolved powers to develop different definitions from 
England for nursing care and personal care'.6 If the formulation of a definition of 
nursing care was within the Assembly's powers the Assembly could choose to 
implement a broader definition of nursing care in comparison to England, enabling a 
wider range of care to be provided free of charge. Professor Dame June Clark, a 
member of the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care, believed these discussions 
indicated a genuine commitment by AMs to providing free personal care, but she 
argued that this commitment lessened as time passed,? 
At this early stage in the development of the Welsh long-term care policy close 
attention was paid to the actions of the UK Government. The Welsh Health Minister 
focused her attention on lobbying the UK Government and the Committee adopted 
4 National Assembly for Wales Health and Social Services Committee (19th January 2001) Paper on the 
Royal Commission for Long- Term CalC' accessed at www.wales.gov.uk on 5/5/04 
S National Assembly for Wales, Health and Social Services Committee (19th January 2001) Minutes 
HSS-Ol-OO accessed at www.wales.gov.uk on 5/5/04 
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a wait and see strategy which involved clarifying their legal position in anticipation 
of the UK Government rejecting free personal care. 
When the UK government formally responded to the Royal Commission in July 
2000, the event went unmentioned in the National Assembly. Unlike in the Scottish 
Parliament, when the UK government's announcement was followed the next day by 
the Conservative motion calling on the Scottish Executive to implement free 
personal care, in the National Assembly for Wales the opposition parties did not 
submit any motions or ask the Welsh Assembly Government any questions on long-
term care following the UK Government's response. It appears that long-term care 
was either not a major concern for the Welsh opposition parties or they were unable 
to effectively respond. Instead it was left to pressure groups and policy experts to 
make the case for free personal care for the elderly. For instance, in August 2000 
Professor Dame June Clark, previously a member of the Royal Commission, argued 
that 'to our great disappointment, Whitehall has decided to make a distinction 
between clinical care and personal care. The former will be free in the Government's 
plans but the latter will not'.8 
5.2 A voiding the free personal care debate 
The National Assembly's Health and Social Services Committee returned to the issue 
of long-term care for the elderly on 14th September 2000. The Health Minister 
produced a paper on long-term care for the Committee which failed to discuss in 
depth the possibility of introducing free personal care, implying that introducing free 
6 Ibid. 
7 Interview with June Clark (Member of the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care) (June 2004) 
8 Davies, G. (2 August 2000) 'Give us more medics, say GPs' in South Wales Evening Post p.l2 
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personal care was not seriously considered by the Welsh Assembly Government.9 
Instead the minister focused on two proposals in relation to financing long-term 
care. Firstly, she suggested that the three-month disregard policy introduced in 
England should be also adopted in Wales. Secondly, the minister suggested re-
evaluating capital limits, suggesting that both the upper and lower capital limits 
should be increased.lO The paper argued that these proposals were superior to 
providing free personal care, as 'Even if the Royal Commission's recommendations 
for personal care had been accepted in full, it would not have avoided the need for 
some people with relatively modest capital assets to sell their home to pay for their 
care'.l1 The Health and Social Service Committee discussed this paper on their 
meeting on 14th September 2000. Some members were critical of the Welsh 
Assembly Government's proposals, arguing that anything short of free personal care 
wasn't enoughY However, Jane Hutt was keen to pOint out that the Welsh 
Assembly Government had to consider 'the response to the Royal Commission in the 
context of its budget'.13 The Committee decided that further discussion of long-term 
care was required, and so the chair of the Health and Social Services Committee 
was asked to write to the Business Secretary requesting a debate in plenary on 
long-term care of the elderly.14 
5.3 Coalition Government 
On 6th October 2000 a coalition government was established between Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats, which replaced the Labour minority government. Deputy 
9 National Assembly for Wales Health and Social Services Committee (14th September 2001) Long-term 
care of the Bder/y in Wales paper HSS-J6-0O, p.3 accessed at www.wales.gov.uk on 5/5/00 
10 IbId 
11 Ibid 
12 National Assembly for Wales Health and Social Services Committee (14th September 2001) Minutes 
HSS-J6-00 accessed at www.wales.gov.uk on 5/05/04 
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First Minister and leader of the Liberal Democrats, Mike German, claimed that for 
about three months prior to the formation of the coalition party, officials had started 
to discuss in private the policy issues which would be part of any possible 
agreement. 1S He recalled that long-term care for the elderly was discussed but the 
partnership agreement, 'Putting Wales First: A Partnership for the People of Wales', 
16 contained no mention of older people or long-term care specifically. 17 Instead 
the partnership agreement centred on a number of education and health 
commitments. Key policies pursued by the Liberal Democrats included a 
commitment to an independent review of voting systems for local government 
elections in Wales, which the Liberal Democrats believed could pave the way for 
proportional representation.18 A commitment to review student finance was also 
included, as the partnership agreement promised to 'institute an immediate 
independent investigation into the issue of student hardship and funding in Wales, 
dealing with those issues covered in the Scottish 'Cubie Report' which fall within the 
Assembly's remit'.19 The student finance proposals were heavily influenced by the 
Scottish Parliament's position, and as in Scotland media coverage of the coalition 
deal focused on the proposal to review student finance. Mike German saw the 
commitment to review student finance as the key achievement of the Liberal 
Democrats in the coalition negotiations, and he was particularly pleased that the 
review led to the introduction of learning grants for students.20 He also claimed the 
Liberal Democrats were successful at securing free prescription charges for those 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
1S Interview with Mike German (Leader of the Welsh Liberal Democrats) (February 2003) 
16 Welsh Labour and Welsh Liberal Democrats (2000) Putting Wales Rrst: A Partnership for the People 
of Wales accessed at www.wales.gov.uk/organicabinetlcontent/putting.htmlon 23/3/02 
17 Interview with Mike German (Leader of the Welsh Liberal Democrats) (February 2003) 
18 Lyons, J. (17 October 2000) 'Labour and Liberal Democrats sign Welsh Coalition deal' in Press 
Association Nevvs accessed at www.lexis-nexis.com/executive on 22/9/04 
19 Welsh Labour and Welsh Liberal Democrats, op.cit 
20 Interview with Mike German (Leader of the Welsh Liberal Democrats) (February 2(03) 
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under 25 and was proud of the Liberal Democrats' part in the decision to freeze 
prescription charges for all.21 In contrast Mike German argued that Labour were 
particularly keen to introduce free bus passes for the elderly.22 However, neither 
party paid much attention to long term care, and no firm agreements were reached 
or commitments announced. 
5.4 Pushing for Free Personal Care 
In the plenary session on 2nd November 2000, Assembly Member Cynog Dafis, from 
Plaid Cymru, tackled the Health Minister on long-term care, arguing that the issue 
should be referred to the Health and Social Services Committee for detailed 
consideration, 
'Has Jane considered that this important matter - which is crucial to the 
people of Wales - should be referred to the Health and Social Services 
Committee for a substantial and detailed investigation into the best way 
forward in Wales?123 
Additionally, the chair of the Health and Social Services Committee, Kirsty Williams, 
and her Liberal Democrat colleague, Peter Black, made attempts at pushing the free 
personal care issue. For instance, on 11 December 2000 they submitted a 
statement of opinion, which argued that 'this Assembly urges the Westminster 
Government to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Long 
Term Care. Both nursing care and personal care should be paid for by the state out 
of general taxation'.24 However, their statement raised little interest, indicated by 
the fact that there were no subscribers to their statement. It is interesting to note 
that the statement focused on the UK government, attempting to pressurise them to 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 2nd November 2000 
24 National Assembly for Wales, Statement of Opinion (11th December 2000) Long-term care of the 
Elderly-OPIN-2000-0110accessed at www.wales.qov.uk on 5/05/04 
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introduce free personal care and did not seek to pursue the matter on a Welsh only 
basis. The Assembly's sparse consideration of free personal care indicates that free 
personal care was not a high priority, in comparison with the Scottish situation. 
AMs saw free personal care as a UK issue, so supporters of free personal care 
focused their efforts on pressurising the UK government to introduce free personal 
care, rather than developing a Welsh only policy. 
If we compare the development of the free personal care policy in Scotland and 
Wales, the Assembly's ability to pursue a distinctive long-term care policy by the 
end of 2000 appears much weaker. Free personal care in Wales was not an issue 
on which the opposition parties focused their attention, the Health and Social 
Services Committee had conducted very little work on the issue and pressure 
groups campaigning for free personal care were barely mentioned in the press. In 
contrast, in Scotland the opposition parties were regularly submitting motions and 
raising the profile of free personal care, the Health and Community Care Committee 
had completed an inquiry on community care, pressure groups and community care 
experts were raising the free personal care issue in the press and the First Minister 
had hinted at support for the policy. In Scotland, by 26th January 2001 the 
Parliament had decided to implement free personal care, whilst in Wales the 
Assembly was focused on providing free nursing care. 
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5.5 The NHS Strategy 
On 2nd February 2001 the Welsh Assembly Government launched its NHS strategy, 
'Improving Health in Wales',25 The plan included a commitment to reform long term 
care, 
'Subject to primary legislation where required, the National Assembly 
proposes to take forward reforms to the funding of long term care, 
including the provision of free nursing care where not currently available 
to those in care126 
The NHS strategy also included a commitment by the Welsh Assembly Government 
to 'seek an enabling, rather than a restrictive, definition of nursing care (and) .. , to 
provide six weeks' free home care for older people when they are discharged from 
hospital'Y Therefore, the National Assembly would provide free personal care, but 
only in someone's home for a period of six weeks after discharge from hospital. 
The NHS strategy was discussed in plenary on 13th February and 1st March 2001. 
The Welsh Assembly Government proposed that the National Assembly should 
endorse the NHS plan,28 However, as an amendment to the Welsh Assembly 
Government's motion, Plaid Cymru AM Jocelyn Davies called for 'the partnership 
administration to examine, in both Plenary and Committee debate, the 
consequences of extending free personal care,29 The Health Minister, Jane Hutt, 
supported the amendment for further discussion of free personal care but argued 
that consideration of free personal care options should primarily be developed 
within the Advisory Group for older people, which was developing a strategy for 
older people and only once their report was completed should free personal care be 
25 The National Assembly for Wales (2001) Improving Health in Wales: A Plan for the NHS with its 
Partners 
26 Ibid, p.42 
27 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary SeSSion, 13th February 2001 
28 Ibid 
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debated in Committee and Plenary.3o The need for more detailed consideration of 
other long-term care proposals was also proposed by Labour AM Gwenda Thomas. 
Gwenda Thomas raised concerns about how nursing needs would be assessed and 
whether attendance allowance payments would cease during the period of six week 
free home care on discharge from hospital.3! 
During questions to the Health Minister on 25th February 2001 there were requests 
for further clarification on her long-term care policy. For instance, Plaid Cymru AM 
Elin Jones wondered whether the Minister remained committed to hold a debate on 
long-term care of the elderly.32 Liberal Democrat AM Mike Bates also raised 
concerns about the long-term policy, questioning whether Jane Hutt regretted that 
'Wales will not receive the power to provide free, universal, personal care under the 
Health and Social Care Bill that is currently going through Parliament'.33 The 
Minister's response made it clear that free personal care was not the Welsh 
Assembly Government's key priority. Rather than focusing on pushing through new 
legislation on long-term care Jane Hutt argued that she would seek to 'broaden our 
definition of free nursing care and implement our promise of up to six weeks' free 
home and personal care'.34 
In the Health and Social Services committee on 28th February 2001, Jane Hutt 
explained how the steering group which developed a strategy for older people 
would operate. Again Hutt highlighted the importance of examining free personal 
care within the context of the strategy for older people. The steering group was 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 15th February 2001 
33 Ibid. 
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meant to be inclusive, gathering evidence from sessions at each Regional 
Committee, an all Wales conference, focus groups of older people across Wales 
(through Age Concern Cymru) and written consultation.35 Jane Hutt also announced 
the draft terms of reference for the steering group, 
'To formulate a strategy for the health and well being of older people in 
Wales that will be responsive to their needs, provide services in a timely 
and appropriate way and promote their independence whenever 
possible'.36 
During the committee meeting Hutt informed the committee of two possible ways to 
organise payment of nursing care.3? The first model was the graduated system 
adopted in England, where an individual's nursing needs would be assessed and the 
amount the NHS would pay for their nursing care varied according to the category 
they were assigned.38 The second option was to implement a flat-rate model, where 
the NHS would pay the same amount per individual irrespective of the input of 
registered nursing time.39 The minister decided to consult on the flat-rate model, as 
it would avoid, 
'problematic distinctions about who actually provides the care [whether 
they were a nurse or a care assistant]. .. the perverse financial incentives 
in a graduated approach to play up an individual's dependency [which 
might be counterproductive to rehabilitation]. .. the need for frequent re-
assessments purely for funding reasons, and also disputes and appeals 
arrangements would be simplified. It also involves fewer transactional 
costs ... It will be easier for everyone to understand and cheaper for 
nursing home owners and the NHS to administer"lO 
During the plenary session on 1st March 2001 the National Assembly voted on the 
NHS strategy. Amendment 4, called on the Welsh Assembly Government to 
34 Ibid. 
35 National Assembly for Wales, Health and Social Services Committee, 28th February 2001, Monthly 
Report of the Minister for Health and Social Services accessed at www.wales.qov.uk on 12/5/04 
36 Ibid. 
37 National Assembly for Wales, Health and Social Services Committee, 28 th February 2001, Minutes 
HSS-04-01 (min) accessed at www.wales.qov.uk on 12/5/04 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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'examine, in both Plenary and Committee debate, the consequences of extending 
free personal care as part of the care funding reforms planned as part of the 
partnership administration's strategy for older people discussed in the NHS plan', 
and was accepted unanimously.41 This was the only amendment to the NHS 
strategy to be accepted by the Assembly. 
5.6 Campaigning for Free Personal Care 
In the middle of May 2001 the parties launched their general election manifestos. 
The Welsh Liberal Democrat manifesto, 'Freedom, Justice, Honesty' included a 
commitment to provide free personal care for the elderlyY During the general 
election campaign it was the Liberal Democrats who often raised the issue of free 
personal care, using it to highlight the Liberal Democrats' achievements in Scotland 
and the benefits of coalition government. For instance, on 6th June, the day before 
the election, the UK Liberal Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy, argued that 'Liberal 
Democrats in Scotland have already delivered free personal care. Liberal Democrats 
at Westminster will give the Assembly the power and funding to enable them to pay 
for all long-term personal care costs in Wales also'.43 Plaid Cymru's general election 
manifesto also supported free personal care, condemning the UK Government's 
position for creating 'an artificial boundary between personal care in hospital and in 
residential homes and between health care and personal care'.44 The Welsh 
Conservative's manifesto failed to mention the issue of personal care for the elderly, 
though it did discuss the need to safeguard the savings of older people from being 
41 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary SeSSion, 1st March 2001 
42 Welsh Liberal Democrat Party Manifesto (2001) Freedom, Justice, Honesty 
43 South Wales Evening Post (6 June 2001) 'Lets Build on Progress', p.14 
44 Plaid Cymru (2001) Manifesto 2001, p.26 
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taken by the state to pay for long-term care.45 The Welsh Labour manifesto also 
contained no mention of free personal care,46 this is unsurprising as in a general 
election it would have been highly controversial for the Welsh Labour party to take 
a different line from the UK wide party on a reserved matter. 
5.7 Free NurSing Care 
In October 2001 discontent was raised about the amount of time it had taken the 
Welsh Health Minister to implement free nursing care. Again comparisons were 
made with the other long-term care policies in the UK. For instance, Age Concern 
Cymru argued that whilst the banded model of nursing care introduced in England 
was more confusing than the Welsh flat rate proposal, at least the English policy 
was implemented in full on 1st October 2001. In contrast in Wales the consultation 
on nursing care did not even end until 19th October, and it was clear that when 
payments for nursing care were introduced these would not be backdated to 1st 
October. 47 In the end free nursing care in Wales for self-funders, those previously 
paying for their care, was introduced just two months later, on the 1st December 
2001. 
On 5th November 2001 the Health Minister, Jane Hutt, announced that the National 
Assembly for Wales would provide free nursing care to all nursing home residents, 
meaning that in Wales, as in England and Scotland, nursing care would be available 
free in all settings.48 As expected, the Health Minister decided to opt for the flat 
payment model, as opposed to the banding system introduced in England. It was 
45 Welsh Conservative Party Manifesto (2001) Time for Common Sense in Wale~ p.24 
46 Welsh Labour Party Manifesto (2001) Ambitions for Wales 
47 South Wales Evening Post (6 October 2001) 'Nursing care Costs for Elderly Still Not Ended', p.? 
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decided that funding would be set at £100 a week for each individual assessed as 
requiring nursing care.49 The Health Minister was keen to point out that the 
financial package for long-term care in Wales would mean that those funding their 
own care 'will receive more than his or her counterpart in England'.50 
The consultation on nursing care ran from 26th July until the 19th October, during 
which time the Welsh Assembly Government received over 70 responses from 
organisations and individuals. In addition to the consultation, the nursing care 
policy was informed by an expert group established by the Minister for Health and 
Social Services under the chairmanship of the National Assembly's Chief Nursing 
Officer.51 The flat payment scheme was clearly the preferred option amongst elderly 
organisations and experts in community care. For instance, Dame Judith Clark 
claimed that the flat-rate model would simplify the process and escape the problem 
of needing to re-assess the category of care someone was entitled to as their health 
deteriorated. 52 The decision to opt for a flat rate payment model was taken partly 
to avoid conflict between the Welsh Assembly Government and the care sector. A 
banded model would have increased the likelihood of appeals as older people 
sought to secure greater funding, resulting in disputes between the Welsh Assembly 
Government and the care sector over relatively small amounts of money.53 
Additionally the policy decision was influenced by the problems associated with the 
banded model. The banded model would have been particularly difficult to 
administer because nursing needs are likely to change, primarily as a person's 
48 National Assembly for Wales (5 November 2001) Press Release: Jane Hutt announces Free Nursing 
Care for all Nursing Homes residents accessed at www.wales.gov.uk on 26/05/04 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Interview with June Clark (Member of the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care) (June 2004) 
53 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
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health deteriorates, therefore, regular reassessments would have been required,54 
Therefore, there was a possibility that the banded model could have cost more to 
administer than the amount the Welsh Assembly Government would have paid out 
to those in long-term care,55 So, the decision to implement a flat-rate model was 
taken to reduce conflict, to indicate support for the troubled care home sector and 
to avoid a complex system requiring high administrative costs, 
5.8 The Strategy for Older People 
In May 2002 the Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older People published their 
report, 'When I'm 64 .. , and more', The Advisory Group, although chaired by an AM, 
was primarily made up of voluntary organisations, local government bodies and 
business representatives, and was considered one of the Assembly's most inclusive 
policy-making forums by voluntary organisations and politicians alike,56 The 
Advisory Group considered open-ended questionnaires asking about the issues 
affecting older people, conducted focus groups throughout Wales, took detailed 
evidence from a range of organisations,57 The Advisory Group operated through 
consensus, meaning that compromise between the different interests within the 
group was essential. Initially the Welsh Assembly Government was reluctant to 
include free personal care as part of the group's remit, for fear of the political 
conflict this could cause with Westminster,58 However, due to pressure from the 
Liberal Democrats, opposition parties and non-governmental organisations, the 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Interview with representatives from Welsh pressure groups and AMs (February 2003 and June 2004) 
57 Interview with Angharad Davies and Greg Walker (Representatives from RCN Cymru) (February 
2003) 
58 Interview with Ana Palazon (Director of Help the Aged Wales) (February 2003) 
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Advisory Group's remit was extended to non-devolved issues.59 Including free 
personal care on the group's remit increased the importance and profile of the free 
personal care issue and presented the opportunity for a serious discussion of long-
term care policy options. 
On the issue of free personal care there were a number of disagreements within the 
Advisory Group. For instance, local authority and health service representatives said 
that they could not endorse a recommendation for free personal care on a Wales 
only basis, whilst many of the representatives from voluntary organisations wanted 
a clear commitment to free personal care.60 In the end the Advisory Group 
recommended that, 
'The Welsh Assembly Government should formally accept the Royal 
Commission's recommendations. The Welsh Assembly Government 
should challenge the UK Government to fund and implement free 
personal care in the context of UK taxation, benefits and inheritance 
policy as the Royal Commission had intended'.61 
The group accepted that a policy of free personal care should only be pursued if 
there was a policy change in England, as 'More generous treatment, relative to 
England, would have to be supported from the Assembly's budget and compete with 
other demands for resources', and the policy would only benefit a relatively small 
number of people.62 
The AdviSOry Group's report went to the Health and Social Services Committee on 
1 st May 2002 and was discussed in plenary later in the month. During the plenary 
debate on the Strategy for Older People the proposal to accept 'the AdviSOry 
Group's conclusions in relation to free provision of personal care by the National 
59 Ibid. 
60 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (February 2003) 
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Assembly' was accepted unanimously by AMs.53 The Welsh Assembly Government 
committed to 'challenge the UK Government to fund and implement free personal 
care in the context of UK taxation, benefits and inheritance policy as the Royal 
Commission had intended'.54 Interestingly, the decision to challenge the UK 
Government, and the acceptance of the Advisory Group's report, occurred before 
the consultation process on the Advisory Group's report had concluded. Whilst there 
was agreement with the principle of free personal care, the National Assembly 
decided the policy should be funded by Westminster. The debate on free personal 
care, therefore, centred on two key issues, what action the Assembly should take to 
pressurise the UK Government and whether the Assembly should act unilaterally if 
the UK Government refused to alter their personal care policy. 
The Conservative Health spokesperson, David Melding, was fierce in his criticism of 
the Welsh Assembly Government's position. Melding suggested that the idea of the 
Welsh Assembly Government pressurising the UK Government to alter their free 
personal care policy was a joke; 'We must accept the realities of our political 
situation. This motion is an empty gesture ... We should not play to the grandstand, 
running to the Welsh public blaming the UK Government for everything'.55 However, 
he did also vote to accept the Advisory Group's report in full, including the 
commitment to challenge the UK Government to introduce free personal care. 
It was generally accepted that it would be unlikely for the UK Government to alter 
their free personal care policy. For instance, David Melding suggested that 'No-one 
51 Welsh Assembly Government Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older People in Wales (May 2002) 
When I'm 64 ... and mor~ p.S3 
52 Ibid. 
53 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 16tn May 2002 
54 Welsh Assembly Government Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older People in Wales, op.cit, p.S3 
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is naive enough to think that were the First Minister to abandon his usual tirades 
against the Welsh Rugby Union, and take on the Treasury he would win',66 Given 
the likelihood of the UK Government refusing to alter their free personal care policy, 
Liberal Democrat AM and Chair of the Health and Social Services Committee, Kirsty 
Williams, asked the Health Minister to 'seek, on behalf of the Welsh Assembly 
Government, the powers and the resources to pursue this policy in Wales',67 The 
Health Minister agreed that if the UK Government failed to change their policy then 
the Welsh Assembly Government would 'press the UK Government for the powers 
and resources to consider the matter in Wales',68 However, Jane Hutt only 
committed to consider free personal care in Wales, as she felt 'it would be 
impractical for the Assembly to pursue a policy of free personal care in Wales',69 
The Welsh Assembly Government's refusal to commit to implement free personal 
care on a Wales only basis suggested to David Melding that the Welsh Assembly 
Government was 'playing a double game',7D He believed that the Welsh Assembly 
Government were not serious about committing to free personal care because they 
had concerns about the costs of the policy, Instead Melding felt that the Welsh 
Assembly Government were playing 'thorny politics',71 avoiding discussing, and 
perhaps rejecting, free personal care in Wales and pretending that the UK 
Government was to blame for their inaction,72 Therefore, instead of focusing on 
pressurising the UK Government on free personal care, David Melding suggested 
that the Health and Social Services Committee should be asked to 'hold an inquiry 
to examine this issue, then reach some coherent judgments and make 
65 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 16th May 2002 
66 IbId 
67 IbId 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Interview with David Melding (Conservative AM) (February 2003) 
72 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 16th May 2002 
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recommendations',73 Melding did not agree that free personal care should be 
introduced, because he felt it was not the best use of resources, However, Melding 
wanted debate on free personal care and felt there was a need to 'have a national 
policy or a fairer, more standard policy, That could limit the charging policies that 
are applied to people who are deemed to have to pay for personal care',74 
5.9 Relations with the UK Government 
The National Assembly's decision to 'challenge the UK Government to fund and 
implement free personal care' was met by a swift rebuttal by the Wales Office?S 
Adrian McMenamin, political adviser to Paul Murphy, the Secretary of State for 
Wales, dismissed the National Assembly's behaviour as 'pathetic .. , symptomatic of 
their irresponsible approach to politics',76 McMenamin believed that if free personal 
care was a priority for the Assembly then they should commit to paying for it and 
suggested that AMs should 'sort out things they're responsible for' rather than 
encroach on Westminster's territory,77 The Wales Office was quick to point out that 
'this decision in the Assembly will have no impact on government policy',78 
The Wales Office's response highlighted the Welsh Assembly Government's lack of 
influence in Whitehall, as Plaid Cymru's Dai Lloyd explained 'It is quite clear Rhodri 
Morgan has no influence over Paul Murphy, so what hope has he of having any 
influence over Tony Blair',79 It also highlighted the lack of negotiation and 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Welsh Assembly Government Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older People in Wales, op.cit./ p.53 
76 Speed, N. and Betts, C. (17 May 2002) 'London Dashes Hope of Free Care for the Elderly in Wales' in 
The Western Mail, p.1 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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consultation occurring between the two levels of government, as it was quite clear 
that the Welsh Assembly Government's policy position had come as a complete 
surprise to officials in the Wales Office. Given the response of the Wales Office it is 
easy to understand why the Welsh Assembly Government were so reluctant to 
include free personal care within the remit of the Advisory Group on the Strategy for 
Older People. Whilst Paul Murphy did later apologise for his advisor's comments 
and the advisor soon left his post it was widely suspected that 'his remarks reflected 
the sentiments, if not the diplomacy of his boss'.Bo A couple of weeks after the 
Assembly had decided to challenge the UK Government to introduce free personal 
care Jane Hutt 'was reported by a Labour AM as [saying] that the policy [of 
challenging the UK Government on free personal care] was "dead'''.B1 
The response of the Wales Office was in contrast to Welsh non-governmental 
organisations. The Western Mail reported that 'The Royal College of Nursing in 
Wales together with Age Concern Cymru and Help the Aged have welcomed the 
news that the Assembly Government has agreed to support the principle of free 
personal care in Wales'.82 Although there was delight that the principle of free 
personal care had been accepted, this was tempered by a concern that verbal 
support for free personal care needed to be put into practice. 83 
80 Osmond, J. (2003) 'From Corporate Body to Virtual Parliament: The Metamorphosis of the National 
Assembly for Wales' in Hazell, R. (Ed.) The State of the Nations 2003: The Third Year of Devolution in 
the Umted Kingdom (Imprint Academic, Thorverton), p.l7 
81 Betts, C. (24 May 2002) 'Heeding his master's voice' in The Western Mail, p.12 
82 South Wales Echo (17 May 2002) 'calls to Cover Care Costs', p.26 
83 Interviews with June Clark (Member of the Royal Commission on Long-Term care), Ana Palazon 
(Director of Help the Aged Wales) and Sarah Stone (Political Officer for Age Concern Cymru) (February 
2003 and June 2004) 
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5.10 A Last Minute Push 
The consultation period for the Strategy for Older People ended on 30 August 2002, 
and over 100 responses were received. 84 These comments were examined by the 
Welsh Assembly Government to inform their Strategy for Older People. The Welsh 
Assembly Government's Strategy and their response to the Advisory Group's 
recommendations were discussed in the Health and Social Services Committee on 
4th December 2002. The Welsh Assembly Government provided the committee 
with their detailed response to the Advisory Group's recommendations and revealed 
a draft of their strategy for older people. The summary of the consultation 
responses revealed that several respondents were disappointed with the lack of free 
personal care and one response described the Assembly's position on free personal 
care as 'a half-way house recommendation that allows Assembly Government as a 
devolved administration to 'pass the buck'.85 The strategy repeated the Welsh 
Assembly Government's position on the issue of free personal care, 
'The National Assembly has accepted the principle of free personal care 
on the basis of the Royal Commission's recommendation that this should 
be a matter for UK taxation, benefits and inheritance policy ... In the 
absence of any change at the UK level... The Welsh Assembly 
Government will continue to press the UK Government for the powers 
and resources to consider the matter in Wales, but will however continue 
to explore opportunities for alleviating the burden of paying for personal 
care'.86 
During the plenary debate on the Strategy for Older People, on December 11th 
2002, Liberal Democrat AM Kirsty Williams called for further action on free personal 
care, suggesting that the Assembly should 'press the case for additional powers and 
84 National Assembly for Wales Health and Social Services Committee (October 2002) Minister's 
Monthly Report accessed at www.wales.gov.uk on 31/05/04 
85 National Assembly for Wales (4 December 2002) Strategy for Older People: Summary of 
Consultation Responses to AdviSOry Group Report 'When 1m 64 ... and More'accessed at 
www.wales.gov.uk on 31/05/04 
86 Welsh Assembly Government (January 2003) The Strategy for Older People in Wales, p.6 
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resources for Wales so that we can move forward as Scotland has'.87 Additionally 
Liberal Democrat AM, Peter Black, highlighted that his party wanted the Assembly to 
push for primary legislation at Westminster which would allow for the Assembly to 
introduce free personal care for Wales alone.88 Although he was careful to criticise 
the UK Government rather than the Welsh Assembly Government, Peter Black's 
comments highlighted a difference of opinion between the coalition partners, whilst 
the Liberal Democrats wanted if necessary for Wales to implement free personal 
care alone, Labour AMs continued to argue that free personal care should only be 
pursued on a UK basis. 
The first term of the National Assembly ended with the Welsh Assembly committing 
to raise their capital limits to £12,250 and £20,000,89 which were just greater than 
the English limits of £12,000 and £19,500. However, there were no plans on free 
personal care other than to attempt to persuade the UK Government to alter their 
policy. The care of older people was given considerable attention during the 
elections to the second term of the Assembly, with Plaid committing to implement 
the full recommendations of the Royal Commission on long-term care, the Liberal 
Democrats agreeing to fund free personal care in Wales and Labour arguing for a 
Commissioner for Older People.90 However, in sharp contrast to Scotland it 
appeared unlikely that free personal care would be introduced in Wales. 
87 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary SeSSion, 11th December 2002 
88 Ibid. 
89 Welsh Statutory Instrument (2003) No. 897 (W.117) The National Assistance (Assessment of 
Resources) (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2003 accessed at www.wales-Iegislation.hmso.gov.uk 
on 24/08/04 
90 Mugaseth, J. (June 2003) 'Policy Development' in Osmond, J. (Ed.) Nations and Regions: The 
Dynamic of De'vVlution- Quarterly Monitoring Programme (The Constitution Unit and IWA), p.28 
accessed at www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/monrep/wales/wales june 2003.pdf on 31/05/04 
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5. 11 Conclusion 
The way in which the National Assembly for Wales formulated its long-term care 
policy is in sharp contrast to Scotland. The Welsh Assembly Government took a 
more measured approach, agreeing to investigate the issue of free personal care 
within the remit of the Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older People, then using 
the basis of their report as their long-term care policy. Unlike in Scotland the Welsh 
Assembly Government maintained its position on free personal care throughout the 
Assembly's first term. The Health Minister always argued that free personal care 
was not the best use of resources and she would prefer to focus on other measures, 
such as raising capital limits and introducing six weeks free home care following 
hospital discharge. The consistent policy can perhaps partially be explained by the 
fact that the Welsh long-term policy, in contrast to the Scottish policy, was shaped 
almost entirely by the Welsh Assembly Government, with little input by the Health 
and Social Services Committee, other Assembly Members, pressure groups or policy 
experts. 
Interestingly, in Wales debate on free personal care was almost non-existent prior 
to the Scottish Parliament's decision to fund it. It appears that actors in Wales were 
strongly influenced by other levels of government, and events in Scotland put 
pressure particularly on the Liberal Democrats, opposition parties and pressure 
groups to make the case for free personal care. Relations with the UK level of 
government were also significant, as the National Assembly for Wales did not have 
the legislative powers to introduce free personal care without primary legislation 
from Westminster. The response of the Wales Office to the Welsh Assembly's 
decision to challenge the UK Government to introduce free personal care indicated 
that there had been a lack of negotiation between actors in the Wales Office and 
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the Welsh Assembly Government. The extent to which the Wales Office publicly 
criticised the National Assembly's position on free personal care was also surprising 
and indicated that the National Assembly faced serious difficulties fighting its corner 
with the Wales Office, never mind other Whitehall departments. 
In Wales it appears that pressure groups and opposition parties could not build up 
the same level of momentum on free personal care as was clear in the Scottish 
case. There are a number of reasons for this, such as the organisation of the 
opposition parties and the division of powers in Wales, which separated 
responsibility for free personal care between different levels of government, 
meaning actors who supported free personal care never clearly focused on the 
Welsh only level. Therefore, both the actors and the institutional setting of the 
Welsh Assembly, in, and around, which actors operated, affected how the 
Assembly's long-term care policy was designed. The next two chapters explore how 
the actors involved in making the free personal care policies in Scotland and Wales 
shaped the policies, chapter six examines actors from the coalition parties and 
chapter seven investigates actors outside the coalition parties. 
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Figure 5.1: Timeline of events 
December 1997 
March 1999 
May 1999 
27 July 2000 
14 September 2000 
6 October 2000 
11 December 2000 
25 January 2001 
2 February 2001 
13 February 2001 
28 February 2001 
1 October 2001 
19 October 2001 
1 December 2001 
21 March 2002 
1 May 2002 
16th May 2002 
17th May 2002 
30 August 2002 
January 2003 
March 2003 
April 2003 
Royal Commission on Long-term care established 
Royal Commission submitted its final report 'With Respect to Old 
Age: Long Term Care- Rights and Responsibilities' 
First elections to the National Assembly for Wales 
UK Government formally responds to the Royal Commission 
Welsh Health Minister, Jane Hutt, proposes re-evaluating capital 
limits and disregarding the value of the home for the first three 
months of entering care 
Coalition Government formed 
Liberal Democrats submit a statement of opinion calling for free 
personal care 
Scottish Executive agrees to implement free personal care in 
Scotland 
Welsh Assembly Government launches NHS Strategy: Improving 
Health in Wales - which included long-term care reforms 
NHS Strategy discussed in plenary and Plaid Cymru calls for greater 
exploration of free personal care, the Health Minister agrees but 
announces that free personal care will be examined within the pre-
existing AdviSOry Group on a Strategy for Older People 
Health Minister announces her preference for funding free nursing 
care through a flat-rate payment rather than banded payments 
England implemented free nursing care 
Consultation on models of funding free nursing care ended 
Free nursing care in Wales implemented for self-funders 
Welsh Assembly Government agreed to raise capital limits from 
£18,500 to £19,000 
AdviSOry Group on a Strategy for Older People published their 
report, recommending that the Welsh Assembly Government should 
accept the Royal Commissions recommendations and seek to 
challenge the UK government to implement free personal care 
National Assembly for Wales unanimously accepted the AdviSOry 
Group's recommendations 
Assembly's policy on free personal care called 'pathetic' and 
'irresponsible' by Wales Office official 
Consultation on the Strategy for Older People ended 
Welsh Assembly Government publishes their Strategy for Older 
People 
National Assembly for Wales dissolved 
Free nursing care implemented for residents of care homes funded 
by local authorities and Capital limits raised above the English limits 
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Chapter Six 
Actors: The Coalition Partners 
As discussed in chapter two, actor-centred institutionalism suggests that actors play 
a crucial role in shaping policy. For instance, Scharpf argued that 'Policy, by 
definition, is intentional action by actors who are interested in achieving specific 
outcomes'.! For Scharpf, understanding an individual actor's preferences (interests, 
norms, identities and interaction orientations), perceptions and capabilities is crucial 
if we are to understand policy-making. Additionally Scharpf suggests that because 
actors rarely have the ability to shape policy alone, it is important to consider the 
configuration of actors involved in policy-making. Therefore, there is a need to 
assess to what extent the capabilities (translated into potential strategies), 
preferences and perceptions of the configuration of actors involved in policy-making 
are compatible with each other. 2 
This chapter and the next explore the influence of the actor on the long-term care 
policies of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. This 
chapter focuses on those actors from the coalition parties who were the key actors 
in relation to free personal care case; the First Ministers and the Scottish and Welsh 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parliamentary parties. These actors were chosen for 
investigation following analysis of parliamentary documents, newspaper reports, 
secondary literature reviews and following insight gained during interviews. The 
role of these actors and how the interaction of their preferences, perceptions and 
! Scharpf, F. W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research 
(Westview Press, Colorado), p.36 
2 Ibid, p.72 
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capabilities influenced the development of the Scottish and Welsh long-term care 
policies will be examined. 
6.1 The First Ministers 
All of the interviewees who were questioned about free personal care in Scotland 
believed that the First Minister, Henry McLeish, played a key part in securing free 
personal care. For instance, interviewees said, 'the change in First Minister was the 
crucial factor? free personal care was off the agenda until 'Henry McLeish made a 
public statement which meant the game was back on',4 and free personal care was 
a 'First Minister led commitment'.5 McLeish clearly played a strong role in pushing 
the free personal care issue, however, why he decided to pursue this matter against 
fierce opposition from his Labour colleagues within his cabinet and in the UK 
Government requires some explanation. 
There is general agreement that McLeish's desire to introduce free personal care 
was in part motivated by a perception that 'free personal care was the right thing to 
do'.6 McLeish explained that he felt the distinctions between personal and nursing 
care were unfair/ as it meant that those suffering from certain illnesses, such as 
dementia, who required assistance with tasks such as washing or eating would be 
charged for this care, whilst those with illnesses requiring more formal nursing care 
would receive their care free of charge. John McTernan (McLeish's special advisor 
with responsibility for Policy and Strategy) argued that McLeish's desire to 
implement free personal care was consistent with the strong sense of social justice 
3 Interview with Mary Scanlon (Conservative MSP) (December 2003) 
4 Interview with Nora Radcliffe (Liberal Democrat MSP) (December 2003) 
5 Interview with Tom Mccabe (Labour MSP) (January 2004) 
6 Interview with Peter MacMahon (Press Secretary to McLeish) (December 2003) 
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which characterised McLeish's political career.8 For instance, McTernan explained 
that when McLeish was the leader of Rfe Council he embarked on a progressive 
programme of care for older people.9 Whilst McLeish may have been partially 
motivated by a genuine belief that free personal care was ideologically the right 
policy to pursue, which was consistent with his political identity, this wasn't his only 
motivation. McLeish argued that focusing on free personal care also enabled him to 
engage in broader political debates about the development of Scotland. McLeish 
perceived that free personal care was strongly related to the wider problems of 
ageing and Scotland's declining population figures, and he believed that these wider 
issues tended to be ignored. lO McLeish suggested that introducing free personal 
care made a statement about the treatment of the elderly and highlighted that 
Scotland's declining population was 'an issue we can't continue to ignore'Y 
McLeish also acknowledged that free personal care provided him with an 
opportunity to mark himself out as a distinctive leader. He argued that as a First 
Minister there is a 'need to bring something distinctive to your leadership' and 
claimed that free personal care provided him with an opportunity to do SO.12 Here 
McLeish seems to have internalised what Scharpf terms a normative role 
orientationY Normative role orientations refer to the expectations of occupants of 
given positions. Whether McLeish was correct or not in his interpretation of the 
normative role orientations associated with his position as Rrst Minister, his policy 
choices appear to have been influenced by his understanding that a First Minister 
7 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
8 Interview with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (January 
2004) 
9 Ibid. 
10 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Scharpf, F. W. op.cit., p.64 
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should act distinctively and his desire to be successful and popular in this role. 
A major impact on McLeish was that his leadership followed that of Donald Dewar. 
Dewar was a well-respected and popular politician. Therefore, McLeish felt 
considerable pressure to adopt distinctive policies to indicate how his administration 
differed and improved on the last. As Dewar had not supported free personal care, 
by embracing the policy McLeish was presented with an opportunity to distinguish 
himself from Dewar and build public support. In addition to distancing himself from 
the previous First Minister, McLeish also had an interest in distancing himself from 
the UK Government. Whilst Dewar as the first First Minister had been expected just 
to get devolution up and running McLeish felt a real need to start producing 
distinctive policies for Scotland, arguing that 'if devolution is to make sense we have 
to diverge from English policies where there are different needs'.14 Free personal 
care provided McLeish with an opportunity to distance himself from both Dewar's 
leadership and the UK Government. 
McLeish has been characterised as an insecure leader, who was unconvinced of his 
own abilities. Brian Taylor explained that McLeish 'doubted, intrinsically, that he 
was up to the task'. 15 McLeish's insecurity meant that those around him were often 
able to influence his policy choices. For instance, he was particularly concerned to 
pursue policies which were popular with Labour party members. McLeish claims 
that Labour members support any policies which are redistributive and so free 
personal care had their backing.16 Concern with winning support within his own 
party was particularly enhanced by McLeish's narrow leadership victory against 
14 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
15 Taylor, B. (2002) Scot/and's Parliament: Triumph and Disaster(Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh), p.32 
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McConnell, which had questioned his popularity within the Scottish Parliamentary 
Labour Party (SPLP). McLeish's insecurity and desire to build a popular policy 
programme explains his particular concern that, 
'[if] every organisation you talk to, every medical group, every local 
authority, the Sutherland people themselves, the PLP, the Liberal group, 
the opposition [are all agreed] - then sometimes you just have to say to 
yourselves: 'Well, look. There is a firm body of opinion. Is what we have 
as a policy the right thing to do?1l7 
Pressures also emerged from McLeish's personal relationships. As a social worker 
McLeish's wife had an interest in the free personal care issue and the press regularly 
referred to her ability to shape her husband's policy decisions. One interviewee 
referred to an occasion where Henry McLeish's wife had explained that 'Henry was 
fairly committed to free personal care, over 50% convinced, but that she was totally 
committed' and so she'd make sure that free personal care became reality.1s 
Although, politicians and journalists often overstated the role of McLeish's wife in 
the free personal care debate, implying that her husband was weak and easily 
manipulated, it is clear that McLeish faced pressure, both personally and politically, 
to introduce free personal care and his insecurities as First Minister encouraged him 
to pursue such a popular policy. 
In summary, there were several factors which motivated McLeish's support for Free 
personal care. Free personal care appeared to McLeish to be the right thing to do. 
The policy also provided him with an opportunity to serve his personal self-interest, 
enabling him to fulfil what he considered to be the normative role associations of 
being Scotland's First Minister, pursuing a policy distinctive from the previous 
administration and highlighting the Scottish Executive's autonomy from the UK 
16 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
17 Sunday Times (5th November 2000) 'McLeish in U-turn on elderly care' 
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Government. Free personal care was also consistent with McLeish's political identity 
and gave him an opportunity to build public support for himself as First Minister, for 
his Government and for the Scottish Parliament in general. 
McLeish not only influenced the shape of the free personal care policy, but his 
leadership style also influenced the way the policy was made. Political 
commentators argued that McLeish's leadership was characterised by a desire to 
avoid confrontation. Brian Taylor, noted that 'Henry would avoid conversations that 
involved conflict ... He would simply walk away'.19 Some respondents believed that 
McLeish's style of leadership caused serious problems, for instance Nora Radcliffe 
compared McLeish to the present First Minister, Jack McConnell. She argued that 
with McConnell 'you know what you are getting, you might not like it but at least 
you know' whilst under McLeish's leadership policy positions were changing all the 
time. 20 In contrast, others argue that a more flexible, consensual style of leadership 
is useful in coalition government. For instance, McTernan compares McLeish's style 
of leadership to the reed in the Aesop fable 'The Oak and the Reed'. In this tale the 
oak boasts of his strength but unlike the reed is unable to survive fierce winds due 
to his inability to sway in the wind. According to McTernan, flexibility is crucial for 
success in coalition government,21 
Whether flexibility is a positive attribute or not, McLeish's style of leadership had an 
influence on policy-making in the free personal care case. There were times when 
McLeish made announcements that had apparently not been discussed with anyone 
18 Interview with an MSP (December 2003) 
19 Taylor, B. (2002) op.cit., p.36 
20 Interview with Nora Radcliffe (Liberal Democrat MSP) (December 2003) 
21 Interview with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (January 
2004) 
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else. For instance, McLeish announced his desire to introduce free personal care on 
Newsnight Scotland without discussion with Peter MacMahon (McLeish's press 
secretary) or the Health Minister, Susan Deacon.22 By making public commitments 
to free personal care, McLeish made it increasingly difficult for those opposing his 
position to argue against personal care without threatening his leadership and 
MacMahon claims McLeish's strategy was deliberate.23 If McLeish was determined to 
introduce free personal care despite the opposition of his Health Minister, he could 
have adopted a number of strategies to achieve his aims. MacMahon thought 
McLeish's behaviour as a calculated way of operating, 'If you fear you may 
encounter internal opposition it can be useful to have been on the record and to 
have opposition politicians and journalists quoting your words, and public opinion 
behind you. That was McLeish's tactic'.24 In contrast, Liberal Democrat MSP, Keith 
Raffan, argued that McLeish's attitude towards Deacon was incredibly weak. He 
suggests that McLeish should have demanded Deacon's resignation after she failed 
to commit to free personal care in the plenary session on 25th January 2001.25 
Raffan explains McLeish was incapable of doing so because he 'was a weak person 
in a weak position'.26 Therefore, it is possible that McLeish did not have the 
capabilities (such as support in the cabinet, negotiating skills or authority) to force 
his Health Minister to adopt his preferred free personal care policy by any other 
strategy. Therefore, McLeish needed to publicly state his commitment to free 
personal care, which raised the stakes involved, forcing Deacon to support the 
policy or contradict the First Minister, thus challenging his leadership. 
22 MacMahon, P. (26 January 2002) 'How McLeish made up his policies on the hoof' in The Scotsman 
accessed at www.news.scotsman.com/topics.cfm?tid=190&id=95992002 on 15/11/03 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Interview with Keith Raffan (Liberal Democrat MSP) (February 2004) 
26 Ibid. 
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McLeish argued that Deacon's failure to commit to free personal care 'didn't worry 
me a bit because I knew it was going to happen'Y McLeish believed that he did not 
always need to argue openly for free personal care during the development of the 
policy, because pressure was coming from other sources. Here McLeish masks the 
fact that even if he had wanted to he would not have been in a strong enough 
position to directly challenge his Health Minister. Deacon was more of an ally than 
most of his backbenchers, who had supported McConnell in the leadership contest. 
As a result McLeish would have simply been unable to sack her. 
McLeish's lack of clear commitment on the free personal care issue, whether due to 
a dislike of confrontation or as an effective political strategy, meant that his 
colleagues perceived that he was not always being entirely open with them.28 For 
instance, Taylor noted that on one occasion in Cabinet 'Wendy Alexander effectively 
accused the First Minister of lying as she confronted him over the care question'.29 
Alexander's allegation can perhaps be explained by McLeish's mode of operating, 
'several senior sources say that McLeish was unwilling to address 
controversy, to close issues down. He would give the impression that he 
agreed or sympathised with the person to whom he was talking at the 
time. The result was confusion, with the cabinet and civil servants 
uncertain what had been decided'.30 
Such an operating style meant that issues remained open for discussion, and it 
provided the opportunity for issues like free personal care to remain on the 
Executive's agenda. 
27 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
28 Taylor, B. op.cit., p.39 
29 Ibid., pAO 
30 Ibid., p.35 
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In contrast to the Scottish case, the First Minister in Wales, Rhodri Morgan, was less 
active on the free personal care issue. In public Morgan offered no statements of 
support for free personal care and instead expressed some concern about 
introducing free personal care. For instance, in a plenary session on the 2nd July 
2002 Morgan explained to AMs that 'The problem with the Scottish system is that 
people lose attendance allowances. If a patient has free personal care, they cannot 
receive certain benefits from the Benefits Agency'.31 Whilst in Scotland, Henry 
McLeish acted as a policy entrepreneur,32 pushing the case for free personal care 
often against the wishes of Labour Cabinet Members, free personal care was not the 
preferred policy for Rhodri Morgan. 
Morgan's opposition to free personal care seems to be based on practicalities rather 
than ideology. The Welsh First Minister had previously explained his commitment to 
extending free service provision. In Morgan's famous 'Clear Red Water' speech at 
Swansea University in December 2002 he explained his opposition to the 
introduction of Foundation Hospitals as in England, 
'our commitment to equality leads directly to a model of the relationship 
between the government and the individual which regards that individual 
as a citizen rather than as a consumer. Approaches which prioritise 
choice over equality of outcome rest, in the end, upon a market 
approach to public services, in which individual economic actors pursue 
their own best interests with little regard for wider considerations'.33 
In his speech Morgan highlighted his support for universal provision and illustrated 
what this meant when shaping policy, 
31 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 2nd July 2002 
32 Kingdon, J. W. (1984) Agenda~ Alternatives and Public Policies (Scott, Foresman and Company, 
London), p.185 
33 Morgan, R. (December 2002) Speech to the National Centre for Public Policy, University of Wales, 
Swansea 
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'This is why, my administration has been determined to ensure a 
continuing stake in social welfare services for the widest possible range 
of our citizens. Universal services mean that we all have a reason for 
making such services as good as possible. Free access to social welfare 
services means that they become genuinely available to the full range of 
people in Wales, not simply those able to afford them. In a second 
Assembly term, we will look to maintain this principle and carry it 
forward. 134 
The First Minister's preference for universal policies is illustrated by his support for 
the Welsh Assembly Government's initiatives to introduce free school milk, free 
entry to museums, provide free bus travel to pensioners and disabled people, to 
extend those entitled to free eye tests and his commitment to eradicate 
prescriptions charges across the board (Morgan planned to eradicate prescription 
charges in the Assembly's second term). Free personal care clearly sits easily with 
Morgan's ideological position on universal provision but unlike McLeish, the Welsh 
First Minister did not push the issue of free personal care. Additionally, the Welsh 
First Minister played only a minor role in shaping the Welsh Assembly Government's 
long-term care policy, leaving others in his cabinet to develop the policy. The fact 
that the Welsh First Minister did not become heavily involved in the free personal 
care debate perhaps indicates, or might be the reason why, free personal care was 
treated much less seriously in Wales compared to Scotland. 
The Conservative AM, Glyn Davies, argued that Rhodri Morgan's lack of support for 
free personal care was an important factor in failing to change the UK Government's 
position. Davies claimed that if the Welsh First Minister clearly made the case for 
the Assembly's right to take a decision on any issue, offered a strong commitment 
and pursued the matter with Whitehall, then in many cases the UK Government 
34 Ibid. 
178 
would allow the National Assembly to take the decision.35 However, even with the 
First Minister's support it appears unlikely that the UK Government would have been 
happy to give the National Assembly for Wales the legislative powers to diverge 
from the UK Government's policy on such a high profile issue. If we examine the 
issues where Welsh primary legislation has been introduced at Westminster these 
have tended to be uncontroversial issues. For instance, the first piece of Welsh-only 
legislation was the Welsh Children Commissioner Act which allowed for the 
introduction of a Welsh Children's Commissioner, a policy which the UK Government 
later adopted by establishing an English Children's Commissioner. It is difficult to 
imagine a case where the National Assembly Government could achieve policy 
divergence in a reserved area without the support of the First Minister. However, it 
is also highly unlikely that the National Assembly for Wales could ever persuade the 
UK Government to pass primary legislation for Wales if the UK Government were 
strongly opposed to the proposal. Therefore, whilst the First Ministers' support for a 
primary legislation proposal can increase the strength of the proposal, in the free 
personal care case it is unlikely that the support of the Welsh First Minister would 
have made a difference to the UK Government's position. 
The First Ministers in Scotland and Wales played very different roles in the 
development of the free personal care policies. Henry McLeish was crucial to the 
achievement of free personal care in Scotland, regularly advocating the issue and 
ensuring free personal care remained on the political agenda. By hinting at his 
support for free personal care and refusing to close the issue down, McLeish raised 
the profile of the free personal care debate. McLeish's role mirrors Kingdon's 
findings about political appointees and policy-making. In Kingdon's study of agenda 
35 Interview with Glyn Davies (Conservative AM) (February 2003) 
179 
setting and public policy he found that the role of political appointees was primarily 
to elevate issues rather than to create them.36 Kingdon suggested that, 
'ideas float around within executive branch agencies for some time, 
without being taken very seriously. But should a high-level political 
appointee take an interest in the project, the issue suddenly attains 
much greater prominence'.37 
Kingdon claims that a policy entrepreneur can encourage the adoption of a 
particular policy by ensuring that problems, policies and politics join.38 In the free 
personal care case McLeish acted as a policy entrepreneur. McLeish highlighted 
that the pre-existing system of funding long-term care was a problem because it 
was unfair, he promoted free personal care as a policy solution to this problem and 
ensured that politically it would have been difficult for his Government not to 
introduce free personal care. 
Kingdon identified that the success of the policy entrepreneur depends in part on 
the context in which they operate. Kingdon argued that during the consideration of 
a policy a window of opportunity can open and it is during this time that the policy 
can be adopted. 39 According to Kingdon 'the window opens because of some factor 
beyond the realm of the individual entrepreneur, but the individual takes advantage 
of the opportunity'.40 In the Scottish free personal care case the window of 
opportunity was opened by the change in First Minister. However, McLeish prised 
the window open further by publicly stating his support for free personal care and 
talking about a policy review. In this way McLeish raised hopes that free personal 
care could be adopted, which offered those in favor of free personal care the 
36 Kingdon, J.W. op.cit/ p.29 
37 Ibid., p.3l 
38 Ibid., p.185 
39 Ibid., p.l77 
40 IbId, p.192 
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opportunity to build up support for the issue and put pressure on the Executive to 
act. 
In contrast, the Welsh First Minister rarely mentioned free personal care and 
certainly never made any commitments to the policy. Additionally the lack of 
direction from the First Minister in Wales may have also encouraged minimal 
consideration of the free personal care issue. Whilst in Scotland the First Minister 
led the free personal care debate, in Wales other Labour party actors had more 
prominent roles, particularly the Health Minister, Jane Hutt, and her deputy, Brian 
Gibbons. 
6.2 Parliamentary Labour Parties 
McLeish claimed that free personal care was popular amongst the Scottish Labour 
party and debates in the Scottish Parliament do indicate that many members of the 
SPLP were supportive of free personal care.41 For instance, Labour backbencher 
Richard Simpson was a particularly strong advocate for free personal care,42 the 
Deputy Health Minister, Malcolm Chisholm, appeared to be 'sympathetic' towards 
free personal care/3 and Jack McConnell had no strong views either way (perhaps, 
as McLeish suggested, his opposition to free personal care was tempered because 
he represented a constituency with a large elderly population).44 However, 
McLeish's policy did not receive the overwhelming support of his Labour cabinet 
colleagues. Sam Galbraith, the ex-Education and Health Minister claimed that 'every 
41 See Scottish Parliamentary debates in plenary on 28th September 2000, 24th January 2001 and 25th 
January 2001 
42 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
43 Interview with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (January 
2004) 
44 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
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Labour member of the Scottish cabinet opposed the policy when it was decided 
upon in 2001, except Henry McLeish'.45 Whilst Galbraith's estimate may be an 
exaggeration, MacMahon suggested that only about half the cabinet were in favour 
of free personal care, and that even those in favour of the policy had reservations.46 
Most notably the Health Minister, Susan Deacon, was strongly opposed to free 
personal care, refusing to reverse her position despite considerable pressure from 
the First Minister and civil SOciety. The lack of support in McLeish's cabinet is not 
surprising considering that the cabinet 'consisted of virtually the same people who 
had backed Dewar's policy on free personal care'.47 The divisions amongst the 
SPLP, discussed below, are shown to be primarily due to different perceptions of 
long-term care costs, different ideological stances and the range of normative role 
associations of the actors involved. 
DeSigning the free personal care policy required predictions to be made about the 
future demands for the care, and therefore, the cost of the policy. Labour policy 
actors disagreed about the future costs of the policy. Lord Sutherland in his report 
estimated that free personal care in the UK as a whole would cost between £800 
million and £1.2 billion a year.48 In Scotland the implementation of free personal 
care was estimated to be around £110 million.49 However, as the population ages, 
the cost of funding free personal care would be expected to rise. The Royal 
Commission's report talked of the 'funnel of doubt', which refered to the range of 
uncertainty surrounding predictions of projected need.50 Critics of free personal 
45 Gordon, T. (9 February 2004) 'Galbraith: free care for elderly should end' in The Herald p.1 
46 Interview with Peter MacMahon (Press Secretary to McLeish) (December 2003) 
47 Taylor, B., op.cit, p.39 
48 Royal Commission on Long-term care (1999) With Respect to Old Age (The Stationary Office, 
London) Terms of Reference 
49 Scott, D. (22 December 2000) 'Stage is set for free personal care for the elderly' in The Scotsman 
p.6 
50 Royal Commission on Long-term care op.cit., Ch.2 
182 
care, for instance, pointed to the Netherlands experience, where free personal care 
for the elderly was introduced in 1968 but 'The costs were three times what they 
expected and the policy had to be abandoned 12 years later',51 Labour cabinet 
members in particular appeared to fear the potential underestimation of free 
personal care costs,52 Sam Galbraith, for instance, described free personal care as a 
'ticking time bomb',53 
There were also fears that predictions about the cost of free personal care were 
underestimated because they failed to take into account older people from England 
moving to Scotland to take advantage of the free personal care package, Labour 
peer, Lord Lipsey, regularly vocalised these fears in the press, arguing on BBe Radio 
Scotland that 'There will be a tremendous problem because you will find English 
middle-class people realising that they can get free personal care and coming here 
to be waited on at the expense of the Scottish taxpayer ... If Scotland wants to be 
colonised by the English middle class that's fine - I thought devolution was 
supposed to end that',54 The different perceptions about the future costs of free 
personal care encouraged different policy preferences, For instance, Susan Deacon 
argued that she was against free personal care because she didn't want to promise 
something she couldn't be sure of delivering in the future,55 However, the main 
area of disagreement for SPLP actors was due to different ideological stances, 
Bill Butler pOinted out that the free personal care case represented a wider debate 
51 Fraser, D. (28 January 2001) 'Why old Scars will not heal' in The Sunday Herald, p12 
52 Shaw, E. (April 2003) 'Devolution and Scottish Labour: The Case of Free Personal Care for the 
Elderly' presented to the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association at the University of 
Leicester, p.8 
53 Gordon, T. op.cit., p.1 
54 Hardie, A. (27 January 2001) 'If Scotland wants to be colonised by the English middle class that's 
fine - I thought devolution was supposed to end that' in The Scotsman, p.10 
55 Taylor, B. op.cit., p.43 
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within the Labour party about the merits of universalism compared with targeting 
resources through means testing.56 One MSP interviewed by Eric Shaw noted that 
the debate on free personal care was 'one of the most turbulent in the party's 
recent history'.57 The debate within the Scottish Labour party, and the Labour party 
in general, is based on different conceptions of equality. The case of free personal 
care brings these differences to the fore. Deeming and Keen identify two types of 
equality in this case, horizontal and vertical equality.58 Horizontal equality is usually 
invoked in relation to the provision of care, and means that equals (in terms of 
health care needs) are treated equally.59 Vertical equality, on the other hand, is 
more usually applied to the financing of health care, and centres on the idea that 
unequals (in terms of income) are treated unequally.60 Free personal care invokes 
horizontal equality, meaning that those with the same health care needs are treated 
equally regardless of their financial position. The free personal care policy 
questioned the New Labour welfare 'modernisation' ideology, that all new benefits 
have to be targeted on those most in need.61 Whilst the cost of universal free 
access is generally thought worth bearing in most aspects of NHS provision,62 the 
Labour Government at Westminster felt that horizontal equality was not the fairest 
basis on which to determine the financing of personal care. For instance, Alan 
Milburn (then the Health Secretary) sided with the notions of vertical equality, 
claiming that 'our policy will be that people should provide for themselves whenever 
they are able to do SO'.63 There was a general attitude in the UK Government that 
free personal care was unfair because 'part of the cost of such universal access 
56 Interview with Bill Butler (Labour MSP) (January 2004) 
57 Shaw, E. op.cit, p.8 
58 Deeming, C. and Keen, J. (2001) 'The Politics of Long-Term Care' in Health Care UK (pp.78-87) 
accessed at www.kingsfund.orq.uklpdf/ltc.pdf, p.80 
59 Ibid 
60 Ibid 
61 Shaw, E. op.cit, p.8 
62 Deeming, C. and Keen, J. op.cit, p.80 
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would be that the rich benefited at the expense of the poor'.64 The Scottish Labour 
party has a reputation for being more traditionally left-wing than the UK party as a 
whole.65 Therefore, the expectation was that Scottish Labour would have sympathy 
for free personal care. 
There was a fundamental agreement amongst the SPLP that if resources were 
unlimited, then free personal care should be implemented. Whilst Deacon 
acknowledged that 'in ideal circumstances, such care should be freely available'66 
she argued that the Executive's 'priority is, unashamedly, to target our resources 
first and foremost on those in greatest need, to ensure that more people in the care 
system receive care according to need, not means'.67 Thus, Deacon questioned the 
value of universal provision of free personal care due to the level of need of those 
who would receive free personal care. The argument is that free personal care 
mainly benefits 'the middle classes, who might otherwise lose their savings, rather 
than the poor, who were always entitled to it'.68 Such arguments clearly question 
the benefit of universalism, preferring to treat those who are economically unequal 
unequally. 
Many of those interviewed had sympathy for Susan Deacon's position and felt that 
she genuinely believed that better use could be made of limited resources. Even 
Henry McLeish did not question the basis of Deacon's argument that the individual 
needs to bear some responsibility for cost. McLeish acknowledged that Labour's 
policies should not always focus on 'transferring costs from the individual to the 
63 House of Commons, Hansard, ;rd December 1999 
64 Deeming, C. and Keen, J. op.cit, pp.80-81 
65 Shaw, E. op.cit, p.ll 
66 Taylor, B. op.cit., p.39 
67 Scottish Parliament, Plenary Session, 24th January 2001 
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state',69 Labour MSP, Bill Butler, also argued for a mixed approach, claiming that 
neither universalism nor means testing can be the sole approach and each case 
needs to be examined individually,70 However, when asked about the criteria which 
should be used to establish whether means testing or universal provision should be 
adopted, all Labour politicians seemed rather vague about how the decision should 
be made, 
The tax system treats economic unequals unequally, thus providing the funding for 
universal provision in other policy areas, The Scottish Executive could have decided 
to use the Scottish Parliament's limited powers over income tax, to fund free 
personal care universally, However, there was a reluctance from all political parties 
in the Parliament to raise taxes, and in particular many Labour politicians 'disbelieve 
the electorate (whatever they might profess in opinion polls) are really prepared to 
pay through taxation',71 Within this context, paying for free personal care would 
inevitably mean that funds would have to be allocated from other sections of the 
Scottish budget. Therefore, self-interested preferences came into play, as individual 
Labour ministers were reluctant to see their own budgets cut in order to fund free 
personal care and portfolios were defended by arguments that more effective use 
could be made of limited resources,72 
SPLP members were also concerned about the impact the free personal care debate 
would have on their relationship with party actors south of the border. The UK 
Government had argued that the problem with free personal care was that 'part of 
68 Gordon, T. op.cit., p.l 
69 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
70 Interview with Bill Butler (Labour MSP) (January 2004) 
71 Shaw, E. op.cit, p.lO 
72 Taylor, B. op.cit., p.39 
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the cost of such universal access would be that the rich benefited at the expense of 
the poor'.73 The reluctance of many in the SPLP to support free personal care has 
partially been explained as a fear of the UK Government, 'Scottish Labour leaders 
keep looking over their shoulders at how London will react. Instead they should be 
exploring the elastic bounds of the new constitutional settlement'.74 
In contrast to Scotland, the Labour members of the Welsh cabinet were united on 
free personal care. The Health Minister, Jane Hutt, was clear that free personal 
care was not a priority, and instead she wanted to 'broaden our definition of free 
nursing care and implement our promise of up to six weeks' free home and personal 
care',l5 The Deputy Health Minister, Brian Gibbons explained that Hutt had some 
sympathy for the case for free personal care. However, she placed the provision of 
quality services and providing care at home above free personal care,l6 Research 
conducted by the Welsh Assembly Government revealed that 80% of older people 
questioned wanted to be looked after at home rather than entering residential 
care. 77 Additionally, Wales was suffering from increasing pressure from bed 
blocking, where older people are forced to stay in hospital beds even though they 
no longer require hospital treatment, due to the unavailability of care elsewhere. 
Therefore, the Welsh Assembly Government decided that their focus should be on 
supporting care at home rather than funding free personal care.78 
73 Deeming, C. and Keen, J. op.cit, pp.80-81 
74 The Guardian (27 January 2001) 'Made in Scotland: The merit of doing things differently' accessed 
at http://society.guardian.co.uk/socialcare/storyl0,7890,430474,00.htmlon 27/11/03 
75 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 1sth February 2001 
76 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (June 2004) 
77 Ibid. 
78 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
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Whilst Hutt was reluctant to support free personal care she did encourage an 
inclusive approach to developing long-term care policy. She clearly decided that 
free personal care was not going to be her priority, but she was open to other ideas 
for alleviating the cost of care. One policy adviser explained that Hutt had a 
particularly inclusive style and argued that 'we don't issue tablets of stone here'.79 
The Health and Social Services Committee clerk agreed with the assessment of the 
Health Minister, and claimed that 'Jane Hutt in general is open and prepared to 
listen. She adopts a pragmatic style and reconsiders her position when someone 
proposes a better case'.80 Hutt's inclusive policy-making style was also praised by 
pressure groups. For instance, representatives from Carers Wales argued that Hutt 
was particularly willing to meet with them and appeared to feel a duty to justify her 
decisions where there was disagreement.81 Additionally, Age Concern Cymru 
pOinted out a number of examples where following discussions with the Health 
Minister she had altered her position to take account of their concerns.82 AMs from 
opposition parties claimed that Hutt also adopted an inclusive approach in relation 
to them. For instance, the Conservative health spokesperson, David Melding, 
compared Jane Hutt with the Education Minister, Jane Davidson. He argued that 
whilst Davidson denied plenary debates on issues of primary legislation, Hutt 
allowed such debates both in plenary and in committee. 83 Whilst Hutt never 
seriously entertained the idea of introducing free personal care, her policy-making 
style allowed pressure groups and opposition AMs to engage in discussions with her 
about the policy, and long-term care in general. Hutt's decided to include 
consideration of free personal care within the remit of the Advisory Group on a 
79 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
80 Interview with National Assembly for Wales Health and Social Services Committee Clerk (June 2004) 
81 Interview with Roz Williamson and Sandra Burton (Carers Wales) (February 2003) 
82 Interview with Sarah Stone (Political Officer for Age Concern Cymru) (February 2003) 
83 Interview with David Melding (Conservative AM) (February 2003) 
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Strategy for Older People after negotiation with opposition parties, her Liberal 
Democrat coalition partners and pressure groups. Other ministers may have been 
more reluctant to allow a discussion of free personal care, instead perhaps 
preferring not to include free personal care on the Advisory Group's remit. 
Therefore, it is possible that Hutt's inclusive approach to policy-making encouraged 
a more thorough examination of different long-term care policy options. By 
allowing free personal care to be included in the remit of the Advisory Group, Hutt 
legitimised the inclusion of free personal care onto the political agenda and ensured 
it also arose on what Kingdon terms the decision agenda. The decision agenda is 
basically those issues arising on the government's agenda which require an active 
decision.84 Without Hutt's action it is possible that the issue of free personal care 
would just have sat on the political agenda indefinitely with no definite decision 
being taken.8s 
In Wales, neither the Health Minister nor the Welsh First Minister led the debate on 
free personal care. Hutt may have allowed for an examination of free personal care 
within the Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older People. However, her 
involvement in this group was limited, and the Deputy Health Minister took on the 
role as chair of this group. In itself it is not surprising that the Deputy chaired these 
meetings rather than the Minister herself, in Scotland too the Deputy Health 
Minister chaired the meetings relating to free personal care and long-term care 
policies. However, in Scotland the First Minister, Henry McLeish, and the Health 
Minister, Susan Deacon, both took a keen interest in the free personal care issue, 
with both actors briefing against each other. Consequently, in Scotland the debate 
84 Kingdon, J.W. op.cit/ pA 
85 Ibid, p.3 
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on free personal care was largely driven by the arguments of the First Minister and 
the Health Minister. In Wales the First Minister and the Health Minister said very 
little on the issue of free personal care. Dame June Clark explained that there were 
attempts to lobby Rhodri Morgan and Jane Hutt but when concerns were raised 
these were referred to the Deputy Health Minister, Brian Gibbons.86 The fact that it 
was the Deputy Health Minister who was the key spokesperson on free personal 
care and the main contact for pressure groups further indicates that the free 
personal care issue was treated much less seriously in Wales than in Scotland. In 
Scotland free personal care was higher up the political agenda, meaning that those 
considering and developing the policy were from the higher echelons of 
Government. Additionally in Scotland the issue had support from members of the 
cabinet, in particular the First Minister and the Deputy Health Minister, Malcolm 
Chisholm. Therefore, these actors wanted to be involved in the formulation of the 
policy, to ensure they could shape it. However, in Wales there was general 
agreement that free personal care was desirable in an ideal world but not 
practicable, therefore, it could be left to the Deputy Health Minister to examine and 
a policy could be developed without the input of more senior members of the Welsh 
Assembly Government. 
The Deputy Health Minister's position on free personal care in Wales was in tune 
with the First Minister and the Health Minister. He argued that it was right not to 
make free personal care a priority because 'free personal care wouldn't have made 
a difference to the quality of care or the amount of care delivered. The only 
difference it would have made was to people's bank accounts'.87 Gibbons claims 
86 Interview with June Clark (Member of the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care) (June 2004) 
87 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (February 2003) 
190 
that the Welsh Assembly Government's original position was that 'we didn't have the 
money or powers to introduce free personal care, so our hands were tied'.sa 
However, he argued that there were areas for negotiation. For instance, Gibbons 
claims that the Welsh Assembly Government 'were willing to be persuaded to lobby 
the UK Government to introduce free personal care'.89 Gibbons never appeared to 
feel pressured into doing anything more than lobbying the UK Government to 
introduce free personal care. He argued that whilst pressure groups and opposition 
parties placed pressure on him to push the issue of free personal care and 'to do 
something', those in favour of free personal care tended to accept that 'it wasn't our 
[the Welsh Assembly Government's] gift to give'.90 Therefore, in contrast to the 
Scottish Government, the Welsh Assembly Government was able to defuse the 
pressure from those in favour of free personal care by redirecting their attention to 
the UK Government. It was much easier for the Welsh Assembly Government to 
escape pressure compared to the Scottish Executive, because the Welsh Assembly 
lacked the powers to legislate for free personal care. 
As in Scotland, symbolic policy-making also played a part in the Welsh Assembly 
Government's policy decisions.91 Symbolic policy-making here involved an attempt 
by actors to shape perceptions and responses to problems rather than to actually 
respond to these problems. This is not to say that symbolic policy-making can not 
lead to real effects. For instance, in her study of the egalite professionelle policy in 
France, Mazur argued that the policy was largely symbolic but that 'symbolic policy, 
at least in France, has an important role of drawing political attention to an issue 
88 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (June 2004) 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Edelman, M. (1985) The Symbolic Uses of Politics- Second Edition (University of Illinois Press, 
Illinois) 
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that would normally not gain decision agenda status'.92 However, Mazur suggested 
that this use of symbolic policy-making would take time to have real impacts. In a 
similar way McLeish suggested that an important part of the free personal care 
debate for him was as an opportunity to indicate his support for older people and 
raise the profile of older people in society. The Welsh Assembly Government also 
expressed similar desires in relation to the Strategy for Older People. The Deputy 
Health Minister, Brian Gibbons, argued that the pension increase of only 7Sp in 
2000 motivated the Welsh Assembly Government to state their commitment to older 
people, which they felt could be expressed by the development of a strategy for 
older people.93 Although there were other reasons for developing a strategy for 
older people, such as a desire to develop a holistic approach to older people 'in 
contrast to single initiatives taken all over the place'/4 a key motivation for 
developing a strategy was to highlight the Welsh Assembly Government's 
commitment to older people. 
The raising of capital limits was another policy pursued by the Welsh Assembly 
Government to indicate their commitment to older people in Wales. Wales 
possessed a higher proportion of older people and a higher proportion of home 
owners compared to the UK as a whole. Therefore, in Wales a particularly high 
proportion of older people owned their own homes and more of these people were 
forced to sell their home to pay for care. Brian Gibbons argued that the 
commitment to raise capital limits was a 'semi-symbolic acknowledgement of a 
particular Welsh problem'.95 The desire to communicate a commitment to older 
92 Mazur, A. (1991) 'Agendas and egalite professionelle: symbolic policy at work in France' in Meehen, 
E. and svenhuijsen, S. (Eds.) Equality Politics and Gender (Sage, London), p.137 
93 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (February 2003) 
94 Ibid. 
95 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (July 2004) 
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people also influenced the Welsh Assembly Governments free nursing care policy. 
For those requiring nursing care within a residential setting, the Welsh Assembly 
Government decided to commit to pay £100 per person each week. Mark 
Drakeford, a health policy advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government, explained 
that a range of figures were examined and the £100 figure was at the higher end of 
what seemed reasonable. 96 Mark Drakeford explained that the decision to opt for 
£100 was taken partly because three figures sounded better than twO.97 Therefore, 
symbolic policy-making, to indicate support and sympathy for older people in care, 
played a major role in the Welsh Assembly Government's long-term care policy-
making. 
Symbolic policy-making is seen as a particular problem in systems with multiple 
levels of government, and Adams and Robinson express concern about 'boutique 
politics' in the devolved UK, where England, Scotland and Wales compete to 
produce superficially better poliCies than each other. 98 Interestingly in both Scotland 
and Wales this competition has been led by a desire to be perceived as the level of 
government offering the most extensive welfare provision. In contrast, states in 
federal systems often adopt boutique policies in an attempt to deter economic 
migrants, or encourage investment, commonly associated with the 'race to the 
bottom' discussed in chapter twO. 99 A possible reason for this difference is that 
actors involved in the new devolved structures are particularly concerned to win 
public support. Pierson argued that in the past states have engaged in attempts to 
96 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
97 Ibid 
98 Adams, J. and Robinson, P. (2002) 'Divergence and the Centre' in Adams, J. and Robinson, P. (Eds.) 
Devolution in Practice: Public policy differences within the UK(Institute for Public Policy Research, 
London), p.206 
99 Peterson, P.E. and Rom, M.C (1990) Welfare Magnets: A New Case for a National Standard (The 
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C) 
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expand social benefits as a method of securing political legitimacy and 'to overcome 
diffuse concern about tax rates... and the frequently important pressures of 
entrenched interests',lOo As a result perhaps the devolved administrations desire to 
win political legitimacy can help to explain why they engaged in symbolic policy-
making which emphasised their extensive welfare provision, If so, it is likely that a 
concern with extending welfare provision would be a particular concern of actors in 
the Welsh Assembly, due to the closeness of the referendum result which made the 
need to establish political legitimacy more important. Another explanation 
discussed later in this thesis is that the financial powers of the devolved institutions 
encourage them to focus on extending rather than reducing welfare provision, or at 
least appear to do so, 
Outside the Welsh Assembly Government, Welsh Labour AMs also appeared 
relatively united on the issue of free personal care, There were minor 
disagreements about the importance of free personal care. For instance, Labour 
AM, Ann Jones, argued that 'free personal care would not mean a single extra 
person receiving care, It would benefit a small minority of elderly people who have 
assets of over £19,000, It would not even benefit them; the only real beneficiaries 
would be their heirs',101 Therefore, Ann Jones suggested that rather than free 
personal care a policy which raises thresholds 'would be a better solution, by which 
more people in our society would be genuinely helped',lo2 However, another Labour 
AM, Gwenda Thomas, was more supportive of free personal care arguing that 'free 
personal care must be the aim',103 Yet these disagreements were minor, and no 
100 Pierson (2000) 'The New Politics of the Welfare State' in Pierson and Castles (Eds.) The Welfare 
State Reao'er (Polity Press, Cambridge), p.309 
101 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 16th May 2002 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
194 
Labour AM supported introducing free personal care on a Wales only basis. The 
arguments proposed by Ann Jones in particular encouraged some representatives of 
pressure groups to question the commitment of the Welsh Labour party to the 
principle of free personal care. One representative from an elderly pressure group 
claimed that there was no desire by many within the Labour party to consider free 
personal care because of the belief that it would benefit the rich.104 As in Scotland, 
therefore, the Welsh Labour party were stuck between two principles, the New 
Labour philosophy that resources should be targeted to the poorest in society and 
the traditional socialist philosophy of universal provision. Ann Jones justified her 
position by pointing to the powers of the National Assembly, 
'As a socialist, I of course support universal rather than means-tested 
benefits. In an ideal world all public services would be paid for through 
progressive taxation. But the assembly can't raise its own money and 
Gordon Brown will need to go much further down the road of raising 
taxes before we can seriously go about phasing out charging for our 
social services'. 105 
Therefore, it appears that Labour AMs were all agreed that whilst desirable in 
principle, the Welsh Assembly Government should not introduce free personal care 
within the current taxation system. As one journalist explained 'radicals on this 
issue [free personal care] are likely to be found within Plaid, the Liberal Democrats, 
even the Tories. But not Labour'.106 Whether it is radical or not to champion 
universal prOVision, in relation to free personal care there was no Welsh Labour AM 
making this case. As a result in both Scotland and Wales the Liberal Democrats 
were often left to defend universal provision and free personal care. 
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6.3 Liberal Democrat Coalition Partners 
In Scotland, the lack of support in the Parliamentary Labour Party for free personal 
care made the position of the Liberal Democrats crucial to the success of the free 
personal care policy. As one journalist explained, 'the Scottish Cabinet has been 
torn apart. Henry McLeish had to rely on the Liberal Democrats because his own 
Labour Ministers refused to follow his lead and had to be dragooned into supporting 
him'.107 The Liberal Democrats were accused of blackmailing the Scottish Executive 
to commit to free personal care, threatening to vote against the rest of the Scottish 
Executive and perhaps even leave the coalition.1oB The Liberal Democrats were also 
blamed for the free personal care 'fiasco' by many Labour back benchers who 
complained of indiscipline in Liberal ranks.10g The Liberal Democrats certainly liked to 
take the credit for free personal care. For instance, in their 2003 Scottish 
Parliament election manifesto Charles Kennedy argued that 'From free personal care 
to the abolition of tuition fees, Liberal Democrats have made the difference in the 
last four years'. 110 However, whilst the Liberal democrats were generally 
sympathetic towards the free personal care policy there was not the deep, unified 
support often portrayed by the press and the Liberal Democrats themselves. Jim 
Wallace, the leader of the party at the time, was reported as opposing free 
personal care, due to concerns about the extent to which spending would have to 
be cut in other areas to fund the policy.1l1 Wallace's argument was based on his 
opinion that the early years of the Parliament had been relatively easy finanCially, 
due to public spending increases in England. However, Wallace was aware that the 
Parliament's financial position was not always going to be so easy, and at times of 
107 Daily Record (26 January 2001) 'Con Trick of Empty Promises', p.S 
lOB Interview with Sam Galbraith (Previously Minister for Health and Education) (February 2004) 
109 Macwhirter, I. (21 February 2001) 'Could this really be the beginning of the end' in The Herald, p.16 
110 Scottish Liberal Democrat Manifesto (2003) Make the Difference: Fresh Thinking for Four More 
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spending cuts in England Scotland would have difficulties maintaining spending 
levels on current policies, even without the additional pressure of services like free 
personal care. ll2 Wallace believed that free personal care should be pursued on a 
UK-wide basis, and should not be implemented on a Scotland only basis. Therefore, 
those pushing for free personal care within the Liberal Democrat group were the 
backbenchers of the party and not the leadership. 
The debate on long-term care in the Scottish Parliament placed considerable 
pressure on the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats, as coalition partners, 
had a duty to support the Executive, whilst their manifesto clearly stated a 
commitment to free personal care. During debates on free personal care there 
were direct appeals by opposition parties to the Liberal Democrats to vote against 
the Executive. For instance, the then SNP MSP, Dorothy-Grace Elder, hoped 'that 
the Liberal Democrats will stand firm against pressure from Labour to obey. We are 
not here to obey anyone except the wishes of the people of Scotland'.113 
One Liberal Democrat stands out above all for pushing the free personal care issue, 
Margaret Smith, the convenor of the Health and Community Care Committee. 
Another Liberal Democrat interviewee explained that 'Margaret Smith was a strong 
protagonist in the discussions, she wore the party down ... we would have agreed to 
almost anything in order to shut her up'Y4 It appears that Margaret Smith and a 
small number of Liberal Democrat back-benchers persuaded the party to support 
free personal care during meetings of the parliamentary party. Free personal care 
was an issue in Liberal Democrat meetings before McLeish became leader, but then 
111 Interview with Keith Raffan (Liberal Democrat MSP) (February 2004) 
112 Ibid. 
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the issue was considered to be off the political agenda, and so lacked the 
importance it was to receive later.ll5 Keith Raffan, who was then the Liberal 
Democrat spokesperson on Health and Community Care, explained that he came to 
support free personal care after listening to the arguments and considering the 
costs of targeting personal care as opposed to providing personal care universally.ll6 
The Health Spokesperson clearly was not one of the key actors pushing the policy 
from within the party, but was eventually persuaded of the benefits of free personal 
care and following a Liberal Democrat meeting where the majority voted in favour 
of free personal care, Raffan felt he had to reflect the position of the pa rty. 117 
Margaret Smith was thought to have a strong ideological commitment to free 
personal care, and like McLeish her uncompromising support for the policy was seen 
to be primarily due to her belief that it was morally the correct policy to pursue.ll8 
In addition, Margaret Smith was the convenor of the Health and Community Care 
Committee, which conducted an inquiry supportive of free personal care (discussed 
in the next chapter). Therefore, there was pressure on Margaret Smith to speak for 
the Committee and to push the unanimous findings of their report. Following 
numerous evidence taking sessions in the Committee it is also possible that the 
welfare lobby, who were strongly pro-free personal care, put pressure on Margaret 
Smith to represent their interests too. Personal and political motivation no doubt 
also shaped Margaret Smith's position. One interviewee suggested that Margaret 
Smith was keen to make a name for herself in the Parliament, and forcing through 
free personal care within her own party and through the Parliament was one way in 
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which she could achieve respect. 119 However, whilst her desire for recognition may 
have been a motivating factor, it was generally agreed by interviewees across the 
political parties that Margaret Smith genuinely believed in the policy, and this was 
her key consideration. 
On 24th January 2001, when Susan Deacon announced the care package which did 
not include free personal care, there was anger and discontent within the Liberal 
Democrat group. So much so that Keith Raffan lodged a motion calling for the 
implementation of free personal care. His motion received the support of ten other 
Liberal Democrats, placing considerable pressure on the Executive to offer a 
compromise. It is worth referring back to a similar situation in 2000, when the 
Conservatives proposed a motion stating support for free personal care. At this 
time there was much speculation about the Liberal Democrats voting against the 
Executive, but a 'hastily-reworded amendment is thought to have stopped most 
Liberal Democrat MSPs joining Health Committee Convenor Margaret Smith in 
backing a Tory motion calling for full implementation of the Sutherland report/Yo In 
January 2001, there were those within the Liberal Democrats who felt that a similar 
amendment could have been worded and so the implementation of free personal 
care could have been avoided. For instance, one Liberal Democrat MSP claims that 
the Liberal Democrats had already decided as a group that they would not vote 
against the Executive on free personal care if it came to it (except Margaret Smith), 
as their duty was first to honour the coalition agreement no matter how difficult this 
would be. l2l However, between the first case of potential revolt on free personal 
care in September 2000 and the situation in January 2001, the Health and 
119 Interview with a Liberal Democrat MSP 
120 McCann, A. and Horsburgh, F. (28 September 2000) 'Revolt on care for elderly set to fizzle out; 
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Community Care Committee and McLeish had hinted at a commitment to introduce 
free personal care. It is impossible to predict what would have happened if the 
Executive had decided not to make a statement committing to free personal care 
and the issue had gone to a vote. However, what is clear is that all Labour MSPs 
and advisers interviewed perceived that there was a real threat that Liberal 
Democrat back benchers would vote against the Executive, and ensure a majority in 
the Parliament for free personal care. 
How those Liberal Democrat backbenchers in favour of the policy were able to 
ensure a commitment to free personal care within their party and with their 
coalition partners is widely debated. Sam Galbraith argued that a deal was done 
between Henry McLeish and the Liberal Democrats the week after McLeish became 
First Minister. 122 Galbraith argued that McLeish needed the support from the Liberal 
Democrats in order to secure his leadership, and committing to free personal care 
guaranteed that he would gain their support.123 Interestingly, when McConnell 
became First Minister he appeared to make a similar deal with the Liberal 
Democrats on proportional representation for council elections, as he reportedly 
agreed to 'make it a priority to deliver a timetable for PR'.124 Whilst it is possible 
that McLeish promised the Liberal Democrats he would review the policy, as the 
leadership of the Liberal Democrats had mixed feelings on free personal care it 
seems unlikely that a deal was done to introduce the policy. Even Galbraith 
acknowledges that Wallace worked hard to maintain the coalition, and on the free 
personal care issue the consensus among interviewees was that Wallace sought to 
persuade his backbenchers to support the Executive. Additionally, prior to McLeish's 
121 Interview with Nora Radcliffe (Liberal Democrat MSP) (December 2003) 
122 Interview with Sam Galbraith (Previously Minister for Health and Education) (February 2004) 
123 Ibid. 
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commitment to review free personal care, the Liberal Democrats suggested, 'we'd 
completely accepted that free personal care was not part of the agreement'.125 
Therefore it is quite surprising that a policy which lacked Cabinet support and was 
not a partnership agreement commitment, even arrived onto the Scottish 
Parliament's decision-making agenda, let alone was passed and implemented. 
Interestingly the pressure from the Liberal Democrats to change the free personal 
care policy came from their backbenchers. The leadership were reluctant to 
implement free personal care on a Scottish only baSis, so 'Wallace tried to persuade 
his backbenchers to back the Executive's line'.126 His failure to constrain his 
backbenchers was seen by some in the party as evidence of his weakness as a 
leader. 127 However, as Shaw noted, it is much more difficult for the leader of the 
Liberal Democrats to restrain his backbenchers than in other political parties. Shaw 
suggested that as a result of the 'individualistic ethos of parliamentary liberalism 
and its relaxed disciplinary regime', the Liberal Democrat backbenchers are regularly 
able to challenge their leadership on key issues.128 A majority in the Parliamentary 
Party were in favour of free personal care and of pursuing the issue in the Scottish 
Parliament, which meant the leadership would struggle to impose its view. One 
MSP also argued that the Parliamentary Party's way of operating was heavily 
dependent upon the characteristics of the leader, Jim Wallace.129 The interviewee 
claimed that 'Wallace is not approachable, so the party's policy-making is not 
inclusive' which lead to more battles in the parliamentary party than were 
124 Macleod, A. (21 November 2001) 'Liberal Democrats to vote for McConneli' in The Times 
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necessaryYO According to this interviewee if the Parliamentary Liberal Party was 
closer and Wallace had been willing to discuss issues at an early stage with MSPS 
then Wallace may have been able to talk the backbenchers round and resist the 
pressure from Margaret Smith.l3l Therefore, it appears that the party culture and 
norms of the Liberal Democrats had a significant impact upon policy-making in the 
coalition. 
Whilst the leadership of the Liberal Democrats had reservations about introducing 
free personal care in Scotland, they had other reasons to support the policy. Free 
personal care appeals to a core group of Liberal Democrat voters, the elderly middle 
class,132 and so it was electorally beneficial for the party to support the policy. As 
Scharpf notes, party leaders have a particular pressure to maximize electoral 
prospects, so Wallace's reservations about funding free personal care may have 
been balanced by electoral concerns.133 Free personal care also provided the 
leadership with a chance to prove the worth of the coalition, and the role the Liberal 
democrats play in it. In the first term of the Scottish Parliament the Liberal 
democrats faced regular criticism from outside the party for entering into the 
coalition. For instance, the Conservatives accusing them of 'being little more than 
lapdogs in the eyes of a disillusioned electorate',n4 In addition the UK Liberal 
Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy, reportedly was 'alarmed by hostile voter 
feedback since the coalition was formed in May'135 and so he warned 'the Scottish 
Liberal Democrat leader Jim Wallace that the party will lose seats at Westminster 
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unless he stands up to Labour in the Scottish Parliament coalition'.136 In this context 
free personal care could be held up as a flagship policy, indicating the point of 
voting for the Liberal Democrats even if they entered into a coalition with Labour. 
After the commitment to free personal care was made, Jim Wallace in particular 
emphasised the Liberal Democrats' role in the development of the free personal 
policy. One interviewee commented that 
'After the vote Wallace went to Deacon Brodies to boast to journalists of 
the victory ... he was talking like it was a flagship policy when he had 
been against it from the beginning and the whole episode was an 
illustration of how not to do things ... it was too much to bear'.137 
Using free personal care as a flagship policy to highlight the importance of the 
coalition to the electorate can be viewed as an attempt to secure further votes. 
Additionally, emphasising the benefits of the coalition was important within the 
Liberal Democrat party. McLeish argued that many Liberal Democrats were not 
happy being in the coalition government. Instead a substantial element of the 
Liberal Democrat Parliamentary Party, and the wider party, would have preferred to 
be an opposition party where their principles would not have to be compromisedY8 
For example, within the Parliamentary Party, Donald Gorrie has often suggested 
that the coalition should be reviewed.139 As many Liberal Democrats were not 
supportive of the coalition, there was a constant need by those within the Executive 
to 'highlight the point of the coalition'.14o So whilst the leadership of the Liberal 
Democrat Parliamentary party had reservations about the detail of the free personal 
care policy, such vigorous support from Liberal Democrat backbenchers combined 
with the opportunity to make political capital out of the issue meant there was not 
total opposition to the policy. 
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After the Executive made their emergency statement committing to free personal 
care there remained some members of the Liberal Democrats that failed to be 
convinced by the policy reversal. Keith Raffan was particularly vocal in his criticism 
of the final commitment to free personal care, arguing that the statement didn't 
include a timetable or an announcement about funding.141 Therefore, he resigned 
as Liberal Democrat Health Spokesperson. His actions suggested a lack of trust 
between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, as there was a clear reluctance to 
believe that the commitment to free personal care would be honoured. Raffan was 
also critical of the way in which the free personal care policy had been agreed, 
'arguing that the issue should have been openly settled within the Executive'.142 
However, it has been suggested that Raffan's resignation was partially motivated by 
his dissatisfaction with his own role in the negotiations, for instance Taylor quotes 
one source as suggesting that Raffan 'was also frustrated at being cut out of the 
serious, off-stage talks'.143 
As in Scotland, the Welsh Assembly Government's long-term care policy was created 
during a time of coalition government, also between the Labour and Liberal 
Democrat parties. In Wales free personal care was not a major issue when the 
coalition government was established. Unlike Scotland, the coalition in Wales was 
created in October 2000, after the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care had 
reported its findings and the UK Government had rejected the argument for free 
personal care. As in Scotland free personal care was not mentioned in the 
Partnership agreement which set out the programme for the coalition government. 
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Whilst there was little discussion of free personal care between the two parties 
during the creation of the partnership agreement, the Liberal Democrats raised the 
issue of free personal care once they were in government. One interviewee 
explained that a compromise position on free personal care was agreed after the 
partnership agreement because 'the issue (of free personal care) in Wales really 
only kicked off after the decision to introduce it in Scotland'.144 Here interestingly 
we see the effects of 'spill-over', where decisions taken at one level of government 
affect the others. However, whilst 'spill-over' has usually been used to refer to 
pressures on the Labour Party, as the major governing party, here we see the 
pressure to converge with party positions at other levels can also affect the minor 
coalition partner. 
According to Mark Drakeford, policy advisor to the Health Minister, the Liberal 
Democrats played a major role in shaping the Welsh Assembly Government's long-
term care policy. He claimed that 'Left to itself a Labour only administration would 
have followed the UK line' as there was not enough money to fund the free personal 
care policy.145 Drakeford explained that the Liberal Democrats tried to persuade 
their Labour colleagues that free personal care should be provided by the National 
Assembly for Wales, even without additional resources from the UK Government. 146 
Labour interviewees were critical of the Liberal Democrat position, pointing out that 
the Sutherland report had not recommended that free personal care was introduced 
by a legislature which lacked the ability to raise revenue.147 However, as a coalition 
government there was a need for everyone to 'save face', therefore, a compromise 
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position was agreed where Labour agreed to lobby the UK Government to introduce 
free personal care, 'even though we knew what the response would be'.148 
Therefore, by agreeing to a compromise position on free personal care Labour and 
Liberal Democrat AMs could save face, and as in Scotland the Liberal Democrats 
could justify their decision to enter into coalition government. As Drakeford 
explained, the compromise position on free personal care 'meant everyone could 
claim they had achieved something'.149 
The Liberal Democrats were able to influence the Welsh Assembly Government not 
only by influencing the shape of the long-term care policy, but also by pushing the 
issue up the political agenda. The Deputy Health Minister, Brian Gibbons, argued 
that it was the Liberal Democrats who brought the 'the issue of free personal care 
to the table'.1so Gibbons gave the Liberal Democrats the credit for the inclusion of 
free personal care within the remit of the Advisory Group on a strategy for older 
people. He claimed that whilst free personal care would no doubt always have been 
raised by the Advisory Group, having the Liberal Democrats in government meant 
that the group's remit was extended to include free personal care.l51 Therefore, the 
Liberal Democrats raised the profile of the free personal care issue, ensuring the 
issue was formalised within the Advisory Group, and thus considered in greater 
detail. 
As in Scotland, there were attempts by some Liberal Democrat AMs to pressurise 
the Welsh Assembly Government for a stronger line on free personal care. In many 
ways Kirsty Williams, the chair of the Health and Social Services Committee, played 
148 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
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a similar role in Wales to Margaret Smith in Scotland, both were Liberal Democrat 
chairs of Health committees in favour of free personal care. Williams sought to 
galvanise support for free personal care by regularly making the case for the policy 
in the press and within the National Assembly. For instance, in one newspaper 
article Williams argued that it was 'morally unacceptable that people suffering from 
long-term chronic conditions such as dementia and Parkinson's disease should have 
to pay for the help they needed with washing and dressing'.1S2 Williams appeared to 
have some success at pushing the issue of free personal care. Dame June Clark 
argued that in the Assembly's second term the Welsh Assembly Government had 
done a degree of back-sliding on the free personal care issue.153 Clark thought that 
the back sliding on free personal care was due to the diminished Liberal Democrat 
role in health policy-making, caused by the lack of coalition government and by 
Kirsty Williams being replaced as the chair of the Health and Social Services 
Committee. However, Kirsty Williams had a lesser impact than her counterpart in 
Scotland. Williams lacked the strong committee support evident in Scotland, 
meaning that her arguments were weakened. For instance, when Williams and her 
Liberal Democrat colleague, Peter Black, submitted a statement of opinion urging 
the UK Government 'to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission 
on Long Term Care', no other AMs supported their statement.154 As in her 
statement of opinion, Williams often focused on persuading the UK Government to 
act, rather than pushing the Welsh Assembly Government to take action 
independently. However, at times Williams also sought to pressurise the Welsh 
Assembly Government to implement free personal care independently of the UK 
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Government. For instance, she asked the Welsh Assembly Government to request 
the powers and the resources to pursue free personal care alone in Wales. 155 
However, once the UK Government made it clear that they were not going to 
reverse their position Williams accepted that there was little pOint devoting serious 
attention to free personal care specifically and she decided to focus on other ways 
of improving long-term care, such as increasing personal allowances for those in 
residential care.156 
As in Scotland, whilst backbench Liberal Democrats indicated their support for free 
personal care, those with ministerial positions appeared more reluctant to vocalise 
their support. For instance, the Deputy Liberal Democrat leader, Jenny Randerson 
(then the Minister for Culture, Sports and the Welsh Language), argued that the 
Assembly needed tax-raising powers if they were to ensure they could pay for free 
personal careY7 Additionally, Mark Drakeford claimed that the Liberal Democrat 
leader in the Assembly, Mike German, was particularly reluctant to support free 
personal care in Wales without additional resources. Mike German was the minister 
for economic development, and Drakeford argued that German was concerned that 
his budget would suffer if free personal care was introduced.158 However, according 
to Drakeford the Liberal Democrats in Wales felt pressurised by the impact of the 
Liberal Democrats on the free personal care policy in Scotland.159 If the Liberal 
Democrats in Scotland could achieve such a policy victory then the Welsh Liberal 
Democrats wanted one too. Therefore, the Liberal Democrat ministers were in two 
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minds about free personal care, caught between a desire to maintain spending 
levels in their areas of responsibility and a desire to achieve a policy success on the 
same scale as their colleagues in Scotland. Consequently, it seemed to the Health 
Advisor that 'there was a ritual feel to the Liberal Democrats lobbying on free 
personal care'.160 The Liberal Democrats had no choice but to argue for free 
personal care, but their hearts weren't really in it; apparently if Labour had actually 
agreed to introduce free personal care, the Liberal Democrats in the cabinet would 
have been seriously concerned about it. 161 
Interestingly, the Liberal Democrats position in Wales mirrored that in Scotland. In 
both Scotland and Wales Liberal Democrat cabinet members had reservations about 
free personal care but their back-benchers were consistently supportive of the 
policy. In Wales the Liberal Democrats only forcibly pursued the free personal care 
issue once the policy had been agreed in Scotland. It seems that competition 
between the devolved institutions, to provide better welfare provision than each 
other, also translates to competition between the same political parties operating in 
different institutions. The Welsh Liberal Democrats clearly felt they needed to 
match the achievements of the Liberal Democrats in Scotland. Therefore, the free 
personal care case shows that even parties which are not the major party in 
government, at the UK or devolved level, can face pressure to converge on policy 
positions. 
The Liberal Democrats were clearly crucial to the development of the free personal 
care policy in both Scotland and Wales. The Liberal Democrat backbenchers in 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
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Scotland lobbied hard for free personal care and the Liberal Democrat chairs of the 
Health Committees in both Scotland and Wales consistently pursued the issue. 
However, their greatest success occurred in Scotland, when McLeish used the threat 
of Liberal Democrat disobedience to bully the rest of his government to act. 
Therefore, it is not just Liberal Democrat actions, such as submitting motions, which 
can impact upon policy development, but the perceptions of Labour MSPs of the 
possibility of a Liberal Democrat revolt. The Liberal Democrats were particularly 
successful in Scotland because it was widely perceived that the Liberal Democrat 
back-benchers would vote against the coalition, a possibility which was exploited by 
McLeish and other supporters of free personal care. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The two First Ministers had very different impacts on the development of the free 
personal care poliCies. Henry McLeish was crucial to securing free personal care in 
Scotland acting as a policy entrepreneur and opening a window of opportunity 
through which supporters of free personal care could push the issue. Without 
McLeish's input in opening the window of opportunity it is difficult to imagine that 
free personal care would have been implemented in Scotland. The Welsh First 
Minister, Rhodri Morgan, took a different approach, rarely commenting on free 
personal care, and when he did express his opinion on the issue he indicated his 
reservations. However, as the UK Government was strongly opposed to free 
personal care it is highly unlikely that it could ever have been introduced in Wales, 
with or without Morgan's support. Morgan also appeared to have little impact on 
the details of the Welsh long-term care policy, and such decisions tended to be lead 
by the Health Minister and her Deputy. 
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In Wales the health minister, Jane Hutt, was firmly opposed to free personal care, 
preferring instead to focus on providing quality of services and care at home. The 
Welsh Health Minister seemed to set the overall tone of the Welsh Assembly 
Government's position on free personal care. Her Deputy, Brian Gibbons and the 
rest of the Labour AMs were united on their position on free personal care, viewing 
it as unrealistic and a low priority policy. In Wales the Labour members of the 
Assembly had little sympathy for free personal care and the lack of dissent within 
the group meant that they prevented their coalition partners from ever sensing that 
free personal care was achievable. In contrast the Labour group in the Scottish 
party were divided on free personal care, most notably McLeish's opinion differed 
from many in the cabinet, particularly his Health Minister. The Scottish Health 
Minister, Susan Deacon, took the same position as the Welsh Health Minister, 
regularly stating that free personal care would not be the best use of resources and 
her preference would be to target resources at those most in need. However, the 
division within the Labour group in Scotland provided the Liberal Democrats with an 
opportunity to threaten to rebel against the coalition government. 
Interestingly in both Scotland and Wales the Liberal Democrats were in coalition 
with Labour, and the backbenchers in the Scottish and Welsh parties sought to 
pressurise their governments into introducing free personal care. The Liberal 
Democrat backbenchers were clearly more strongly in favour of free personal care 
than the Liberal Democrat ministers, and in Scotland in particular there were clear 
tensions between the leadership and the backbenchers over free personal care 
policy. In Scotland the Liberal Democrats threatened to rebel against their Labour 
colleagues and vote in favour of free personal care, thus ensuring a majority for 
free personal care in the Parliament. It is unclear how serious the threat of a 
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Liberal Democrats revolt actually was, as the situation was often misreported and 
manipulated by supporters and opponents of free personal care. It is of particular 
interest how the Scottish First Minister, Henry McLeish, encouraged the Liberal 
Democrats to fight for free personal care and add to the pressure on his 
government to introduce the policy. Using the minor coalition partner to build-up 
pressure allowed McLeish to push for free personal care indirectly, meaning he 
could escape direct confrontation with his Health Minister. 
Also of interest is the fact that the Welsh Liberal Democrats' policy on free personal 
care was clearly shaped by their Scottish counterparts. Only when free personal 
care had been accepted by the Scottish Parliament did the Welsh Liberal Democrats 
consider the matter in any depth. Therefore, events in Scotland made free personal 
care a devolved issue. The Welsh Liberal Democrats appeared to feel that if their 
Scottish colleagues could claim victory on the free personal care issue they needed 
to ensure similar achievements to prove they could be a success in the coalition. It 
is interesting that the pressure on the Liberal Democrats encouraged them to 
pursue the same policy throughout the UK, despite the fact that historically they are 
the most federal of the UK-wide parties. In contrast, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, the Conservatives were happy to promote different free personal care 
policies. 
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Chapter Seven 
Actors: Outside the Coalition 
Chapter six examined the impact of actors within the coalition parties on the free 
personal care policy. This chapter focuses on the actors outside the coalition 
parties, examining the roles of the opposition parties, the health committees, policy 
experts and pressure groups, and the UK Government. As in the previous chapter 
these actors were chosen for investigation following analysis of documents and 
interview data. The role of the resources, preferences and perceptions of these 
actors on the development of the long-term care policies will be examined in this 
chapter. 
7. 1 Opposition Parties 
In the Scottish Parliament those outside the coalition parties were able to have an 
impact upon the free personal care policy by questioning and challenging the 
Scottish Executive's position, developing a detailed policy proposal, and encouraging 
and directing support for free personal care inside and outside the Parliament. As a 
relatively left of centre party in Scotland, it was not surprising that the SNP were 
supporters of free personal care and played a key role in pushing the issue. For 
example, SNP MSP Christine Grahame lodged a Private Member's Bill entitled 
'Alzheimer's and Dementia Care Bill' in an attempt to encourage debate over 
personal care. Christine Grahame claimed that it was never her intention for the bill 
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to become law, just to increase the pressure on the Executive to act.! Free personal 
care was popular with the SNP partly due to their opposition to inequality, for 
instance, Christine Grahame and Shona Robison (who were members of the Health 
and Community Care committee) claimed they were disgusted by the inequalities of 
financing care before the introduction of free personal care. 2 However, the SNP also 
used the issue of long-term care for the elderly issue to make broader political 
points. For instance, the SNP's manifesto for the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary 
election suggested that only through independence could 'the indignity of means 
testing for residential care' be removed. 3 Therefore, by arguing for free personal 
care the SNP could draw attention to their wider constitutional aims, and emphasise 
that popular poliCies, like free personal care, would be easier to achieve in an 
independent Scotland. The SNP were also aware of the possibility that the free 
personal care issue could cause tensions between the governments in Edinburgh 
and Westminster.4 When tensions between England and Scotland are high this can 
encourage greater public support for Scottish independence, which also is likely to 
increase the electoral support for the SNP. By campaigning for free personal care 
the SNP could claim some credit if the policy was implemented. In addition the SNP 
could have gained political capital if the Executive failed to introduce free personal 
care, and they successfully linked the lack of free personal care to the case for 
Scottish independence. Therefore, the SNP had an incentive to push the free 
personal care issue up the political agenda, and had much to gain whether the 
policy was implemented or not. 
! Interview with Christine Grahame (SNP MSP) (January 2004) 
2 Interviews with Shona Robison (SNP MSP) (December 2003) and Christine Grahame (SNP MSP) 
(January 2004) 
3 Scottish National Party Manifesto (1999) Manifesto for the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary election 
accessed at www.psr.keele.ac.ukJarea/ukJass/snp/man99.pdf on 4/12/03 
4 Interviews with Shona Robison (SNP MSP) (December 2003) and Christine Grahame (SNP MSP) 
(January 2004) 
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Opposition parties are also motivated by the desire to cause the government 
embarrassment. In Scotland, as the Labour Party were initially opposed to free 
personal care by supporting the policy the SNP could highlight Labour's inability to 
represent Scotland. Additionally, the existence of coalition government shaped the 
opposition parties' response to the free personal care issue. The SNP knew it was 
an issue on which there was disagreement between the coalition partners, so 
pursuing free personal care had the potential to cause conflict and tension within 
the Executive. Therefore, after McLeish became First Minister, the SNP took a 
decision to focus on free personal care, primarily because 'there was a strong belief 
within the SNP group that they could get movement on the issue'.s The SNP group 
held discussions with a number of Liberal Democrats about how to ensure a 
majority in favour of free personal care.6 Interestingly, despite their commitment to 
free personal care, the Conservatives were not involved in the meetings between 
the Liberal Democrats and the SNP, and according to MSP Mary Scanlon were not 
even aware that these meetings took place.7 This highlights that one of the SNP's 
strategies was to pursue policies by targeting the Liberal Democrats. One SNP MSP 
pOinted out that on free personal care there were enough Liberal Democrats to 
force the Scottish Executive's hand, so the SNP's role was to ensure they did.s 
However, perhaps inviting the Conservatives to discussions on the free personal 
care issue would have allowed the opposition parties to develop a more coherent 
strategy for securing a commitment to free personal care within the Scottish 
Parliament. The Conservative's absence here hints at a lack of trust or willingness 
S Interview with Shona Robison (SNP MSP) (December 2003) 
6 Ibid. 
7 Interview with Mary Scanlon (Conservative MSP) (December 2003) 
S Interview with Christine Grahame (SNP MSP) (January 2004) 
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to cooperate between them and the other parties, even when a common interest 
exists. 
The manipulation of the smaller coalition party to encourage policy change within 
the Executive is an interesting feature of Scottish devolution. A Conservative MSP 
interviewed by Simeon also 'admitted that the opposition strategy in the Parliament 
is to compare the Liberal Democrat election manifesto with the coalition agreement 
and then raise for debate all those items which the Liberal Democrats had been 
forced to abandon in order to reach agreement with Labour'.9 The opposition 
parties knew the Liberal Democrats were in favour of free personal care on a UK 
wide basis, so suspected that by applying pressure on them in Scotland the coalition 
would face tensions. Whilst the SNP interviewees suspected such pressure could 
result in policy change, the Conservatives tended to be more cautious, claiming that 
on free personal care 'Liberal Democrats like to claim the credit for it, but I don't 
think they were influential. .. they wouldn't have voted against the Executive, they 
never have'.lD Perhaps this difference in attitude helps to explain why the 
Conservatives were not involved in the negotiations between the SNP and the 
Liberal Democrats to secure free personal care. 
The strategy of targeting the minor coalition party placed the Liberal Democrats in a 
difficult but also a powerful position. The dynamic in the Parliament meant that the 
Liberal Democrats' manifesto commitments offered key opportunities for policy 
divergence. Therefore, the Liberal Democrat manifesto helped to set the agenda of 
the opposition parties. By focusing on Liberal Democrat manifesto commitments, 
9 Simeon, R. (2003) 'Free Personal Care: Policy Divergence and Social Citizenship' in Hazell, R. The 
State of the Nations 2003: The Third Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom (Imprint Academic, 
Exeter), p.230 
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the opposition parties put the Scottish Executive under pressure to adopt policies on 
issues such as social spending, normally associated with the left.ll Such a dynamic 
also put the Scottish Conservatives in an unusual position. If they are to challenge 
the Scottish Executive by pressurising the Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives in 
Scotland will often find they are arguing for traditionally left-of-centre policies. As a 
result the Conservatives will be forced to embrace an ideological shift for political 
gain. Here we see how coalition government can shape and define ideological and 
policy change within other political parties, and thus influence the policies 
considered in the Parliament. 
The UK Conservative Party were opposed to the implementation of free personal 
care in England and Wales, arguing that free personal care would 'not be a sensible 
use of the money. It is a question of priorities',12 However, the Scottish 
Conservatives differed from the UK party line, instead taking a pro-free personal 
care stance. Mary Scanlon, the Conservative Health Spokesperson in the Scottish 
Parliament explained that the decision to support free personal care was taken with 
no consultation with UK party representatives, instead it was a unanimous decision 
taken due to the strong arguments in favour of the policy.13 Her criticisms of 
charging for personal care centred on the fact that the existing policy was a 
discriminatory policy and went against ideas of equality.14 Ideologically this places 
the Conservatives in the Scottish Parliament in a different position from the 
Conservatives at Westminster, who argued for a long-term care policy which largely 
maintained personal responsibility. It is worth noting that if the Conservatives had 
10 Interview with Mary Scanlon (Conservative MSP) (December 2003) 
11 Simeon, R. op.cit, p.230 
12 White, M. (31 May 2001) 'Liberal Democrats and Tories battle for the grey vote' in The Guardian 
13 Interview with Mary Scanlon (Conservative MSP) (December 2003) 
14 Ibid. 
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not supported free personal care, the combined votes of the Liberal Democrats and 
the SNP would have not been enough to force free personal care on the Executive. 
In such a scenario, the Liberal Democrats would have known they could not win a 
vote on free personal care, and so would have probably not voted against the 
Executive on the issue. Therefore, the role of the Scottish Conservatives, diverging 
from the UK-wide party position, in favour of a more left-wing proposal, played an 
important role in securing policy divergence in the free personal care case. 
The degree to which the Scottish Conservatives pushed the issue of free personal 
care is also of interest. Whilst the SNP played a Significant role on free personal 
care by submitting private members bills and asking parliamentary questions, it was 
the Conservatives who took the lead in raising the free personal care issue within 
the Parliament. For example, the day after the UK government revealed its 
response to the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care, in July 2000, it was the 
leader of the Conservatives in the Scottish Parliament, David McLetchie, who lodged 
a motion calling 'upon the Scottish Executive to implement in full the 
recommendation of the Royal Commission'.15 It appears that the Scottish 
Conservatives were proactive on the free personal care issue primarily due to the 
design of the institutional setting in which they operated, discussed in the next 
chapter. However, in addition David McLetchie and Mary Scanlon played important 
roles, with the strength to act autonomously from their party in England and Wales, 
and the ability to campaign vigorously for free personal care. 
15 McLetchie, D. (lodged on 28 July 2000) 'S1M-1114: Long-Term Care' in Business Bulletin 122/2000: 
Section F Motions and Amendments accessed at www.scottish.parliament.uk on 5/12/03 
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As in Scotland the main opposition party in the National Assembly for Wales, in 
terms of the number of seats held, were the nationalists. Plaid Cymru supported 
free personal care, but their support was complicated by the model of devolution in 
Wales. Plaid's policy director explained that the 'limited nature of devolution meant 
we had to take a two-pronged approach on long-term care. Benefits are a reserved 
matter so on many issues we have no choice but to target the UK Government'.16 
This two-pronged approach is illustrated by Plaid's position on free personal care in 
their 2003 Assembly election manifesto, 
'The National Assembly, unlike the Scottish Parliament currently lacks the 
powers to implement the Royal Commission's recommendations, while 
the injustice of the Barnett Formula would make it extremely difficult to 
meet the cost. A Party of Wales Government will press for both these 
deficiencies to be corrected'.17 
Plaid Cymru did attempt to pressurise the Welsh Assembly Government to act on 
free personal care. For instance, during a debate on the Welsh Assembly 
Government's NHS plan, Plaid Cymru proposed an amendment challenging 'the 
partnership administration to examine, in both Plenary and Committee debate, the 
consequences of extending free personal care'.18 However, Plaid Cymru's position 
on free personal care issue at times appeared confused. Plaid's approach to free 
personal care was criticised by Peter Black, a Liberal Democrats AM, who argued 
that Plaid focused on the UK government and failed to develop long-term care 
proposals for the National Assembly.19 Plaid Cymru's desire to push the issue of free 
personal care also seemed at times half-hearted. For instance, unlike the opposition 
parties in Scotland, Plaid Cymru did not organise a minority party debate on free 
personal care. Additionally, when representatives from the major political parties in 
16 Interview with Lila Haines (Plaid Cymru's Policy Director) (June 2004) 
17 Plaid Cymru Manifesto (2003) Manifesto 2003 accessed at www.plaid.cynru.orgon8/8/04.S.II.B(c) 
18 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 1st March 2001 
19 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 21 st March 2002 
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Wales were asked which five pieces of primary legislation they would like to see 
introduced whilst the Liberal Democrat leader, Mike German, mentioned his first 
choice would be free personal care, Plaid Cymru's policy director, Cynog Dafis, failed 
to mention free personal care at al1.20 As a result, Plaid Cymru's approach to free 
personal care appears haphazard. When long-term care was on the Assembly's 
agenda Plaid AMs made the case for free personal care. For example, Plaid Cymru's 
Health Spokesperson, Dai Lloyd, advocated free personal care when long-term care 
was on agenda of the Health and Social Service Committee. 21 However, Plaid AMs 
rarely proactively forced free personal care onto the agenda, indicated by their 
failure to raise questions or hold minority party debates on free personal care. 
Additionally Plaid Cymru seemed to lack a coherent strategy for pursuing free 
personal care, and it seems that they simply supported measures to ease long-term 
care costs for the elderly when the issue arose in the Assembly, and when they 
remembered to do so. For instance, when the Assembly were discussing the sums 
allowed for personal requirements for those in long-term care (an equivalent to 
pocket money for older people in care) Plaid Cymru proposed an amendment to 
raise capital limits. Liberal Democrats AM Peter Black argued that it was strange 
that the Plaid Cymru proposal seemed to come from nowhere, as the party had not 
raised the issue 'in the Health and Social Services Committee when it considered its 
budget priorities ... [and] It was not raised either as a priority issue during the 
budget debate'. 22 
The weakness of Plaid Cymru's advocacy of free personal care is especially obvious 
when we compare the party's actions with opposition parties in Scotland. The 
20 Shipton, M. (18 November 2001) 'Make our Day!' in Wales on Sunday, p.1? 
21 National Assembly for Wales Health and Social Services Committee (20 June 2001) Minutes HSS-10-
01 (min) accessed at www.wales.gov.uk on 25/05/04 
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Scottish Conservatives in particular were proactive on the free personal care issue; 
they raised free personal care as the issue for their minority party debate and 
frequently asked the Scottish Government about their response to the Royal 
Commission. It is possible that Plaid's behaviour can be explained by a weaker 
commitment to free personal care. However, all Plaid Cymru interviewees argued 
that their commitment to free personal care ran deep; additionally Plaid's Policy 
Director argued that the party made such a fuss about free personal care that they 
had to actively take steps to follow their commitment throughY Therefore, it is 
worth exploring why, despite Plaid's commitment to free personal care, they were 
less vocal on the issue than the Conservatives in Scotland. 
It is possible that Plaid Cymru were less well organised than the Conservatives in 
Scotland, meaning that the party had to respond on a case by case basis rather 
than developing a strategic plan. However, Plaid Cymru has vigorously pursued 
other issues, such as extending free eye tests, with great success. Plaid Cymru 
interviewees suggested that their weaker position on free personal care was due to 
the Welsh devolution settlement, which made free personal care less likely in Wales 
because primary legislation from Westminster would first be necessary.24 The 
improbability of primary legislation being passed by the UK government encouraged 
some AMs to argue that the party should focus on other issues. For example, Dai 
Lloyd accepted that free personal care was less of a campaigning issue for Plaid 
Cymru than for opposition parties in Scotland because the party believed they had 
little chance of success.2S However, Ula Haines, Plaid Cymru's policy director 
suggested that whilst the improbability of success was a consideration, she claimed 
22 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 21st March 2002 
23 Interview with Lila Haines (Plaid Cymru's Policy Director) (June 2004) 
24 Interview with Dai Lloyd (Plaid Cymru AM) (June 2004) 
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it was not a key consideration. 26 In addition Lila Haines suggested that Plaid 
decided to campaign for free personal care across different levels of government 
because they genuinely believed in the policy and wanted to get the issue onto the 
political agenda, even if they were unsuccessful at shaping the policy itself.27 
As for the SNP, free personal care also offered Plaid Cymru a perfect opportunity to 
highlight their wider constitutional aims. For instance, the Plaid Cymru leader at the 
time, Ieuan Wyn Jones, argued that the Scottish Parliament's decision to provide 
free personal and nursing care, was an indicator of 'what real devolution can do to 
bring about real improvements in people's Iives'.28 As a result Ieuan Wyn Jones 
suggested that the National Assembly should have the same powers as the Scottish 
Parliament as only with such powers could the Assembly 'take real action'.29 Plaid 
only began to argue for free personal care once the Scottish Parliament had decided 
to implement the policy, implying that the free personal care issue became 
particularly important to Plaid when they saw that Wales was unable to adopt the 
same policy as Scotland. For example, Plaid submitted their first motion calling for 
free personal care to be considered by the National Assembly in February 2001, just 
a few weeks after the decision was taken in Scotland. Plaid's health spokesperson, 
Dai Lloyd, admitted that issues such as free personal care and the student finance 
package in Scotland helped Plaid to communicate their constitutional aims. He 
argued that the concept of greater independence for Wales frightened some people 
but by focusing on popular poliCies which would only be achievable through greater 
25 Interview with Dai Lloyd (Plaid Cymru AM) (February 2003) 
26 Interview with Lila Haines (Plaid Cymru's Policy Director) (June 2004) 
27 Ibid. 
28 Jones, I.W. (11 February 2001) 'Its Time to Fight back for Wales' in The News of the World 
29 Ibid. 
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independence Plaid could more easily highlight the benefits of devolving more 
powers to the Assembly. 30 
In addition to Plaid's argument that the Assembly was incapable of securing free 
personal care due to the devolved settlement, other members of the party 
suggested that the Welsh Assembly Government was capable, and should do more. 
For instance, Helen Mary Jones argued that a 'strong Assembly position might 
persuade the Westminster Government to re-examine its ill thought-out and 
parsimonious response to the Royal Commission's recommendations overall'.31 
Therefore, on the one hand Plaid appeared to suggest that the National Assembly 
was unable to act on free personal care and so further devolution was necessary, 
and on the other hand, Plaid suggested that the Welsh Assembly Government was 
capable of persuading the UK Government to introduce free personal care if they 
acted decisively and adopted a strong position. However, usually Plaid Cymru AMs 
focused less on pressurising the Welsh Assembly Government to act on free 
personal care and more on using the issue to highlight the weaknesses in the Welsh 
Devolution settlement. As a result it appears that Plaid Cymru had an incentive to 
push free personal care onto the political agenda but perhaps had most to gain if 
their calls for free personal care were ignored. 
The position of the Welsh Conservatives mirrored the position of the party at 
Westminster, and was in sharp contrast to the Scottish Conservatives. The 
Conservatives in Wales were sceptical of the case for free personal care, arguing 
that they 'remain to be convinced about dedicating the amount necessary to fund 
30 Interview with Dai Lloyd (Plaid Cymru AM) (June 2004) 
31 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 13th February 2001 
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free personal care',32 In addition, David Melding, then the Conservative Health 
Spokesperson in Wales, argued that all of the other parties shared the 
Conservatives' reservations about the cost of the policy but were afraid to admit so 
in public.33 As a result Melding claimed that the Welsh Assembly Government were 
guilty of 'thorny politics' because they could blame the UK Government for the 
failure to implement free personal care even though there was a possibility that 
they might reach a similar conclusion,34 Whilst Melding's critique of the Welsh 
Assembly Government may hold some truth the Conservative party in Wales were 
also guilty of similar 'thorny politics', 
The Welsh Conservatives were generally opposed to free personal care due to cost. 
However, for political reasons the Conservatives did not want to emphasise their 
opposition to free personal care,35 The desire to hide their opposition to free 
personal care may explain why there was some confusion about the Conservative's 
position on the issue, In May 2002 a newspaper reported that there was a 
difference of opinion within the Conservative group, it stated that whilst David 
Melding had sympathies with free personal care he could not commit his group to 
supporting free care due to the cost implications,36 Melding argued that he was 
never convinced of the case for free personal care and the Conservatives 
unanimously agreed that implementing free personal care was not a serious 
option,37 Therefore, it is possible that Melding played down the Conservatives 
opposition to free personal care when discussing the issue with journalists, 
32 Interview with David Melding (Conservative AM) (February 2003) 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Interview with David Melding (Conservative AM) (June 2004) 
36 Bodden, T. (2 May 2002) 'We Want a Minister for OAPs; Call for Free Care for the Elderly' in The 
Daily Post, p.5 
37 Interview with David Melding (Conservative AM) (June 2004) 
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Interestingly, therefore, the Conservatives had no interest in placing free personal 
care on the political agenda because their opposition to the policy would have 
become obvious. 
Melding suggested that the Assembly's final position of challenging the UK 
Government to introduce free personal care whilst not committing to pay for it 
'made the Assembly a laughing stock'.38 However, the Conservatives did vote with 
the rest of the Assembly in support of the Advisory Group's report on a strategy for 
older people, which meant accepting the proposal to 'challenge the UK Government 
to fund and implement free personal care in the context of UK taxation, benefits 
and inheritance policy as the Royal Commission had intended'.39 As the 
Conservatives were opposed to free personal care, it appears that they may have 
agreed to challenge the UK Government simply as a way of avoiding drawing 
attention to the issue and their position in relation to it. 
The opposition parties in Scotland and Wales all faced unique challenges and 
opportunities due to the devolved structures in which they operated. The political 
make-up of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales 
encouraged the opposition parties to behave in ways, which would have been less 
likely in Westminster. In Scotland there was a considerable degree of consensus 
between the opposition parties, with the SNP, Conservatives, Scottish Socialists, 
Greens and Independents all in favour of free personal care. It is particularly 
interesting that the Scottish Conservatives not only decided to support free personal 
care, but took a particularly strong lead in pushing the issue, as the party at 
38 Interview with David Melding (Conservative AM) (June 2004) 
39 Welsh Assembly Government Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older People in Wales (May 2002) 
When I'm 64 ... and more, p.53 
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Westminster and the Welsh Conservatives were against free personal care. In 
Wales the Conservatives were against free personal care and had an interest in 
preventing discussion of free personal care arising on the political agenda, so they 
could avoid stating their opposition to the publicly popular free personal care policy. 
The Welsh Conservatives lack of support for free personal care meant that in the 
National Assembly for Wales the opposition parties were divided, with Plaid Cymru 
and the Liberal Democrats the only parties in favour of free personal care. 
Free personal care presented the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales with the 
opportunity to raise the profile of constitutional issues. Plaid Cymru and the SNP 
both suggested that free personal care would only be achievable if the devolved 
institutions had greater powers. However, in Wales the nationalists never rigorously 
campaigned for the free personal care issue, partly due to poor organisation and a 
belief that focusing on the issue was pointless, but also because the Welsh model of 
devolution made it more difficult for the opposition parties to hold the Welsh 
Assembly government to account. Devolution also created an interesting paradox 
for the nationalist parties, as despite their support for free personal care it was 
possible that greater electoral success could be gained if free personal care was not 
implemented successfully in Scotland and Wales, thus allowing the nationalist 
parties to highlight the weaknesses in the devolution settlements. 
7.2 Health Committees 
As discussed in chapter two it can be difficult to determine whether to treat entities 
such as the Scottish and Welsh health committees as actors or as institutions. It 
was decided that it would be helpful to at times define them as an actor, and at 
others they could better by understood as institutions. In this discussion of the 
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committee the focus will be on its role as a purposeful actor, with its institutional 
role explored in greater depth in the next chapter. 
In Scotland the cross-party Health and Community Care Committee spent ten 
months conducting its inquiry into community care and concluded with members 
unanimously supporting the principle of free personal care, which it estimated would 
cost £110 million per year.40 The unanimity of the Committee members was also 
mirrored by those giving evidence to the Committee, as the clear majority of them 
supported free personal care. During the Committee's inquiry into community care, 
evidence was taken from a range of elderly organisations and policy experts. 
Interviewees regularly commented on the similarity of the views expressed to the 
committee from a range of sources, 'perhaps there were 1 or 2 dissenting voices 
but they were the exception, and they weren't particularly memorable'.41 Stewart 
Sutherland, the chair of the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care, was one of the 
first to give evidence to the Committee, and made a strong case for free personal 
care. In addition, expert after expert supported Sutherland's evidence. With no 
strong counter arguments against free personal care it would have been difficult for 
members of the Committee to dismiss it. Therefore, the Committee added its 
support to those calling for free personal care, and galvanised support for this 
consensus position, especially inside the Scottish Parliament. The Health and 
Community Care's inquiry was meant to be a broad inquiry into options for long-
term care, but developed a specific focus on free personal care due to the concerns 
expressed when it took evidence.42 Therefore, the Committee's inquiry provided the 
40 Health and Community Care Committee (2000) Nih Report 2000: Inquiry into the Delivery of 
Community care in Scot/and accessed at www.scotttish.pariiament.uk on 18/11/03 
41 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
42 Ibid. 
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opportunity for pro-free personal care actors to voice their views, thus publicly 
developing the case for the policy. 
The unanimity of the Committee's conclusions with the pro-free personal care lobby 
who gave evidence, implies that these actors can be viewed as an advocacy 
coalition on free personal care, a group of 'actors from a variety of public and 
private institutions at all levels of government who share a basic set of beliefs 
(policy goals plus causal and other perceptions) and who seek to manipulate the 
rules, budgets and personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these 
goals over time'.43 Such a definition implies that the Committee lost its ability to 
objectively examine the arguments for free personal care, perhaps being captured 
by the pro-free personal care lobby, and joining the free personal care advocacy 
coalition. Such an analysis is supported by Alison Petch's recollection that the 
question of whether free personal care was affordable was never considered by the 
Committee.44 Perhaps this lack of detailed scrutiny also helps to explain why in the 
Scottish Parliament's second term, the Audit Committee returned to the issue of free 
personal care to examine concerns about the cost of the policy, and the Health 
Committee launched an inquiry to investigate its implementation.45 However, the 
detail and quality of the Health and Community Care Committee's report was 
mentioned by several interviewees. For example, Alison Petch, a member of the 
Care Development Group, argued that despite being a young committee its 
performance was impressive.46 McLeish suggested that the key contribution of the 
43 Sabatier, P.A and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (1993) 'The Study of Public Policy Processes' in Sabatier, P.A 
and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (Eds.) Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach 
(Westview Press, Colarado), p.5 
44 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
45 The Scottish Parliament (21 March 2005) Press Release: Audit Committee doubts true cost of free 
personal care and The Scottish Parliament (31 st August 2005) Press Release: Health Committee to 
examine free personal care accessed at www.scottish.parliament.uk on 2/9/05 
46 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
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Committee to the free personal care debate was its 'informed sUppOrt'.47 McLeish 
suggested that the Committee played a major role in pressurising the Scottish 
Executive to reverse their decision, by offering strong and informed support for free 
personal care.48 If the Health and Community Care Committee's report had 
concluded against introducing free personal care in Scotland it would certainly have 
been much more difficult for those in favour of free personal care to justify their 
position. Additionally, if the Health Minister's opposition to free personal care was 
mirrored in the Committee's report her position within the cabinet would have been 
strengthened, making it more difficult for McLeish to secure support for free 
personal care. Therefore, the Health and Community Care Committee helped to 
build a consensus on free personal care and made those with opposing views look 
increasingly isolated. 
In addition to offering informed advice on free personal care, the Health and 
Community Care Committee's report also helped to push free personal care up the 
political agenda. The report received considerable coverage in the press at the time 
of its publication, helped by the fact the report was leaked a few days before it was 
officially due to be released. One interviewee found this amusing and helpful, as 
leaked reports make issues look important, a view not commonly associated with 
the care of the elderly.49 Therefore, by holding an inquiry into the issue, the 
Committee galvanised support within the Scottish Parliament and outside, isolated 
critics of the proposal, strengthened the evidence base and raised the profile of free 
personal care. 
47 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
48 Ibid. 
49 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
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In sharp contrast, the Health and Social Services Committee in the National 
Assembly for Wales contributed little to the free personal care debate. The clerk to 
the Committee argued that the lack of attention to free personal care was primarily 
because the Assembly lacked the money to introduce the policy, so committee 
members felt the issue was not a high priority.5o In addition, committees in Wales 
conduct far fewer inquiries compared to those in Scotland. For instance, in the 
Assembly's first term the Health and Social Services Committee undertook three 
inquiries, into a Children's Commissioner, an extension of free eye tests and SSE. 
Therefore, it was more difficult for free personal care to arise on to the Committee's 
agenda in Wales. Also, the topics on which the Health and Social Services 
Committee has undertaken inquiries have all been areas on which there is common 
agreement for action. For instance, the proposal to introduce a Children's 
Commissioner for Wales was supported by all the political parties, with Labour, the 
Liberal Democrats and Plaid committing to introducing the Commissioner in their 
manifestos for the 1999 Assembly election. As discussed above, free personal care 
was a more contentious issue, with the Conservatives and Labour opposed to 
introducing free personal care on a Wales only basis. Dai Uoyd argued that the 
Labour majority on the Committee combined with the Health Minister's membership 
of the Committee meant that it had been impossible to force the committee to 
examine anything contentious.51 A wide range of interviewees also felt that the 
minister's membership of committees made it difficult for the committee to establish 
an independent identity. 
50 Interview with National Assembly for Wales Health and Social Services Committee Clerk (June 2004) 
51 Interview with Dai Lloyd (Plaid Cymru AM) (June 2004) 
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In contrast to the Scottish Committee where members occasionally escaped their 
partisan positions to challenge the Scottish Government, this was much more 
difficult in Wales, a problem intensified 'If the Committee Chair is from the same 
party as the minister ... especially if they are also buddies'.52 In the case of the 
Welsh Health and Social Services Committee, the chair was the Liberal Democrat 
Kirsty Williams. Williams was a strong supporter of free personal care and was not 
afraid to challenge the Health Minister to offer a greater commitment to free 
personal care. However, Williams was criticised for being an ineffective 
counterweight to the Health Minister Jane Hutt and for failing to provide strategic 
direction to the CommitteeY Tensions within the Committee meant that Plaid 
Cymru challenged her position, arguing that she should move towards a more 
investigative role, examining long-term concerns rather than considering issues on a 
day-to-day basis.54 The complaint against the Committee's lack of strategic direction 
may also help to explain why contentious issues, such as free personal care, did not 
appear on the Committee's agenda, and perhaps Kirsty Williams's leadership was 
lacking in this area. However, above all, Plaid's challenge highlights a lack of unity 
in the Committee, with the in-fighting preventing Plaid and the Liberal Democrats 
from forming a united front on free personal care. 
The contrast between the Health Committees in Scotland and Wales highlights once 
again that free personal care was taken more seriously in Scotland than in Wales. 
The Committee in Scotland took ten months to consider detailed evidence and 
submit a comprehensive report on free personal care, whilst in Wales free personal 
52 Interview with National Assembly for Wales Health and Social Services Committee Clerk (June 2004) 
53 Richardson, N. (November 2000) Health Policy and the National Assembly for Wales: Monitodng 
Devolution and Health August to November 2000 (Constitution Unit, IWA and Nuffield Foundation) 
accessed at www.ucl.ac.uklconstitution-unitlfiles/devolution and health/walnovOO.pdf on 27/05/04 
54 Ibid. 
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care was barely discussed. In addition, in Scotland the Health and Community Care 
Committee developed a consensus on free personal care, with all members of the 
Committee supporting the findings of the Committee's report, that free personal 
care should be implemented in Scotland. In Wales the Health and Social Services 
Committee was divided, and tensions between Committee members and the 
Committee Chair prevented a unified front developing on free personal care, even 
between Plaid Cymru and the Liberal Democrats. 
In Scotland the Health and Community Care Committee's report provided detailed 
evidence on free personal care, which strengthened the case for the policy and 
made those who opposed it look increaSingly isolated. In addition, by developing 
such a detailed report the Health and Community Care Committee provided 
pressure groups and policy experts with the opportunity to express their views. As 
most pressure groups and policy experts giving evidence to the Committee were in 
favour of free personal care, it meant that the Committee presented the Parliament 
with the picture that there was a consensus on free personal care and in their 
inquiry gave support to the advocacy coalition on free personal care. 
7.3 Policy Experts and Pressure Groups 
In Scotland actors outside the Parliament played an important role during the free 
personal care debate. There were three key ways in which pressure groups and 
policy experts participated in the policy-making process; by conducting public 
campaigns and lobbying MSPs, by giving evidence to the Health and Community 
Care Committee, and through participation in the Scottish Executive's policy groups. 
Most individuals and organisations which sought to shape policies on the long-term 
care of the elderly were involved in all three of these activities. 
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The fact that the Royal Commission produced a minority report meant that 
arguments about free personal care continued after the Commission had reported, 
keeping the debate visible and alive.55 Interestingly, the Chair of the Commission, 
Lord Sutherland, was a particularly high-profile campaigner for free personal care. 
Sutherland became a fierce policy advocate, lobbying politicians, giving evidence to 
the Health and Community Care Committee and campaigning in the press. As 
Alison Petch notes, it is rare to find the chairs of Royal Commissions pushing 
poliCies, 'normally they just complete the report and wait for the response'.56 
Sutherland focused on encouraging MSPs to diverge from the UK Government, 
'MSPs would have to have been both courageous and bold, which is why I wonder if 
the arm of Westminster is the real reason Scotland stopped short of its 
recommendations'.57 However, prior to McLeish's election as First Minister, 
Sutherland was fairy satisfied with the care for the elderly policies produced in 
Scotland, 'even Sutherland regarded it as a good outcome, which was much better 
than the English package'.58 So, whilst Sutherland upped the pressure once McLeish 
hinted at a move towards free personal care, he only applied this pressure because 
McLeish re-opened the debate. 
In opposition to Sutherland and his arguments was Lord David Lipsey, one of the 
authors of the Royal Commission's minority report. Lipsey, like Sutherland, 
regularly appeared in the press, for instance, suggesting that 'Free long-term care 
55 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
56 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
57 McCann, A. (13 October 2000) 'Sutherland attacks London pressure over reforms to care of the 
elderly' The Herald, p.l 
58 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
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would attract elderly migrants and turn Scotland into a residential home',59 As a 
result Lipsey asked 'McLeish and his colleagues, in the name of fairness and 
equality, to think again',60 However, Lipsey's arguments were ridiQJled by sections 
of the press who questioned the 'queues of cars at the border as the English middle 
class rush north with granny in the back to be left on the doorstep of Dundee social 
services',61 Lipsey's arguments helped to keep the debate on free personal care 
alive, providing pro-free personal care actors with arguments to respond to, 
Therefore, far from diminishing the case for free personal care, it is possible that 
Lipsey added to the pressure on the Scottish Executive to act, 
SNP MSP, Christine Grahame, felt that Stewart Sutherland had a direct impact upon 
the Executive's acceptance of free personal care, She argued that his high profile, 
personable and engaging character made him a persuasive force,62 Alison Petch 
explained that Sutherland put forward a very powerful case for free personal care 
and suggested that politicians would 'have to be strong and sure of their ground to 
contradict him',63 Sutherland was clearly a well-respected and well liked expert, 
who was able to persuade many of his case, The combination of inexperienced 
politicians, in a young Parliament, dealing with a complicated issue, meant 
Sutherland's role as a policy advocate was enhanced, Interestingly, all those in the 
Health and Community Care Committee interviewed for this thesis mentioned 
Sutherland as an important and influential actor. For example, Keith Raffan said 
that Sutherland's arguments were one factor which convinced him of the virtues of 
59 Lipsey, D. (21 January 2001) 'Why free care for elderly is a road to ruin' in Sunday Times 
60 Ibid. 
61 'Made in Scotland: The Merit of Doing Things Differently' (27 January 2001) in Society Guardian 
accessed at www.societv.quardian.co.uklsocialcare/story/0.7890.430474.00.htmlon 1/03/04 
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free personal care,64 and Christine Grahame saw Sutherland and opposition party 
pressure as the key factors which encouraged the Scottish Executive to commit to 
free personal care. 
Campaigning for free personal care was another channel commonly adopted by civil 
society actors in favour of the policy. For example, a year after the Royal 
Commission on long-term care had reported, Help the Aged organised a press stunt 
with older people protesting next to a giant clock, indicating that time was ticking.65 
At this stage, the Scottish Parliament was in session and a number of MSPs were 
interested in the attempt to raise the profile of the debate. 66 Pressure groups also 
attempted to use the Scottish parliamentary system to voice their concerns. For 
instance Age Concern submitted a petition calling for 'the Scottish Parliament to 
implement all of those recommendations contained in the report of the Royal 
Commission on Long-term care for the elderly, which its devolved powers permit'.67 
The petition was passed to the Health and Community Care Committee for 
consideration as part of their inquiry into Community Care. The strength of 
organisations lobbying for the elderly and free personal care was aided by their 
united position. Liz Duncan, from Help the Aged, explained that the only area of 
disagreement was on the legality of the UK Government's actions over Attendance 
Allowance. 68 In addition to their press campaigns, civil society actors sought to 
increase support for free personal care through their involvement with the Health 
and Community Care Committee, where they had considerable success at 
persuading MSPs of their case. 
64 Interview with Keith Raffan (Liberal Democrat MSP) (February 2004) 
65 Interview with Liz Duncan (Director of Help the Aged Scotland) (February 2004) 
66 Ibid 
67 Petition- PE7? accessed at www.scottish.parliament.uk/S1/parl bus/petitions1.htm on (01/03/04) 
68 Interview with Liz Duncan (Director of Help the Aged Scotland) (February 2004) 
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The final method employed by pressure groups and policy experts to influence the 
free personal care policy was through their direct involvement in groups established 
by the Scottish Executive. The Scottish Executive launched two groups of 
significance to the free personal care policy; the Care Development Group (CDG), 
which developed 'proposals to ensure that older people in Scotland have access to 
high quality and responsive long-term care in the appropriate setting and on a fair 
and equitable basis, including proposals for the implementation of free personal 
care'/9 and the Implementation Steering Group which focused on how to implement 
free personal care throughout Scotland. Much of the work of these groups was 
highly technical and was done after a commitment to free personal care had been 
made. Members of the CDG and the Implementation Group, such as Mary Marshall 
(Director of the Dementia Services Development Centre), Jim Jackson (Chief 
Executive of Alzheimer's Scotland) and Alison Petch (Professor of Community Care 
Studies at Glasgow University) were advocates of free personal care. The CDG was 
chaired by Malcolm Chisholm, then the Deputy Health Minister, who was 
sympathetic to free personal care. Alison Petch claimed that members of the CDG 
were 'astounded by Chisholm's involvement. .. not only was he there week after 
week chairing the meetings but was intimately involved in debates and 
discussions'.70 Petch argued that Chisholm's direct, hands-on involvement didn't 
seem usual/1 and was taken to indicate his personal support for the policy.72 
Therefore, those developing the details of the policy all seemed to operate with a 
great deal of consensus. The extensive use of civil society in developing policy 
69 Care Development Group (14 September 2001) Fair Care for Older People accessed at 
www.scotland.gov.uk/librarv3/health/cdgr-00.asp 
70 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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proposals in Scotland, one ex-civil servant argued, can be explained by the lack of 
policy development expertise within the Scottish Executive.73 As it is impossible for 
the Scottish Executive to replicate policy research in Whitehall, this ex-civil servant 
suggested that professionals and experts from civil society needed to be involved in 
policy-making.74 Once involved in the policy-making process civil society actors may 
be able to have a real impact on policy design, however, those involved at this level 
are invited by the Scottish Executive due to their similar interests and opinions, as 
one interviewee pOinted out 'we wouldn't invite those who disagreed with our 
overall objectives'.75 For example, a member of the COG expressed how all 
members of the group were particularly concerned with shifting the delivery of care 
from residential setting to the home, but this focus was directed and pushed 
forward by Malcolm Chisholm.76 
Devolution appeared to offer policy experts and pressure groups an enhanced role 
in policy-making, providing them with a variety of routes into the policy-making 
process. Lord Sutherland clearly played a role in galvanising support for free 
personal care, and having the opportunity to give evidence to the Health and Social 
Services Committee gave him a platform from which to publicly make his case. As 
Scotland lacked experience in policy development, compared to Westminster, actors 
from civil society have often found they have been heavily involved in policy-making 
in Scotland. In the free personal care case experts were used to finalise the 
technical details of the policy once a commitment had been made. Interestingly 
although pressure groups and policy experts were disappointed by the Scottish 
Executive's initial decision not to implement free personal care they tended to 
73 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
74 IbId 
75 Ibid. 
237 
accept that the Scottish policy on long-term care was better than the English model. 
Attempts were made to push free personal care, but the major efforts were directed 
at the UK Government, as most pressure groups and policy experts thought that 
free personal care should be implemented at the UK level. Therefore, the 
importance of pressure groups and policy experts really came into play in the later 
stages of the free personal care policy formation, once McLeish had placed the issue 
on the agenda, and hinted at movement on the issue, 
In Wales free personal care was not given the same level of press coverage as in 
Scotland, in fact there was almost no mention of the policy prior to the decision to 
implement free personal care in Scotland in January 2001. Welsh elderly pressure 
groups conSistently argued that there were gaps in the Welsh Assembly 
Government's policies for older people and promoted the need to develop a holistic 
strategy for older people,77 Elderly pressure groups in Wales united to form a loose 
alliance of organisations called Age Alliance, The alliance included 19 organisations, 
such as Unison, Age Concern Cymru, Help the Aged Cymru and the RNIB,7B 
Following the free personal care decision in Scotland, Welsh pressure groups, in 
particular Age Concern Cymru, called on the Assembly to 'take up the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Long-term Care for the Elderly',79 
The director of Age Concern Cymru, Robert Taylor, warned that 'If the rest of the 
UK didn't follow Scotland, a two-tier system would exist',8o Here Age Concern 
Cymru focused on both the UK Government and the Assembly, calling on both levels 
76 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
77 Interview with a representative from an elderly pressure group (February 2003) 
78 Fletcher, P. (7 November 2001) 'Free Personal care for Elderly Sought; Hutt Scraps NHS Nursing 
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of government to support free personal care. In a similar vein to Plaid Cymru, 
pressure groups in Wales were aware that in order to achieve free personal care 
they needed to target Westminster as well as the Welsh tier of government. 
Consequently, the Welsh Assembly Government got the impression that whilst 'most 
pressure groups were in favour of free personal care they generally accepted that it 
wasn't our gift to give'.8i 
When the Welsh Assembly Government took the decision to introduce free nursing 
care elderly groups used the opportunity to indicate their desire for free personal 
care. For instance, on 5th November 2001 the National Old Aged Pensioners 
Association of Wales handed over a petition calling for free personal care and their 
general secretary, Alun Davies, explained that 'We [Wales] should be like Scotland 
the brave where personal care is free'.82 Therefore, Scotland was held up as a 
model for the Assembly, which highlighted the possibilities of devolution. Following 
the announcement of free nursing care in Wales, Age Alliance arranged a meeting 
to be held on 14th November 2001 to discuss a battle plan for pressuring the Welsh 
Assembly Government to adopt a more generous care package for older people. 
However, it is worth pointing out that this attempt to pressurise the Welsh Assembly 
Government to act on free personal care came at a late stage of the policy-making 
cycle, after the Welsh Assembly Government had announced their NHS strategy, 
which included plans for long-term care reform. Additionally, some organisations 
never fought for free personal care on a Wales only basis. Welsh pressure groups 
generally accepted that it would be difficult for the Welsh Assembly Government to 
fund free personal care out of its current resources so many organisations preferred 
81 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (June 2004) 
82 The Western Mai/(l November 2001) 'Pensioners protest to Assembly over provision of personal 
care services', p.11 
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to focus on challenging the UK Government to act. For instance, interviewees from 
Royal College of Nursing (RCN) Wales explained their belief that a UK wide 
approach was needed on free personal care, so the UK organisation, RCN UK, took 
the lead role on the issue.83 As a result, compared to Scotland, there was a greater 
level of division amongst pressure groups in Wales. Whilst many Welsh pressure 
groups were convinced of the need for free personal care, they tended to believe 
that the policy needed to be funded by the UK Government, therefore, they focused 
their attention at this level of government instead. 
In addition to their lobbying role, pressure groups in Wales also had input into 
developing the details of the long-term care policy. The Advisory Group on a 
Strategy for Older People, although chaired by an AM, was primarily made up of 
pressure groups, local government and business representatives. In addition to the 
members of the Advisory Group, a wide range of organisations and individuals were 
consulted through its work. The Advisory Group considered open-ended 
questionnaires, conducted focus groups throughout Wales, took detailed evidence 
from a range of organisations and considered a range of papers and literature 
reviews.84 In a sense here the Advisory Group played a similar role to the Health 
and Community Care Committee in Scotland, hearing evidence and providing a 
forum for examining the pros and cons of free personal care. 
There were a number of disagreements about free personal care within the Advisory 
Group. Local authorities and health service representatives said that they could not 
endorse a recommendation for free personal care on a Wales only basis, whilst 
83 Interview with Angharad Davies and Greg Walker (Representatives from RCN Cymru) (February 
2003) 
84 Ibid. 
240 
many representatives from voluntary organisations wanted a clear commitment to 
actually implement free personal care.8S In the end the Advisory Group accepted 
that a policy of free personal care should only be pursued if there is a policy change 
in England, as 'More generous treatment, relative to England, would have to be 
supported from the Assembly's budget and compete with other demands for 
resources'.86 The Advisory Group's report claimed it would be difficult to justify 
reallocating money from other areas in order to pay for free personal care because 
of the small number of people who would benefit from the policy .87 It appears that 
whilst supportive of free personal care Welsh pressure groups were reluctant to 
apply considerable pressure on the Welsh Assembly Government to introduce free 
the policy due to the Assembly not having the ability to raise taxes in order to pay 
for the policy. The Welsh Assembly Government also benefited from a degree of 
good-will from elderly pressure groups. Community care experts and elderly 
pressure groups were impressed with the Welsh Assembly Government's strategy 
for older people. Their only complaint was that the strategy did not go far enough, 
particularly in its rejection of free personal care in Wales. As a result whilst the 
Welsh Assembly Government was under some pressure 'to do something' in relation 
to long-term care, as pressure groups and policy experts in Wales accepted that 
action was unlikely on free personal care, they tended to focus on related long-term 
care issues instead.8s 
Welsh pressure groups have at times been able to influence the Welsh Assembly 
Government's policies. For instance, representatives from Carers Wales explained 
85 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (February 2003) 
86 Welsh Assembly Government AdviSOry Group on a Strategy for Older People in Wales (May 2002) 
When I'm 64 ... and more, p.57 
87 Ibid. 
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that because a key civil servant responsible for drafting the Carers Strategy in Wales 
was ill, the strategy was drafted by two representatives from carers organisations 
with civil servants.89 On the specifics of the long-term care policy, Age Concern 
argued that they were able to influence the focus of the document by suggesting 
that the older person's strategy should not just deal with health and social services 
issues but should take a broader approach.90 All interviewees argued that elderly 
pressure groups, particularly those involved in Age Alliance, pushed for some action 
on free personal care. However, the focus of many of these groups was to achieve 
some level of ideological commitment to free personal care from the Welsh 
Assembly Government, rather than actual implementation of the policy.91 Dame 
June Clark claimed that her plan was to overtly aim to secure primary legislation to 
allow for free personal care in Wales, but covertly aim to increase the pressure on 
the Welsh Assembly Government to raise nursing care payments above inflation 
each year.92 Interestingly pressure group actors sought to take credit for placing 
free personal care on the remit of the Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older 
People. According to one director of an elderly organisation there was reluctance by 
the Welsh Assembly Government to include the issue of free personal care on the 
group's remit, as they sought to limit the investigation into devolved issues only, but 
they changed their position due to lobbying from pressure groupS.93 The reluctance 
of the Welsh Assembly Government to allow discussions of free personal care has 
been mentioned by many other interviewees. However, interviewees from the 
Welsh Assembly Government argued that it was the Liberal Democrats, rather than 
89 Interview with Roz Williamson and Sandra Burton (Carers Wales) (February 2003) 
90 Interview with Sarah Stone (Political Officer for Age Concern Cymru) (February 2003) 
91 Interview with a representative from an elderly pressure group (February 2003) 
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pressure groups, who persuaded them to place free personal care on the AdVisory 
Group's remit. 94 
Pressure groups were fairly positive about their relationship with the Welsh 
Assembly Government, with most organisations under the impression that they 
were listened to. For instance, Phil Davies from the Alzheimer's Society believed 
that 'if you have a strong case and compile a good briefing document' then you will 
have a good chance of influencing pOlicy.95 People spoke highly of the Welsh 
Assembly Government's attitude, arguing that 'there is a real attempt by the 
Assembly Government to discuss their plans with interested parties before putting 
pen to paper'.96 In particular the strategy for older people was considered as a 
'model' of how the consultation process should operate.97 Angharad Davies and 
Greg Walker from RCN Wales identified five different stages of consultation 
undertaken in relation to the Strategy for Older People. Firstly, civil servants 
devised an open ended questionnaire about older people in Wales, which was sent 
to key organisations. Secondly, the questionnaire responses went to the Advisory 
Group on the Strategy for Older People. Then the Advisory Group compiled a 
report, 'When I'm 64 ... and more'. The proposals from the Advisory Group went to 
the Assembly for discussion in plenary and in the Health and Social Services 
Committee, and was subsequently send out for consultation. Finally, the Welsh 
Assembly Government examined the consultation responses and responded to the 
Advisory Group's report by developing its Strategy for Older People. 
94 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (June 2004) 
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Jane Hutt, the Health Minister was highly regarded by most pressure group 
interviewees. She had worked in the voluntary sector, so there was a feeling 
amongst voluntary sector organisations that she understood their concerns and 
supported their work.98 However, most interviewees from pressure groups 
experienced difficulties placing issues onto the Assembly's agenda. Representatives 
from RCN Wales explained that they did not believe they were able to influence the 
agenda because they were too busy responding to the huge number of consultation 
documents emanating from the Assembly.99 The interviewee from Help the Aged 
agreed, arguing that their organisation was under-resourced so they could not 
respond to all the consultations they would have liked to, so had difficulty adopting 
a proactive approach.lOo Pressure groups in Wales during the first term were also 
forced to play catch-up, developing new systems to deal with the realities of 
devolution. For example, Help the Aged in Wales did not have a distinct identity in 
Wales pre-devolution. Until 1999 Help the Aged administered Wales and the 
Midlands as one unit,101 Therefore, after devolution the Welsh section of the 
organisation had to start from scratch to develop a semi-independent policy-making 
role to account for the new devolved system. So it is not surprising that on the 
issue of free personal care many pressure groups struggled to devote much time 
and energy to publicly campaigning for the issue on a distinctly Welsh basis. Whilst 
organisations such as Help the Aged in Wales and Age Concern Cymru, did compile 
press releases and leaflets on the issue of free personal care, these tended to be 
arranged on a UK-wide basis. These organisations were involved in the Welsh 
Assembly Government's policy-making, for instance, Age Concern Cymru was 
98 Interview with Phil Davies (Representative from Altzheimers Wales) (February 2003) 
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involved in formulating the Welsh Assembly Government's consultation document 
and the director of Help the Aged in Wales was on the Advisory Group on a Strategy 
for Older People. However, this meant there was little time to conduct a high 
profile public campaign for free personal care in Wales. Consequently, compared to 
the Scottish Government, the Welsh Assembly Government was under less pressure 
from elderly organisations, as groups in Wales were too busy involved in actually 
formulating the details of the Strategy for Older People to scrutinise the Welsh 
Assembly Government's approach or raise public awareness about the opportunities 
for introducing free personal care in Wales. Additionally, there was poor press 
coverage of the Welsh Assembly, in comparison to Scotland, so that pressure 
groups struggled to communicate the case for free personal care to the public. 
Many pressure groups felt that the Welsh Assembly Government lacked policy 
formation expertise. For instance, RCN Cymru interviewees argued that the concept 
of 'policy development' in Wales was a new phenomenon, meaning that politicians 
and civil servants had little personal experience of making policy, let alone creating 
policy within this new multi-level governance system. 102 Therefore, several pressure 
groups felt that the voluntary sector was being used to plug the policy development 
gap. Mark Drakeford, Policy Advisor to Jane Hutt, agreed that pressure groups 
were used to assist policy development but he highlighted how their input into 
policy development was very much on the Welsh Assembly Government's terms. 103 
Drakeford discussed Jane Hutt's decision to abolish the health authorities in Wales. 
He argued that Jane Hutt decided to restructure the organisation of the NHS in 
Wales with no consultation on the decision itself, she wanted to do it and so took 
102 Interview with Angharad Davies and Greg Walker (Representatives from RCN Cymru) (February 
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103 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
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the decision and announced it.104 However, once Hutt had taken the decision to 
abolish the health authorities she consulted widely on how to do it. 105 The 
structural reform of the NHS was opposed by many organisations in Wales,106 
Therefore, pressure groups in Wales could only influence the policy when the Welsh 
Assembly Government asked for their input. 
Whilst it is not surprising that governments seek to develop policy according to their 
beliefs and ideology, there was some resentment amongst pressure groups about 
the one sided nature of their relationship with the Welsh Assembly Government. As 
one interviewee explained, the Welsh Assembly Government 'gets a lot out of the 
voluntary sector for very little',107 Labour AM Ron Davies argued a similar point, 
claiming that whilst the Welsh Assembly Government pays lip service to the notion 
of partnership with the voluntary sector they are primarily wheeled out 'to justify 
decisions that have already been taken',108 For instance, one interviewee felt that 
the decision on how to organise payments for nursing care was taken without 
reference to the consultation responses,109 She explained that during a discussion 
with a civil servant about the nursing payment model he let it slip that the decision 
to adopt the flat rate model had already been made, well before the consultation 
process had ended,l1O However, the Deputy Health Minister, Brian Gibbons, and the 
Health Policy Advisor, Mark Drakeford, argued that everyone consulted on the 
nursing payment method were in agreement about how to organise nursing 
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payments and so they imagined it was obvious which policy they would adopt 
before the consultation process formally ended. 111 
In addition to representatives from pressure groups, the key policy expert outside 
the Welsh Assembly Government involved in campaigning on long-term care, issues 
was Dame June Clark, who previously was a member of the Royal Commission for 
Long-Term Care. Here we see parallels with Scotland, as eX-Royal Commissioner 
Sir Stewart Sutherland was a key figure in the Scottish campaign for free personal 
care. Dame June Clark regularly appeared in the press arguing for free personal 
care. For example, she expressed her disappointment that 'Whitehall has decided 
to make a distinction between clinical care and personal care. The former will be 
free in the Government's plans but the latter will not'.112 However, Dame June 
Clark, like many others, tended to argue that it was the UK, rather than the Welsh 
Assembly Government, who needed to take action on the free personal care issue. 
Following the Assembly's unanimous decision to challenge the UK Government to 
fund free personal care, Clark did alter her stance slightly, focusing on what the 
Assembly could do to secure policy movement at Westminster, 'We now need to see 
everyone in the Assembly - government and opposition - putting pressure on 
Westminster to grant us the power and the resources to implement this for older 
people in Wales'.113 Clark argued that she started to focus more heavily on 
introducing free personal care in Wales after the decision was taken by the Scottish 
111 Interviews with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) and Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the 
Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
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Executive to introduce the policy, suggesting that the Scottish decision 'allowed us 
to argue that if they could do it why couldn't we'y4 
Clark's ability to apply pressure on Assembly Members was limited by the lack of 
opportunities within the Assembly to discuss the issue. Although Clark was invited 
to give a short presentation on long-term care to the Health and Social Service 
Committee on one occasion, this opportunity can be contrasted to the situation in 
Scotland where Sutherland was able to submit detailed evidence to the Health and 
Community Care Committee's inquiry into free personal care, discussed in greater 
depth in the following chapter. 
In addition to lobbying the Welsh Assembly Government to adopt free personal 
care, Dame June Clark was also involved in formulating the detail of the Assembly's 
long-term care policies, as a member of the task force responsible for examining 
methods of arranging free nursing care. June Clark suggested that this task group 
had little input into policy-making. According to Clark, the task group started work 
and met a few times but then it 'just died'.lls She explained that eventually 
meetings simply stopped being arranged and 'we then heard nothing more about 
it',116 Therefore, Clark was unable to build the same level of momentum on free 
personal care as Sutherland achieved in Scotland. In Wales it seemed to be much 
easier for the Welsh Assembly Government to close down the free personal care 
issue, simply ignoring advice or recommendations and allowing task groups looking 
at long-term care issues to simply disappear. 
114 Interview with June Oark (Member of the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care) (June 2004) 
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In Scotland pressure groups and policy experts have been operating with greater 
autonomy from England for a longer time than similar actors in Wales. Therefore, 
those pressure groups and policy experts in Wales campaigning for free personal 
care often faced greater organisational difficulties than similar actors in Scotland. In 
Wales pressure groups appeared to struggle with combining the dual roles of 
campaigning for free personal care and shaping detailed policy proposals with the 
Welsh Assembly Government, primarily due to capacity and resource difficulties. 
The Welsh devolution settlement also presented problems for pressure groups and 
policy experts in Wales, as they struggled to determine whether they should 
develop a distinctive position on free personal care or leave it to their better funded 
and organised UK group. Due to these problems pressure groups in Wales only 
focused on free personal care once the Scottish Parliament had developed plans to 
introduce the policy, as then it became perceived as a devolved issue. In contrast 
in Scotland pressure groups worked hard to develop a Scottish free personal care 
proposal as soon as the UK Government decided not to introduce the policy. In 
Scotland pressure groups and policy experts were involved in developing the free 
personal care policy at each stage of the policy-making process, from raising the 
issue in public petitions to designing the implementation of free personal care in the 
Care Development Group. 
It is worth noting that ex-members of the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care, 
were key contributors to the free personal care debate in both Scotland and Wales. 
However, June Clark had fewer opportunities to argue for free personal care than 
Sutherland had in Scotland. For pressure groups and experts in Scotland the Health 
and Community Care Committee provided an important arena from where they 
could make the case for free personal care. Having fewer opportunities to discuss 
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free personal care, combined with the complex devolution settlement and 
inexperience meant it was more difficult for policy experts and pressure groups in 
Wales to campaign for free personal care than in Scotland, where greater pressure 
was sustained throughout the development of the free personal care policy. 
7.4 The UK Government 
UK governmental actors were involved in the free personal care debate in Scotland 
through their direct attempts to influence the Scottish Executive's policy and by the 
nature of devolution, which meant closely related issues were the responsibility of 
different levels of government. The UK Health Secretary, Alan Milburn, was 
mentioned by several interviewees as seeking to change the Scottish free personal 
care policy. For instance, McLeish claimed that Milburn was angry that free 
personal care had not been a commitment in Labour's manifesto and so before the 
Scottish Executive committed to expensive policies they should meet their manifesto 
commitments.ll7 However, Milburn's main concern centred on the implications for 
England, he was worried that if Scotland moved on free personal care pressure 
would build on him to do the same, at a cost of around £1.2 billion for England and 
Wales. 118 
Simeon interviewed one civil servant, who admitted to conversations with UK 
Governmental actors after McLeish hinted at a policy review, where pressure was 
applied to the Scottish Executive not to introduce free personal care.ll9 Additionally, 
even after the clear commitment to free personal care had been made in the 
117 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
118 Ibid.. 
119 Simeon, R. (2003) op.cit., p.225 
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Scottish Parliament in January 2001, there were attempts by UK Governmental 
actors to question what commitment had actually been made. For instance, John 
Hutton (then the UK Health Minister) argued that the Scottish Executive had 
committed to examine 'proposals for free personal care', rather than to introduce 
free personal care. 120 The Treasury appeared particularly concerned about the free 
personal care proposal, with Gordon Brown apparently warning against making 'rash 
promises'.121 Brown was perceived as being particularly concerned about 
developments in Scotland because it is widely believed that problems on his 'home 
patch' can impact on his UK standing.122 As Chancellor, Brown was able to have a 
direct impact on the Scottish Executive due to their reliance on the UK Government 
for funding. The political commentator Brian Taylor explained that when McLeish 
persisted with free personal care, 'the Treasury threatened to re-examine the extent 
of the funding available to Scotland. If the Scottish Executive could even 
contemplate free personal care, it plainly had too much disposable cash'.123 The 
complaint that the Scottish Executive received too much money was also raised by 
backbench Labour MPs, who were apparently infuriated with Scotland's ability to 
commit to a superior care package. 124 As one civil servant noted, the over-funding 
of Scotland is a real issue for Labour Northeast MPs, and the issue will not go away, 
particularly as the Scottish Parliament commits to expensive public spending 
policies. 125 The financial settlement for Scotland has often been justified by the 
levels of poverty in Scotland, as the extra money would provide some equalisation 
with England. However, in the free personal care case Scotland committed to a 
120 Hutton,]. quoted in McWhirter, I. (28 January 2001) 'Pensioners left: dazed by the power of 
semantics' in The Sunday Herald, p.12 
121 The Scotsman (November 20th 2000) 'McLeish faces more pressure over care cash', p.2 
122 Taylor, B. (2002) Scotland's Parliament: Triumph and Disaster (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh), p.29 
123 Ibid 
124 Interview with Sam Galbraith (Previously Minister for Health and Education) (February 2004) 
125 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
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policy that England decided it could not afford. Sam Galbraith argued that English 
Labour MPs did not expect Scotland's generous financial settlement to be 'used for 
policies which the English couldn't afford'.126 A possible consequence of pursuing 
policies such as free personal care, which commit Scotland to spending resources on 
policies which cannot be afforded in England, is that the financial settlement will be 
re-examined. Galbraith argued that free personal care represents 'another nail in 
the coffin' for Scotland's financial settlement. 127 There are real concerns that the 
Barnett formula will be re-examined soon anyway, and it is possible that issues such 
as free personal care may not help Scotland's case in the long-term, as it indicates 
that the extra money Scotland receives per head of the population may not be 
funding Scotland's distinctive needs. It appears, therefore, that the UK Government 
can influence the Scottish Executive's actions without actually applying any 
pressure, due to the expectation of repercussions by Scottish actors. 
Scottish politicians interviewed for this thesis were aware of the implications of 
committing to additional spending, and there was an acceptance by several 
interviewees that concerns about the financial settlement would affect how 
distinctive the Scottish Executive would be. Additionally one civil servant argued 
that such concerns should impact upon the Scottish Executive's priorities. He 
claimed that due to the threat to the Scottish block, there is a need to reduce 
services to England's per capita levels immediately, because if this is done when 
public spending is rising, then expenditure would not have to be cut in any area.128 
126 Interview with Sam Galbraith (Previously Minister for Health and Education) (February 2004) 
127 Ibid. 
128 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
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The case of Attendance Allowance indicated that whilst issues, such as free personal 
care, may be devolved, devolution does not allow for complete autonomy. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, Attendance Allowance is a benefit paid by the DWP, 
which was affected by the Scottish Parliament's decision to introduce free personal 
care. The assumption by the Care Development Group and the Scottish Executive's 
Health Department was that Attendance Allowance would be transferred to the 
Scottish Parliament. According to one political adviser there were rules established 
in a memorandum between the Scottish Executive and the UK Government which 
stated that if the Scottish Parliament passed legislation which created a cost burden 
on the UK then money would be transferred from Edinburgh to London.129 
However, the free personal care policy cut UK spending, which is apparently a grey 
area in the memorandumYo Despite the lack of clarity over funding arrangements, 
the clear expectation by those involved in formulating the free personal care policy 
in Scotland was that Attendance Allowance would be transferred no matter what the 
legal situation was because it was the right thing to do. A member of the COG 
argued that 'we presumed due to natural justice we would get the money'.131 This 
seems to highlight the danger of involving experts so closely in policy-making, as 
their beliefs about what should happen appeared to affect their judgement of what 
would happen. The moral case was simply that the free personal care policy 
would save the UK Government around £1.2 million a year, which most Scottish 
actors agreed should have been transferred. 132 The assumption that Attendance 
129 Interview with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (January 
2004) 
130 Ibid 
131 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
132 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
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Allowance would be transferred was so great that the COG didn't even bother to 
look at alternative funding arrangements, there was no back-up plan.133 
The confusion about Attendance Allowance also indicates a lack of communication 
between the governments, there had obviously been little detailed negotiation 
between them.134 Such claims are supported by the experience of the COG which 
requested a member of the OWP to attend their meetings on a number of 
occasions, but no one from the OWP ever attended. 135 The legal position is unclear, 
these things come down to interpretation, and as one interviewee noted, because 
the UK Government controls the money, it was the UK Government's view that 
mattered. 136 If the UK Government had wanted to assist the Scottish Parliament it 
could easily have transferred the money. One of Simeon's interviewees argued that 
the refusal to transfer OWP Attendance Allowance 'was about not co-operating with 
a policy they thought was stupid and inconvenient',137 and 'if the UK Government 
'were sympathetic, they would have found a way of helping',B8 After McConnell 
became First Minister, in November 2001, he made a political decision not to pursue 
the matter through a legal challenge. There is an appeals mechanism, in the Joint 
Ministerial Council, which McConnell could have employed, but he accepted the 
OWP's position.139 Whilst most interviewees felt that the Scottish Executive had a 
good case most argued that politically McConnell's stance was sensible. As 
McTernan pointed out, because the legal position wasn't completely clear it was not 
worth fighting about Attendance Allowance, he argued that there will be other 
133 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
134 Interview with Christine Grahame (SNP MSP) (January 2004) 
135 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
136 Interview with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (January 
2004) 
137 Simeon, R. (2003) op.cit./ p.22S 
138 Ibid. 
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battles in the future where there is a greater chance of winning and it's best to 
focus on them instead.140 
In contrast to the Scottish case, where UK Governmental actors attempted to 
influence policy-making at every stage of the policy-making process, in Wales there 
was a lack of UK Governmental involvement until the Assembly took the decision to 
challenge the UK Government to fund and implement free personal care. The 
Assembly's stance on free personal care was met by a swift rebuttal by the Wales 
Office. The National Assembly had taken some time to reach their position on free 
personal care, for instance, the consultation on the Strategy for Older People had 
begun over a year previously. Therefore, the disrespect with which the Wales 
Office treated the Assembly in public was surprising. After all the Wales Office was 
'ostensibly the National Assembly's lead ally in Whitehall'. 141 
Following his comment that the National Assembly's position on free personal care 
was 'pathetic ... symptomatic of their irresponsible approach to politics'/42 Adrian 
McMenamin left the Wales Office. However, it was widely suspected that 
McMenamin's comments reflected 'the sentiments, if not the diplomacy, of his boss 
[Paul Murphy]'.143 This was a view shared by most interviewees, for instance, one 
Labour AM argued that Murphy's replacement as Secretary of State for Wales in 
October 2002, Paul Hain, came as 'a breath of fresh air'.144 As Murphy was a former 
139 Interview with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (January 
2004) 
140 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
141 Osmond, J. (2003) 'From Corporate Body to Virtual Parliament: The Metamorphosis of the National 
Assembly for Wales' in Hazell, R. (Ed.) The State of the Nations 2003: The Third Year of Devolution in 
the United Kingdom (Imprint Academic, Thorverton), p.l? 
142 Speed, N. and Betts, C. (l? May 2002) 'London Dashes Hope of Free Care for the Elderly in Wales' 
in The Western Mail, p.l 
143 Osmond, J. (2003) op.cit., p.l? 
144 Interview with a Labour AM (February 2003) 
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treasurer of the 1979 anti-devolution campaign in Wales his commitment to Welsh 
devolution was also widely questioned.145 Ron Davies suggested that because 
Murphy's 'lacked a commitment to devolution'/46 he viewed his role as Secretary of 
State for Wales in limited terms. According to Davies, Paul Murphy saw himself as a 
'messenger', acting as a communication channel for the different levels of 
government,147 In contrast Davies claimed that the subsequent Secretary of State 
for Wales, Paul Hain, behaved as an 'advocate', fighting in the Assembly's corner.148 
Davies felt that the different approaches of the Secretaries of State can purely be 
explained by their attitude to devolution, however, Murphy's supposed negativity 
towards the Assembly was also mirrored by others in the Wales Office. One 
member of the Wales Office explained that the Assembly had 'a tendency to play 
the popularist card' and felt that the Assembly's ability to spend money without the 
responsibility for raising it meant that institution could easily lose credibility.149 
Additionally, the same interviewee criticised the Assembly for concerning itself with 
issues outside its remit and being obsessed with promoting itself. Rather ironically 
though, this interviewee felt that the Assembly's biggest failure had been its inability 
to 'sell itself' to the public.15O Therefore, it appeared a commonly held view in the 
Wales Office that the Assembly's approach to politics was irresponsible and 
Assembly Members of all parties perceived that the Wales Office held this negative 
view of the Assembly. For instance, Brian Gibbons expressed regret that the Wales 
Office's response to the Assembly on free personal care did not come as a 
surprise.151 
145 Speed, N. (25 October 2002) 'Hello Peter ... Goodbye Paul' in The Western Mal'l, p.5 
146 Interview with Ron Davies (Labour AM) (February 2003) 
147 Ibid 
148 Ibid 
149 Interview with Senior Wales Office representative (February 2003) 
150 Ibid 
151 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (February 2003) 
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All interviewees from the Assembly mentioned the problems the Welsh Assembly 
Government faces in persuading Westminster to introduce Welsh-only legislation. 
Some saw the lack of Welsh-only legislation as an indication that Whitehall is 
uninterested in Welsh affairs. For instance, in her evidence to the Richard 
Commission, Edwina Hart, the minister for Finance, Local government and 
Communities, argued that 'There is a reluctance sometimes for UK government 
departments... to recognise the Assembly exists'.m Many interviewees also 
criticised the Welsh Assembly Government, suggesting that the Welsh Assembly 
Government needed to take some of the responsibility for the lack of Welsh-only 
legislation. For instance, Ron Davies argued that in relation to the Health (Wales) 
Act, the Welsh Assembly Government did not fight for Welsh legislation on reform of 
the Health Boards but quickly accepted that UK Government's decision to deal with 
matters in a joint English and Wales Act. 153 Mike German suggested that many of 
the limits on the Assembly were self-imposed because the 'desire by the Labour 
ministers not to upset the London apple cart' pervades all aspects of Assembly 
policy-making. 154 Ron Davies agreed, suggesting that the 'administration is too 
sensitive about its party political links with Westminster'.155 
The policy advisor to Jane Hutt, Mark Drakeford, explained that because the Welsh 
Assembly Government was unconvinced of the case for free personal care their 
attempts to 'challenge' the UK Government's position represented 'a ritual 
152 Richard Commission (5 December 2002) Evidence of Edwina Ha/t- Welsh Assembly Government 
Minister for Finance, Local Government and Communities (National Museum and Gallery, cardiff) 
accessed at www.richardcommission.gov.uk on 13/8/04 
153 Interview with Ron Davies (Labour AM) (February 2003) 
154 Interview with Mike German (Leader of the Welsh Liberal Democrats) (February 2003) 
155 Interview with Ron Davies (Labour AM) (February 2003) 
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process'.156 The Welsh Assembly Government went through the motions because 
they had to, not because they actually believed in the policy. Drakeford explained 
that the Welsh Assembly Government wrote to the Secretary of State for Wales 
stating the Assembly's agreed position.157 Meetings were also held between the 
Health Minister and Paul Murphy, and the Health Minister raised the issue of free 
personal care 'but couched it in terms like "I have written to you about free 
personal care and I look forward to your reply"'.158 This 'ritual dance' meant that 
when the Minister was asked about free personal care in the Assembly she could 
say that she had raised the issue with the Welsh Secretary.159 The Secretary of 
State, Paul Murphy, then sat on the letter for a long time until the issue died down, 
then replied saying whilst he appreciated the letter, the UK Government did not 
believe in free personal care so nothing could be done.16o Drakeford compared 
lobbying the UK Government on free personal care with policies which the Welsh 
Assembly Government actively supported. In these instances Drakeford claimed 'we 
go through the same process but we phrase letters strongly, expressing that this is 
something we really want and we actually seek to persuade'.161 The implication 
here is that the formalities of lobbying the UK Government always look the same 
but the signals of the interaction are very different. 
The Wales Office's response on free personal care also highlighted another aspect 
of intergovernmental relations. McMenamin's comment that 'It is not clear to 
anyone what the thinking behind this is. There hasn't been a vote on this issue in 
156 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
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the Assembly Labour group or at the Welsh Labour Party conference'/62 implied that 
the Welsh Assembly Government's position had come as a complete surprise to 
officials in the Wales Office. The lack of consultation between the levels of 
government might indicate that the Assembly has independence from the UK 
Government when developing its own policy positions. However, as the free 
personal care case indicated, the Welsh model of devolution means that if the 
Assembly is to implement its preferred policies then it needs to consult closely with 
Whitehall. A member of the Wales Office described that a number of problems 
have occurred due to a lack of consultation. For instance, the Assembly's decision 
to introduce a learning grant for higher education students led to problems with the 
DWP, problems arose because students receiving benefits who were entitled to a 
learning grant had their benefits clawed back by the DWP.163 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the Wales Office official blamed the Welsh Assembly Government for 
failing to discuss their policy plans with the DWP. According to the Wales Office 
representative, the benefit claw back problem was resolved relatively simply, but 
could have been completely prevented if there had been better communication 
between the levels of government. 164 
The UK Government's involvement in the free personal care issue differed 
dramatically in the Scottish and Welsh cases. In Scotland UK Governmental actors 
were involved throughout the policy-making process, with regular attempts to 
persuade the Scottish Executive to oppose free personal care. In Wales UK 
Governmental actors were not involved in the free personal care debate until later in 
the policy-making process, when the National Assembly unanimously voted to 
162 Speed, N. and Betts, C. (17 May 2002) 'London Dashes Hope of Free Care for the Elderly in Wales' 
in The Westem Mail, p.l 
163 Interview with Senior Wales Office representative (February 2003) 
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challenge the UK Government to introduce free personal care. UK Governmental 
actors were particularly concerned about spill-over, fearing that supporters of free 
personal care in England would put considerable pressure on the UK Government to 
follow Scotland's decision to introduce free personal care. In contrast the Wales 
Office took the Assembly's free personal care policy less seriously. The Wales Office 
did not argue the Assembly's case in Whitehall, but instead raised the failings of the 
Assembly's policy-making process. 
In both Scotland and Wales the free personal care issue highlighted the lack of 
formal agreement between the devolved governments and Whitehall. In Scotland 
there was confusion about Attendance Allowance and in Wales there was a lack of 
negotiation over their proposals to challenge the UK Government to take action on 
free personal care. In many respects it appears that the National Assembly for 
Wales had greater autonomy than the Scottish Parliament to develop its own 
position on free personal care, if only because the UK Government was less 
interested or concerned about developments in the Assembly. However, the nature 
of devolution means that the devolved governments need to negotiate with 
Whitehall and the ability of the devolved administrations to implement distinctive 
policies without the UK Government's support is questionable. In Wales the need 
for UK Governmental input into policy-making is enhanced by the need to secure 
primary legislation at Westminster. However, the case of Attendance Allowance 
highlighted that the Scottish Parliament can face serious financial difficulties without 
the backing of the UK Government. 
164 Ibid. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
Actors outside the coalition parties played a crucial role in developing the free 
personal care policies in Scotland and Wales. In Scotland a strong advocacy 
coalition in favour of free personal care developed, including opposition parties, the 
Health and Community Care Committee, policy experts and pressure ~roups. In 
contrast actors in favour of free personal care in Wales were much weaker. In 
Wales the opposition parties were divided, the Health and Social Services 
Committee added little to the free personal care debate and policy experts and 
pressure groups were unsure whether to focus their attention on the UK 
Government or the Welsh Assembly Government. The advocacy coalition in 
Scotland successfully applied pressure on the Scottish Executive to act, as their 
united position ensured those opposing free personal care looked isolated from 
mainstream opinion. Therefore, in Scotland a range of governmental and non-
governmental actors pressurised the Scottish Executive to introduce free personal 
care, which offers some support for the MLG notion of shared policy-making 
authority amongst a range of actors. However, it must be noted that in many 
respects the free personal care debate centred on a disagreement between the First 
Minister and his Health Minister, with other actors used by them and their 
supporters to strengthen their position. Consequently, the existence of shared 
policy-making authority is weak, and Executives at any level of governance appear 
to dominate policy-making. 
In Wales the advocacy coalition never successfully challenged the Welsh Assembly 
Government to take action on free personal care, as many accepted that free 
personal care was primarily the UK Government's responsibility. Instead in Wales it 
was the actors within the devolved government which were able to have greatest 
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impact on the Assembly's free personal care policy. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, in Wales the Liberal Democrat coalition partners were able to ensure the 
inclusion of free personal care onto the remit of the Advisory Group on a Strategy 
for Older People, ensuring that the Welsh Assembly Government committed to 
challenging the UK Government to implement free personal care. In Scotland, 
however, those in favour of free personal care outside the devolved governments 
played a crucial role in shaping the Scottish Executive's free personal care policy. 
The combined efforts of the Scottish opposition parties, Health and Community Care 
Committee, policy experts and pressure groups allowed the Liberal Democrats and 
the Scottish First Minister, Henry McLeish, to identify a consensus of opinion when 
attempting to persuade their cabinet colleagues of the need to support free 
personal care. We can see how these groups outside the devolved governments 
were used to strengthen the case for free personal care by examining Henry 
McLeish's comments in the Sunday Times, 
'(if) every organisation you talk to, every medical group, every local 
authority, the Sutherland people themselves, the PLP, the Liberal group, 
the opposition [are all agreed] - then sometimes you just have to say to 
yourselves: 'Well, look. There is a firm body of opinion. Is what we have 
as a policy the right thing to dO?'.165 
Of all the actors outside the devolved governments, the UK Government was the 
key opponent of free personal care. In Scotland the UK Government sought to 
persuade the Scottish Executive not to introduce free personal care, and by 
withdrawing Attendance Allowance, ensured that there were serious financial 
implications for the Scottish Parliament developing distinctive policies. In Wales the 
National Assembly had little, if any, contact with the DWP or UK Health department 
on free personal care. Instead the Welsh Assembly Government primarily dealt with 
the Wales Office. Interestingly, the UK Government had little success in shaping the 
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Scottish Executive's free personal care policy, other than by making it a more 
expensive policy for the Scottish Parliament to implement. However, the resolution 
of the Attendance Allowance issue in Scotland might make it much more difficult for 
the Scottish Parliament to diverge from the UK Government in the future, due to the 
Scottish Parliament fearing the UK Government's response and simply having less 
money to spend on other divergent policies. As a result it appears that the UK 
Government possess considerable control over policy-making, even in devolved 
areas. UK Governmental actors were able punish and block policy-making when the 
devolved institutions pursued poliCies of which they disapproved. However, UK 
Governmental actors were not able to dominate policy-making in the devolved 
system, indicated by their inability to prevent the introduction of free personal care 
in Scotland. Therefore, as identified in the MLG model, state executives may remain 
the most important loci of power but actors from the state level are unable to 
exercise complete control over the policy-making process. 
165 Sunday Times (5th November 2000) 'McLeish in U-turn on elderly care' 
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Chapter Eight 
Institutional Setting 
The previous two chapters considered the impact of various actors on the 
development of the Scottish and Welsh long-term care policies. As discussed in the 
second chapter, actor-centred institutionalism contends that the resources, 
preferences and perceptions of these actors, and the way they interact are shaped 
by the institutional context in which they operate. This chapter focuses on five 
features of the institutional setting which seemed to shape the long-term care 
policies in Scotland and Wales, the party and electoral systems, the legislative 
functions, financial powers and the design of the devolved institutions and the place 
of these devolved institutions, within the UK political system. These features are 
described in chapter one, so this chapter provides only a brief description of them, 
focusing more on their impact on policy-making in the case of long-term care for 
the elderly. 
8.1 Party Systems and the New Electoral System 
It has been suggested that whilst the party systems in England, Scotland and Wales 
have similarities, from the 1970s differentiated party systems have emerged. Kellas 
claims that between 1974 and 1997 Scotland displayed distinctive voting patterns. 1 
For instance, after 1970 the electoral performance of the Scottish Conservatives 
declined sharply and the same period saw the rise of the Liberal and SNP vote, 
1 Kelias, J. G (1989) The Scottish Political System (4th edition) (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge), p.l13 
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often in previous Conservative strongholds.2 In 1974, for example, the SNP took 
eight seats from the Conservatives.3 A similar pattern emerged in Wales, and so 
even 'prior to devolution Scotland and Wales had begun to evolve their own 
distinctive party systems in which Labour's main competitors were the nationalist 
parties rather than the Conservatives, with the Liberal democrats as a significant 
third force'.4 As a result, by the time of the first elections to the Scottish Parliament 
and National Assembly for Wales, 
'Both nations had witnessed the electoral wipeout of the Conservative 
Party in the May 1997 UK general election, as the Tories were left with 
parliamentary representation from English constituencies alone. Both 
were by now bastions of the Labour Party-a dominance extended 
further in the 1997 poll. And both Scotland and Wales had indigenous 
nationalist parties ... attaining modest but significant levels of electoral 
support and parliamentary representation'.s 
In both Scotland and Wales there is a high degree of ideological polarisation 
between the centre left parties (the nationalists, Labour, Liberal Democrats, the 
Scottish Socialist Party and the Greens), in contrast to the Conservatives on the 
centre-right. 6 Whilst in general party competition after devolution has generally 
remained centrist, the nationalist parties, the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) and the 
Greens have tended to pull the dynamics of party competition to the left? For 
instance, the SNP have been forced by the SSP to 'shore up their 'pacifist' image' 
and the Conservatives have moved to a more centrist position in an attempt to build 
2 Smith, G. (1989) 'Core Persistence: Change and the People's Party', West European Politics (VoI.12, 
fP.157-168) 
Kellas, J. G op.cit., p.ll1 
4 Laffin, M., Shaw, E. and Taylor, G. (2004) 'Devolution and Party Organisation in Britain: How 
Devolution has changed the Scottish and Welsh Labour Parties' Devolution and Constitutional Change 
Programme Discussion Paper No.1B- p.3-4 accessed at 
www.devolution.ac.ukLpdfdataLDevolution%20 and party organisation Laffin.pdf 
5 Jones, R.W and Scully, R (2006). 'Devolution and Electoral Politics in Scotland and Wales' in Publius 
(VoI.36, No.1, pp.1l5-134), p.1l6 
6 Bennie, L. and Clark, A. (2003) 'Towards Moderate Pluralism: Scotland's Post-Devolution Party 
System, 1999-2002' in Railings, c., Scully, R. Tonge, J. and Webb, P. (Eds.) British Elections and 
Parties Review (Vol. 13) (Frank Cass, London), pp.149-150 
7 Ibid., p.150 
265 
electoral support.s This situation particularly affects the Scottish and Welsh Labour 
parties, as in contrast to the position in England, disenchanted Labour voters in 
Scotland and Wales have several protest, and exit options.9 Labour's main political 
competition, the nationalist parties, are competing across the similar social 
democratic territory, significantly to the left of that of the Westminster 'English' 
parties, and even despite a poor electoral performance in May 2003, in both 
Scotland and Wales, the nationalist parties have consolidated their position as the 
official opposition parties.lO Basically this means that there is a gravitational pull on 
Labour to the left, and the structure of the party system in both Scotland and Wales 
means that the centre of political gravity is much further to the left than in 
England,.ll The new electoral system introduced for the elections to the new 
devolved institutions appears to exacerbate the differences in the party systems 
between Scotland and Wales, and England. 
The electoral system adopted for electing the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales was the additional member system, which provided a greater 
degree of proportional representation than first past the post models.12 The 
electorate were given two votes, the first to elect a constituency MSP or AM by the 
traditional first-past-the-post system and the second was a regional vote which 
corrects the lack of proportionality in the first vote. The consequence of the 
electoral system in Scotland is that it is unlikely that any party will win an outright 
majority. In Wales the higher levels of support for Labour make a majority 
8 Ibid. 
9 Shaw, E. (2003) 'Labour in Scotland and Westminster and the Dynamics of Policy Divergence' paper 
prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Pennsylvania 
Convention Centre 28-31 August 2003), p.25 accessed at 
www.devolution.ac.ukJpdfdata/Shaw Labour %20in%20 Scotland and Westminster.pdf 
10 Laffin, M., Shaw, E. and Taylor, G. Op.Clt 
11 Shaw, E. (2003) op.cit p.25 
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government possible even under this electoral system, which was the result of the 
National Assembly election in 2003. However, in the Assembly's first term Labour 
was unable to form a majority government, and decided to run as a minority 
administration. However, due to serious problems operating as a minority 
administration a coalition government was established in 2000, between Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats. The coalition government brought a new stability to the 
Welsh Assembly Government, meaning that 'at a stroke the Administration was 
provided with an assured majority and a programme of government, two attributes 
that had eluded it during the first year of devolution'.13 However, during the second 
term of the Assembly, Labour were able to secure a majority, receiving 30 out of 
the 60 seats which meant that their majority was only assured because the 
Presiding Officer was from the opposition benches.14 Therefore, within the first 
term the National Assembly has experience of being led by coalition, minority and 
majority administrations. However, for both Scotland and Wales the electoral 
system makes either coalition government or minority administrations more likely 
and at the time when the free personal care policies were being developed the 
Welsh Assembly and the Scottish governments were coalitions between Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats. Compared to majority governments, coalition governments 
require different decision-making processes, encouraging different policy outputs 
compared to those produced by majority governments. Additionally the electoral 
system gave greater representation to smaller political parties, thus affecting the 
composition of opposition policy actors. 
12 Myles, A. (1999) 'The New Electoral System' in Hassan, G. (Ed.) A Guide to the Scottish Parliament 
(The Stationery Office Limited, Edinburgh), p.89 
13 Osmond, J. (2001) 'In Search of Stability: Coalition Politics in the Second Year of the National 
Assembly for Wales' in Trench, A. (Ed.) The State of the Nations 2001 (Imprint Academic, Thorverton), 
p.13 
14 Trench, A. (2004) 'Introduction: Has Devolution Made a Difference?' in Trench, A. (Ed.) Has 
Devolution Made a Difference?: The State of the Nations 2004 (Imprint Academic, Exeter), p.3 
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Coalition governments need to negotiate pOlicy between different parties, meaning 
that policies tend to be adopted only after some discussion. As one interviewee 
pointed out, in coalition government you can't just use the whip to force policies 
through.is The importance of compromise and negotiation means that politicians 
have to be cautious about drawing a firm line in the sand on any issue, as 
everything in coalition government has to be negotiable. Consequently, issues like 
free personal care are always open for negotiation. As Warwick explained 'bargains 
made can always be unmade'.16 
In Scotland prior to the free personal care commitment, the Executive had produced 
a compromise amendment in 2000 which stated they would, 'continue, over time, to 
work towards fulfilling the Royal Commission's objectives of fairness and equity in 
the care of the elderly'P The amendment was ambiguous enough that both parties 
could support it. However, the amendment left free personal care on the agenda, 
no definite decision was stated and so there was always the possibility that the 
issue could be renegotiated at a later date. McTernan claimed that when McLeish 
became leader the Liberal Democrats exploited the new situation by using it as an 
opportunity to bring new issues to the table and re-open old debates, thus 
strengthening their position in the coalition. is Therefore, the culture of coalition 
government in the free personal care case meant that there was always a possibility 
15 Interview with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (January 
2004) 
16 Warwick, P. (2001) 'Coalition Policy in Parliamentary Democracies: Who Gets How Much and Why'in 
Comparative PoliticalStudes(Vol.34, No.10, pp1212-1236), p.1212 
17 Scottish Parliament Motion SlM-1215.1 Long-term care in Business Bulletin 145/2000 accessed at 
www.scottish.parliament.uk on 5/12/03 
18 Interview with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (January 
2004) 
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that the issue could be re-opened and any changes to the leadership of the parties 
in the coalition could result in new policy positions. 
In chapter six McLeish's leadership style was discussed. Whilst McLeish's personal 
preferences may have encouraged his avoidance of confrontation, coalition 
government also encouraged a more compromising stance. As McTernan noted it is 
'much easier to be confrontational if you have a majority,.19 Flexibility is essential 
for coalition government, and leaders in particular need to be able to sway as 
situations change. Although such flexibility leads to confusion, indicated in the free 
personal care case when McLeish's position was unclear, it is perhaps inevitable and 
a valuable way of operating in coalition government. 
In Wales many interviewees argued that the existence of coalition government had 
a major impact on the development of the free personal care policy. Mark 
Drakeford, policy advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government, claimed that that 'left 
to itself a Labour-only administration would have followed the UK line'?O However, 
as Drakeford pOinted out, coalition government changed the political context of 
decision making,21 meaning that Labour could not simply push their preferred policy 
onto their coalition colleagues. 
Drakeford suggested that initially the Liberal Democrats did not push for free 
personal care, instead suggesting that the issue only became one of serious 
discussions after the decision was taken in Scotland to introduce free personal care. 
As a result of the decision in Scotland Gibbons suggested that Labour needed to 
19 Interview with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (January 
2004) 
20 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
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offer the Liberal Democrats something on free personal care, so that they could 
'save face'.22 Therefore, the issue was added to the remit of the Advisory Group on 
a Strategy for Older People; a measure which Gibbons believed would not have 
happened if the Liberal Democrats had not been in government. 23 Therefore, it 
appears that by being in government the Liberal Democrats were able to raise the 
issue onto the political agenda. Additionally, the Liberal Democrats had some 
success at altering the position of the Welsh Assembly Government on free personal 
care. 
Drakeford argued that whilst Labour were reluctant to support calls for free personal 
care, coalition government meant they needed to compromise. 24 He argued that 
Labour 'were willing to be persuaded to lobby the UK Government' on free personal 
care, because they knew that the UK Government would refuse. 25 However, such a 
stance allowed the Liberal Democrats to claim a degree of policy success?6 Gibbons 
felt that challenging the UK Government was an effective way to end debate on the 
free personal care issue, but would not have been necessary if Labour had 
governed with a majority. Therefore, coalition government appeared to playa big 
role in shaping the decision to challenge the UK Government to fund free personal 
care. 
In a coalition government the government's line can differ from either party's policy. 
This puts considerable pressure on the coalition parties, as they have to defend the 
coalition's programme, when neither party may completely agree with the 
21 Ibid. 
22 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (February 2004) 
23 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (June 2004) 
24 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2(04) 
25 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (February 2004) 
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compromise policy. Prior to the commitment to free personal care in Scotland the 
Liberal Democrats were in a difficult position, facing direct criticism for supporting a 
policy which went against their party's position. Liberal Democrat MSPs claimed 
they found it difficult to justify their position. There was an acceptance amongst 
some Liberal Democrats that this situation was just part of coalition politics/7 but 
others found it difficult to vote against policies which they supported. Interestingly, 
in the case of free personal care in Scotland the pressures on the minor coalition 
partner were transferred to the major coalition partner.28 The threat that 
backbench Liberal Democrats would vote against the Executive forced Labour to 
reach a compromise. It has been suggested that when the pressure on the Liberal 
Democrats to pursue their party's position intensified, the Liberal Democrats could 
have simply voted with the opposition parties and forced their preferred policy to be 
adopted, thus giving the Liberal Democrats a decisive role in policy formation. Yet, 
consistently voting against the major coalition party would have threatened the 
coalition. Galbraith argued that this was not significant for the Liberal Democrats 
because whilst there was a desire by the Parliamentary Labour party to keep the 
coalition going 'the Liberal Democrats never really wanted to be in a coalition and 
can threaten to walk out on any issue'.29 Additionally Labour would have found 
difficult to form a coalition with any other party, mainly because the Conservatives 
and the SNP were close electoral rivals of the Labour party in Westminster and 
Scottish elections respectively. Additionally, whilst in the Parliament's second term, 
Labour, the SSP, Greens and Independents could have formed a slim majority 
government, it would have been difficult for such a diverse grouping to reach an 
agreement, and as the majority would be so slim it would have undoubtedly lead to 
26 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
27 Interview with Nora Radcliffe (Liberal Democrat MSP) (December 2003) 
28 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
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numerous government defeats. Whilst Galbraith over-estimates the ease with 
which the Liberal Democrats might have left the coalition, there is no doubt that the 
Liberal Democrats were in a powerful position in the Scottish Parliament and there 
was some resentment of their power in the Labour party. 
Coalition government also alters the potential influence of actors outside the 
government. Greer argued that having two parties formally in power means there 
are 'mathematically if not always practically, twice as many chances for policy 
advocates to make their case,.30 In contrast, Ron Davies believed that coalition 
government in Wales closed decisions to those outside the Welsh Assembly 
Government, for AMs and pressure groupS.31 Davies claimed that coalition 
government in Wales had meant that the Assembly reverted to the Westminster 
model of policy-making, which Davies suggested lacks compromise and 
negotiation?2 Whilst in some circumstances Davies is correct to note that compared 
to minority administrations, coalition governments result in less negotiation and 
discussion, coalition governments can also be beneficial for those outside 
government. The leader of the Welsh Liberal Democrats, Mike German, explained 
that coalition governments can encourage transparency because coalition 
governments negotiate their policy programme in relation to each party's manifesto 
commitments.33 Given German's position in coalition government at the time, it is 
not surprising that German would emphasise the potential benefits to coalition 
government. However, his perception of coalition government was also mirrored by 
others. Interviewees from Carers Wales claimed that in their experience minority 
29 Interview with Sam Galbraith (Previously Minister for Health and Education) (February 2004) 
30 Greer, S. (2002) 'When does devolution cause divergence? Health Agendas and policy debates 
before and after devolution' presented at the 2002 PS4 conference (Aberdeen), p.12 
31 Interview with Ron Davies (Labour AM) (February 2003) 
32 Ibid. 
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governments made policy in secret, surviving by agreeing deals with other parties 
on a day by day basis behind closed doors.34 As a result they argued that coalition 
government opened the policy process up. 
In Scotland the arithmetic of free personal care meant that in simple terms there 
were more MSPs in the parliament in favour of implementing free personal care 
than against it. McTernan argued that McLeish's commitment to free personal care 
was partially a reaction to the threat of losing a crucial vote in the chamber, 
implying that McLeish's stance was partly a pragmatic decision.35 By talking up the 
threat of the Liberal Democrats voting against the Executive, McLeish could win 
over opponents of free personal care who were motivated by a desire to prevent 
losing an embarrassing vote in the chamber. However, it often appeared that 
McLeish encouraged the Liberal Democrats to put pressure on the Executive to 
adopt free personal care, for instance, by engaging in press briefings hinting at 
support for free personal care.36 Therefore, McLeish used the pressures of 
governing in a coalition to his own advantage, creating a situation where the SPLP 
could be blackmailed by their coalition partners. In addition, coalition government 
could be used as an excuse for pursuing free personal care with his UK Labour 
colleagues. As Nora Radcliffe pOinted out, when Labour politicians want to diverge 
from the Westminster programme coalition government is probably a useful 
excuse.37 McLeish accepted that he did use the threat of a Liberal Democrat revolt 
to explain why he needed to introduce free personal care. McLeish claimed that 
when discussing free personal care policy with UK governmental actors he 
33 Interview with Mike German (February 2003) 
34 Interview with Roz Williamson and Sandra Burton (Carers Wales) (February 2003) 
35 Interview with John McTernan (Special Advisor to McLeish- Head of Policy and Strategy) (January 
2004) 
36 Interview with Peter MacMahon (Press Secretary to McLeish) (December 2003) 
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frequently explained to them that coalition government meant the Executive had to 
consider the views of the Liberal Democrats views.38 Additionally McLeish informed 
the UK Health Minister, Alan Milburn, that there were simply more MSPs in favour of 
free personal care than against, and so in a sense the Scottish Executive had little 
option but to support the pOlicy and gain the credit for a popular policy which would 
probably be implemented with or without their support.39 
The extent to which McLeish played the Liberal Democrat coalition partners off 
against the SPLP is difficult to gauge. Some backbench Liberal Democrats indicated 
that the threat they posed to the Scottish Executive on free personal care was 
exaggerated. Nora Radcliffe believed that if it the Scottish Executive had decided 
not to commit to free personal care then the Liberal Democrats would not have 
voted en masse against them, though she points out that Margaret Smith, as 
convenor of the Health and Community Care Committee, might have done SO.40 
Radcliffe's argument is supported by Mary Scanlon, then the Conservative Health 
Spokesperson, who argued that the Liberal Democrats 'wouldn't have voted against 
the executive, they never have. They make the right noises but always cave in at 
the last minute'.41 Scanlon's argument has some strength because if we refer back 
to the vote on free personal care in 2000 there was speculation that a number of 
Liberal Democrats would vote against the Executive, but only two actually did.42 
Therefore, perhaps the threat of a Liberal Democrat revolt was never as severe as it 
appeared. All Labour MSPs and advisors interviewed mentioned that they perceived 
37 Interview with Nora Radcliffe (Liberal Democrat MSP) (December 2003) 
38 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Interview with Mary Scanlon (Conservative MSP) (December 2003) 
42 McCann, A. and Horsburgh, F. (28 September 2000) 'Revolt on care for elderly set to fizzle out; 
Amendment wins over most Liberal Democrat MSPs on Sutherland report issue' in The Herald, p.6 
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that the threat was real at the time, though a couple mentioned that on reflection 
their perception may have been manipulated by free personal care supporters. 
It is possible that the lack of clarity of coalition government allowed interested 
parties to emphasise the threat of revolt in order to gather support for their 
favoured policy positions. McLeish suggested that he did not directly have to speak 
of the threat posed by the Liberal Democrats because as the debate over free 
personal care continued the SPLP felt the pressure from a number of different 
sources. According to McLeish 'interests build up which places pressure on people 
without direct pressure having to be placed,.43 Therefore, simply by being 
sympathetic to free personal care and indicating room for policy movement McLeish 
was able to emphasise and encourage the possibility that the Executive would lose 
the vote without directly raising the issue as a threat. Therefore, coalition 
government provided McLeish with an opportunity to pursue his chosen policy 
because it allowed him to play on the instability of policy positions to push for 
movement on free personal care. 
Jess Barrow from Age Concern Scotland pOinted out that the impact of coalition 
government can also be less direct and more subtle. She claimed that the media 
and public interest in free personal care only developed because the, 
'free personal care issue threatened the coalition, and revealed tension 
between the UK Government and the Scottish Executive. If it weren't for 
these factors there would have been no media interest and the policy 
wouldn't have gone through,.44 
Therefore, the existence of coalition government and the tension between the 
coalition parties meant that issues usually considered uninteresting could become 
43 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
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major political dramas, increasing their news value and raising their profile. By 
threatening the coalition, free personal care became a major story requiring the 
Scottish Executive to act. Several interviewees involved in campaigning for 
improvements in care for the elderly found the free personal care case unusual 
because in their experience the care of the elderly tends to be ignored in politics. 
In Scotland coalition government had a major influence on the decision to introduce 
free personal care because those in favour of free personal care in the Scottish 
Parliament numerically outweighed those against. In Wales the numbers did not 
stack up in the same way, which weakened the ability of the minor coalition 
partners to influence the free personal care policy. In the Assembly Labour and the 
Conservatives were opposed to free personal care, meaning that the parties against 
free personal care had 37 AMs, compared to 22 in favour. 45 If a vote had been held 
on introducing free personal care on a Wales only basis it is difficult to imagine any 
Labour AMs breaking ranks to vote with the opposition, and for the pro-free 
personal care group to win it would require at least 7 AMs to do so. Therefore, in 
comparison with Scotland the Liberal Democrats in Wales had less bargaining 
power. 
In the National Assembly for Wales the electoral system also impacted upon the 
shape of long-term care policies. As Brian Gibbons explained, the Liberal Democrats 
brought the demand for free personal care to the table,.46 Without Liberal 
Democrat involvement in government it seems likely that free personal care would 
have been a low priority and been barely considered. The Welsh Liberal Democrats 
44 Interview with Jess Barrow (Director of Communications for Age Concern Scotland) (March 2004) 
45 As the Presiding Officer was from the opposition benches, it reduces the number able to vote for 
free personal care by one. 
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helped to ensure that free personal care was included on the remit of the Advisory 
Group on a Strategy for Older People. By doing so, the Liberal Democrats gave civil 
society actors a chance to voice their opinions and push the free personal care 
issue. Coalition government, therefore, ensured that the Assembly discussed free 
personal care in depth and the Welsh Assembly Government was forced to develop 
a policy on free personal care, and justify this decision. As Drakeford, pointed out 
'left to itself a Labour only administration would have followed the UK line'.47 
Therefore, in Wales the free personal care issue would have not been considered in 
such depth without coalition government. In Scotland, the picture may have been 
different, as in opposition the Liberal Democrats would have been able to pursue 
free personal care with greater vigour, and combined with the votes of the other 
opposition parties, could still have secured free personal care. 
The electoral system alters the party system in Scotland and Wales because it 
introduces a new dynamic to the relations between the parties, making it unlikely 
that parties will be able to govern alone and allowing more parties to enter the 
Parliamentary arena. As a result, the party systems in Scotland and Wales seem to 
be moving 'from an asymmetrical party system to a more pluralist, mUlti-party 
politics,.48 Dahl argued that the competitiveness of opposition parties in both 
electoral and parliamentary arenas is key to classifying party systems.49 Dahl 
developed a sliding scale to classify the strategies pursued by parties, with 
competitive strategies at one end and coalescent strategies at the other. Dahl 
identified four types of party system: strictly competitive, co-operative-competitive, 
46 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (June 2004) 
47 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
48 Hassan, G. (2002) 'The paradoxes of Scottish Labour: devolution, change and conservatism', in 
Hassan, G. and Warhurst, C. (Eds) Tomorrow's Scotland (Lawrence and Wishart, London), p.43 
49 Dahl, R. A. (1966) Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (Yale University Press, London) 
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coalescent-competitive; and strictly coalescent. He claims that 'parties are strictly 
competitive ... if they pursue strategies such that both cannot simultaneously belong 
to a winning coalition', such as in the UK Parliament where the electoral system 
means that parties expect to govern alone and so opposition parties adopt 
competitive strategies.50 In contrast, in a co-operative-competitive system, 
opposition parties aim to maximise their electoral strength but also are interested in 
strengthening their influence through coalition negotiations. Bennie and Clark 
suggest that in Scotland and Wales 'the new electoral system forces parties to 
consider co-operating,.51 The suggestion is that Scotland and Wales now have a 
'co-operative-competitive party system where parties cannot solely consider 
competitive strategies,.52 Whilst parties need to be competitive to maximise their 
vote, they must adopt co-operative strategies to enable them to form an executive 
which can command a parliamentary majority.53 In this way, therefore, it appears 
that the competitiveness of the party systems in Scotland and Wales will be limited. 
Bennie and Clark identify that the Scottish political parties are already showing signs 
of developing more co-operative strategies in the parliamentary arena, though in 
the electoral context they identify that the parties remain competitive. For instance 
they suggest that Labour and the Liberal Democrats share a number of 
philosophical and policy overlaps; such as land reform, the abolition of feudal 
tenure, and more liberal social policy. Whilst there have been tensions between the 
coalition parties, Bennie and Clark suggest that the shared objectives 'of 
50 Dahl, R. A. op.cit., p.336 
51 Bennie, L. and Clark, A. (2003) 'Towards Moderate Pluralism: Scotland's Post-Devolution Party 
System, 1999-2002' in Railings, c., Scully, R. Tonge, J. and Webb, P. (Eds.) British Elections and 
Parties Review (Vo/.13) (Frank Cass, London), p.1S1 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid 
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constitutional reform and a desire to make home rule 'work' that laid the ground for 
collaboration in the parliamentary context'. 54 In a strictly competitive party system 
Bennie and Clark claim, the parties' policy difference would have been dominant, for 
instance, tuition fees, PR for local government and the use of Scotland's tax varying 
powers.55 In contrast, however, other political parties have shown less collaborative 
tendencies. For instance, the SNP and the Conservatives have been reluctant to 
work together. In relation to the free personal care case study this was seen by the 
exclusion of the Conservatives from the pro-free personal care talks involving the 
Liberal Democrats and the SNP. Such a lack of communication may be explained by 
the incompatibility of their ideological positions, encouraging Webb to describe the 
parties as 'virtually ideological antipodes,.56 Similar relationships are evident 
between Plaid Cymru and the Welsh Conservatives, characterised by, at best a lack 
of communication and often aversion and distrust. The inability of the nationalists 
and Conservatives to form a coherent and united opposition to the executive, 
therefore, means that in Scotland and Wales the party systems are tri-polar, with an 
executive, a left of centre and a right of centre opposition. These differences 
between the party systems in Scotland, Wales and England encourage area of 
pressure and conflict within the parties operating in the different nations, and 
appear to be encouraging slightly different policy and ideological positions. As a 
result it may be a mistake to classify parties operating across the UK, particularly 
the Labour party, as 'unitary actors'. 
The distinctiveness of the Scottish and Welsh party systems means that the political 
parties in England, Scotland and Wales are faced with very different electoral 
pressures, these pressures particularly affect the Labour party, as a governing party 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Webb, P. (2000) The Modern British Party System (Sage, London), p.1S 
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in each nation and a heavily centralised party organisationally. For instance, 'Blair's 
New Labour themes are generally perceived as less popular in Scotland, leading to 
pressure on the Scottish party to demonstrate its independence from Labour at 
Westminster. 57 As a result, 'Scottish and Welsh Labour can no longer simply 
replicate the national party manifestos, as happened in the 1999 elections, but need 
to adapt their election platforms to meet the exigencies of party competition in their 
nations'.58 There are some signs that the Labour party in Scotland and Wales are 
beginning to do develop a distinctive profile from the English party. For example, in 
the general election of May 2001 the Westminster manifesto pledged increased 
involvement of the private sector as a means of improving public services. Scottish 
Labour, however, avoided such commitments, and unlike the British manifesto the 
Scottish document did not promise to use spare capacity in private sector hospitals 
to treat NHS patients. 59 As Curtice notes, it is unlikely that such an omission would 
have occurred if the Prime Minister had maintained responsibility for such matters in 
Scotland.60 In addition, the electoral system in Scotland and Wales attaches 
roughly the same weight to each persons vote. As a result, for instance the vote of 
a working class Labour supporter in the Party's heartland is given the same weight 
as a floating voter in a marginal constituency. 61 In this context, 'the New Labour 
electoral strategy of chasing the Tory-inclined voter in the marginals (whatever its 
merits in England) is not relevant,.62 As a result it is clear that Scottish and Welsh 
Labour operate in a different climate to the British party. Bennie and Clark predict 
that it will be a difficult balancing act for the Labour parties in Scotland and Wales 
57 Bennie, L. and Clark, A. op.cit, p.143 
58 Laffin, M., Shaw, E. and Taylor, G. op.cit, pA 
59 Bennie, L. and Clark, A. op.cit, p.143 
60 Curtice, J. (2002) 'Did Devolution Make a Difference? The First Post-Devolution UK Election in 
Scotland', in L. Bennie et al. British Elections and Parties Review 12: The 2001 General Election (Frank 
Cass, London), p.69 
61 Shaw, E. (2003) op.cit, p.25 
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--
to remain consistent with New Labour and at the same time contend with different 
electora I com petitors. 63 
As a result of the pressure on the different components of the Labour party to 
remain consistent throughout the UK and to contend with their respective electoral 
competitors there is some evidence of tensions between the Labour party in 
England, Scotland and Wales. This was clearly shown in relation to free personal 
care when the UK Health Secretary, Alan Milburn, who expressed anger that free 
personal care should not be pursued by the Scottish Executive before policies which 
had been manifesto commitments. 64 In Wales the pressures were even more 
blatant, when the Welsh Assembly Government's challenge to the UK Government 
to fund free personal care was judged by Wales Office officials as 'pathetic'.65 The 
pressure from the leadership of the party on the Scottish and Welsh parties to tow 
the line tended to be based on threats to the finances of the devolved institutions, 
which, as the case of Attendance Allowance indicated, are still heavily controlled by 
the centre. As Hopkins notes, 'National-level party leaderships are much more 
willing to talk about decentralisation when they are out of power, for the obvious 
reason that they do not have much power to lose. Once in power, they are likely to 
be much more reluctant to embark upon organisational reforms which distribute 
power from the national to subnational levels/.66 
62 Ibid. 
63 Bennie, L. and Clark, A. op.cit, p.143 
64 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
65 Speed, N. and Betts, C. (17 May 2002) 'London Dashes Hope of Free Care for the Elderly in Wales' in 
The Western Mail, p.1 
66 Hopkins, J. (2002) 'Political Decentralisation and Party Organisational Adaptation: A Framework for 
Analysis' Paper presented at Fourth European Urban and Regional Studies Conference (Barcelona, 4-7 
July 2002), p.3. accessed at www.devolution.ac.uklpdfdata/hopkin paper pdf. pdf 
281 
Laffin et al. do not believe that the differences in the party systems in England, 
Scotland and Wales have to date resulted in sharp ideological difference between 
the 'the Labour leaderships at the centre and the periphery'.67 However, Bennie and 
Clark believe that there are 'some signs that Scottish and British Labour are 
becoming more distinct,.68 Whilst it is probably too early to tell whether the Labour 
parties throughout Britain will split ideologically, the evidence suggests that it is not 
always helpful to treat the Labour party as a unitary actor. The fact that the 
English, Scottish and Welsh parties face different electoral competitors and work in 
different party systems means that their behaviours are shaped by different 
incentive structures and they are forced to consider different strategies. These 
structural characteristics affect other political parties too, though to date the Liberal 
Democrats appear to have tended to maintain a consistent profile across the UK, 
despite being the most federally organised, of the UK wide parties. In contrast, the 
Conservatives in Scotland have developed a profile which is further to the left than 
the English party. However, the conflict between the different Conservative parties 
across the UK has been less pronounced than those in the Labour party, for 
instance, in relation to free personal care there was a lack of pressure from, or even 
discussion with, the party leadership in London when the Scottish party decided to 
support free personal care. In part this difference can be explained by the fact that 
Labour are in government in Westminster, Scotland and Wales. However, this is 
also an organisational issue. As the most centrally controlled party in Britain, it is 
likely that pressures will continue to emerge between the Labour parties in 
Scotland, England and Wales, particularly if the different component parties drift 
ideologically and the organisation of the party is not devolved.69 
67 Laffin, M., Shaw, E. and Taylor, G. op.cit., p.13 
68 Bennie, L. and Clark, A. op.cit, p.143 
69 Laffin, M., Shaw, E. and Taylor, G. op.cit, pA 
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8.2 Legislative Powers 
As explained in chapter one a devolved system of government where related 
functions are divided between central and devolved responsibility will occasionally 
lead to a lack of clarity about where each institution should act. The close division 
of powers also makes it likely that on any policy decision the Scottish Executive or 
the Welsh Assembly Government will need to consult with the UK Government. In 
Scotland the Parliament clearly had the powers to legislate on free personal care. 
Henry McLeish explained that 'legally and constitutionally free personal care is a 
devolved matter and so we could do what we wished ... but in reality there is 
ministerial pressure, Labour party pressure, pressure from friends'.70 According to 
McLeish the unclear division of legislative function did not have a major impact upon 
the autonomy of the Scottish Parliament. Shona Robison, an SNP member of the 
Health and Community Care Committee, agreed with McLeish's assessment, arguing 
that legislative relations between Whitehall and the Scottish Executive have been 
less significant than the financial relations, and so 'the major sticking points 
between Westminster and the Scottish Executive have tended to be on issues of 
finance'.71 
It was widely accepted that the debate over Attendance Allowance was crucial to 
the development of the free personal care policy, and many interviewees suggested 
that this case had major implications for devolved policy-making in the future. The 
Attendance Allowance debate raised questions about whether the introduction of 
free personal care in Scotland should lead to a transfer of funds to the Scottish 
70 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
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Parliament from Westminster, which is discussed in greater detail in the next section 
on the Parliament's financial powers. However, it is important to note that whilst 
the Scottish Parliament could legally introduce free personal care the implications of 
the free personal care policy for Attendance Allowance payments, which is primarily 
a Social Security issue (and therefore, a reserved matter), opened up an interface 
with the UK Government. McLeish therefore suggested that UK ministers could 
justify their desire to influence the free personal care decision in Scotland because it 
impacted on this reserved issue.72 The legislative powers of the Scottish Parliament 
meant that it was clear that the Scottish Parliament had the power to legislate on 
free personal care and so there was a lack of negotiation and consultation with 
actors from the UK Government. In contrast, the possession of unclear and weaker 
legislative functions, compared to those held by the Scottish Parliament, had a 
major impact upon making the policy in Wales. 
As the National Assembly for Wales lacks primary legislative powers, free personal 
care could not be introduced in Wales without the assistance of the UK Government. 
The need for assistance from another level of government immediately made it 
more difficult for the National Assembly for Wales to pursue free personal care. 
Dividing legislative functions between levels of government increases the number of 
actors involved in policy-making. In relation to Germany Scharpf suggested that 
joint decision making encouraged the need for agreement between policy actors, 
which Scharpf believed paralysed the policy-making process causing a joint-decision 
trap.73 Scharpf suggested that this inability to reach agreement often lead to no 
71Interview with Shona Robison (SNP MSP) (December 2003) 
72 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
73 Scharpf, F.W. (1988) 'The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German federalism and European 
Integration' in Public Administration (Vol. 66, pp.239-278) 
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policy change, or sub-optimal policies being produced. 74 As the National Assembly 
for Wales is constitutionally weaker than Westminster it seems that the effect of the 
jOint-decision trap can be reduced. On several occasions the National Assembly has 
reached a joint-decision making trap, making a policy decision which it then has 
been unable to implement, due to lack of powers. For instance, on a free vote in 
January 2003, the National Assembly supported a motion by Alun Pugh AM (Labour) 
to request that the National Assembly be granted the powers to prohibit smoking in 
public places.75 The UK Government did not grant the Assembly these powers, and 
due to lack of parliamentary time Welsh MP, Julie Morgan, was unsuccessful at 
passing a private members bill on the matter in March 2005. As a result, the policy-
making process on banning smoking in Wales met a dead end. As Scharpf 
predicted no policy change occurred, or is likely to occur in Wales until the UK 
Government enact similar legislation to ban smoking in public places for England.76 
Many AMs felt that the lack of primary legislative powers made policy-making in the 
National Assembly difficult. For instance, Labour AM, and subsequently member of 
the Welsh Assembly Government, Alun Pugh argued that 'It's a nonsense for policy 
ideas to start in Cardiff then go to London to be held up in a logjam before 
returning to Cardiff again'.77 There are additional problems faced by the National 
Assembly for Wales due to the particular division of powers between Cardiff and 
Westminster, and the wider constitutional questions that producing Welsh only 
legislation poses. 
74 Ibid. 
75 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, 22nd January 2003 
76 In the White Paper, Choosing Health: making health choices easier(November 2004) the Health 
Secretary, John Reid, hoped that many of the measures on banning smoking in public places for 
England could also be applied for Wales. 
77 Interview with Alun Pugh (Labour AM) (February 2003) 
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Prior to devolution, the White Paper 'A Voice for Wales' stated that, 'In the making 
of legislation and in the debates on UK policy, Wales' voice and influence must be 
felt in the Cabinet and Parliament'.78 However, there is some disappointment in the 
Assembly about the extent to which their requests for primary legislation at 
Westminster are either ignored or treated as a low priority. For instance, David 
Melding argued that 'our ability to influence primary legislation is the weakest link in 
the Welsh model of devolution'.79 A study conducted by the Glamorgan Policy 
Centre supported Melding's argument, as they found that the Assembly Government 
often faced considerable difficulties in getting Wales-only proviSions included in 
Westminster Acts.8o 
Figure 8.1 on the next page indicates that the ability of the Welsh Assembly 
Government to secure primary legislation at Westminster is mixed. Where the 
Welsh Assembly Government has been most successful at securing their provisions 
it has usually been on the back of Whitehall Bills.81 For instance, a number of 
measures requested by the National Assembly for Wales were included in the 
National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002, the Education 
Act 2002 and the Licensing Act 2003. In contrast, in the first term of the National 
Assembly for Wales only two pieces of Welsh-only legislation were passed, the 
Children'S Commissioner for Wales Act 2001 and the Health (Wales) Act 2003. 
Several interviewees explained that the difficulties in securing Welsh-only legislation 
were partly due to the wider constitutional implications of doing so, particularly as 
78 Welsh Office (1997) A VOIce for Wales: The Governments Proposals for a Welsh Assembly (HMSO, 
London), section 8 
79 Interview with David Melding (Conservative AM) (February 2003) 
80 Laffin, M. et al. (March 2003) Future Options: An Assessment of the Powers of the National 
Assembly for Wales (University of Glamorgan), p.S 
81 IbId 
286 
this could lead to a need for English only legislation.B2 Conservative AM, David 
Melding explained that the UK government is not yet willing to address the 'difficult 
issue of having Welsh and Scottish MPs voting on entirely English bills'.B3 According 
to Davies and Melding the UK Government are wary of introducing Welsh-only 
legislation partly due to the constitutional questions this would raise about the role 
of Welsh and Scottish MPs at Westminster. 
Figure 8.1: Assembly bids for Primary legislatiorl'4 
Bids submitted Outcome 
2001-02 session 
Health and Well-Being (Wales) Successful. Provisions included in National Health 
Bill Service Reform and Health care Professions Act 2002 
and Health (Wales) Act 2003 
Education (Wales) Bill Partly successful. Some provisions included in the 
Education Act 2002 
St David's Day Bill Unsuccessful 
Census (Amendment) Wales Bill Unsuccessful. But administrative arrangements 
introduced to enable the Assembly to influence census 
forms being. made in concordat with the Office of 
National Statistics 
2002-03 session 
Common Land (Wales) Bill Bid not pursued because DEFRA commitment to seek 
legislative time for England and Wales legislation in 
2004-05 
Sunday Licensing (Wales) Bill Successful. Provisions contained in Licensing Act 2003 
St David's Day Bill Unsuccessful 
Land Use Planning Bill Successful. Separate provisions for Wales contained in 
the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Bill 
Education Bi II Partly successful. Some provisions contained in the 
Education Act 2002, others unsuccessful 
Even where the UK Government has been in agreement with the general aims of 
the National Assembly's legislative proposals it has been difficult for the Assembly to 
secure the necessary legislative time at Westminster. For instance, the Welsh 
B2 Interview with Ron Davies (Labour AM) (February 2003) 
B3 Interview with David Melding (Conservative AM) (February 2003) 
B4 Report of the Richard Commission (Spring 2004) Commission on the Powers and Electoral 
Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales (The Stationary Office), p.lS? 
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Assembly Government wanted to introduce a Children's Commissioner for Wales , 
which Westminster legislated for in 2001. However, the National Assembly would 
have preferred legislation enabling a Children's Commissioner for Wales to be 
included in the Care Standards Act 2000. The UK Government broadly supported 
the National Assembly's proposal, indicated by their current plans to introduce a 
similar Children's Commissioner for England. Therefore, it appeared that even on 
issues which lacked controversy 'it is difficult to get legislative time at 
Westminster'.8s 
Civil servants working for the Welsh Assembly Government argued that on free 
personal care it would have been particularly difficult for the UK Government to 
assist the National Assembly for Wales to introduce the policy whilst not committing 
to it themselves.86 The swift rebuttal by the Wales Office to the Assembly's 
challenge to the UK Government to fund and implement free personal care can also 
be seen as a sign that requesting primary legislation on the free personal care issue 
would have been a waste of time.87 The degree to which the interpretation of the 
Assembly's powers is a political decision is indicated by policy-making during the 
foot and mouth crisis. During the foot and mouth crisis there was a need for quick 
action and the UK Government and the Welsh Assembly Government were agreed 
on what needed to be done. As a result the Assembly was allowed to take decisions 
over areas which it did not technically have the legal right to.88 However, on the free 
personal care issue the model of devolution in Wales and the views of UK 
governmental actors, made it unlikely that the National Assembly would be able to 
secure the necessary legislation at Westminster. The belief that Westminster would 
8S Interview with Kirsty Williams (Liberal Democrat AM) (February 2003) 
86 Interview with Welsh Assembly Government Civil Servants (June 2004) 
87 Interview with an AM (February 2003) 
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be unlikely to introduce primary legislation had a significant impact upon the 
behaviour and strategies of those involved in making policy in the National 
Assembly. It is possible that the strategies and behaviours that this model of 
devolution encouraged were almost as significant as the lack of legislative powers 
itself. 
It is worth noting that the Welsh Assembly Government did not ask for primary 
legislation on free personal care. In part this may have been due to a lack of 
commitment to the policy, as suggested by many opposition AMs and 
representatives from Welsh pressure groups. For example, the Deputy Health 
Minister at the time, Brian Gibbons, explained that he perceived the worst possible 
scenario for the Welsh Assembly Government on the free personal care issue would 
have been if the UK Government had given the Assembly the legislative powers to 
act but not additional resources to fund the policy.89 In addition Welsh Assembly 
Government actors did not see the rationale of focusing on securing primary 
legislation on free personal care when the UK Government would be unlikely to 
introduce the legislation. For instance, Brian Gibbons argued that he would have 
been very surprised if Westminster had allowed the Assembly to legislate on free 
personal care because 'it would make the situation in England untenable'.90 Labour 
AM, Ron Davies argued that the belief that the UK Government would not enact 
much of the primary legislation requested by the Welsh Assembly Government had 
made the Welsh Assembly Government timid in their primary legislative requests.91 
According to Ron Davies the Welsh Assembly Government usually only asked for 
88 Interview with Mike German (February 2003) 
89 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (February 2003) 
90 Ibid. 
91 Interview with Ron Davies (Labour AM) (February 2003) 
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primary legislative proposals which it knew would be granted.92 Davies claimed that 
when the Welsh Assembly Government took a risk and sought primary legislation it 
was unlikely to get, this tended to be on symbolic or insignificant areas, such as the 
Welsh Assembly Government's request for legislation allowing St David's Day to be 
declared a public holiday in Wales.93 
The Welsh model of devolution means that the Welsh Assembly Government each 
year can only ask for a few pieces of legislation to be pursued at Westminster, 
usually the Welsh Assembly Government asks for between 4-5 bills. Therefore, if 
free personal care was to be included as one of the requests then the Welsh 
Assembly Government would need to consider the issue as one of its key priorities 
for the coming year. If the same criteria had been applied in Scotland, it would 
have been unlikely that the Scottish Executive would have chosen to pursue free 
personal care with the UK Government, indicated by the lack of support for the 
policy amongst cabinet members. Therefore, the lack of primary legislative powers 
in Wales made it more difficult to pass primary legislation on free personal care 
compared to Scotland. Primary legislation tends only to be requested when an 
issue is considered to be a high priority and there is considerable support for the 
policy within the Welsh Assembly Government. 
Plaid Cymru AM, Dai Lloyd, argued that the lack of primary legislative powers 
allowed the Welsh Assembly Government to escape serious debate and 
consideration of long-term care policies.94 As David Melding explained the Welsh 
Assembly Government did not actually want primary legislation to allow the Welsh 
92 IbId 
93 IbId 
94 Interview with Dai Uoyd (Plaid Cymru AM) (June 2004) 
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Assembly to introduce free personal care on a Wales only basis. However, they did 
not necessarily want to draw attention to their lack of support for free personal 
care, at least without additional funds. As a result Melding argued that the Welsh 
Assembly Government was guilty of irresponsible polities, committing to free 
personal care in principle whilst being unwilling to pay for it.95 Melding believed that 
the Welsh Assembly Government placed the responsibility of free personal care on 
another level of government without assessing whether free personal care would 
actually be the right policy in Wales.96 The suggestion here is that the model of 
Welsh devolution allowed the Welsh Assembly Government to escape making an 
unpopular decision. Therefore, the National Assembly's lack of primary legislative 
powers enabled the Welsh Assembly Government to publicly state their commitment 
to a popular policy, and blame the UK Government for not introducing it. If the 
National Assembly for Wales had possessed primary legislative powers the Welsh 
Assembly Government would not have been able to 'pass the buck' so easily. 
The National Assembly's lack of primary legislative powers also enabled the Welsh 
Assembly Government to escape some of the pressures from supporters of free 
personal care who were so active in Scotland. The lack of primary legislative 
powers meant, therefore, that whilst most pressure groups were in favour of free 
personal care, 'there was generally an acceptance that it wasn't our gift to give'. 97 
As a result the Welsh Assembly Government could direct supporters of free personal 
care to the UK Government. The division of powers between Westminster and 
Cardiff created difficulties for Welsh civil society actors who supported free personal 
care. In part due to the model of Welsh devolution pressure groups and opposition 
95 Interview with David Melding (Conservative AM) (February 2003) 
96 Ibid. 
97 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (June 2004) 
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parties faced difficulties in maintaining a coherent message, directed at the Welsh 
Assembly Government, which lessened the impact of their lobbying. Additionally 
some pressure groups and opposition parties felt it was so unlikely that free 
personal care would be introduced that they should focus on other issues. 
Therefore, in comparison with Scotland some pressure groups and opposition 
parties put less energy into campaigning for free personal care. Plaid Cymru faced 
similar problems, not being certain which level of government to target. As a result 
Plaid Cymru actors switched between blaming the Welsh Assembly Government and 
the UK Government for the lack of action on the development of long-term care 
policies. 
The weakness of the Assembly's legislative powers also altered the strategies that 
policy actors employed to influence policy. Liberal Democrat AM, Kirsty Williams, 
argued that the lack of primary legislative powers encouraged Assembly Members to 
develop their policy proposals to fit in with the Assembly's powers.98 Williams 
claimed that 'The devolution settlement has made us all creative'.99 For instance, as 
the National Assembly for Wales did not have the powers to prevent the 
introduction of student tuition fees, the Welsh Assembly Government decided to 
introduce a learning grant, for about the same amount as the fees, to lessen the 
impact of tuition fees.lOo On the free personal care issue it appeared that the option 
of pursuing the policy on a Wales-only basis would be closed to Assembly members, 
due to the UK Government's opposition to the policy. Therefore, many of those in 
favour of free personal care decided instead to focus on other methods of improving 
long-term care for the elderly, such as introducing more generous personal 
98 Interview with Kirsty Williams (Liberal Democrat AM) (February 2003) 
99 Ibid 
100 Ibid 
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allowances for those in residential care. 101 As a result it is possible that the powers 
of the National Assembly for Wales actually encourage it to become a 'laboratory of 
democracy', adopting different policies from England and Scotland due to its 
different legislative powers. 
8.3 Financial Powers 
As discussed in chapter one the funding arrangements for the National Assembly for 
Wales and the Scottish Parliament mean that the devolved administrations are 
responsible for spending but not raiSing the bulk of their revenue. As a result, 
Morgan and Mungham argued that financing devolution goes against the 'first 
principle of sound government, namely that the power to spend money must not be 
divorced from the power to raise it'.102 Consequently, Morgan and Mungham 
suggested that the devolved institutions have more incentive to spend money than 
if they needed to raise the money themselves.103 Several interviewees agreed that 
the way in which the devolved institutions were funded encouraged irresponsible 
policy-making. For instance, SNP MSP Christine Grahame argued that 'If you're 
guaranteed an allowance whatever you do, you will not spend with the same 
attitude and care as if you'd raised the money yourself'/04 and a representative from 
the Wales Office accused the National Assembly for Wales of regularly playing the 
popularist card and spending money without taking responsibility. lOS The opinion of 
these interviewees is supported by the fact that to date policy departures from the 
101 IbId 
102 Morgan, K. and Mungham, G. (2000) Redesigning Democracy: The Making of the Welsh Assembly 
(Seren, Bridgend), p.201 
103 Ibid. 
104 Interview with Christine Grahame (SNP MSP) (January 2004) 
105 Interview with Senior Wales Office representative (February 2003) 
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UK Government have tended to involve additional public expenditure. 106 For 
instance, the Scottish Parliament's distinctive policies on free personal care, 
abolition of up-front student tuition fees and the three year settlement for teachers 
pay and conditions, all involved additional spending compared to the relevant 
English poliCies. 
A lack of consideration of financial issues was noted in relation to the free personal 
care policy in Scotland by one interviewee who worked as an advisor to the Health 
and Community Care Committee. Alison Petch was amazed at the lack of discussion 
surrounding the implementation of free personal care. She claimed that in the 
Committee's discussion no detailed questions were asked about financing the policy, 
instead the Committee established an ideological commitment to free personal care 
and questions of cost seemed almost irrelevant to them.107 One interviewee was not 
surprised by the Committee's lack of consideration of cost. He argued that there 
was a 'fundamental irresponsibility in the system' of government in Scotland,108 
because the Scottish Parliament has greater powers than in the Westminster model. 
As a result he suggested that the Parliament often pushes for commitment to wide 
ranging spending policies without having to face the responsibility of implementing 
or funding them. 109 
As Simeon pointed out 'free personal care was defended as the fulfilment of the 
NHS principle of universal access from the cradle to the grave, free at the point of 
106 Hazell, R. (2001) 'Conclusion: The State of the Nation after Two Years of Devolution' in Trench, A. 
(Ed.) State of the Nations 2001: The Second Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom (Imprint 
Academic, Exeter), p.259 
107 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
108 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
109 Ibid 
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delivery. It was not defended in the name of a uniquely Scottish need'.l1O In 
Scotland the First Minister, Henry McLeish, argued that one of his key motivations 
for pursuing free personal care was to raise a debate about where state 
responsibility lies.111 In Wales too the Welsh Assembly Government has extended 
the state's role, for instance by introducing free prescriptions for all. As Simeon 
notes, whilst Westminster is unlikely to recklessly champion social issues that could 
create expensive new demands on its own budget, the devolved institutions do not 
face the same restraints. ll2 In fact the UK Government is not only reluctant to 
champion expensive policies in new areas, but is also restricting state involvement 
in areas traditionally considered as the state's responsibility. For instance, the move 
towards PFI schools and hospitals transferred the state's responsibility to the private 
sector, and the removal of grants and introduction of fees for students has 
transferred responsibilities from the state to the individual. Interestingly, devolution 
in the UK has created a dynamic where there are incentives for the devolved 
administration to broaden state involvement while the central level of government 
has incentives to restrict it. In contrast, Banting and Corbett noted that in federal 
systems these incentives are reversed. In federal systems 'a race to the bottom' is 
often identified, where federal units compete for capital and investment, thus 
encouraging the sub-national governments to restrict public expenditure. In this 
context, Banting and Corbett argued that central governments are more likely to 
safeguard a minimum level of welfare provision, whilst sub-national governments 
attempt to restrict public expenditure.ll3 There is an assumption in Banting and 
110 Simeon, R. (2003) 'Free Personal Care: Policy Divergence and Social Citizenship' in Hazell, R. The 
State of the Nations 2003: The Third Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom (Imprint Academic, 
Exeter), p.232 
111 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
112 Simeon, R. op.cit, p.232 
113 Banting, K.G. and Corbett, S. (2002) 'Health Policy and Federalism: An Introduction' in Banting, 
K.G. and Corbett, S (Eds.) Health Policy and Federalism: A Comparative Perspective on Multi-Level 
Governance (McGill-Queens University Press, London), p.22 
295 
Corbertt's work that there is a desire by the sub-national units to restrict the welfare 
state, and the existence of multi-level governance 'multiplies the number of veto 
points at which action can be delayed, diluted or defeated'.114 Devolution in the UK 
differs from federalism by providing the sub-state tier with little responsibility for 
capital and investment. Perhaps Banting and Corbett's model indicates that the 
level of government responsible for attracting capital and investment is more likely 
to seek to restrict public expenditure, whilst the level of government without this 
responsibility will seek to increase public expenditure. Consequently, whilst Banting 
and Corbett's model of health policy and federalism does not precisely fit devolution, 
it is possible that the factor they identify, responsibility for capital and investment, is 
a Significant variable for encouraging a restrictive public expenditure approach, in 
both federal and devolved systems. Therefore, the particular division of financial 
powers in the UK devolved model increased the likelihood of distributive policies 
being pursued by the devolved institutions, by reducing the political capital available 
for opposing greater public expenditure. 
The disincentive to support financial restraint is most obviously illustrated by the 
policy positions adopted by the Conservatives throughout the UK. Whilst the UK 
and Welsh Conservative parties advocated individual responsibility for financing 
personal care, the Scottish Conservative party supported universal free personal 
care. Simeon argued that whilst this can partially be explained by, 
'the need to overcome the legacy of the Thatcher government and 
define the party as 'Scottish' almost certainly played a role. An additional, 
structural explanation is that the Conservatives' traditional platform of 
fiscal restraint is undermined by the lack of fiscal autonomy for the 
Scottish Parliament'.115 
114 Ibid., p.5 
115 Simeon, R. op.cit, p.231 
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When asked why the Scottish Conservatives decided to support free personal care, 
Mary Scanlon, who was then the Conservative Health Spokesperson, argued that 
the decision was based on the inequalities of care funding.ll6 Clearly, the Scottish 
Conservatives were moving in a different policy direction to their UK counterparts. 
Without any responsibility for raising revenue or lowering taxes there was simply no 
political capital to be made out of arguing for less state involvement. ll7 As one 
Conservative MSP interviewed by Simeon claimed, 'if you have a spending 
commitment that would impact on your borrowing as a treasury, I suppose that 
would impact on everything else. We just simply have to say we know that for the 
next 20 years we're going to get a block so we'll just devote that much to it'.11B 
Some policy actors appeared to enjoy the freedom from raising revenue created by 
the devolution settlement. For instance, one Labour AM did not want the Assembly 
to be given tax raising powers because he anticipated that using these powers 
would be unpopular. ll9 The Conservative AM, David Melding, felt that the National 
Assembly's inability to raise taxes, like its inability to introduce primary legislation, 
allowed the Welsh Assembly Government to avoid debate. 12o He argued that whilst 
the tax-varying powers of the Scottish Parliament have not actually been used, the 
possession of this power has led to more thorough discussion of policies than has 
occurred in the National Assembly for Wales. l21 Melding suggested that the Welsh 
Assembly Government were able to avoid making a decision about whether free 
personal care was actually the best use of resources, which would have been 
116 Interview with Mary Scanlon (Conservative MSP) (December 2003) 
117 Simeon, R. op.cit, p.231 
118Ibid 
119 Interview with a Labour AM (February 2003) 
120 Interview with David Melding (Conservative AM) (February 2003) 
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unavoidable if they had the ability to raise taxes to pay for the policy.122 Melding 
clearly has a point, as if the National Assembly possessed tax-varying powers those 
in favour of free personal care would have been able to suggest taxes should be 
raised to pay for the policy, thus prompting greater debate about whether free 
personal care was the best use of resources. However, in Scotland there was also a 
lack of discussion about how to implement free personal care, particularly the 
financial implications of the policy. 
Civil servants working for the Welsh Assembly Government argued that the lack of 
money available to the National Assembly affected which policies could be 
pursued. 123 Most interviewees involved with the National Assembly for Wales 
believed that free personal care was not an affordable option available to the 
Assembly, without additional funds from the UK Government. For instance, policy 
advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government, Mark Drakeford, believed that whilst 
the Barnett formula provided Scotland with enough money to fund free personal 
care, it left Wales disadvantaged and unable to fund such policies.124 However, 
Plaid's policy director, Lila Haines, argued that as the National Assembly's financial 
reserves are under spent each year there would have been enough to pay for free 
personal care. 125 Whilst Haines is correct to note that the Assembly consistently 
under spends, as a senior Scottish civil servant pOinted out, whilst the under-spend 
meant that it would not have been difficult to fund free personal care for one year, 
the problem arises because the policy is then budgeted for in the next year which 
could potentially store up problems for the future, as the cost of long-term care is 
122 Ibid. 
123 Interview with Welsh Assembly Government Civil Servants (June 2004) 
124 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
125 Interview with Lila Haines (Plaid Cymru's Policy Director) (June 2004) 
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likely to increase.126 Therefore, whilst free personal care may be affordable in the 
short term there are questions over its long-term viability. 
The funds allocated to the devolved institutions not only affected which policies 
could be adopted, but also the way the policies were implemented. Welsh Assembly 
Government civil servants pOinted out that the lack of money available to the 
National Assembly for Wales meant that 'we can't deliver policies which are 
expensive to administer'.127 This inability to fund policies which are costly to 
administer was a factor in the Welsh Assembly Government's decision to fund free 
nursing care through a flat-rate payment rather than the banded model chosen by 
the UK Government. The banded model required a person's care needs to be 
assessed regularly, as people in long-term care are likely to have deteriorating 
health conditions, and thus, changeable needs. In contrast, the flat-rate payment 
simply requires a simple assessment of whether someone required nursing care or 
not. 
In comparison to the National Assembly for Wales the Scottish Parliament was less 
restricted by their reliance on the block grant, primarily because the Scottish 
Parliament receives more money per person than elsewhere in the UK. For 
instance, in the 2001/02 financial year spending per head in Scotland was estimated 
at 20 per cent above the UK average.128 In relation to health spending in 2001/02, 
the Scottish Parliament spent 14.5% per capita above UK average.129 Scotland's 
possession of greater resources than England made it easier for the Scottish 
126 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
127 Interview with Welsh Assembly Government Civil Servants (June 2004) 
128 Bell, D. (November 2003) 'Finance' in Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution- Quarterly 
Monitoring Report Scotland accessed at www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit on 22/3/04, p.4l 
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Parliament to commit to policies requiring additional public expenditure. 
Committing to free personal care is simply more affordable in Scotland than in 
Wales or England. However, it is debatable whether the Scottish Parliament will 
always have the freedom to fund expensive policies. 
The gap between spending in Scotland and the rest of the UK has historically been 
justified 'by higher spending needs, for example based upon scarcity of population 
or relative deprivation'Yo However, there have been attempts to reduce the 
spending gap between Scotland and the rest of the UK. For instance, changes have 
been made to the Barnett formula to ensure that the population estimates on which 
the formula is based are updated annually to take account of population change. 
The consequence of a stricter application of the Barnett formula is that Scotland is 
suffering from a Barnett squeeze, meaning that in relation to England the level by 
which Scottish spending is increasing has decreased. The Barnett squeeze does not 
mean that the Scottish spending is decreasing, only that the rate of spending 
increase is slowing down in comparison to England. At the present time the Barnett 
squeeze is not a major problem, as the comprehensive spending review raised the 
Scottish block by £4 billion from 2002/3 to 2005/6.131 However, in the future if 
English spending decreased, the Scottish Parliament could face difficulties. For 
instance, Taylor imagines a scenario whereby English spending increases just 
enough to cover inflation, in such a case Scotland's increase would be below 
inflation.132 If spending decreases in England the Scottish Parliament may be able to 
limit the impact by using its limited tax power, however, it is also likely that the 
Parliament would be forced to make budget cuts. In a climate of spending cuts the 
130 Taylor, B. (2002) Scot/and's Parliament: Triumph and Disaster (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh), p.243-244 
131 Ibid, p.239 
300 
pressure to cut policies, such as free personal care, which are judged to be 
unaffordable in England, rather than to reduce spending on policies which both 
institutions are both committed, may be irresistible. At the moment we can only 
speculate on the future pressures, but the future of distinctive policies which require 
additional expenditure is questionable. 
The political consequences of pursuing distinctive policies can be costly partly 
because the Treasury has such extensive powers over the funding of the devolved 
institutions. Wales's Secretary for the Transport and General Union argued that the 
so far the central government has used treasury regulations to prevent the National 
Assembly for Wales from acting.133 Hancock argued that the UK Government's 
control over finances played a significant role during the development of the Welsh 
Assembly Government's learning grant policy. The Welsh Assembly Government 
faced problems during the implementation of the learning grant policy because 
students on benefits found that their benefits were being clawed back by the 
Department of Work and Pensions, due to their increased income generated by the 
learning grant. 134 Whilst a representative from the Wales Office felt that that these 
difficulties were caused by the Welsh Assembly Government not communicating 
their policy proposal effectiveIY,135 Hancock saw this as an example of the UK 
Government using their control over the benefit system to indicate their disapproval 
for the Assembly's policyY6 Hancock's version of events is supported by the fact 
that the interviewee from the Wales Office opposed the Learning Grant policy, 
132 Ibid., p.245 
133 Interview with Jim Hancock (Regional Secretary for Wales Transport and General Union) (February 
2003) 
134 Interview with Senior Wales Office representative (February 2003) 
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arguing that the idea behind the policy was a good one but the policy itself lacked 
substance.137 
A similar criticism was made of the UK Government during the debates over 
Attendance Allowance in Scotland. As discussed in the previous chapter, the DWP 
argued that those in receipt of Attendance Allowance in Scotland should have their 
benefit withdrawn if free personal care was introduced in Scotland. Most 
interviewees from the Scottish Executive, the Scottish Parliament and Scottish civil 
society agreed that the DWP's position on Attendance Allowance was an example of 
the UK Government showing its lack of support for free personal care. For the 
Welsh Assembly Government the position of the DWP was another factor ensuring 
that Welsh Assembly Government would not introduce free personal care. As the 
ex-Deputy Health Minister, Brian Gibbons pointed out, 
'Wales is under financed by the Barnett formula. The M (Attendance 
Allowance) resolution meant that if the Welsh Assembly introduced free 
personal care we would end up paying for UK benefit commitments. 
This simply isn't fair. We don't have the kind of money Scotland has to 
play with, we are so under-resourced it wouldn't be fair for us to pay for 
M'138 
Therefore, for the Welsh Assembly Government the Attendance Allowance ruling not 
only meant that Wales could not afford to introduce free personal care, but it also 
questioned whether it would be fair for the Assembly to fund a UK benefit. 
In Scotland almost all interviewees agreed that the most serious threat to the 
Scottish Parliament's capacity for distinctive action was the financial arrangements 
of devolution. In Wales about half of the interviewees considered the Assembly's 
137 Interview with Senior Wales Office representative (February 2003) 
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financial arrangements as the more constricting factor on their policy options (with 
almost all the remainder considering the Assembly's legislative functions as the 
crucial factor). Therefore, it is clear that those involved in developing policy in each 
of the devolved institutions consider the way in which the devolved institutions are 
funded to have a major impact upon their capacity for distinctive action. However, 
simply because those involved in the policy-making process feel that a factor 
influences their capacity for distinctive action, does not necessarily mean that it 
does. For instance, very few interviewees mentioned the impact of the design of 
the devolved institutions as a major factor in shaping policy, but it is likely that 
features such as a strong committee system and a focus on being open and 
accessible have promoted a different model of policy-making to that found in 
institutions designed differently. 
8.4 Design of the Devolved Institutions 
The Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales were designed to be 
different from Westminster. For example, the Consultative Steering Group, 
established four principles that should guide the Scottish Parliament's work: 
1. the Scottish Parliament should embody and reflect the sharing of power between 
the people of Scotland, the legislators and the Scottish Executive 
2. the Scottish Executive should be accountable to the Scottish Parliament and the 
Parliament and Executive should be accountable to the people of Scotland 
3. the Scottish Parliament should be accessible, open, responsive, and develop 
procedures which make possible a participative approach to the development, 
consideration and scrutiny of policy and legislation 
4. the Scottish Parliament in its operation and its appointments should recognise the 
need to promote equal opportunities for all139 
138 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (June 2004) 
139 Consultative Steering Group on the Scottish Parliament (1998) Scotland's Parliament (The Scottish 
Office), section 2 
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Additionally the White Paper which set out the Government's plans for Welsh 
devolution stated that, 'The Government is committed to establishing a new, more 
inclusive and participative democracy in Britain'.140 In Wales a degree of power-
sharing between the executive and the institution was meant to be encouraged by 
its structure as a corporate body, whilst in both Scotland and Wales the committee 
system was designed to encourage wider involvement in policy-making within the 
devolved institutions. The Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales 
were also designed to encourage greater engagement with civil society, indicated by 
measures such as the Public Petitions Committee in Scotland and the legal right to 
consultation for local government, voluntary organisations and the business 
community in Wales.141 The National Assembly developed a Voluntary Sector 
Scheme to ensure it meets its legal requirements to conSUlt, which includes 
measures such as, 
'[Assembly Secretaries shall] meet with representatives of the relevant 
networks of voluntary organisations covering their areas of responsibility 
at least twice in anyone calendar year. These meetings will review the 
operation of the Scheme and the level of consultation and discussion that 
has taken place between the network and the appropriate 
Secretary/Committee'.142 
According to several interviewees the devolved institutions possessed a specific 
policy-making culture, which allowed for a more open policy-making process. 
McLeish, who has been a parliamentarian at Westminster and the Scottish 
Parliament, pointed out that at Westminster there is a constant awareness of the 
history of the institution which meant that its ways of operating rarely changed. In 
contrast McLeish argued that in the Scottish Parliament 'good ideas travel'.143 
Additionally Ron Davies suggested the size of the devolved institutions made a 
140 Welsh Office (1997) A Voice for Wales: The Government's Proposals for a Welsh Assembly (HMSO, 
London), p.1S 
141 Government of Wales Act 1998, Chapter 38,5.113-115 
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difference, and as a smaller institution than Westminster, Davies found it easier to 
influence policy-making in Cardiff than in London.l44 However, there is some 
evidence to suggest that the institutional culture of the devolved institutions 
changes as time passes. For instance, SNP MSP Christine Grahame believed that in 
the early days of the Scottish Parliament policy divergence from the UK Government 
was more likely because there was a lack of procedures and conventions established 
with Whitehall. 145 Grahame suggested that policy-making has since tightened up, 
preventing considerable policy input from those outside the Executive. Interestingly 
Grahame believed that the tightening up of policy-making in the Scottish Parliament 
was partly as a consequence of the free personal care case, as the UK Government 
woke up to the impact that Scottish decisions could have on them. Ron Davies 
suggested that a similar process has occurred in Wales, 'The Assembly has slipped 
back into the old Westminster model [where]. .. government decides and expects to 
get its policy through'.146 However, the strength of the devolved institutions in 
relation to their Executives encouraged by the design of the Scottish Parliament and 
the National Assembly for Wales, appeared to play a significant role in the free 
personal care issue, particularly in Scotland. 
Henry McLeish argued that he used the strength of the Scottish Parliament to drive 
the free personal care policy.147 McLeish claimed that he pushed free personal care 
onto the agenda, hinted at a policy reversal and then let the Parliament build-up the 
pressure on a reluctant Executive.148 A senior official with the Scottish Executive 
142 National Assembly for Wales (2000) Voluntary Sector Scheme 
143 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
144 Interview with Ron Davies (Labour AM) (February 2003) 
145 Interview with Christine Grahame (SNP MSP) (January 2004) 
146 Interview with Ron Davies (Labour AM) (February 2003) 
147 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
148 Ibid. 
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agreed with McLeish's assessment of the situation, suggestiing that the Parliament 
was important in securing the free personal care decision. However, unlike 
McLeish, the Scottish Executive official believed that the Parliament's influence was 
a bad thing. He argued that the 'Parliament doesn't have the responsibility for 
implementing policies or financing them... Therefore, there is a fundamental 
irresponsibility in the system.149 Basically the civil servant felt that the Parliament 
had an incentive to support expensive distributive policies, which are popular with 
their constituents, and that they regularly make such commitments without having 
to face the consequences of their decisions. 15o 
The key channel through which the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly 
for Wales challenge the Executive's control of the policy-making process is through 
the committees. As discussed in chapter one, the committees in the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales have a wider remit and greater 
powers than their counterparts in Westminster. As a corporate body, it was 
expected that the committees in Wales in particular would be a major player in 
policy development. However, in Wales the committee system has been heavily 
criticised by Assembly members. For example, Ron Davies argued that the 
corporate structure should have made it easier for AMs to influence policies but in 
reality the 'committees work hard and then are ignored'.l51 In Wales the 
committees write fewer reports than in Scotland. For example, in the first term the 
Health and Social Services Committee in Wales produced eight reports, four of 
which were annual reports. The other reports were entitled 'A Children's 
Commissioner for Wales', 'Extension of Categories of People Entitled to Free Eye 
149 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
150 Ibid 
151 Interview with Ron Davies (Labour AM) (February 2003) 
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Tests', 'Implications for Wales of the Phillips (BSE) Inquiry Report' and 'Review of 
Services for Children with Special Health Needs'. In contrast, in Scotland the Health 
and Community Care Committee produced 75 reports. Although 47 of these were 
reports on subordinate legislation, many were substantial reports, such as an inquiry 
into GM crops, a report on the Mental Health (Scotland) Bill, a report to the 
Education, Culture and Sport Committee on the Schools Meals (Scotland) Bill, a 
Report on Hepatitis C, a report on petition PE145 calling for an enquiry into issues 
surrounding the alleged relationship between the combined Measles, Mumps and 
Rubella Vaccine and Autism, and a report on the Influenza Vaccination. The Health 
and Community Care Committee in the Scottish Parliament devoted a considerable 
amount of time exploring free personal care, indicated by the fact that it conducted 
an in-depth inquiry into the delivery of Community Care in 2000. Their inquiry into 
community care was well respected, for instance Alison Petch, who worked as an 
advisor to the Committee, was impressed by the MSPs, who she believed tended to 
explore the issues in depth and follow their own line of inquiry.152 The evidence 
provided to the committee was almost unanimous, all parties endorsed the Royal 
Commission's report, thus strengthening the case for free personal care. The 
Committee's inquiry also helped to convince MSPs of the benefits of free personal 
care, enhanced the publicity about the issue and silenced those against the policy. 
Henry McLeish argued that the Health and Community Care Committee 
strengthened the 'constituency of interests' within the Parliament who were 
supportive of free personal care.153 Therefore, in Scotland the strong committee 
system enabled the Health and Community Care Committee to conduct a detailed 
and independent inquiry, which then added to the pressure on the Executive to act. 
152 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
153 Interview with Henry McLeish (First Minister) (December 2003) 
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In contrast, the Welsh Health and Social Services Committee did not conduct an 
inquiry into long-term care, and rarely discussed free personal care. The clerk of 
the Health and Social Service Committee explained that the lack of discussion of 
free personal care was partly due to the weakness of the Committees in Wales.lS4 
She argued that the Health and Social Services Committee only examines issues in 
depth which have the broad support of everyone in the Committee. 1ss Plaid Cymru 
AM, Dai Lloyd, also explained that it was difficult to discuss anything contentious in 
committee,ls6 and Conservative AM, David Ian Jones felt the entire committee 
system was 'too cosy' and greater scrutiny of the Executive was required. 157 
Although a few AMs felt that it was easier to raise issues for discussion in the 
National Assembly's committees compared to Westminster they tended to feel that 
such discussion had little impact upon the Welsh Assembly Government.1SS AMs also 
felt that the committees were not able to develop the same independent and 
respected profile, so crucial to the Health and Community Care Committee's ability 
to apply pressure on the Scottish Executive. The lack of an independent voice can 
partly be explained by the fact that the relevant minister sits on the committees in 
Wales. The clerk of the Health and Social Services Committee explained that the 
Minister's membership of the Committee was a particular problem when the 
committee chair comes from the same party as the Minister, and if they are good 
friends she argued that it was incredibly difficult for the committee to conduct 
proper scrutiny.159 Therefore, whilst in Scotland the Parliament has been designed 
154 Interview with National Assembly for Wales Health and Social Services Committee Clerk (June 
2004) 
1SS Ibid. 
156 Interview with Dai Lloyd (Plaid Cymru AM) (June 2004) 
157 Interview with David Ian Jones (Conservative AM) (February 2003) 
lSS Interview with Glyn Davies (Conservative AM) (February 2003) 
1S9 Interview with National Assembly for Wales Health and Social Services Committee Clerk (June 
2004) 
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to allow the committees to develop independently from the Executive in Wales the 
committees and the Executive were meant to share power and policy development 
responsibility. However, as the corporate body structure in Wales has developed 
into a more Parliamentary model it has become apparent that power over policy 
development has not been shared and in addition the committees have been unable 
to provide detailed scrutiny of the Welsh Assembly Government. In relation to free 
personal care the design of the Scottish Parliament enabled the development of a 
strong Health and Community Care Committee, which challenged the Executive 
through galvanising support and conducting a well-respected inquiry into 
community care. In Wales the structures discouraged the creation of such an 
independent inquiry and so gave AMs fewer opportunities to influence the Welsh 
Assembly Government's long-term care policies. 
The Welsh Assembly Government's policy on free personal care was developed in 
the AdviSOry Group on a Strategy for Older People. The Advisory Group included 
members from voluntary organisations, local government, the care sector and 
private business. According to one member from Help the Aged, the way in which 
the strategy for older people was developed showed a real commitment to a new 
way of working which went beyond the rhetoric of 'openness, transparency, 
inclusivity and all that'.160 All the interviewees from voluntary organisations believed 
that their legal right to consultation made a crucial difference to their ability to 
influence policy-making. However, an interviewee from Carers Wales felt that 
'formal structure makes consultations with those who are reluctant to listen easier, 
but informal discussions are more likely to make the difference'.l6l Therefore, whilst 
160 Interview with Ana Palazon (Director of Help the Aged Wales) (February 2003) 
161 Interview with Roz Williamson and Sandra Burton (carers Wales) (February 2003) 
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the institutional setting can encourage discussion between the Welsh Assembly 
Government and the voluntary sector, it is unlikely that this will lead to action unless 
the Welsh Assembly Government is in agreement. June Clark also believed that in 
the Assembly's second term it was gradually closing itself off from voluntary 
organisations.162 June Clark explained that this distancing process was occurring 
because the Welsh Assembly Government was now a majority government and so 
did not need to adopt a consensual policy-making style. 163 However, other 
interviewees felt that it was always inevitable that the Welsh Assembly Government 
would stop listening to voluntary organisations once they gained experience and no 
longer needed help and support,164 As a result it appears that whilst the legal right 
to consult and the institutional features of the National Assembly for Wales 
encourage dialogue, the Welsh Assembly Government will only engage with the 
voluntary sector if they get something in return. However, the institutional features 
of the devolved institutions tend to ensure that the voluntary sector do have more 
to offer to the devolved governments. As a senior official in the Scottish Executive 
pointed out '[We] can't replicate the policy research in Whitehall so in designing the 
Scottish Parliament it was clear that we needed to use the skills of professionals, 
especially the voluntary sector.165 Therefore, it has been common for the devolved 
governments to rely heavily on the voluntary sector to sit on working groups and 
develop policy proposals. It was also suggested that by engaging civil society actors 
in the policy-making process the Scottish Executive can 'buy their support', which 
was particularly important to new institutions, especially the National Assembly for 
Wales which was introduced only by the briefest of margins.166 
162 Interview with June Clark (Member of the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care) (June 2004) 
163 Ibid. 
164 Interview with Roz Williamson and Sandra Burton (Carers Wales) (February 2003) 
165 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
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In Scotland, as in Wales, the Scottish Executive appeared more likely to involve civil 
society in policy-making than the Scottish Office was in the pre-devolution days. 
Several interviewees claimed there had been a tremendous change in the culture of 
the civil service in Scotland. One interviewee argued that when developing policies 
in the past the Scottish Office used to first phone Whitehall, but since devolution 
they begin their consideration of policy by talking to relevant policy experts and 
interested organisations in Scotland. 167 Of course, civil servants would want to 
argue that they are involving civil SOCiety in policy-making, however, there was also 
a perception amongst interviewees from pressure groups that since devolution they 
had been more actively involved in the political process. Liz Duncan, from Help the 
Aged in Scotland, believed that throughout the Scottish Parliament's first term there 
was a growing acceptance by the Scottish Executive of the need to consult with 
relevant organisations. 168 For example, she pOinted to when the timetable for the 
implementation of free personal care was extended. Duncan argued that there was 
a lack of consultation with elderly organisations about the timetable extension and 
as a result she had been sceptical of the Executive's motives and went to the press 
claiming that the Executive were attempting to backtrack from their commitment to 
free personal care. 169 However, after doing so she was contacted by Malcolm 
Chisholm, then the health minister, who explained there were good reasons for the 
delay.17O Liz Duncan saw this event as a turning point in communication, and 
afterwards felt she was at least aware of relevant policy decisions. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Interview with Liz Duncan (Director of Help the Aged Scotland) (February 2004) 
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A key difference in the development of the free personal care policies in Scotland 
and Wales was the involvement of policy experts and elderly pressure groups in the 
policy process. A wide variety of civil society actors were also involved in policy-
making during the Health and Community Care Committee's inquiry into long-term 
care. The committee system in the Scottish Parliament encouraged a high level of 
involvement from actors from outside the institution to give evidence, and in the 
free personal care case the variety of organisations giving evidence to the 
committee was impressive. Alison Petch, who was an advisor to the Committee, 
pOinted out that the Sutherland report took much less evidence than the Health and 
Community Care Committee.l7l In Wales whilst civil society actors were able to give 
evidence to the Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older People, the Advisory Group 
reported to the Welsh Assembly Government, and not directly to the Assembly. As 
a result pressure groups were not as able to work closely with AMs to build up 
pressure on the Welsh Assembly Government on free personal care. Additionally 
the Minister's membership of the Health and Social Services Committee made it 
more difficult for the Committee to develop an independent profile, as detailed 
inquiries such as the one in Scotland on long-term care gave way to the Welsh 
Assembly Government's agenda. 
In Scotland, in addition to working with the Health and Community Care committee 
to galvanise support for free personal care elderly pressure groups also used the 
Scottish Parliament's Petition Committee to push the free personal care issue onto 
the agenda. The Public Petition Committee was designed to ensure there was a 
direct avenue for communication between the public and the Scottish Parliament, 
thus ensuring that the Scottish Parliament fulfilled its commitment to openness and 
171 Interview with Alison Petch (Member of the Care Development Group) (February 2004) 
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accessibility outlined by the Consultative Steering Group. Age Concern used the 
petition process to call for the 'Scottish Parliament to implement all of those 
recommendations contained in the report of the Royal Commission on Long-term 
care for the Elderly'.m The petition was submitted in January 2000 and received 
11,000 signatures, which meant it was at that time the largest petition submitted to 
the Scottish Parliament.173 The Petitions Committee provided the elderly lobby with 
an effective tool for publicising their campaign. An interviewee from Age Concern 
claimed that the petition process increased media interest and played a key role in 
ensuring issues arose on the political agenda. 174 The petition process raised the 
profile of the free personal care debate by providing the media with another excuse 
to consider the issue, so adding to the pressure on the Scottish Executive to act. 
The existence of the Public Petitions Committee provided pressure groups in 
Scotland with an alternative method for raising issues and pressurising the 
Executive, and together with other institutional factors, such as the strong Health 
and Community Care Committee, provided actors with greater opportunities for 
galvanising support for free personal care than existed either at Westminster or in 
the National Assembly for Wales. The absence of a petitions committee in Wales is 
another difference between the devolved institutions which weakened the voice of 
civil society actors on the free personal care issue in relation to those operating in 
Scotland. 
172 Petition- PEon (January 2000) by Age Concern Scotland 
173 Interview with Jess Barrow (Director of Communications for Age Concern Scotland) (March 2004) 
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8.5 Devolved institutions within the UK 
So far this chapter has focused on the internal institutional features of the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. However, a key characteristic of 
the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales is that they are 
devolved institutions operating alongside each other within the UK framework. As 
institutions operating within a UK setting the devolved institutions can be affected 
by activity at the UK level. Additionally the devolved institutions can influence each 
other. For instance, in the free personal care case actors in Wales were influenced 
and sought to emulate developments in Scotland. As a result it is clear that the 
devolved institutions do not operate in isolation. 
The UK Government has a much stronger research capacity than the devolved 
institutions. As a result many interviewees were concerned that the UK 
Government's policy proposals also set the agenda for the devolved institutions. For 
instance, Peter MacMahon believed that the Scottish Executive was in the habit of 
following Westminster's lead, even though their final policy design may differ.175 
Here MacMahon noted that whilst slightly different poliCies may be adopted in 
Scotland, the Scottish Executive has been incapable of introducing the most radical 
form of policy divergence, developing a distinctive agenda from the UK 
Government.176 In Wales one interviewee from a voluntary organisation was even 
more scathing of the potential for policy divergence in the devolved insitutions, 
arguing that the Welsh Assembly Government has a tendency of watching what 
England does and then sticking a daffodil on top.177 Here Palazon implied that that 
175 Interview with Peter MacMahon (Press Secretary to McLeish) (December 2003) 
176 Keating, M. (2003) 'Policy Convergence and Divergence in Scotland under Devolution' paper from 
Devolution in Comparative Perspective Conference (University of Strathclyde, 7th January-9th January 
2004), p.l 
177 Interview with Ana Palazon (Director of Help the Aged Wales) (February 2003) 
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not only did the UK Government determine which issues the Welsh Assembly 
Government examined, but also shaped their policy response to a large extent. As 
a result Palazon hinted that the Welsh Assembly Government's policies differed in 
detail rather than scope.178 This analysis of the extent of policy divergence in Wales 
appears to accurately explain the development of the free nursing care policy. On 
free nursing care one interviewee argued that the Welsh Assembly Government was 
'aware of policy development in England' and it was 'immediately obvious that a 
similar policy would be implemented in Wales'.179 However, the Welsh Assembly 
Government decided to provide free nursing care by paying a flat-rate payment to 
recipients rather than assessing their care needs and using the banded model 
implemented in England. Therefore, the broad aims of the Welsh Assembly 
Government's policy matched those of England, but the way in which the policy was 
implemented differed in Wales. 
The free personal care case indicated how an issue which arose on Westminster's 
agenda then transferred to the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for 
Wales. As Simeon explains 'The story begins with the creation of the UK Royal 
Commission on long-term care in 1997, chaired by Lord Sutherland'.180 The ex-
Deputy Health Minister in Wales, Brian Gibbons, explained that in Wales it is 
common for the Assembly's agenda to mirror Westminster's due to the form of 
devolution in Wales.181 Several interviewees noted the difficulties that the devolved 
institutions face in developing their own agenda independently of Westminster. 
Many interviewees explained that Westminster continued to set the policy agenda 
178 Ibid. 
179 Interview with Mark Drakeford (Health advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government) (June 2004) 
180 Simeon, R. (2003) 'Free Personal Care: Policy Divergence and Social Citizenship' in Hazell, R. The 
State of the Nations 2003: The Third Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom (Imprint Academic, 
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primarily due to their greater resources, particularly their research capacity. For 
example, the Sutherland report was used by actors in the Scottish Parliament and 
National Assembly for Wales as the basis for their exploration of free personal care. 
The Sutherland report was used so much primarily because it was a thorough report 
which was well respected and also because it would have taken 'too much time and 
money for the research to be done [separately in Wales and ScotlandJ'.182 
Additionally, as John McTernan noted, civil servants working for the devolved 
institutions were not separate from those in England. McTernan argued that the 
existence of a UK wide civil service means that ideas and connections flow between 
Scotland, England and Wales.183 However, as civil servants working at the UK tier 
have greater resources and experience they tend to dominate the generation of 
ideas, so the flow of ideas is primarily driven by the UK tier. Therefore, as one 
Scottish Executive official pointed out, the Scottish Executive works closely with UK 
departments on all issues in order to benefit from their greater resources and 
expertise.184 
The fact that the devolved institutions operate within the UK framework also means 
that the UK Government's potential opposition to the development of distinctive 
policies is important. In relation to free personal care, actors from both the Scottish 
Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government noted that initially there was an 
expectation that there would be a UK wide policy.18s An interviewee from the 
Scottish Executive argued that the desire to introduce a uniform policy throughout 
the UK was primarily driven by recognition that if different policies were pursued 
181 Interview with Brian Gibbons (Deputy Health Minister) (June 2004) 
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then pressures on both the Scottish Executive and Whitehall from pressure groups 
in particular would be intense. 186 The Scottish First Minister was also aware of such 
pressures, and commented that during negotiations with UK Ministers there was 
deep concern that the decision in Scotland to introduce free personal care would put 
pressure on the UK Government to follow suit,187 Therefore, the fact that the 
devolved institutions operate within a UK framework encouraged a fear of policy 
divergence, particularly by the UK Government. What is interesting about the free 
personal care case is that the pressure expected by the UK Government to follow 
Scotland's lead has not been as intense as predicted, and the UK Government have 
faced little difficulties justifying their policy choice. 188 Several interviewees felt that 
policy divergence was now a more acceptable part of devolution and one 
interviewee predicted that the pressure from the UK Government for conformity will 
continue to decrease 'as it becomes more common for the Scottish Parliament to 
diverge'.18g In fact, as the Health Committee returned to the issue of free personal 
care in the second term of the Scottish Parliament, conducting an inquiry on the 
implementation of the policy, the Scottish Parliament's long-term policy may yet 
reconverge with the UK Government's policy. 
It also appears that actors within the devolved institutions have become more 
effective at managing the UK Government's concerns. For example, in Wales one 
interviewee explained that when the Welsh Assembly Government wanted to act 
distinctively it now attempted to do so by arguing that Wales has different needs 
185 Interview with Welsh Assembly Government Civil Servants (June 2004) 
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and so different policies were required. 190 Apparently such claims are usually 'a load 
of rubbish and we just want to introduce different policies because we disagree with 
the UK Government's proposals'.191 However, as the free personal care case 
indicates, whilst the devolved institutions may be able to develop distinctive policies, 
generally they continue to follow the agenda set by the UK Government. 
As suggested by the notion of 'laboratories of democracy',192 discussed in chapter 
two, it is also possible that devolution may encourage the different governments 
and institutions in the UK to learn from each other. In the free personal care case 
the actors in the National Assembly for Wales appeared to learn about what was 
possible in a devolved system from policy developments in Scotland. After the 
Scottish Parliament adopted the free personal care policy the Western Mail 
commented on the differences between the devolution settlements in Scotland and 
Wales, 
'as Scotland begins to flex its muscles, pursuing pOlicies which are 
obviously distinctive from England, questions will be asked about why 
Wales is handcuffed and, more importantly, when the manacles will be 
unlocked. Free care for the elderly is the latest tartan policy which is 
showing up the gap between the different settlements'.193 
The article suggested that free personal care symbolises wider problems with the 
devolution settlement, that whilst Scotland has the powers to pursue distinctive 
policies from England, Wales does not. Welsh pressure groups were quick to draw 
comparisons between the institutions, using Scotland's decision to put pressure on 
the National Assembly for Wales. For instance, Age Concern Cymru called 'for the 
National Assembly to give free personal care for the elderly - following the Scottish 
190 Interview with Labour AM (February 2003) 
191 Ibid 
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Executive's lead'.194 It appeared that the Scottish policy highlighted that devolution 
could produce distinctive poliCies, which awoke supporters of free personal care in 
Wales. As Sarah Stone from Age Concern Wales noted, the voluntary sector was 
closely watching Scotland.195 
Additionally policy-making in Scotland had a strong impact upon the strategies 
employed by Plaid Cymru. As one Plaid Cymru AM, Dai Lloyd, pOinted out 'Scotland 
is the beacon for Plaid Cymru'.196 As Plaid Cymru want the National Assembly for 
Wales to possess the same powers as the Scottish Parliament they regularly make 
comparisons between the situation in Scotland and Wales to emphasise what the 
National Assembly could do with greater powers. For example, Plaid's manifesto for 
the Assembly election in 2003 states: 
'The National Assembly, unlike the Scottish Parliament currently lacks the 
powers to implement the Royal Commission's recommendations, while 
the injustice of the Barnett Formula would make it extremely difficult to 
meet the cost. A Party of Wales Government will press for both these 
deficiencies to be corrected'197 
Therefore, according to Plaid Cymru's policy director Lila Haines, Plaid are 
constantly keeping one eye on developments in Scotland.198 
Plaid only began to push for free personal care once the Scottish Parliament decided 
to implement free personal care, implying that the issue became particularly 
important to Plaid when they saw that Wales was unable to adopt the same policy 
as Scotland. Actors seeking to influence policy-making in the National Assembly for 
193 Hornung, R. (27 January 2001) 'Scotland Leaves Wales Standing' in The Western Mail, p.8 
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Wales struggle to develop their own distinctive voice and so mirror developments 
elsewhere. It appears that as the Scottish Parliament pursues distinctive policies it 
highlights what devolution can achieve and so the National Assembly attempts to do 
something too. Interestingly then it appears that the National Assembly for Wales 
may be learning about what to aspire to from the Scottish Parliament, rather than 
learning about the details of making policy. 
The agenda of the National Assembly for Wales is strongly affected by 
developments in Scotland, particularly as Plaid Cymru and many civil society actors 
seek to establish a similar model of devolution in Wales as exists in Scotland. As a 
result the Welsh Assembly Government also tends to be aware of what is happening 
in Scotland, and in the free personal care case used what was happening in 
Scotland to justify their decision not to introduce free personal care. For instance, 
during a debate on the NHS strategy Brian Gibbons defended the Welsh Assembly 
Government's reluctance to support free personal care by pointing out that, 
'In Scotland, for example, they only gave about 5.5 per cent or 5.7 per 
cent increases in allocations to their health service. It left them able to 
make more ambitious offers in terms of health and social care, 
particularly free personal care. In Wales, we have given an allocation of 
about 7.5 per cent to 7.7 per cent to health authorities. That was our 
choice and we have offered a more innovative package in terms of 
support care within the community'.199 
Additionally, the Welsh Health Minister pointed out that the Welsh free nursing care 
package was more generous than the model adopted in Scotland, as well as the one 
in England. She argued that in relation to nursing care Scots would only receive 
£65 a week in contrast to the £100 payment available to those receiving nursing 
care in Wales.2oo This again indicates that the devolved institutions are motivated by 
199 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary Session, J:fh February 2001 
200 National Assembly for Wales, Plenary SeSSion, tt November 2001 
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a desire to provide the most generous welfare provisions. Interestingly, the 
existence of either a race to the bottom or a race to the top will encourage policy 
convergence amongst the devolved institution's policies. In the free personal care 
case the National Assembly for Wales clearly faced pressure to emulate policy 
developments in Scotland, however, it is possible that such pressures could work in 
the other direction. Interestingly, however, whilst the devolved tiers appeared to 
face the pressure to provide more generous welfare proviSions, the UK Government 
has appeared able to escape such pressures, particularly in relation to free personal 
care. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The institutional setting in which devolved policy-making occurred influenced the 
way in which the policy was made and the particular policy responses adopted. The 
electoral system, which encouraged coalition government, provided the Liberal 
Democrats in particular with a much greater role in policy-making than the 
Westminster system could. Therefore, here the institutional setting was significant 
because it gave different actors greater power and the ability to influence policy. 
Additionally the existence of coalition government encouraged a different style of 
policy-making to the Westminster model, with a greater emphasis on consensus and 
negotiation. In the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales it was 
not enough for the governments to order its backbenchers to support a policy. 
Instead they often needed to persuade backbenchers from other political parties to 
support them. As a result, the need to develop a strong argument became more 
important for policy-making. In relation to free personal care, coalition government 
was a key factor in determining the policies adopted in both Scotland and Wales, 
with the Liberal Democrats able to secure greater discussion of free personal care in 
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Scotland and Wales. In Scotland, as the institution possessed the legislative powers 
required to implement free personal care, it was difficult for the Scottish Executive 
to ignore the pressure that built up on them to act, particularly as those in favour of 
free personal care were in the majority in the Scottish Parliament. However, in 
Wales the Welsh Assembly Government were able to escape detailed discussion of 
free personal care primarily due to their lack of legislative powers. The lack of 
legislative powers in Wales weakened the case of those arguing for free personal 
care, as pro-free personal care actors were confused about whether to target the 
UK or Welsh Assembly governments. In addition, in Scotland the greater financial 
resources available to the Parliament meant it was less difficult than in Wales to 
introduce such an expensive policy. However, the strength of the UK Government 
on financial matters, indicated by the debate over Attendance Allowance, showed 
that it was difficult for the Scottish Parliament to pursue a distinctive policy from 
Westminster. There are also real fears about the long term effects of such high 
spending on distinctive policies, due to the well reported over-funding of Scotland 
compared to the rest of the UK. Therefore, the institutional setting makes it difficult 
for the devolved institutions to pursue distinctive policies; in Scotland these 
difficulties were particularly due to the financial arrangements whilst in Wales they 
were due to a lack of both legislative and financial powers. 
The design of the devolved institutions, however, also can encourage policy 
divergence, particularly by allowing actors from outside the institution to have a 
stronger voice in policy development, than they would have in Westminster. 
Additionally the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales give 
greater powers to the institutions in relation to the Executives, compared to 
Westminster. Several interviewees noted that this may lead to 'irresponsible policy-
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making' as AMs and MSPs outside the governments have an incentive to introduce 
expensive and popular policies without having the responsibility to implement or 
fund them. Therefore, it is likely that whilst other features of the devolved 
institutions encourage policy convergence, the enhanced role of backbenchers and 
pressure groups secured by the design of the devolved institutions can advance 
policy divergence. 
As the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales operate within the 
context of the UK institutional setting they struggle to develop distinctive policies, 
and perhaps more significantly, to develop their own agendas. Although the 
Scottish Parliament was able to implement free personal care against the wishes of 
the UK Government, this was clearly a difficult task and many interviewees 
questioned 'whether so early on in devolution it was worth straining relations with 
Westminster'.2D! Interestingly, it appears that after the free personal care issue the 
Scottish Executive has sought to smooth relations, and there has been a lack of 
such contentious policy divergence since. It is fascinating that in relation to free 
personal care the issue was virtually ignored in Wales until the Scottish Parliament 
decided to adopt the policy, and this highlights that there is a high level of copy-cat 
policy-making occurring in the devolved system, as the governments in Scotland 
and Wales compete to be the most generous in terms of welfare provision. 
The institutional setting in which devolved policy-making occurs can encourage both 
policy divergence and convergence. Features such as the devolved institutions' 
place in a UK political system, can make it difficult for the Scottish Parliament and 
the National Assembly for Wales to develop distinctive policies. In contrast, the 
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different party systems, the new electoral system and the design of the devolved 
institutions often give different actors access to the policy-making process compared 
to Westminster, suggesting that out of this different mix will come distinctive 
policies. Therefore, it is clear that whilst the institutional setting is important to the 
development of policies in the devolved institutions, as a rule it is not clear whether 
they will lead to greater convergence or divergence. 
201 Interview with Scottish Executive Senior Civil Servant (February 2004) 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
Examining the roles of actors and institutions in the formation of the long-term care 
of the elderly policies highlighted that in the real world these two elements are 
mutually dependent and cannot be separated. The policies of the devolved 
governments at the end of their first terms were different, both to each other and to 
the UK government, as a result of differences in both institutions and actors. This is 
consistent with the ideas of actor-centred institutionalism. 
Individual actors had a major impact upon the development of the long-term care 
poliCies in Scotland and Wales. In Scotland Henry McLeish's impact upon the 
decision to introduce free personal care was considerable. In Kingdon's terms 
McLeish was a policy entrepreneur, ensuring that the problems, policies and politics 
streams joined.1 McLeish did this by highlighting that the pre-existing system of 
funding long-term care was a problem because it was unfair. He promoted free 
personal care as a policy solution and ensured that politically it would have been 
difficult for his Government not to introduce free personal care. In addition McLeish 
helped to open the window of opportunity for a policy change. It was the change in 
First Minister which provided the opportunity for free personal care to be re-
examined, and McLeish opened the window further by repeatedly stating his 
commitment to review the long-term care policy. Without McLeish, therefore, it is 
highly probable that free personal care would never have been introduced in 
Scotland. 
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The method McLeish adopted to secure free personal care involved encouraging the 
press, coalition partners and MSPs to pressurise his Health Minister to adopt the 
policy rather than directly ordering her to do so. Without the existence of coalition 
government, and the threat of a Uberal Democrat revolt, McLeish would have 
struggled to apply the necessary pressure on his Health Minister to commit to free 
personal care. Additionally, as the existence of coalition government encouraged a 
more consensual, negotiation based form of policy-making, compared to that found 
in Westminster, coalition government helped to ensure that the issue of free 
personal care was open for renegotiation on McLeish's promotion to First Minister. 
The existence of the Liberal Democrats in government in Scotland also provided the 
party's backbenchers with a strong opportunity to pursue their preferred policies, in 
the case of free personal care this was achieved without the support of the Liberal 
Democrat Ministers. Similarly, within the coalition government in Wales the Liberal 
Democrats secured a number of concessions to appease their desire for free 
personal care, such as the inclusion of free personal care on the remit of the 
Advisory Group on a Strategy for Older People. It is also interesting that the Welsh 
Liberal Democrats' policy on free personal care was clearly shaped by their Scottish 
counterparts, demonstrating horizontal competition between the Scottish and Welsh 
parties. Only when free personal care had been accepted by the Scottish 
Parliament did the Welsh Liberal Democrats consider the matter in any depth. 
Therefore, events in Scotland made free personal care a devolved issue (even 
though the Welsh Assembly lacked the primary legislative powers required to 
1 Kingdon, J.W (1984) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Scott, Foresman and Company, 
London), p.185 
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implement it) and the Welsh Liberal Democrats appeared to feel that if their Scottish 
colleagues could claim to have been victorious on the free personal care issue, they 
needed to ensure similar achievements, particularly to highlight their success in 
government. 
Of the actors outside the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government, 
there was a strong unity amongst pressure groups lobbying for free personal care. 
In Scotland the policy advocacy coalition in favour of free personal care were well 
organised and active in the press. These actors used the structures of the Scottish 
Parliament well, for instance by providing consistent support for free personal care 
when giving evidence to the Health and Community Care Committee. As a result 
the policy advocacy coalition successfully encouraged MSPs to support free personal 
care and, crucially, made opponents of the policy look isolated. Therefore, in 
Scotland a range of civil society actors, opposition MSPs, Liberal Democrat 
backbenchers and the First Minister pressurised Scottish Executive actors to 
introduce free personal care, which offers some support for the multi-level 
governance notion of shared policy-making. 
In contrast, actors in favour of free personal care in Wales were much weaker. In 
Wales the opposition parties were divided, the Health and Social Services 
Committee added little to the free personal care debate and policy experts and 
pressure groups were unsure whether to focus their attention on the UK 
Government or the Welsh Assembly Government. As a result, the Welsh Assembly 
Government was able to escape serious criticism of its long-term care policy. This 
highlighted the problems of holding a single level of government to account in a 
multi-level governance system. As has been demonstrated in the Welsh long-term 
327 
care case, devolution can allow a government at one level to commit to popular 
policies but blame other levels of government for failing to implement such policies. 
In both Scotland and Wales the UK Government was the key opponent of free 
personal care. In Wales the National Assembly had little, if any, dealings with the 
DWP or UK Health Department on free personal care. Instead the Welsh Assembly 
Government's policy-making on long-term care was ignored by the UK Government 
until they decided to challenge the UK position on free personal care, when the 
Wales Office quickly rebutted the Welsh Assembly's petition. The Welsh Assembly's 
experience suggests that they are free to develop their policies without the 
involvement of UK Governmental actors, perhaps due to their lack of interest. 
However, when UK Government actors become aware, and disapprove of a policy 
decision, they have the power to halt the policy process. In contrast, in Scotland 
UK Governmental actors sought to persuade the Scottish Executive not to introduce 
free personal care as soon as McLeish hinted at a policy change. However, the UK 
Government had little success at halting the introduction of free personal care in 
Scotland, though by withdrawing Attendance Allowance they ensured that there 
were serious financial implications for the Scottish Parliament implementing this 
distinctive policy. 
As identified in the multi-level governance model, the state level government was 
able to exercise considerable control over policy-making but was unable to 
completely dominate policy-making in the devolved system. In the long-term care 
case UK Governmental actors possessed considerable power to punish and block 
policy-making when the devolved institutions pursued policies they disliked. 
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However, the control of UK Governmental actors was restricted, indicated by their 
inability to prevent the introduction of free personal care in Scotland. 
Policy divergence in the long-term care case was particularly interesting because 
where the devolved institutions diverged from the UK Government they chose to 
extend welfare provision and commit greater resources to long-term care for the 
elderly. As Jeffrey notes, this challenges the notion of a 'race to the bottom' 
commonly associated with multi-level governance systems; 
'It may be the case that the UK's experience can act as an antidote to 
the notion, in Germany and elsewhere, that a regional competition of 
ideas has the negative outcome of some form of 'race to the bottom': 
the evidence so far on issues such as student fees, prescription charges 
and equal opportunities suggests that the UK's regional 'laboratories of 
democracy' are ratcheting upwardsthe level of policy provision,.2 
Despite the absence of a race to the bottom, there was a strong element of regional 
competition in the long-term care case. Actors at the National Assembly for Wales 
came to focus on free personal care as an option only after the Scottish Parliament 
had decided to introduce the policy. Welsh pressure groups and opposition parties 
in particular used developments in Scotland to pressurise the Welsh Assembly 
Government to act. In response the Welsh Assembly Government justified their 
policy response by drawing out the weaknesses in the Scottish approach. For 
instance, Deputy Health Minister, Brian Gibbons argued that, 
'In Scotland, for example, they only gave about 5.5 per cent or 5.7 per 
cent increases in allocations to their health service. It left them able to 
make more ambitious offers in terms of health and social care, 
particularly free personal care. In Wales, we have given an allocation of 
about 7.5 per cent to 7.7 per cent to health authorities. That was our 
choice and we have offered a more innovative package in terms of 
support care within the community'.3 
2 Jeffery, C. (June 2002) Fiscal and Economic Decentralisation: Towards an Agenda for Policy Learning 
Between Britain and Germany (Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society), p.13 
accessed at www.agf.org.uklpubs/pdfs/1366Fiscalweb.pdf 
3 National Assembly (13 February 2001) Plenary Session accessed at www.wales.gov.uklassemblydata/ 
3A8ACA4800019E8300000A7COOOOOOOO.pdf on 06/05/04 
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Why the devolved institutions in the UK should, if anything, race to the top, rather 
than the bottom, is linked to their institutional design and youth. A key feature of 
the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales is their heavy reliance 
on the block grant from the UK Government for funds. Interestingly, the reliance on 
a block grant and the lack of serious tax raising powers alters the strategies and 
preferences of actors within the devolved institutions. In relation to long-term care 
policies, this could most clearly be seen through the Conservatives, who in Scotland 
vigorously pursued free personal care, in contrast to their colleagues at Westminster 
and Cardiff, who either opposed or were indifferent to the policy. Here the Scottish 
Parliament's lack of responsibility for lowering taxes or raising revenue meant there 
was no political capital to be made out of arguing for less spending, and so the 
Scottish Conservatives chose to alter their usual policy position of defending 
individual responsibility over extending state provision.4 
Free personal care, to some extent, has come to symbolise more than it offers. As 
discussed in chapter three, free personal care does not actually mean all personal 
care is provided for free, because a person's entitlement to the benefit is capped. 
In addition, the number of people that are thought to benefit from the policy is 
relatively small. This is not new, as Edelman noted, 'many of the public programs 
universally taught and believed to benefit a mass public in fact benefit relatively 
small groups'.s However, many actors still believed that free personal care was the 
correct policy to pursue because it symbolised respect for older people and a 
concern about the way their care was financed. A similar motivation was expressed 
4 Simeon, R. (2003) 'Free Personal care: Policy Divergence and Social Citizenship' in ~azell, R. T?e 
State of the Nations 2003: The Third Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom (Imprint AcademiC, 
Exeter) p.231 
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by actors involved in the Welsh Assembly Government's decision to provide a fiat-
rate payment for nursing care of £100, as Drakeford explained they were in part 
motivated by the fact that three figures sounded better than two. 6 Such comments 
suggest that what their long-term care policy symbolised to their communities was 
almost as important to the devolved governments as what they were able to offer. 
A key concern of many MSPs and AMs was to prove the value of devolution, and 
their place in it, and a symbolic policy such as free personal care provided such an 
opportunity. This motivation was most evident in McLeish who suggested that 'if 
devolution is to make sense we have to diverge from English policies where there 
are different needs'.? Interestingly, however, in the case of long-term care there 
were no distinctive Scottish or Welsh needs which required a different policy 
response. For McLeish, and many others, it appeared that the desire to win public 
support was a key factor in his pursuit of the policy. Pierson argued that this desire 
to win legitimacy is commonly associated with modern states, which tend to expand 
social benefits to win support.B If Pierson was correct, the desire of actors in the 
devolved institutions to extend their welfare provision in an attempt to win 
legitimacy for their institution will diminish over time, though the desire of policy 
actors to win personal legitimacy will no doubt remain. 
In many respects the extent of policy divergence on long-term care appeared less 
Significant in Wales than in Scotland, after all the Welsh Assembly failed to 
introduce free personal care. However, as discussed in chapter three, the Welsh 
5 Edelman, M. (1964) The Symbolic Uses of Politics (University of Illinois Press, Illinois), pA 
6 Interview with Mark Drakeford (July 2004) 
? Interview with Henry McLeish (Fonner First Minister)(December 2003) 
8 Pierson (2000) 'The New Politics of the Welfare State' in Pierson and Castles (Eds.) The Welfare State 
Reao'er(Polity Press, Cambridge), p.309 
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Assembly Government's consideration of long-term care issues within a wider 
Strategy for Older People may imply that the level of policy divergence, as defined 
by Keating, was greater in Wales than in Scotland. The National Assembly's focus 
during the long-term care debate was primarily on how to prevent the need for 
care, rather than responding to care needs already in existence. Greer suggested 
that the long-term care case in this respect was not unique, and the Welsh 
Assembly Government has offered a strong commitment to the New Public Health 
agenda in a number of ways, focusing on the 'root causes of ill health in great social 
problems such as unemployment, environmental, ill-health, and lifestyle problems 
through collaboration between agendas'.9 Here the Welsh Assembly might be 
diverging from the UK Government in a more radical manner than the Scottish 
Executive, and actually framing issues differently. Such divergence is more difficult 
to spot, and by framing issues differently from England or Scotland the Welsh 
Assembly Government make it more difficult to make simple comparisons with 
policies adopted elsewhere. Therefore, the Welsh Assembly Government was been 
able to escape political conflict with Whitehall over their long-term care policy. If 
the Welsh Assembly Government continue to frame their long-term care issues in 
this way it seems likely that they can prevent conflict with Westminster in the 
future. Consequently, it seems that the distinctive Welsh approach to long-term 
care for the elderly may be more sustainable than the Scottish policy in the long 
term. However, there are pressures for the Welsh Assembly Government to move 
away from its new public health agenda. For instance, because the Health Minister 
Jane Hutt decided to focus on preventative health measures rather than reducing 
waiting lists, waiting times in Wales have not decreased as rapidly as those in 
9 Greer, S. (2002) 'When Does Devolution Cause Divergence?: Health agendas and policy debates 
before and after devolution' Paper presented at the 2002 PSA Conference (University of Aberdeen, 
April 5th_7th), p.1S 
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England and Scotland. As a result of concerns about the Welsh waiting lists 
compared to other nations, Hutt was removed as Health Minister in January 2005. 
Therefore, it appears that pressure to converge with English policies remains a 
powerful feature of Welsh political life, but interestingly this pressure came from 
opposition AMs, the press and public opinion rather than from London. 
In an institution which lacks primary legislative powers it appears that this ability to 
frame issues differently may be its key opportunity for policy divergence. After all, 
examining the long-term care issue in a more holistic manner is achievable without 
extensive legislative powers, and is probably cheaper too. Therefore, the form of 
policy divergence pursued by the Welsh Assembly appears moulded by the shape of 
the institution. As Kirsty Williams noted, 'The devolution settlement has made us all 
creative' .10 
The creativity of the National Assembly's policy ideas encourages support for Greer's 
prediction that 'the four countries [in the UK] will continue to become more 
distinct'.l1 In contrast, however, there are concerns about the long-term 
sustainability of the Scottish Executive's commitment to its divergent poliCies, 
particularly free personal care. Questions have already been asked about whether 
the Scottish Executive can afford free personal care in a tighter economic 
environment, particularly as concerns have been raised about the future costs of the 
policy, and the accuracy of the Care Development Group's projections of future cost. 
In addition, at the time of writing the Scottish Health Committee was conducting an 
inquiry into the implementation of free personal care. Therefore, it is possible that 
10 Ibid 
11 Greer, S. (2003) 'Policy Divergence Will it Change Something in Greenock?' in The State of the 
Nations 2003: The Third Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom (Imprint Academic, Exeter), p.212 
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in the future the Scottish Executive will face financial pressures which require a 
reconvergence with the English long-term care policies. 
Alternatively, it is possible that such popular cases of policy divergence by the 
devolved institutions will put pressure on the UK Government to follow suit. This 
was certainly a key concern of UK Governmental actors prior to the introduction of 
free personal care in Scotland. This process fits with the laboratories of democracy 
idea, whereby one institution tries a new idea, and if successful the others follow 
suit. An example of this is the Children's Commissioner policy, which was pioneered 
in Wales and then adopted in both England and Scotland. 12 However, in the free 
personal care case, despite the predictions, it appears that the UK Government have 
avoided serious pressure to alter their policy following the Scottish decision to 
introduce free personal care. Therefore, it is possible that in the future UK 
Governmental actors may possess a more relaxed attitude to policy divergence by 
the devolved institutions. 
As a result, whilst examining policy divergence during the devolved institutions' first 
terms is of interest, it will be fascinating to see how such policies develop in the 
longer term, particularly whether a reconvergence occurs or whether the Scottish 
Parliament and the Welsh Assembly can maintain policy divergence. It is also of 
interest whether the outcome of one public case of policy divergence affects the 
ability of the devolved institutions to diverge in other policy areas. For instance, 
after introducing free personal care the Scottish Executive appeared to be motivated 
by a desire to smooth relations with the UK Government, and McConnell appeared 
12 Keating, M. (2003) Policy Convergence and Divergence in Scotland under Devolution (Regional 
Studies Association Annual Conference), p.l00 accessed at www.devolution.ac.ukl Keating rsa 03.pdf 
on 9/9/04 
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to seek to calm things down, indicated by his concern for 'doing less, better'. 
Additionally, since the introduction of free personal care there have been few cases 
of policy divergence where Scotland has followed a completely different path from 
the UK Government, except perhaps McConnell's move to ban smoking in pubs and 
restaurants from April 2006. 
To conclude, the devolved institutions in the UK are faced with a range of conflicting 
pressures to on the one hand converge with, and on the other diverge from, the UK 
Government's policies. As actor-centred institutionalism suggested, both actors and 
institutions playa major role in shaping policy responses. The differences between 
Westminster, the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales, 
particularly the actors involved in policy-making, the design and powers of the 
institutions, and the way these institutions allocated resources and incentives to 
actors, encouraged policy divergence. However, the devolved institutions still 
operate within a UK political system, and are faced with public and political 
pressures if they engage in too much policy divergence. Although an example of 
policy divergence, the long-term care case also highlighted the limits to this 
divergence, as the issue was primarily dealt with on a UK wide basis, through the 
Royal Commission on Long-Term Care. The policy options considered in England, 
Scotland and Wales were all based on the same recommendations of the Royal 
Commission, and much of the policy debates in Scotland and Wales were based 
upon research conducted for the Royal Commission. 
In the long-term care case the devolved institutions were motivated by a desire to 
extend welfare proVision, compared to Westminster. It appears that their desire to 
do so was influenced by the ideological positions of Scottish and Welsh actors, 
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which are historically more left-wing than English actors. Actors were also keen to 
prove the purpose of devolution, by acting distinctively, and wanted to pursue 
popular policies in an attempt to win support for the devolved institutions. 
Additionally, the lack of financial powers in the devolution system provided little 
incentive for the devolved institutions to cut expenditure. However, devolved 
policy-making is in its early days. What will happen to expensive cases of policy 
divergence, such as free personal care, at a time when the UK Government cuts 
expenditure remains to be seen. It will be of interest, therefore, to observe 
whether the divergent long-term care poliCies are sustainable, or whether 
devolution will mean a process of short-term policy divergence followed by a 
reconvergence of poliCies throughout the UK. It is quite likely that obvious and 
expensive cases of policy divergence, like the Scottish free personal care for the 
elderly, will not last. In contrast it is possible that the National Assembly for Wales's 
moves to frame health issues differently may well encourage greater and more 
sustainable policy divergence in the longer-term. 
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Appendix 
Methodology 
Examining policy-making often requires the study of informal, private discussions 
and negotiations. Consequently, often the only way to gain an understanding of the 
policy-making process is by gaining access to those directly involved in the 
development of policy. The need to access policy-makers directly is enhanced when 
exploring devolved policy-making due to the youth of devolution, meaning that only 
limited research in this area has been conducted. Therefore, it became clear to me 
that to gain an insight into devolved policy-making my methodological approach 
should be based upon elite interviews. Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
for this study because whilst interviews needed to focus on certain issues 
interviewees needed to be free to draw attention to the factors and events which 
they considered important. 
A range of actors were interviewed from the main political parties, and from the 
front and back benches. As it was often difficult to interviewee ministers, policy 
advisors and civil servants often were also asked about the experience and opinions 
of the ministers they worked with. Additionally interviews were conducted with 
actors from outside the institutions, mainly pressure group representatives working 
in Scotland and Wales. 
To gain insight into devolved policy-making the case of long-term care for the 
elderly was chosen and the development of the policy was followed. Long-term 
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care for the elderly was chosen because it was a case where both the devolved 
institutions followed a different line to the UK Government. Additionally the policy-
making process highlighted some interesting features of the devolved system, such 
as tensions between the different levels of government and the impact of coalition 
government. 
Interviewees were selected due to their involvement in shaping policy in the long-
term care case. Newspapers, plenary debates, committee reports and committee 
minutes, research from pressure groups, journal articles and books on devolution 
were consulted to identify potential interviewees. Interviewees were asked slightly 
different questions depending on their involvement and experiences of devolution 
and their role in devolved policy-making. For instance, when interviewing 
representatives from pressure groups questions were asked about their experience 
of gaining access to government which were not relevant when talking to 
government advisors and civil servants. Each interview shaped subsequent 
interviews, as different questions arose during the interview process. Each 
interviewee was also asked which actors they felt were important in the long-term 
care case, and interviews were arranged with those actors mentioned who had not 
already been interviewed. 
Relying heavily on interviews for information did pose some challenges. 
Interviewees might seek to evade certain issues or provide inaccurate information, 
intentionally or not. A range of actors from different political parties and 
organisations, and in different roles in these organisations, were interviewed in an 
attempt to gain a fuller picture of policy-making. Responses from interviews were 
compared, and where there was common agreement between actors their 
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comments were more likely to be taken at face value. Additionally secondary 
sources were consulted to check information provided in interviewees. However, 
even if there was disagreement between the information provided by different 
interviewees this information was still useful, particularly at gaining a deeper 
understanding of actors' perceptions and the relationships between these actors. It 
was also helpful to use information provided by one interviewee to challenge the 
comments of another, often this lead to a deeper explanation by the interviewee of 
events. As a result of this process occasionally interviewees were re-interviewed in 
light of new information. 
In total 43 actors were interviewed, 16 of whom were involved in shaping policy in 
Scotland and 27 in Wales. The difference between the number of interviewees with 
actors from Scotland and Wales was primarily because when the Scottish interviews 
were conducted a clearer focus on the case study had developed. On the next page 
is a list of all interviewees and their posts during the period of time under study. 
Some interviewees asked to remain anonymous, so their names are not included. 
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Figure 1: Scottish Interviewees 
Bill Butler 
Jess Barrow 
Liz Duncan 
Sam Galbraith 
Christine Grahame 
Tom McCabe 
Henry McLeish 
Peter MacMahon 
John McTernan 
Alison Petch 
Nora Radcliffe 
Keith Raffan 
Shona Robison 
Mary Scanlon 
Scottish Executive 
Civil Servant 
Scottish Executive 
Senior Civil Servant 
Labour MSP 
(January 2004) 
Director of Communications for Age Concern Scotland 
(March 2004) 
Director of Help the Aged Scotland 
(February 2004) 
Previously Minister for Health and Education 
(February 2004) 
Scottish Nationalist Party MSP 
(January 2004) 
Labour MSP 
(January 2004) 
First Minister 
(December 2003) 
Press Secretary to McLeish 
(December 2003) 
Special Advisor to McLeish -Head of Policy and Strategy 
(January 2004) 
Member of the Scottish Executive's Care Development 
Group 
(February 2004) 
Liberal Democrat MSP 
(December 2003) 
Liberal Democrat MSP and party's health spokesperson 
(February 2004) 
Scottish Nationalist Party MSP 
(December 2003) 
Conservative MSP and the party's health spokesperson 
(December 2003) 
Involved with older people policy 
(February 2004) 
Previously the head of a Scottish Executive department 
(February 2004) 
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Figure 2: Welsh Interviewees 
Sandra Burton 
June Clark 
Angharad Davies 
Glyn Davies 
Phil Davies 
Ron Davies 
Mark Drakeford 
Mike German 
Brian Gibbons 
Lila Haines 
Brian Hancock 
Jim Hancock 
David Ian Jones 
Dai Lloyd 
Ana Palazon 
Representative from Carers Wales 
(February 2003) 
Member of the Royal Commission on Long-Term care 
(June 2004) 
Representative from RCN Cymru 
(February 2003) 
Conservative AM 
(February 2003) 
Representative from Alzheimers Wales 
(February 2003) 
Labour AM 
(February 2003) 
Health policy advisor to the Welsh Assembly Government 
(June 2004) 
Leader of the Welsh Liberal Democrats 
(February 2003) 
Deputy Health Minister 
(February 2003 and June 2004) 
Plaid Cymru's Policy Director 
(June 2004) 
Plaid Cymru AM 
(February 2003) 
Regional Secretary for Wales Transport and General 
Union 
(February 2003) 
Conservative AM 
(February 2003) 
Plaid Cymru AM 
(February 2003 and June 2004) 
Director of Help the Aged in Wales 
(February 2003) 
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Alun Pugh 
David Melding 
Collete Morgan 
Sarah Stone 
Greg Walker 
Kirsty Williams 
Roz Williamson 
Welsh Assembly 
Government 
Civil Servant 
Welsh Assembly 
Government 
Civil Servant 
Wales Office 
Senior representative 
National Assembly 
Committee Clerk 
Labour AM 
(February 2003) 
Conservative AM 
(February 2003 and June 2004) 
Policy Officer for Care and Repair Cymru 
(February 2003) 
Political Officer for Age Concern Cymru 
(February 2003) 
Policy Officer for RCN Cymru 
(February 2003) 
Liberal Democrat AM and chair of the Health and Social 
Services Committee 
(February 2003) 
Manager of Carers Wales 
(February 2003) 
Helped to develop the Assembly Government's strategy 
for older people 
(June 2004) 
Worked in the health department 
(June 2004) 
(February 2003) 
Health and Social Services Committee 
(June 2004) 
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